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Abstract 
This study attempts to f i l l an important gap which exists in the literature on the People's 
Republic of China's foreign policy - China's relations with the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula countries. It provides a detailed description of China's policy towards the 
region from the time of the establishment of the PRC in late 1949 to the end of the 
twentieth century, by focusing on the factors that shaped China's foreign policy and its 
objectives. The researcher draws upon the neo-realist theory arguments and 
assumptions in explaining China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region, particularly the impact of external factors in shaping states' foreign 
policies. The major argument of the study is that two main factors have been most 
salient in shaping China's foreign policy towards the region. The first factor has been 
China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, which very much 
shaped China's foreign policy towards the region throughout most of the Cold War era. 
The second factor is China's drive to increase its economic capabihty by fostering 
strong economic ties with the countries of the region, particularly after becoming a net 
importer of oil in 1993. The researcher finds that these two factors have directed 
China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region throughout the 
first half-century of the PRC's interactions with the countries of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. 
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Chapter one: General elements and literature review 
1.1. Focus and purpose of the study 
This study focuses on the foreign policy of one of the most important and influential 
states in today's international system, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and 
attempts to assess its relations with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. The thesis 
identifies and explores different forces and variables which have impacted China's 
foreign policy behaviour towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region from the time 
of the establishment of the PRC in October 1949 until the end of the twentieth century. 
Its purpose is to establish and develop a comprehensive understanding of China's 
foreign policy behaviour towards the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region. Such an understanding is critical for analysts of China's foreign policy and 
policy makers, particularly in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, to explain and 
even predict China's behaviour towards the region. The study also aims at filling an 
important gap in the study of China's foreign policy. Most of the works on China's 
foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region deal with this area as part 
of the bigger picture of China's relations with either the Arab world or the Middle East. 
No separate study has dealt comprehensively with the issues of China's foreign 
relations with the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. This study is the 
first comprehensive attempt at exploring China's relations with the region during and 
after the Cold War. It covers China's political, economic, and social interactions with 
Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and 
Bahrain. 
1.2. Significance of the study 
The significance of this study derives from its aim to overcome the shortcomings 
pertaining to the study of China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian 
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Peninsula region. The literatures on China's foreign relations with the countries of the 
region do not cover China's relations with all the countries of this area. They instead 
focus their attention on studying China's foreign relations with some of the countries of 
the region in the context of its implications for China's relations with the rest. Abidi's 
study (1982), for example, focuses most of its attention on China's relations with Iran, 
leaving a small portion of his study to the discussion of China's relations with the other 
Gulf countries. Other studies, for example Yitzhak Shichor's (1979), John Calabrese's 
(1991), and Lillian Craig Harris's (1993) have studied China's foreign relations with the 
countries of the region in the context of China's foreign relations with the rest of the 
Middle East. Issues like China's relations with Egypt and China's policy towards the 
Palestine question are treated, along with China's relations with the United States and 
the Soviet Union, as the key issues in shaping China's foreign policy towards the 
countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. This thesis, however, is an attempt 
to provide the field with the first comprehensive study of China's foreign policy 
towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, covering China's interaction with all its 
countries during and after the Cold War. 
1.3. Why study China? 
China's economic and strategic weight at both the global and regional levels forms one 
of the most prominent elements in today's international politics. China's importance 
reflects two significant factors. The first is the sustained growth of the Chinese 
economy since 1979 and its implications for China's long-term economic and strategic 
power. The second is the increased political muscle and military capability of China 
and its continued transfer of advanced military technology to many parts of the world. 
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Since 1979 China has embarked upon one of the most successful economic 
modernisation programmes in the world. A programme that earned China a 9.3 percent 
average annual growth rate of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) between 1979 and 
1993, and 11.8 percent in 1994 and 9.8 percent in 1996. Such a growth was one of the 
highest in the world particularly since the rest of the world experienced a growth rate of 
just 2.6 percent for the same period. China's GDP increased 3.76-fold in just 15 years.' 
The World Bank has estimated that China's economic output will reach $10 trillion by 
the middle of the twenty first-century; and it is expected that China will become the 
world's largest economy, in terms of GDP, by 2010.^ Today, China's dynamic 
economy fetches the country more foreign investments than any other country in the 
world except the United States. The implications of the strong Chinese economy are 
said to be important for regional security. Gary Klintworth (1995) argues that the 
strong Chinese economy gives the Chinese a lucrative interest in the preservation of 
regional stability, which may help account for Beijing's contribution to resolving 
Cambodia's civil war and keeping the 1994 Korean crisis from escalating.^ Stuart 
Harris (1995) indicates that the world wants strong Chinese economy to prevent the 
dangers of internal instability and to deepen its participation in the world economy, 
potentially making China a more responsible international actor and a lucrative 
economic partner with its neighbours. Harris however argues that a strong economy 
could also provide China with the basis for immense political power, which Beijing 
' Fei-Ling Wang, 'To Incorporate China: A Policy for a New era', in The Global and Mail, vol. 21, no. 1, 
winter 1998, p. 68. 
^ B. Michael Frolic, 'Re-engaging China: Striking a Balance Between Trade and Human Rights', in 
Canada Among Nations 1997, Asia Pacific Face O f f , Carleton Public Policy Series no. 21, (Ottawa: 
Carleton University Press Inc, 1997), p. 324. 
^ Gary Klintworth, 'China Evolving relationship with APEC, International Journal, vol. 50, no. 3, 
summer 1995, p. 488. 
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might use to force its own interests upon its neighbours."^ In either case, China's 
regional and global significance will be enhanced as the Chinese economy continues to 
grow in an impressive manner. 
However, it is not only the economic modernisation that has created an important role 
for China in today's international system, but also China's increasing military 
capabilities and its continuing political and military co-operation with many countries in 
the world. China is not only a nuclear power but also a power possessing some of the 
world's most advanced military technologies and military dominance over many of its 
Asian neighbours. It is working to enhance and increase its military capabilities by 
developing a modern tactical aircraft fleet including the acquisition of the Russian Su-
27, the FC-1 light fighter, the F-10 multi role fighter, the advanced XXJ fighter, the F-8 
I I M interceptor, and the FB-7 striker.^ It is also developing much more accurate 
ballistic and cruise missiles. In addition, China is increasing its naval offensive 
capability by purchasing two Russian Sovermenyi-Class missile destroyers and four 
Russian Kilo-Class conventional submarines, as well as developing its own nuclear 
powered boats.^ Such an increase in China's military capabilities has been coupled with 
a rise in Chinese military technology exports to many parts of the world including the 
Middle East. China has emerged as one of the world's major suppliers of military 
hardware. According to the SIPRI, China became the sixth leading supplier of major 
conventional weapons in the nineties. The value of China's military exports was around 
Stuart Harris, 'The Economic Aspects of Security in the Asia-Pacific Region', in Journal of Strategic 
Studies, vol. 18, no. 3, September 1995, p. 37. 
Joseph C. Anselmo, 'China's Military Seeks Great Leap Forward', in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, vol. 146, no. 20, 12 May 1997, p. 324. 
^ H. A. Hynes, 'China: The Emerging Superpower', in <http//:cfcsc.dnd.ca/irc/nh/nh9798/0046.html>, 
pp. 1-13. 
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$4,357 million from 1992 to 1996.^  China sees its military co-operation with countries 
like Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Libya, some of the Middle Eastern 
countries that China has provided military technology to, as both a source of hard 
currency and an opportunity for Beijing's foreign policy to score some political and 
strategic points. The international concerns over Chinese military transfer is prompted 
not just by China becoming one of the leading arms exporters in the world, but by the 
type of countries that China is providing weaponry technology to. Most of the countries 
that China is believed to have supplied arms technology to are countries perceived by 
the West as dangerous to regional and world stability and supportive of terrorist 
activities. This therefore has upgraded China's importance to the West as well. Its co-
operation with the West in halting its military transfer to such countries is considered a 
vital Western interest. 
China's geography, population, and political weight in the international arena have also 
contributed to the rising of China's role in the international system. China is a vast 
country with 9.6 million square kilometres, next only to Russia and Canada. Its land 
border is 22,800 kilometres, and is bordered by fifteen different countries. Across the 
seas to the east and the southeast are South Korea, lapan, the Philippines, Brunei, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia. One of the most important features of China's geography has 
been the application of its military power securing and ensuring the stability in its 
border areas. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (1999) argue that small 
neighbours, like South Korea, will reconcile to reduce the threat and benefit from co-
operation; on the other hand, other countries, like Japan and India, might pursue an 
^ SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armament, Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), p. 268. 
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aggressive strategy in an attempt to balance against China.^ Both Japan and India are 
countries that China has continued to have territorial and border disputes with. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, China's rising military power has triggered a similar response in 
these two countries to increase their own military capabilities. Japan began to expand 
its military spending and work to advocate the implementation of a national missile 
defence theatre. India on the other hand started to build up its own military capability 
by becoming a nuclear power.^ 
China is the world's most populous nation where over 1.2 billion people, 22 percent of 
the world's population, lives (excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and M a c a o ) . I t is 
predicted that China's population will reach 1.63 billion in the year 2030 (including 
Hong Kong and Macao).'' The political weight of the large Chinese population is 
believed to be one of the most important factors to be felt not only in regional terms but 
also internationally. According to Lester Brown (1995) China's arable land will 
dwindle greatly in the process of industrialisation. This will lead to a decrease in 
China's self-reliance in food supply, which, according to his calculation, will cause a 
world-wide food crisis in the coming century.'^ Scot Stevenson (1998) highlights this 
point by arguing that i f the continuing growth of China's population is not matched with 
an increase in the welfare of the people, massive population movements from China to 
^ Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, 'Conclusion', in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, 
Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, (New York: Routledge, 1999), p. 283. 
'•^  See Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, 
(New York: Perennial, 1999). 
'° Robert Benewick and Stephanie Donald, The State of China Atlas, (London: Penguin Books Limited, 
1999), pp. 11-17. 
" Lester R. Brown, Who Will Feed China? , (New York; W. W. Norton and Co., 1995). 
'2 Ibid. 
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the neighbouring countries could threaten the region. This would clearly spell large 
political, economic, and social problems for the neighbouring countries in particular and 
for the security of the region in general.'"^ Some have even indicated that the continuing 
growth of China's population could force China to adopt a more aggressive policy and 
push towards the new territories and natural resources of Central Asia.^ "^  It is not 
surprising then to witness Japan, South Korea, Singapore, America, and Southeast 
Asian countries pursuing an engaging economic policy with China. It can also be said 
that the sixty million wealthy overseas ethnic-Chinese who occupy key economic 
positions in many Southeast Asian countries have also raised China's importance. 
Steven W. Mosher (2000) has raised the dangers to the Far East of China using its 
overseas ethnic population to re-establish its regional hegemony. To Mosher, the 
increased numbers and role of the ethnic Chinese populations in many countries of Asia 
could encourage China to redraw its borders and set new claims over new territories, 
and could also lead China to justify its intervention in the internal affairs of many 
countries of the region.' 
A l l of the above widespread international certainty over how current states' policies 
towards China should reflect long-term national and multilateral responses to the rise of 
Chinese influence and power. A constructive type of engagement has been adopted by 
many countries of the world in their relations with China. The goal of this strategy has 
Scot Stevenson, 'China's Population: a Dilemma for the Future', in Journal of Southeast Asia, vol. 1, 
no. 1, summer 1998, pp. 12-30; see also Jack A. Goldstone, 'The Coming Chinese Collapse', in Foreign 
Policy, no 99, summer 1995, pp. 35-52. 
See for example Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 'Geopolitics Beckons: Hydrocarbons and the Politics of the 
Persian Gulf , in Al i Mohammadi and Anoushiravan Ehteshami [eds.], Iran and Eurasia, (Reading: 
Garnet Publishing Limited, 2000), p. 108. 
'"^  Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World, (San Francisco: 
Encounter Books, 2000), pp. 106-107. 
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been to make China's leaders more sensitive to regional and international security and 
political concerns through dialogue and peaceful discussion. 
1.4. Literature survey 
There is a wide range of literature examining and analysing different aspects of China's 
foreign poUcy. Two major schools of thought have dominated the study of China's 
foreign policy. One school has argued for the internal factor as the most dominant 
factor in shaping China's foreign policy. The other school has focused on China's 
rivalry with both the United States and the Soviet Union as its motivating factor. This 
school argues that China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union 
have been the pre-eminent factors in shaping China's foreign pohcy towards the world. 
Since the former is discussed in greater detail in chapter two, the latter will be the focus 
here. 
Some of the Chinese foreign policy strategies have been regarded by the scholars as a 
natural result of Beijing's perception of its relations with Washington and Moscow. 
The 'two camps' theory and the 'leaning to one side' policy of the early fifties, for 
instance, both are widely accepted to be products of China's perception of superpower 
behaviour during that period. Chun-tu Hsueh and Robert C. North (1977) argue that 
these two Chinese foreign policies had been derived from the policies of both the 
United States and the Soviet Union towards China in the fifties. They believe that 
Washington's criticism of communist government in China and Washington's 
unprecedented support for the nationalist government in Taiwan pushed China towards 
Chapter one: General elements and literature review 
adopting the two foreign policy strategies.'^ Similar argument is also made by Michael 
H. Hunt (1996). Hunt indicates that Mao was flexible and opportunistic in his handling 
of China's foreign policy. Mao, according to Hunt, was willing to reach a deal with 
Washington before the adoption of these two foreign policies. However, it was 
American rigidity that prevented accommodation, which at the end led China to adopt 
the hostile foreign policies of leaning to one side and the two camps. 
China's perception of its relations with the two superpowers was also reflected in the 
literature studying the changes in Chinese foreign policy in the late fifties and early 
sixties with the growing political and ideological disputes between Beijing and 
Moscow. As China began to look to the Third World countries as potential allies in the 
struggle against imperialism, particularly following the Bandung Conference, China-
Soviet relations started to deteriorate. Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong (1998) contribute 
the tension in the two countries' relations to Khrushchev's secret speech of February 
1956 in which he attacked Stalin's policy. To them, China's foreign policy towards the 
world had shifted following Khrushchev's attack on Stalin from pursuing alignment 
with the Soviet Union towards challenging the Soviets throughout the Third World. 
Donald S. Zagoria (1962) contributes the differences between Beijing and Moscow to 
the risk calculations that could be assumed in protecting and supporting local 
revolutionary movements. While Moscow accused the Chinese of minimising the 
Chun-tu Hsueh and Robert C. North, 'Peking's Perceptions of Soviet-American Relations', in Chun-tu 
Hsueh [ed.]. Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1977), pp. 49-53. 
' M i c h a e l H. Hunt, The Genesis of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, (Columbia University Press, 
1996). 
Chen Jian and Yang Kuison, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Odd 
Arne Westad [ed.]. Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 259-266. 
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dangers of all-out nuclear war, the Chinese accused the Russians of exaggerating those 
dangers.'^ The result was the failure of the Chinese-Soviet alliance which was marked 
by extensive border clashes and d i spu tes .Th i s development in Chinese-Soviet 
relations was perceived by many international relations analysts to have a profound 
impact on the direction of China's foreign policy. Peter Van Ness (1970) argues that 
China after the collapse of its alliance with the Soviet Union began to use its support for 
revolutionary movements as an instrument of its foreign policy throughout the Third 
World. Challenging, therefore, the Soviet presence and influence there.^' Tai Sung An 
(1976) believes that the deterioration in China-Soviet relations urged Chinese foreign 
policy makers to adopt countermeasures to spoil soviet efforts in Asia, Europe, Latin 
America and Africa by seeking a 'united front'. The United States was not out of this 
new Chinese foreign policy. The shift in China's foreign policy towards Washington in 
the late sixties and early seventies was seen by many as part of both Beijing and 
Washington's efforts to undermine Soviet policy in Asia, Europe and in other regions. 
Jonathan D. Pollack (1991) finds that the opening of China to the United States 
'reflected longer-term strategic developments that directly affected Beijing's security 
calculation' .Among these developments was 'the increase in Soviet conventional and 
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1962). 
See Dennis J. Doolin, Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: Documents and Analysis, (The 
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace: Stanford University, 1965). 
^' Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking Support for Wars of National 
Liberation, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). 
"^ Tai Sung An, The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 
160-161. 
Jonathan D. Pollack, The Opening to America', in Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank [eds.], 
The Cambridge History of China, volume 15, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 404. 
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nuclear forces deployed in Asia that posed a direct threat to the security of China'.^ "^ 
Such an analysis continued to dominate China's foreign policy towards the two powers 
in the 1970s.^ '^  With regard to China's relations with the United States, John W. Garver 
(1993) argues that the new Chinese policy originated in the ancient Chinese strategy of 
'using barbarian to control barbarians'. According to Garver, China was aiming to 
divide the superpowers by improving relations with the United States, then use the 
strength of the United States to offset that of the Soviet Union. Garver, in my opinion, 
is right when he indicates that China was aiming by developing relations with the 
United States to use Washington to undermine Moscow's policies throughout the world. 
Yet, his assumption that China was also hoping to divide the superpowers is not 
substantiated. It is true that China might have feared the possibility of collaboration 
between the two superpowers against Beijing. But both Washington and Moscow were 
already divided over many ideological and political issues and China was not their 
ultimate concern. Their concerns however were centred around the uncertainty over 
what each of them would do next to undermine the other. 
Robert G. Sutter (1978) sees China's need to use Chinese-American rapprochement to 
offset the Soviet pressure on China as the main factor which led Beijing to pursue a new 
foreign policy. He argues that the outbreak of Sino-Soviet border clashes in late 1960s 
and the American pullback from Asia had urged China to improve relations with the 
United States and its allies around the world. The Chinese, on one hand, saw the 
American pullback from Asia as solid evidence of Washington's interest in improved 
^'^Ibid. 
25 Ibid., pp. 402-407. 
John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1993), pp. 74-76. 
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relations with Beijing and the abolition of its containment policy. The change in 
China's foreign policy was evident in the adoption of a flexible policy towards Eastern 
Europe. The aim was to turn Soviet bloc discontent with Moscow to China's 
advantage. China also focused its attention on strengthening its influence in key 
neighbouring countries and on blocking suspected Soviet initiatives there. In North 
Vietnam, China began to overlook its past series differences with the North Vietnamese, 
adopting more amicable attitude towards their communist neighbour. In North Korea, 
China continued its efforts to demonstrate its solidarity with Pyongyang.^^ Harry 
Harding (1992) talks about the rationale in the continuing of the strategic relationship 
between Beijing and Washington. He views Chinese-American strategic relations as an 
important counterweight to Soviet power in Asia which could have helped promote a 
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the removal of Vietnamese forces from 
Cambodia.^^ Jonathan D. Pollack (1984) argues that the continued improvement in 
Chinese-American relations at the end of the 1970s was based not only on the Chinese 
anxieties about Soviet political and military encirclement, but also on the ascendance of 
Deng Xiaoping who was prepared to cement ties with the West. Deng was hoping to 
29 
receive some vital assistance for China's modernisation effort. 
However, the literature on China's foreign policy in the 1980s started to play down the 
impact of China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union on China's 
foreign policy. New variables, like modernisation, have been seen as the dominant 
Robert G. Sutter, China-Watch: Toward Sino-American Reconciliation, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), pp. 63-102. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relatic 
The Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 162-169. 
Jonathan D. Pollack, 'China and the Glo 
Foreign Relations in the 1980s, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 146-169. 
l tionship: The United States and China since 1972, (Washington D.C.: 
bal Strategic Balance', in Harry Harding [ed.], China's 
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factors in determining China's foreign p o l i c y . Y e t in the 1990s another school of 
thought began to see China's foreign policy as being driven by its ambitions to emerge 
as a powerful state that will dominate regional and to some extent international affairs. 
Two main developments in China ignited the profusion of the 'China threat' literature. 
First was the increase in China's military capability compared with the East and South 
East Asian countries, and its continuing military co-operation with many unfriendly 
Third World countries to the West. Second was the rapid rise in China's economic 
power and the advanced technological investments by Western companies in China. 
The main assumption of the 'China threat' thesis could be traced to the general finding 
of Samuel P. Huntington's work The Clash of Civilisation: Remaking of World Order 
(1996). In this and some other earlier works, Huntington underlined how the Chinese 
civilisation presented a challenge to Western civilisation. He believes that in the post-
Cold War era, the ideological conflict has been replaced by a conflict of civilisations, 
which has become the root of international conflicts and wars. He has also said that the 
primary adversary of Western civilisation is Islam and Confucianism, which have 
formed a coalition challenging Western values, interests and power." '^ While 
Huntington's argument provoked a great deal of controversy among Chinese officials 
and intellectuals who criticised him 'for ignorance of and bias against Chinese culture'^" 
many Western scholars have adopted this argument in explaining China's foreign 
policy. The work of Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 'The Coming Conflict with 
America' (1997), is one of them. Bernstein and Munro argue that the Chinese 
The impact of these variables is discussed in the next chapter. 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clashes of Civilisations: Remaking of World Order, (New York: 
Touchstone, 1996). 
Wang Zhongren, ' "China Threat" Theory Groundless', in Beijing Review, volume 40, no. 28, July 14-
20, 1997, pp. 7-8. 
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leadership since the late 1980s has taken an offensive national policy, which is contrary 
to American interests and aims to replace the United States as the dominant power in 
Asia. China since then, according to Bernstein and Munro, has come to see Washington 
not as a strategic partner but as the chief obstacle to its own strategic ambitions. 
Therefore, it has worked to reduce American influence in Asia, to prevent Tokyo and 
Washington from containing China, to build up its military capabihty, and to expand its 
influence in the region's essential sea-lanes.In a later work, Bernstein and Munro 
(1998) argue that China's policy towards the United State is focusing on using 
Washington for achieving China's goals; meanwhile the United States policy towards 
China is not guided by a clear and firm sense of American national interests. In their 
opinion, the United States' military, economic, and political engagements with China 
are serving Beijing's national interests more than that of Washington's. They 
encourage Washington to adopt a clear policy that outhnes the need to prevent China 
from becoming the hostile hegemon that could interfere with the American pursuit of its 
interests in Asia."^ "^  Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett 11 (1998) agree, 
indicating that China is the only foreign country currently targeting American cities for 
nuclear destruction. They criticise the Clinton administration for selling out America's 
national security by co-operating with Beijing militarily and allowing the Chinese 
government to influence American politics by raising campaign cash."^ ^ In a later work, 
Timperlake and Triplett argue that China, armed with the most modern weapons of 
mass destruction, is the only regime in the world that poses a greater threat to global 
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 'The Coming Conflict with America', in Foreign Affairs, vol. 
76, no. 2, March/April 1997, pp. 18-32. 
'^^  Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China, (New York: Vintage Books, 
1998), pp. 203-221. 
See Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett I I , Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised 
U.S. Security for Chinese Cash, (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1998). 
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security. To Timerlake and Triplett, China is an expanding regional power poised to 
dominate the Pacific by challenging the United States and its allies in the region. The 
increasing capability of its military, the continuing supply of arms technology to 
'terrorist countries', and the growing Chinese forces in the South China Sea, and the 
continuing threat to Taiwan have been directed by China's foreign policy objective to 
dominate the region and relinquish American influence there.^ ^ Steven W. Mosher 
(2000) goes further and claims that China is a hegemonic power aiming to dominate the 
world. According to Mosher, Its appetite for domination is embedded in its long 
history, with its origin in Qin dynasty, the hegemon's appetite for dominance grew 
century after century until, by the time of the Qing dynasty in the 18^*^  century, China 
held control of a vast territory stretching from today's Siberia, southward along the 
Himalayas to the Indian Ocean, and eastward across Laos and Vietnam. China's 
dominance, however, declined in the 19'*^  century when it came into conflict with the 
Western powers. But, according to Mosher, China's hegemonic spirit reawakened after 
the Communists seized control of the country and the new 'Mao dynasty' was created. 
Mosher believes that China's quest for domination will develop in three stages: first, 
China will begin with recovering Taiwan and then the small reclaimed islands in the 
South China Sea; second, China will move towards establishing a strong influence in 
Siberia, Mongolia, and the Central Asian republics. Then China will continue to assert 
its position in the Korean Peninsula and in the southeast Asian countries. Thirdly, 
China will work to complete its regional domination by bringing the Philippines and 
See Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett I I , Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's military 
Threat to America, (Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999). 
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Indonesia under its sway. It will neutralise India and extend its reach into the Middle 
East and Africa.'^ "^ 
To some extent all of the above arguments about 'China's threat' and its foreign policy 
have some validity in them. China's foreign policy towards the Asian countries has 
reflected China's interest in preventing the emergence of a dominant power in Asia. 
China carries a foreign policy that criticises Japan's military development and its efforts 
to establish a national defence missile system, supports the Communist regimes in 
North Korea and Laos, sells arms technology to Pakistan, uses military force to control 
the disputed territories in the South China Sea, works to establish political and 
economic influence in the Central Asia republics, and continues to criticise U.S. support 
of the Taiwanese regime. Al l these foreign policy strategies suggest that China is 
hoping to achieve political and military influence for itself in the region. However, the 
assumption that China is increasing its efforts to challenge or undermine the American 
presence in Asia is not quite clear. Other than the U.S. involvement in Taiwan, the 
Chinese leadership seems to have accepted the American presence in the region. The 
American military presence in Japan, for instance, is China's best current alternative to 
keep Japan from pushing for building a nuclear capability and, therefore, dominating the 
region as it did in the past. China also, at least, is not doing any harm to the U.S. efforts 
to bring a peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, China's foreign 
policy towards Asia might have been driven by China's ambition to dominate the region 
but its perceived challenge by the above literature to the American interest in the region 
is not accurate. 
Steven W. Mosher, Hegemon: China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World, pp. 97-116. 
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The literature on China's relations with the countries of the Middle East tend to study 
the origin and evolution of China's foreign policy towards these countries in the context 
of China's relations with the superpowers. This rivalry, mentioned earlier, between 
China and the two superpowers constitutes the basic background for the literature 
studying China's relations with the countries of the Middle East. 
Yitzhak Shichor is the first scholar to study in depth the PRC's relations with the 
countries of the Middle East. His study discusses the evolution of China's foreign 
policy towards the Middle East in its first 38 years of development. Shichor's basic 
assumption is that the Middle East had always been important to China 'as a part of the 
general historical development of the world which affected and involved China's 
interests'."^^ Shichor asserts that China's policy towards the Middle East had been a 
reflection of China's own perception of its relations with the United States and the 
Soviet Union and both superpowers' relations with each other. His division of his work 
to five subjects illustrates that China's policy towards the Middle East from 1949 to 
1977 reflected China's relations with both the great powers. He argues in his first 
chapter that the origin of Communist China's Middle East policy can be found in the 
early 1940s, long before the Bandung Conference or the establishment of the PRC. In 
his view, the Chinese Communist leaders realised in the early 1940s the strategic 
importance of the Middle East to the country's future. They believed that the 
domination of the Middle East by a hostile power, like Germany, would lead to the 
collapse of British presence there, which would clear the way for the new dominant to 
Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979), p. 1. 
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seek domination in Asia and therefore China. However, China remained isolated 
politically from the region. Despite Israel's recognition of the PRC in the early 1950s, 
diplomatic relations was not established between them. Shichor contributes the absence 
of diplomatic relations between China and Israel at that time to the Israeli government's 
refusal to foster diplomatic relations with C h i n a . H e , however, does not give a clear 
explanation as to why the Israeli government refused to establish diplomatic relations 
with the newly established Communist regime in China. His only explanation is 
directed towards the following Israeli official response: 'the Government had decided in 
principle to establish diplomatic relations with People's China, but nothing should be 
done in this direction until the situation in the Far East becomes clear' ."^ ^ He does not 
explain what part of the situation in the Far East in 1950 prevented Israel from 
establishing formal relations with China, or who was willing to do so. China's relations 
with the Arab countries in the mid-1950s began to draw more positive results however. 
Despite the absence of diplomatic relations, economic and cultural relations were 
China's first tactic towards fostering relations with countries of the Middle East. This 
was coupled with China playing an important indirect role in producing the first major 
arms deal between Moscow and Cairo in 1955."^ ' In May 1956 Egypt became the first 
Middle Eastern country to establish diplomatic relations with China. Cairo's decision 
was said to be directed by Nasser's belief that China could play the role of an 
independent source of arms. Syria and Yemen followed suit in July and August 1956 
respectively. Shichor sees China's policy towards the Middle East in the late 1950 as 
being directed towards the struggle against Western imperialism and to undermine its 
Ibid., pp. 9-22. 
^° Ibid., p. 23. 
^' Ibid., pp. 41-42. 
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presence in the region. China's foreign policy became more militant. But as China's 
ideological rhetoric found little sympathy in the Arab world, China turned to support the 
'people's war' idea in the most revolutionary areas of the Middle East."^ ^ But as China's 
relations with the Soviet Union began to seriously deteriorate in the 1960s, China used 
the Middle East to wage its struggle against American imperialism and Soviet 
revisionism. Shichor says that China in the first half of the 1960s did almost everything 
it could to please the Arab governments in order to relinquish the American and the 
Soviet influence there. China however did not succeed. From 1966 onwards China's 
foreign policy became more oriented towards the national liberation movements which 
were still committed to the struggle against imperialism and, by implication, against 
Soviet revisionism as well. According to Shichor, China's perception of the Middle 
East changed in the 1970s as its perception of its relations with Washington and 
Moscow changed. China became more pragmatic in its relations with the countries of 
the Middle East, supporting most of their policies and abolishing it revolutionary 
propaganda.^ "^  
Like Shichor, John Calabrese has produced an insightful book on China-Middle East 
relations. His China's Changing Relations with the Middle East (1991) has mapped the 
changes and continuities in the first forty years of the PRC relations with the Middle 
East. Calabrese sees China's Middle East policy as reflecting the changes and shifts in 
Chinese foreign policy as a whole. Calabrese's discussion echoes Shichor's central 
thesis that China's Middle East policy can best be understood as a reaction to global 
events that were dominated by the superpowers, rather than to indigenous conflicts in 
Ibid., p. 97. 
Ibid., p. 145-1! 
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the region. The book provides analysis of China's changing perceptions of, and 
relations with Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Israel, and the PLO. 
Calabrese explores these relations in a chronological narrative format, describing 
China's foreign policy towards the Middle East in seven different development phases. 
Phase one is China's 'leaning to one side' policy of 1950-1957. China's policy towards 
the region in this phase, according to Calabrese, was determined by China's hostility 
towards the United States and its strategic alignment with the Soviet Union. Therefore, 
China adopted a 'tactically flexible approach' in its relations with the countries of the 
Middle East in this phase. Most notable of this approach was the adoption of a more 
flexible and pragmatic tone, instead of showing a more ideological rigidity, during the 
Bandung meetings."^ "^  In phase two, one becomes aware of the cost of militancy in 
China's Middle East policy from 1958 to 1965. Calabrese argues that China's dispute 
with the Soviet Union over the later 'weak' responses to the Western intervention in the 
Middle East, namely in Lebanon and Jordan, during that period generated divergence in 
Beijing's and Moscow's policies in the region. While relations with Egypt stumbled 
upon difficulties, China moved to foster closer ties with the newly established regime of 
Qasim in Iraq. But relations did not last long and China once again found itself 
isolated, except in its relations with the Palestinians, from advocating struggle against 
imperialism in the region. Calabrese concludes that China during this period did not 
achieve its goal of reducing Western predominance in the region. In phase three 1966-
1968, China's foreign policy towards the region changes from advocating a united front 
with the countries of the region to narrowing the front to the liberation and 
revolutionary movements of the region, mainly the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, (New York: Printer Publisher, 
1991), pp. 7-14. 
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(PLO) and the Dhofari rebels. He concludes that China was successful in building 
credit among them that could pay future dividends in the event of their victory; but on 
the other hand, China failed to achieve a lasting influence in its relations with the PLO, 
and it further worsened its relations with the governments of the region. In phase four 
1969-1971, he finds that China's perception of the Soviet threat to the region prompted 
China to begin adopting a more pragmatic foreign policy in regard to its relations with 
the countries of the Middle East. In phase five 1972-1977, the new pragmatic foreign 
policy reaches its peak. During this period, China classified the Soviet Union as 
China's primary enemy. China believed that the balance between Washington and 
Moscow was in Moscow's favour. Therefore, China pushed for closer ties with 
Washington and the governments of the region. In phase six (1978-1981), 
modernisation became the central objective of Chinese foreign policy and international 
stability became the essential pre-requisite for its successful pursuit. For its oil and 
markets the Middle East was part of China's modernisation efforts. In the last phase 
(1982-1989), Calabrese indicates that China's foreign policy in the Middle East was 
shaped by its general aim of carving an independent foreign policy, which meant paying 
close attention to the superpower rivalry without close alignment with them. China's 
main aim in the region in this phase was to compete with the Soviet Union for market 
and political influence. China's foreign poUcy concentrated its efforts to promote and 
protect its political and economic relations with the countries of the region. 
Calabrese's work is very useful for it provides a clear analysis of China- Middle Eastern 
relations in the first forty years of interactions. Calabrese's study, however, lacks 
details about many aspects of China's foreign pohcy towards the Middle East. Take, 
for example, the Front Liberation National of Algeria (FLNA); China supported the 
FLNA in its struggle for liberation from France. It also, unlike Moscow, recognised the 
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Provisional Government of the Republic of Algeria in September 1958, and criticised 
Moscow's support for the French position to achieve a cease-fire in Algeria."^^ By 1960, 
China provided the Algerians credit estimated at $10 million for the purchase of 
military equipment and other supplies."^ ^ It also provided Algeria with economic 
assistance worth $126.9 million ranging from donations, loans, and small and large-
scale industrial and social construction projects between 1956 to 1977."^ ^ Al l of this 
demonstrates that Algeria was an important part of China's foreign policy towards the 
region. Yet, both Shichor's and Calabrese's works do not discuss in any detail the 
objectives and implications of China's involvement in Algeria. 
On the other hand, Calabrese's last phase could also be used to explain China's relations 
with the Middle East in the post-Cold War era. China's policy towards the region in the 
post-Cold War era is driven not by China's rivalry with Washington and Moscow but 
by China's efforts to increase its economic contacts with the Middle East and to 
establish political influence there. The Middle East presents China with a potential 
market for Chinese civilian and military goods. It is also a place where China could co-
operate with a country like Israel in developing some advanced military technologies. 
Hashim S. H. Behbehani's China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975 (1981) 
presents three case-based analyses of China's foreign policy towards the Palestinian 
resistance movement, the liberation movement in Oman, and Kuwait. Like Shichor and 
See Peking Review, no, 43, 25 October 1963, pp. 7-14; and Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet 
Conflict, pp. 272-273. 
Alba Ogunsanwo, China's policy in Africa 1958-71, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 
pp. 52-53. 
Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of the PR China to developing and Socialist Countries, (London: 
K.G. Saur, 1989), p. 37. 
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Calabrese, Behbehani's work illustrates the changes that took place in China's policy 
towards the Arab world during the 1950s, 1960, and the 1970s. These changes were 
perceived to have been dictated by China's perception of the world as a whole and its 
national interest at each stage, and not specifically by the conditions present in the case 
studies. His study is the only work that discusses in great detail the evolution and the 
development of China's support for the Palestinian and other revolutionary movements 
in the Gulf, mainly in Oman, and the different variables involved in the development of 
China's relations with Kuwait. Based on these three cases, Behbehani argues that the 
changes that occurred in China's policy towards the Arab world in the period from 1955 
to 1977 was a result of China's desire to f i l l a gap and achieve a leadership status in the 
Third World. Throughout the 1950s China's foreign policy towards the Arab world 
followed the Soviet Union's policies in the region. In the 1960s, China began to 
compete with the Soviet Union for influence in the Third World. China's remedy for 
the Third World countries was to use armed struggle, which China itself followed in 
order to achieve independence. The Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) and the 
Dhofar Liberation Front, known later as the Popular Front for the Liberation of the 
Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), provided a great opportunity for China to achieve 
its political and strategic goals in the region. According to Behbehani, China provided 
the two movements with military aid and encouraged a 'people's war'. But China's 
changing policy in the early 1970s contributed to the withdrawal of support to the 
PFLOAG and directly led to the weakening of the movement. He emphasises that the 
changes in China-PFLOAG relations were not due to the latter's failure on the ground. 
The PFLOAG consistently adhered to the Chinese political and ideological lines, but 
China's changing policy of gaining a foothold in the Gulf through existing regimes 
contributed to the abandonment of its support to the PFLOAG in favour of establishing 
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relations with Iran and Kuwait. On the other side, China supported the PRM and 
provided military assistance to Fatah. Yet, Behbehani argues that the changes in 
China's foreign policy in the 1970s did not lead to the decline in China's support for 
Fatah. He explains the decline in Chinese interest to the improved Soviet-Fatah 
relations in the 1970s. He makes the point that the changes in China's policy towards 
both the PFLOAG and Fatah, and the effort towards improving relations with Kuwait 
had been led by the changes in China's foreign pohcy towards the two superpowers, 
most specifically by the adoption of its anti-Soviet policy."^^ This finding is not 
something new. Shichor's work (1979) had already discussed the role played by the 
changing Chinese policy towards the Soviet Union in the early 1970s and its 
implications for China's foreign policy towards the region. But the depth of the detail 
provided in Behbehani's work makes it a valuable source on China's relations with the 
liberation movements in the Middle East. 
Lillian Craig Harris's China Considers the Middle East (1993) discusses both 
traditional and modern Chinese relations with the Middle East, paying sufficient 
attention to the historical origins of that relationship. According to Harris, the historical 
contacts between China and the Middle East go over two thousand years. China used 
the Middle East as both a barrier and bridge between China and Europe. Both sides 
enjoyed commercial benefits from the trade relations which were conducted through the 
Silk Road. The road also enhanced China's cultural relations with the Middle East. But 
Harris argues that the breaching of the barrier between China and Europe by the 
Mongols, which had led to the European incursion, yielded a decline in China's 
Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World 1955-1975: Three Cases Studies, 
(London: KPI, 1981). 
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relations with the Middle East. In the Republic era (1912-1949) China's relations with 
the Middle East were very limited. Trade relations reached its lowest level due to the 
termination of the role played by the Silk Road. But, Islam provided the only 
significant medium of exchange with the Middle East. Harris then turns to discuss 
China's foreign relations with the Middle East in the post-1949 era. According to 
Harris, China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to the 
direction of China's foreign policy towards the Middle East. Harris argues that 
Bandung was the starting opportunity for China to rebuild the bridges with the Middle 
East. It achieved some political gains, but on the whole failed to achieve its goal of 
presenting itself as a revolutionary model to the governments of the region. Instead, it 
moved towards supporting armed struggles in Algeria, South Yemen, Eritrea, Dhofar, 
and Palestine. The continuing deterioration in Chinese-Soviet relations in the seventies 
brought China closer to the governments of the Middle East than any other time 
previously. China used Islam and trade relations to foster closer ties with the countries 
of the Middle East. Harris argues that in the eighties, the Middle East had emerged as a 
major component in China's economic modernisation."^^ According to Harris, China's 
concerns in the post-Cold War era centred on the growing instability in both the Middle 
East and Central Asia."''*^  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait put at risk China's valued 
economic relations in the region. China, therefore, adopted new foreign policy tactics in 
order to rebuild closer relations in the region. Strengthening ties with Iran and Pakistan, 
selling arms to the region, establishing ties with Israel are some of the new Chinese 
tactics. Harris concludes that 'China had won out over the Soviets in the Middle East'^' 
Liilian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East, (New York: I . B. Tauris, 1993). 
Ibid., 245. 
" Ibid., p. 266. 
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in the post-Cold War era. She sees China's place in the Middle East and Central Asia to 
have been boosted by the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This argument, however, 
remained unclear. The disintegration of the Soviet Union did elevate China's role in 
Central Asia. China's efforts to establish ties with the new Central Asian states 
following the fall of the Soviet empire could be traced to China's hope to f i l l the power 
vacuum there. Yet, in the Middle East the disintegration of the Soviet Union did not 
enhance China's role in the region. For one, Russian military co-operation with the 
countries of the Middle East and its arms sales in the 1990s were much higher than that 
of China. Even Moscow's involvement in the Middle East peace process is more 
noticeable than Beijing's. Thus, it is not clear how the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union affected China's position in the Middle East. 
A.H.H. Abidi's China, Iran, and the Persian GM//(1982) is the only work that focuses 
its attention on the relations between China and the countries of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. Although much of Abidi's work focuses on Chinese-Iranian relations, 
China's relations with the other countries of the Gulf are also discussed. Abidi's study 
identifies the historical, international, and domestic forces that brought China and Iran 
into a logical partnership. The work includes informative chapters on Iran's recognition 
of China in the early 1970s and the relations before and during the Iranian revolution as 
well as the way the Chinese sought to maintain relations with the Islamic Republic. 
Though not comprehensively, China's relations with Iraq, the Yemens, Kuwait, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain have also been discussed. His justification 
for his focus on Iran stems from his understanding that Iran claimed more attention 
from China than any other littoral state of the Gulf. In addition to that, Iran's special 
position in the Gulf because of its size, geo-strategic location, resources, and regime 
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orientation marked its importance in China's foreign policy. According to Abidi, the 
1960s presented China with the first real opportunity to assess its policy in the region. 
Iran began to reassess its attitude towards China and Kuwait gained independence. Yet, 
no breakthrough in the relations between China and the countries of the region emerged 
in the sixties. This was mainly due to China's support for the revolutionary movements 
in the region. But the changes in China's perceptions of the superpowers in the late 
1960s and early 1970s led China to foster political, economic, and social relations with 
Kuwait, Iran, and Oman. In the name of preserving stability in the region and 
preventing the Soviets from advancing in the region, China offered recognition 
unilaterally to Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE.^^ 
Al l of the above works on Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East tends to 
study such relations in terms of the relations between China and the two superpowers. 
Yet the work edited by P. R. Kumaraswamy (1999) discusses China's relations with 
some of the countries of the Middle East in terms of China's quest for influence rather 
than challenging the two superpowers. Kumaraswamy's article in the book argues that 
China's recognition of Israel in 1992 is viewed by the Chinese leadership as a stepping 
stone to Western technology. He also argues that China is hoping that its defence co-
operation with both Israel and its adversaries will give it the necessary political 
influence to play an active role in Middle East politics in the future.^^ Meanwhile, 
William H. Haddad and Mary Foeldi-Hardy furthered this argument by indicating that 
China's relations with the Palestinians in the 1990s took a new turn from its old 
A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1982). 
P. R. Kumaraswamy, 'China and Israel: Normalisation and After', in P. R. Kumaraswamy [ed.], China 
and the Middle East: The Quest for Influence, (London: Sage Publications, 1999), pp. 20-41. 
Chapter one: General elements and literature review 28 
supportive policy of the Palestinians. China's interest in becoming a business partner to 
all the parties in the Middle East including Israel forced a readjustment in China's 
calculations about its relations with both the Palestinians and Israel. As a consequence, 
China has adopted more of a neutral position than supporting or leaning towards one 
side against the other.'^ "^  John Calabrese's article on China's relations with Iraq briefly 
reviews the evolution of China-Iraq relations. It concludes that China's policy towards 
Iraq reflects its overall foreign policy objectives. While rivalry with the two 
superpowers may have characterised China's policy towards Iraq in first thirty years of 
interaction, China's policy towards Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s was a reflection of its 
modernisation programme.'^ '' 
It is clear from the above that there is a growing body of literature on China's foreign 
policy towards the Middle East. Yet there is no detailed study and analysis of the 
dynamics of the relations between China and the countries of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region is available. With the exception of Abidi all the others have made 
only fleeting references to China's relations with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
and then only in the context of the overall discussion of China's Middle Eastern foreign 
policy. This study hopes to improve the analytical picture somewhat. 
'^^  William W. Haddad and Mary Foeldi-Hardy, 'Chinese-Palestinian Relations', in Ibid., pp. 42-51. 
John Calabrese, 'China and Iraq: A Stake in Stability', in Ibid., pp. 52-67. 
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1.5. Chapter plan 
The study is divided into four parts. We have discussed part one which includes a 
discussion of the general elements of the research and the literature on Chinese foreign 
policy in general and Chinese foreign policy towards the Middle East in particular. Part 
two surveys China's foreign relations in a global context. It encompasses a chapter on 
international relations theory and its relevance to the study of China's foreign policy. 
Several theories and approaches of international relations are explored and discussed in 
Chapter 2 as to assist the researcher in finding a suitable theoretical approach to apply to 
the study of China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. As 
will be discussed, the neo-realist theory of international relations as developed by Waltz 
has been chosen to be the principle guideline for the research. Neo-realism, as we will 
see, focuses on the external factor rather than the internal one to be the important factor 
in determining states' foreign policy. Part one also includes a chapter studying China's 
foreign policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union. Studying the relations 
between China and the two powers is essential for producing a strong understanding of 
how the external factor has affected China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region. 
In the third part we shall discuss China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. Chapter 4 looks at China's foreign policy towards the region. The 
researcher has divided China's involvement in the region into three main stages. He has 
argued that China's policy towards the region in each stage has changed in accordance 
with the changes in China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union 
and China's drive to increase its economic, political, and military capabilities. Chapters 
5 and 6 review China's bilateral political, economic, social, and cultural relations with 
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each of the states of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. We shall then draw these 
themes together in a final concluding chapter, which assesses the international 
dimensions of China's foreign policy towards the region and its implications for both 
China and the countries of the region. 
PART II 
CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY 
IN GLOBAL CONTEXT 
CHAPTER TWO 
THEORISING CHINA'S FOREIGN 
POLICY 
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The People's Republic of China's policies and its importance have led to a quantitative 
explosion of literature studying the different aspects of its foreign policy. Yet there is 
still no single theory in international relations can take the leading role in explaining 
and predicting China's foreign behaviour. There are different theoretical approaches 
that have been applied to explain and somewhat predict China's foreign behaviour but 
none is able to give a consistent explanation that can be applied to the conduct of every 
Chinese foreign policy initiative since the establishment of the PRC until the present 
time. Many theoretical frameworks have successfully been applied to explain and 
predict China's foreign policy in regard to specific issues and situations but they remain 
mostly one sided explanatory approaches. They tend to explain China's foreign policy 
by looking either at the impact of the external factor or the internal factor in determining 
China's foreign behaviour. By doing so, they limit their explanations of China's foreign 
behaviour to one independent variable, and tend to some degree ignore the other 
variables. 
Generally speaking, the lack of a 'grand' theory in the field of China's foreign relations 
and foreign policy can be, on one hand, seen as a result of a disciplinary shortage in the 
field of social sciences, which is described as being 'coloured by hidden normative and 
policy preference, an absence of conceptual clarity, and the repeated intrusion of policy 
makers' concerns and slogans into intellectual discourse'.^ On the other hand, the 
absence of a broad theory of China's foreign relations and policy can also be blamed on 
China's own behaviour and practices. Samuel S. Kim argues that ambiguity in China's 
' The Elusive Quest: Theory and International Politics, (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1988), p. 211. 
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foreign behaviour provides a major obstacle in theorising about China's foreign pohcy, 
as theory requires 'the actor's behavioural consistency over time'? 
Against this backdrop, this Chapter seeks to address the different theoretical approaches 
to China's foreign policy in order to gain an understanding of the practices of China's 
foreign behaviour from different points of view. Our aim is to find a more useful 
theoretical approach to serve as a conceptual map that can help us make sense of 
China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. 
There are several schools of thought in regard to China's foreign relations and policies. 
They tend to explain China's foreign behaviour as being directed by either internal or 
external factors. In order to determine which school is the most useful to apply to this 
study, this chapter is going to survey those two most dominant schools in the literature 
of Chinese foreign policy. 
2.1. Internal factors 
The most dominant theoretical approaches in international relations that focus on the 
significance of the internal factors as a prominent component of states' foreign policy 
are the state-level approach and pluralism. The state-level approach surveys the internal 
characteristics of a state and argues that a state's domestic characteristics have a greater 
influence on the determination of its foreign policy than the external factors.^ 
' Samuel S. Kim, 'China's International Organisational Behaviour', in Thomas W. Robinson and David 
Shambaugh [eds], Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 
402. 
^ David Bachman, 'Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign PoUcy', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China and the 
World: New Directions in Chinese Foreign Relations, Second Edition, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1989), pp. 32-34. 
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Characteristics like history and traditions, poHtical system, leadership, and ideology are 
seen as the primary sources of a state's foreign policy."^ Scholars in international 
relations like Morton A. Kaplan and Richard N. Rosecrance acknowledge the essence of 
history and traditions in determining states' foreign behaviour.^ Some have highlighted 
the role of leadership in determining states' foreign policy. Margaret G. Hermann 
(1976) has argued that the more authority the leader has over a nation's foreign policy 
machinery, fewer people will be above him in the foreign policy bureaucracy to change 
his decisions; and the less well defined the policy makers' role, the more likely the 
leader's personal characteristics will influence foreign policy.^ Others have turned to 
analyse states' political system as the main determinant of their external behaviour. 
Gabriel Almond, Karl Deutsch, and David Easton have concerned themselves with the 
functions performed by the political system and the role it plays in shaping the foreign 
behaviour of a state.^  
The pluralist image of international relations is another approach to the study of 
domestic sources in foreign policy. One of their fundamental criticisms of the 
traditional realism, a school that dominated the field for some time, is their emphasis on 
"^ Denny Roy, China's Foreign Relations, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), pp. 
235-238. 
^ See Morton A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, (New York: Krieger, 1976); 
Morton A. Kaplan, 'The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations', in 
World Politics, vol. XIX, October 1966, pp. 13-25; and Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in 
World Politics, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). 
^ Margaret G. Hermann, 'When Leader's Personality will Affect Foreign Policy: Some Propositions', in 
James N. Rosenau [ed.], In Search of Global Patterns, (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1976), p. 327. 
^ See Gabriel A. Almond's introduction in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman [eds.]. The Politics of the 
Developing Areas, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bengham 
Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Development Approach, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), Chapter 2; 
Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of the Government, (New York: The Free Press, 1964); David Easton, A 
Framework for Political Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965); and David 
Easton, A System Analysis of Political Life, (New York: Wiley, 1965). 
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the significance of the internal factors in determining states' foreign policy. Unlike the 
realists who argue that balance of power and the international system are the most 
important factors in determining foreign policy, pluralists believe in the role of different 
internal factors- mainly economic- in shaping states' foreign policy. Paul Viotti and 
Mark Kauppi (1993) summarised the assumptions of the pluralist image of international 
relations. They presented the following assumptions as the basic elements of the 
pluralist image of international relations: 
1. Unlike the realist image, the pluralist sees non-state actors as important entities that 
can not be ignored in international relations. International and regional 
organisations play as an important role as states in international relations. 
2. Unlike in the realist image, a state in the pluralist image is not a unitary actor, 
instead it is composed of different actors like individual bureaucracies, interest 
groups and individuals that attempt to influence the making of a foreign policy. 
Therefore, foreign policy decisions are not easily made, as the realist would think. 
3. To pluralists states are not rational actors as the realists would assume. To them, the 
foreign policy decision-making process is a complicated one and requires clashes, 
bargaining and compromise between and among different actors. 
4. To pluralists it is not only the security issues, as the realist would argue, which play 
the dominant role in designing foreign policy. Pluralists see economic and social 
issues as important elements of foreign policy debates besides the security issue. 
Pluralist image of international relations is associated with the works of many scholars. 
Among them is the work of Wolfram F. Hanrieder. Hanrieder (1978) has argued that 
^ Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
Second Edition, (Massachusetts: Allyn and Bacon, 1993), p. 78. 
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the realists' traditional distinction between domestic and international politics is 
breaking down, and that the result has been a 'domestication' of international politics, in 
which security issues have been diminished in salience and economic issues have 
gained a new significance. According to Hanrieder the satisfaction of rising demands of 
citizens has become an important element for any state's legitimacy; and such demands 
'can be satisfied only by extensive commercial, monetary and technological interactions 
on the international level'. Such interaction can be 'horizontal'- on the government-to-
government level, 'lateral'- on society-to-society level through sub-national groups and 
organisation, and 'interactive'-involving a great deal of integration such as the European 
Economic Community. Al l of these levels are 'the structures through which 
governments perform a variety of functions' including the 'way in which state and 
society seek to arrange their domestic and foreign environment'. 'The choice of one 
structure over another is determined as much by internal ideological, institutional, and 
political orthodoxies as it is by external necessities'. Therefore, he concluded, 'the bulk 
of today's global political processes are of a kind that are typical of an approximate 
domestic political process, leading to the "domestication" of international polities', and 
that 'it is not a new type of international politics which is "dissolving" the traditional 
nation-state but a new nation-state which is "dissolving" traditional international 
politics'.^ G. John Ikenberry (1986) looks at the interaction between domestic and 
international political economy and its affects on the state's elites. He argues that state 
elites are engaged in the continuous process of adjustment between the demands of 
domestic and international activities, through bargaining rather than competition.'^ 
^ Wolfram F. Hanrrieder, ' Dissolving International Politics: Reflections on the Nation-State', in The 
American Political Science Review, volume 72, number 4, 1978, pp. 1276-1287. 
'° G. John Ikenberry, 'The State and Strategies of International Adjustment', in World Politics, volume 
39, number 1, 1986, pp. 53-77. 
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Chadwick F. Alger (1977) has stressed the major role that interest groups can play in 
the shaping of foreign as well as domestic policies. He believes that interdependence 
generates new types of policy issues and participants in the foreign policy process, 
undermining the realist assumptions of the state as being a unitary actor. '^ Edward L. 
Morse (1970) focuses on the impact of modernisation on the formations of foreign 
policy. Modernisation leads to an increasing level of interdependency among societies 
at the international level, leading to increasing priorities of domestic rather than external 
needs at the national level. He argues that the process of modernisation has broken 
down the realist distinction between foreign and domestic policy, changed the balance 
between 'high' and 'low' politics in favour of the latter, and reduced the level of control 
that any state can exercise at the domestic or the international level .Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye, Samuel Huntington, and Charles Pentland all have argued for the 
importance of international and multinational organisations in world politics. Keohane 
and Nye (1974) point to the role played by international organisations in providing a 
forum for national governmental officials to meet and form coalitions as well as open 
new channels for policy formations at the international level with officials of other 
states.'"^  They therefore contest the realist assumption that international organisations 
are only instruments of states' policy. Huntington (1973) has emphasised multinational 
corporations' presence as independent actors in world politics. Instead of being created 
by the nation-state, multinational- or transnational- organisations prosper through a 
process of bargaining and agreement with the nation-state. He argues that both are 
" Chadwick F. Alger, 'Foreign' Policies of US Publics', in International Studies Quarterly, volume 21, 
number 2, 1977, pp. 277-293. 
Edward L. Morse, 'The Transformation of Foreign Policies: Modernisation, Interdependence and 
Externalisation', in World Politics, volume XXI I , number 3, 1970, pp. 371-392. 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Transgovernmental Relations and International Organisations', 
in World Politics, volume X X V I I , number 1, 1974, pp. 39-62. 
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interrelated and that the existence of one requires the existence of the other.Pentland 
(1976) extended the significance of international organisations in world politics to 
include: first, states use international organisations as instruments to pursue their own 
foreign policy objectives; second, states tend to use them to modify their behaviour; and 
third, states can through them achieve a degree of autonomy and influence as political 
actors. 
On the issue of theorising China's foreign policy many scholars have paid a great deal 
of attention to the impact of the internal factor in determining China's foreign 
behaviour. They tend to adopt the above arguments about the role of domestic factors 
and non-state actors in shaping China's foreign policy. They argue that different 
variables like history, traditions, ideology, leadership, economy, national interest, 
political system, bureaucracy, intellectuals, and media play a key role in forming 
China's foreign behaviour. In order to survey the writings on the impact of these 
variables on China's foreign relations, we are going to focus on the impact of the 
following main domestic components: history and traditions, ideology, leadership and 
political system, and modernisation, on China's foreign policy. 
2.1.1. History and tradition 
Those who have written on the impact of history and traditions on China's foreign 
policy argue that history and traditions are essential and central to an understanding of 
Chinese foreign behaviour. To them, the pre-1949 experience exercised a significant 
Samuel P. Huntington, 'Transnational Organizations in World Polities', in World Politics, volume 
XXV, April 1973, pp. 333-368. 
'•"^  Charles Pentland, 'International Organizations and their Role', in J. Rosenau, K. W. Thompson and G. 
Boyd [eds]. World Politics, (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 631-656. 
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influence on China's post-1949 foreign policy. Among those who argue for definite 
continuities of the past in the present are Mark Mancall, Robert A. Scalapino, John 
Cranmer-Byng, Chih-yu Shih, and Rafe de Crespigny. Mancall (1963) has looked at 
China's traditional world order, and summarised the Chinese assumptions of world 
order as follows: 
1. China's world order was hierarchical, not egalitarian. 
2. China's centrality in the world was a function of its civilisation and virtue, 
particularly the virtue of the Chinese ruler. 
3. No balance of power existed. 
4. National power was a reflection of the natural virtue. Power was moral because it 
derived from the possession of virtue. 
5. International society was the extension of internal society; no boundary existed 
since there was no nation-state. Boundary was defined in terms of cultural 
differences.'^ 
The Chinese saw themselves at the centre of the world and source of all civilisations 
and cultures.'^ They regarded their country as the 'Middle Kingdom' or the centre of 
the world, with the Chinese emperor at the heart of everything as a universal ruler, and 
18 
the 'uncivilised barbarian' nations at the peripheries. They regarded their civilisation 
to be superior to any other nation's. And their rulers were designated with the mandate 
Mark Mancall, 'The Persistence of Tradition in China's Foreign policy', in The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Sciences, volume 349, September 1963, pp. 17-19. 
The Chinese did not differ in this respect from other great civilisations. The Greeks and the Romans 
saw themselves as the sole sources of all culture and civilisations as well. 
See Wolfgang Frank, China and the West, (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1967), p. 4. 
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of heaven, as the son of heaven, governing the land from one dynasty to another.'^ 
Foreign societies were ranked high or low in the hierarchy depending on how close they 
were to China culturally. In the Chinese perception of the world order, the territorial 
limitations were imprecise and the purpose of interactions between 'barbarians' and the 
Chinese was the transformation of the former along the lines of the Chinese model."° 
'Barbarians'- foreigners - could come to China to participate in the benefits of the 
Chinese civilisation and learn from the achievements of the Chinese in spheres of 
natural and social sciences. Those who wished to come to China and learn to be 
civilised must accept Chinese culture and recognise the supreme authority of the 
emperor as mediator between heaven and earth by bringing tributes. The tributary 
system was established to enable the tributary state to trade with China and receive 
21 
permission for their traders' power in China from the emperor. Thus, the tributary 
system was the means for conducting and establishing foreign relations with China. In 
order to deal with them foreigners were required to send tribute missions periodically to 
the Chinese emperor. Such missions were perceived by the Chinese as recognition by 
the 'barbarians' of the emperor's superiority. 
Mancall, therefore, has stated that the breakdown of the institutions of China's 
traditional world order, after the signing of the Treaty of Nanking on August 27, 1842 
with the British, took place faster than the erosion of the above assumptions on which 
King C. Chen, 'Traditional Chinese Foreign Relations' in King Chen [ed.]. The Foreign Policy of 
China, (New Jersey: East-West Inc., 1972), p. 8. 
°^ For a comparison between the Chinese view of world order and the European world order see John W. 
Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-
Hall Inc., 1993). 
^' John King Fairbank and S. Y. Teng, 'The Traditional Role of Tribute', in King Chen [ed.]. The Foreign 
Policy of China, p. 13. 
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the order itself was based. It is therefore, as he has argued, possible that historically 
rooted assumptions concerning the nature of the international order, differing from that 
of both the West and Russia, may be a complicating factor in contemporary China's 
foreign r e l a t ions .He has specified the influence of the past on the PRC's foreign 
policy through the following levels: 
1. A vivid sense of outrage directed at the Western imperialist powers that contributed 
to the erosion of China's traditional world order and influence. 
2. A sense of China's primacy in its relations with its neighbouring countries marked 
with the signing of border agreements with Pakistan, Nepal, and Burma, which 
depended on China's good will for their validity. 
3. Adoption of old techniques in the contemporary Chinese diplomacy including the 
exchange of cultural missions, and official visits, as well as 'using barbarians 
against barbarians' in its relations with both the United States and the Soviet 
Union.^^ 
Scalapino (1962) has further argued that China's old diplomatic techniques of receiving 
gifts has now been substituted by the exchange of dance and musical troops, official 
delegations, students and scholars, journalists, and civic leaders. Personalised 
diplomacy through cultural missions, Scalapino argues, is central to the PRC's 
diplomacy as it was under the Ming Emperor. He also sees the influence of the past on 
the PRC's foreign relations in the continuance of xenophobia in China's foreign 
relations, which led China to adopt a nationalist foreign policy in its relations with the 
neighbouring Asian countries and the superpowers. China, according to Scalapino, is 
Mark Mancall, 'The Persistence of Tradition in Chinese Foreign Policy', pp. 21-22. 
Ibid., pp. 23-26. 
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seeking to achieve the following three objectives: first, to define and defend its 
boundaries; second, to acquire a buffer system that give it security in depth; and finally, 
to exercise some degree of hegemony over the region with which it has primary contact. 
To him, China was showing a sense of primacy when marking its boundaries with the 
surrounding countries, gaining rather than making concessions.^ "^  
In addition to the above arguments of the levels of influence that the past has left on the 
PRC's foreign policy, China's traditional assumption of hierarchy in world order has 
also left its mark. This was evident in China's own classification in the 1950s of the 
international system through the lens of its 'two camps theory', and also in its 'three 
worlds theory' of the 1970s. Such classifications highlighted the hierarchical ranking of 
states in each theory. 
Cranmer-Byng (1993) argues that despite China being forced by powerful Western 
countries and Japan in the late nineteenth century to abandon its own 'well-tried 
methods and ideology for conducting relations with non-Chinese people', the method 
remained influential on many powerful Chinese leaders. Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-
shek in the 1920s and 1930s respectively maintained that China had to become strong 
so that it could once again play its traditional role in the world through the moral 
influence of the Chinese culture. Mao's adoption of JVlarxist-Leninism was based on his 
beliefs of the possibility of world revolution in which China's example would be 
crucial. According to Cranmer-Byng both versions of China's mission in the future 
'^^  Robert A. Scalapino, 'Traditions and Transition in the Asian Policy of Communist China', in E. F. 
Szczepanik, Symposium on Economic and Social Problems of the Far East, (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1962), pp. 262-277. 
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coexisted after the establishment of the PRC and nourished by strong feelings of 
nationalism and pride in China as an exemplar in 'cultural' values. He concluded: 
One essential quality, which both versions of this faith in China's special mission 
have in common, is their 'imprinted' belief in the relevance of Chinese culUiral 
values and lifestyle as an inspiration to guide other peoples of the world in the 
future. ^ "^  
Shih (1990) has studied the effect of Chinese traditions and cultural norms like 
Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism on China's foreign behaviour. He produced three 
different styles of leadership: the hierarchical style, the normalcy style and the rebellion 
style. The hierarchical style refers to a leadership that seeks coercive incentives to 
demand mass support for certain moral principles, and emphasises loyalty and 
organisation. The normalcy style refers to a leadership that tries to 'reconcile national 
interests and individual citizens' self interest through materials incentives', and 
emphasises rationality. The rebellion style refers to a leadership that encourages the 
mass to fight against the status quo. According to him, the adoption of a certain style 
depends on the leader's personality, personal experiences and the situation. He found 
that before the Cultural Revolution Mao Zedong adopted the hierarchical style, which 
tends to apply the 'asymmetric norms' to diplomacy which advocates Confucianist's 
ideas of control through punishment and reward, superiority and obedience. Liu 
Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping adopted the normalcy style, which tends to 
apply the 'symmetric norms' to its diplomacy that advocates Confucian brotherhood, 
friendship, and to maintain them through compromise. Mao adopted after the Cultural 
Revolution the rebellion style, which tends to apply the 'Yi norms' to its diplomacy that 
John Cranmer-Byng, 'The Chinese View of their Place in the World', in China Quarterly, volume 53, 
1973, January/March, pp. 76-79. 
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advocates 'revolutionary brotherhood', and commitment to challenge the 'unjust' 
authority." Shih concluded that China's diplomacy 'reflects the world view held by 
Chinese leaders' and that the 'norms for inter-personal relationships are applied to 
understanding and the management of inter-state relationships'.^^ 
Crespigny (1995) has stated that the past has left its mark on the contemporary Chinese 
foreign policy in terms of the following: 
1. The old issue of Chinese rejection of foreign interference in its internal affairs has 
been carried out by the PRC's government in its foreign relations. 
2. The hierarchical nature of the traditional Chinese view of the internal and the 
international systems and their division of power within each system continue to 
play a key role in China's present interests in East and South East Asia. Its policy 
towards this region, according to Crespigny, is not only influenced by a sense of 
order but also by expectations of control and guidance, which stems from the old 
Chinese family hierarchical system in which the father and the elderly assumed a 
superior role. 
3. Official control by the central government is also another aspect of the influence of 
the past on China's contemporary foreign policy, as control has been viewed as an 
essential ingredient of the effort to keeping the country undivided.'^ ^ 
Al l of the above arguments suggest that history and traditions have played a key role in 
influencing and shaping China's foreign behaviour. 
Chih-yu Shih, The Spirit of Chinese Foreign Policy, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), pp. 80-190. 
Ibid., 190. 
Rafe de Crespigny, 'Tradition and Chinese Foreign Policy', in Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth 
[eds.], China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities, and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1995), pp. 42-43. 
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2.1.2. Ideology 
The writings on the role of ideology in the PRC's foreign policy suggest that there are 
two stages in the development of the role of ideology. The first is the Mao Zedong 
period from 1949 to the late 1970s; and the second is the post-Mao's phase from 1979 
to the present time. The role of ideology in the PRC's foreign policy has been 
perceived in terms of this time scale. Ideology is seen to be the most dominant factor in 
shaping China's foreign policy during the first stage. Scholars and political analysts 
based their views of the PRC's foreign policy on studying Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong's thought as the ideological guidance of the PRC's foreign policy. Beijing's 
behaviour towards accepting Moscow's superiority in the 1950s, supporting solidarity 
in the Third World and advocating a new Third World policy in the 1960s, and shifting 
its alliance towards favouring closer ties with the United States in the 1970s have all 
been viewed as the logical result of China's conversion to Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong's Thought. Among those who adopted this pattern are H. Arthur Steiner,^ ^ 
Tang Tsou and Norton H. Halperin,^° Franz Schurmann,^ ^ Chieh Hsiung,^^ and Steven I . 
Levine.'''' From the 1980s onwards many scholars and analysts began to view a decline 
in the role played by ideology in China's foreign policy. They, therefore, see new 
H. Arthur Steiner, 'Communist China in World Community', in International Conciliation, number 
533, May 1961, pp. 394-402. 
Tang Tsou and Norton Halperin, 'Mao Tse-Tung's Revolutionary Strategy and Peking's International 
Behaviour', in The American Political Science Review, volume 59, number 1, March 1965, pp. 80-104. 
^' Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, second edition, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1968). 
"'^  James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice the Evolution of Chinese Communism, (London: Pall Mall 
Press, 1970). 
Steven I . Levine, 'Perception and Ideology in Chinese Foreign Policy', in Thomas W. Robinson and 
David Shambaugh [eds.], Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), pp 30-46. 
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doctrines like nationalism, modernisation, and national interest as the replacements for 
the old principles of IVlarxism-Leninism-lVIao Zedong's Thought.^ "^  
Those who argue for the significance of ideology in China's foreign behaviour tend to 
focus on the influence of Marxism-Leninism and the influence of Mao Zedong's 
Thought. Schurmann (1968) distinguishes between the two forms of ideologies in 
relation to their actions. He defined Marxism-Leninism as the 'pure ideology', while 
Mao's thought as the 'practical ideology'. To him, 'pure ideology' aims at shaping the 
thinking of the people, rather than producing immediate actions; and 'practical 
ideology' aims at producing action to implement certain policies. In this account, 'pure 
ideology' is a shared ideology among all communist parties of the world, but 'practical 
ideology' is something that varies from one party to another according to the 
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circumstances of each country. According to him, the 'pure ideology' played a key 
role in developing the 'practical ideology' in China. Mao's world outlook was seen as a 
product of the impact of 'pure ideology' in China's foreign policy. Two main themes of 
Mao's thought were given substantial attention by analysts for their role in shaping 
China's foreign policy. First is Lenin's interpretation of imperialism,^^ which had made 
a great deal of impact on Mao's perception of the 'enemy' in international relations. 
James Chieh Hsiung stresses that Lenin's theory of imperialism filled an intellectual 
'^ '^  See, among many, Stuart R. Schram, 'Economics in Command?' Ideology and Policy since the Third 
Plenum, 1978-84', in The China Quarterly, number 99, September 1984, pp. 417-461; Harry Harding, 
'China's Changing Role in Contemporary World', in Harry Harding [ed.], China's Foreign Relations in 
the 1980s, (New Haven: Yale University, 1984), pp. 177-208; Bill Brugger, Chinese Marxism in the Post-
Mao Era, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990); and Arif Dirlik and Maurice Meisner 
[eds], Marxism and the Chinese Experience: Issues in Contemporary Chinese Socialism, (Armonk, New 
York: M . E. Sharpe, 1989). 
Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organisation in Communist China, pp. 19-33. 
""^  For details on Lenin's theory of imperialism see V. I . Lenin, 'Imperialism as a Special Stage of 
Capitalism', in The Essential of Lenin, volume I , (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1908), pp. 709-716. 
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vacuum for many Chinese, including Mao himself, who found no explanation within 
their own traditions regarding exploitation.During the Chinese-Soviet alliance in the 
1950s, Mao adhering to Lenin's imperialism, made imperialism the main slogan in 
China's propaganda war against the United States and the West; and viewed the world 
order in terms of two camps: the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, and the 
capitalist or the imperialist camp headed by the United States. The conflict between 
these two camps was the basic element to shape the nature of China's foreign policy. 
Therefore, he saw the 'lean to one side' policy as the most reliable foreign policy 
strategy to achieve China's foreign policy goals in the 1950s: 
Internationally, we belong to the side of the anti-imperiahst front headed by the 
Soviet Union, and so we can turn only to this side for genuine and friendly help, 
not to the side of the imperialist front.''^  
Another main aspect of the impact of Mao's thought on China's foreign policy was his 
thought on contradictions. According to this thought, in order for a certain society to 
develop towards the final objectives - in China's case it is Communism - it had to 
advance through stages. In each stage there are some 'primary' and 'secondary' 
contradictions embodying the struggle to achieve the advancement of society to the next 
stage. Resolving the contradictions of each stage would be the primary step in the 
development of societies.Such analysis is essential in explaining the changing of 
China's foreign policy from one period to another particularly in regard to its relations 
with both the United States and the Soviet Union. The deterioration of China's relations 
James Chieh Hsiung, Ideology and Practice the Evolution of Chinese Communism, pp. 36-37. 
• Mao Zedong, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', in Selected Reading From the Works of Mao 
Tsetung, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1971), pp. 313-314. 
'^^  See Mao Zedong, 'On Contradiction', in ibid., pp. 91-98. 
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with the Soviet Union in the 1960s onwards, and its shifting policies towards the Third 
World and later on towards the United States could be explained by looking at this 
analysis. John W. Garver (1993) explains Mao's thoughts on contradiction in political 
terms. He indicates that at each stage of China's history, there exists a primary enemy 
blocking the development of Chinese society to achieve its final objectives; the 
Japanese were the primary contradiction in the 1930s, the Chinese Nationalists in the 
1940s, the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. 
This means that China has to raise all the efforts to solve the primary contradiction in 
each stage first before it moves to the next one.'^ ^ 
Thus, the impact of ideology on China's foreign policy can be explained in the 
following terms: 
1. Ideology had led China to adopt the 'lean to one side' policy following the 
proclamation of independence in 1949 and guided China's foreign policy to follow 
the Soviet line in its foreign relations. China, as a result, was isolated from the non-
communist countries of the world, and was in total confrontation with the United 
States. '^ 
2. Mao's thinking shifted China's foreign policy strategy from ignoring the countries 
of the Third World in the first half of the 1950s to engaging them in the second half 
of the 1950s and the 1960s. The announcement of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence as the main elements of China's foreign relations with the countries of 
See John W. Garver, Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China, pp. 44-48. 
^' Ibid. 
Chapter two: Theorising China's foreign policy 48 
the Third World presented China's willingness to establish friendly relations with 
those countries in order to weaken the U.S. strategic position mainly in Asia."*^  
3. Mao's revolutionary thinking played a key role in the 1960s throughout the Third 
World. China supported the idea of 'people's war', endorsing revolutions in a total 
of 23 countries in the world in 1965;'^ '^  and devoted substantial resources for military 
training, arms supplying and ideological teaching to the revolutionaries throughout 
those countries. 
4. Mao's idea of contradiction helped China's foreign policy to adjust the shift in 
China's alliance from the Soviet Union towards rapprochement with the United 
States in the 1970s. Moscow, rather than Washington, according to Mao, had 
become the primary contradiction - principal enemy - to Beijing. China, therefore, 
had to work first to eliminate the primary enemy even if that required an alignment 
with the secondary enemy. 
2.1.3. Leadership and political structure 
Some have argued that leadership also plays a key role in shaping and determining 
China's foreign policy. David Bachman (1998) agrees with the above argument and 
stresses that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership plays an acute role in 
conducting China's foreign policy. Mao, according to Bachman, was the 'undisputed' 
maker of China's foreign policy. He enjoyed an integral authority over China's foreign 
See ibid., p. 119. 
'^ ^ Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1970), pp. 132-148. 
Ibid., pp. 114-116. 
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policy, as foreign policy was his major intellectual and political concern."^ ^ A. Doak 
Barnett (1985) extended this argument and argued that Mao totally dominated the 
foreign policy decisions up to the time of his death, and that Deng Xiaoping made the 
final decisions on many foreign policy issues in the 1980s and 1990s. He indicated that 
Deng up to the time of his death remained the ultimate source of authority for making 
policy decisions in China - on foreign as well as domestic issues - even though he did 
not occupy the highest formal positions in the Party or government. Most major 
decisions made by him, and all must be accepted by him."^ ^ Barnett, however, 
distinguished between Mao's method and Deng's method of foreign policy decision 
making process. Mao's method was individualistic because he enjoyed complete 
authority, while Deng's method was based on building a coalition in support of his 
policy instead of imposing them on others."^ ^ Such a method is said to be carried out by 
the Jiang Zemin leadership as well. 
Bachman (1994) also argues that the characteristics of China's political structure -
authoritarianism, highly articulated nature, fragmentation and bargaining - also shape 
China's external behaviour. Al l of these characteristics of the political system 'affect 
foreign policy behaviour via co-ordination and control problems and competition 
among Chinese entities', and also 'enable the state to pursue a largely mercantilist 
international policy'. He stressed this point by giving an example of the missile sales to 
Saudi Arabia. He indicated that the high ranked officials in the Chinese government 
'^ ^ David Bachman, 'Structure and Process in the making of Chinese Foreign PoUcy', in Samuel S. Kim 
[ed.], China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1998), pp. 37-41. 
"^^ ^ A Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985), p. 12. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
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and party made the decision to sell the weapons, without even consulting the foreign 
ministry. Thus, the authoritarian nature of the system in China allows the centralisation 
of the decision-making process around few high-ranking officials."^^ Harry Harding 
(1987) believes that political reform in the post-Mao era has transformed some of the 
ideological features of the Chinese political system. He has described the system as a 
'consultative authoritarian' regime, in which the party may consult with individuals and 
institutions from inside or outside the government in its determination of national 
policy. Harding sees it as 'a significant departure from the totalitarianism of the recent 
past, but not a truly pluralistic, or even quasi-democratic, political system'."*^ China, 
according to this analysis, still does not allow independent parties, autonomous media, 
and independent social and professional organisations to participate in the formation of 
national policy. Zhao Quansheng (1994) demonstrated that the process of foreign 
policymaking in China was transformed in the post-Mao era from its 'vertical 
authoritarianism' during Mao's leadership to 'horizontal authoritarianism' or 'collective 
authoritarianism' in the post-Mao era. The former was a one-man dominated process 
based on a vertical command system; the latter involves several players participating in 
the foreign policymaking process. An example of the post-Mao 'horizontal' or 
'collective authoritarianism' is the adoption of the 'independent foreign policy' in 1982. 
Zhao argues that the proclamation of the 'independent foreign policy' in China's 
relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union was a product of collective 
authoritarian compromise between Deng's line of foreign policy, which favours closer 
'^ ^ David Bachman, 'Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China and the 
World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1994), p. 51. 
Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1987), p. 200. 
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ties with Washington, and Chen Yun's (a powerful senior leader in the party) line, 
which favoured a conciliatory policy towards Moscow. 
2.1.4. Economic modernisation 
China's Four Modernisations programme was launched as a result of the approval by 
the Third Plenum of the Eleventh National Party Congress Central Committee in 
December 1978.^ ^ The modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence, and 
science and technology were to be carried forward to build 'socialism with Chinese 
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characteristics'. In order to carry forward the programme, adjustments to the 
country's foreign policy needed to be made. As a result, many of Mao's principles were 
postponed indefinitely. Mao's formula of 'solving war by war' was replaced by Deng's 
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formula of 'solving war by peaceful means'. An 'independent foreign policy' was 
adopted in September 1982. Its basic objectives have centred on creating a global 
environment favourable to China's reform e f f o r t s . T r a d e , industrial, social and 
military co-operation with Moscow began to increase after the introduction of the 
independent policy. China's economic modernisation programme's aims are: 
'^^  Zhao Quansheng, 'Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal 
Authoritarianism', in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, volume 519, 
January 1992, pp. 162-164. 
'^ Among many useful reviews of the four modernisation programmes see Richard Baum [ed.], China's 
Four Modernizations: the New Technological Revolution, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980). 
"^^ Stuart R. Schram, 'Deng Xiaoping's Quest for 'Modernisation with Chinese Characteristics' and the 
Future of Marxism-Leninism', in Michael Ying-Maohau and Susan H. Marsh [eds.J, China in the Era of 
Deng Xiaoping a Decade of Reform, (New York: An East Gate Book, 1993). 
" Deng said: 'There are many disputes in the world, and we have to find ways to solve them. Over the 
years I have been considering how those disputes could be solved by peaceful means, rather by war', 
Deng Xiaopeng, 'A New Approach to Stabilising the World Situation', in Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, volume 3, (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1994), p. 59. 
Hu Yaobang, 'Create a New Situation in all Fields of Socialist Modernisation', in Beijing /?eview, 
volume 25, number 37, 13 September 1982, pp. 29-33. 
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1. To legitimise the authority of the CCP among the Chinese people by providing job 
opportunities for millions of Chinese workers; 
2. To introduce new and more advanced technology through foreign investments in 
China; and 
3. To support the modernisation of China's defence. Deng annunciated the importance 
of the economic modernisation for the modernisation of defence at an enlarged 
meeting of the Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party on June 4, 1985: 
The four modernisations include the modernisation of defence. Without that 
modernisation there would be only three. But the four modernisations should be 
achieved in order of priority. Only when we have a good economic foundation 
will it be possible for us to modernise the army's equipment. So we must wait 
patiently for a few years. I am certain that by the end of the century we can 
surpass the goal of quadrapling the GNP. At that time only, when we are strong 
economically, we shall be able to spend more money on updating equipment. 
It is worth mentioning that China has achieved its goal and its economy today is one of 
the leading in the world, generating a much needed capital required to develop its 
defence modernisation. 
Thomas W. Robinson (1994) argued that despite the long historical background of 
humiliation and domination by the West and Japan, China's modernisation programme 
has changed the Chinese government's view of interdependence since it stresses 
investment, trade, technology transfer, and scientific exchanges. China's new view of 
interdependence stresses mutual benefits. He sees the growth of China's foreign trade, 
the increase in foreign investment, and China's borrowing from foreign commercial and 
Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, p. 133. 
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multilateral institutions as well as foreign countries as measures of China's economic 
interdependence. He also sees growing interdependent links in the field of science, 
security, politics and culture.^^ Another aspect of the impact of China's modernisation 
on foreign policy is its membership and its active participation in a number of 
multilateral economic institutions. William R. Feeny (1994) argues that China's 
economic modernisation programme has urged the Chinese government to adopt an 
'inclusive participatory approach' to the international economic system in order to gain 
access to foreign capital and expertise and other long-term economic benefits. China 
joined in 1980 the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or the World Bank, and the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC). In 1983 China was granted observer status to the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT); and in 1986 it officially applied for full GATT 
membership, and joined the Asian Development Bank (ADB).^^ China's behaviour 
towards the international organisations has also changed in the post-Mao era. Samuel S. 
Kim (1994) observes that China by 1977 participated in 21 international 
intergovernmental organisations (IGO), and 71 international non-governmental 
organisations (INGO). This however changed with the acceleration of China's 
modernisation programme. The PRC's memberships were raised to 37 IGO, and 677 
INGO by 1989.^ ^ 
Thomas W. Robinson, 'Interdependence in China's Foreign Relations', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China 
and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 187-199. 
57 William R. Feeney, 'China and the Multilateral Economic Institutions', in ibid., pp. 226-245. 
Samuel S. Kim, 'China's International Organizational Behaviour', in Thomas W. Robinson and David 
Shambaugh [eds.], Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, p. 406. 
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Table 2.1: China's participation in international organisations, 1960-1989 
1960 1966 1977 1984 1986 1987 1988 1989 
IGO 2 1 21 29 32 35 37 37 
INGO 30 58 71 355 403 504 574 677 
Source: Samuel S. Kim, 'China's International Organisational Behaviour', in Thomas W. Robinson and 
David Shambaugh [eds.], Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994), p. 406. 
China's attitudes towards the United Nations has also shifted from viewing it as a dirty 
international organisation manipulated by a few big powers to emphasising the 
importance of the existence of the United Nations for world peace. China's Premier 
Zhao Ziyang, on the eve of the 40* anniversary of the founding of the UN said: 
While it [UN] has made some serious mistakes, on the whole it has done much 
and has played an active part in safeguarding world peace, opposing armed 
aggression and occupation of one country by another, encouraging the 
restructuring of the inequitable international economic order, and promoting 
international economic and technological co-operation 59 
China's stance on aid and investment has assumed a new understanding. China has 
changed since 1978 its international status from aid giver to aid recipient.^^ It received 
from 1979 to 1992, 752 loans from different bilateral and multilateral sources valued at 
$74.7 billion.*^^ The PRC changed its old argument of rejecting foreign investments in 
favour of encouraging foreign investments in its territory. Between 1985 and 1996 
•''^ Beijing Review, volume 28, number 42, 21 October 1985, pp. 4-5. 
'''^  For more details see John Franklin Copper, 'China's Foreign Aid in 1978', in Occasional 
Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, (Maryland: School of Law, University of 
Maryland). 
Susumu Yabuki, China's New Political Economy: the Giant Awakes, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1995), pp. 162-163. Between 1983 to 1991 China cumulative loans were $50,446 million supplied 
by Japan 32.3%, World Bank 21.6%, France 11.1%, Great Britain 5%, Hong Kong and Macao 4.9%, 
Germany 4.6%, U.S. 3.1%, Canada 2.9 %, and others 14.5% in ibid., p. 162. 
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approximately $176 billion of foreign direct investment was invested in China;^^ and 
between 1993 and 1997 China became the world's second largest recipient of foreign 
direct investment.^ "* PRC's involvement in the world capitalist market has increased its 
trade interdependency. Womack and Zhao (1994) argue that China's dependence on a 
single trade partner declined from over 50 percent in the fifties to 37 percent in the 
1986-1990 period.^ "^ Its total trade share in the Gross National Product (GNP) had risen 
greatly from 9.89 percent in 1978 to 27.90 percent in 1991.^ ^ 
Zhao Quansheng (1992) argues that China's economic modernisation prograimne and 
its policy opening to the outside play a key role in the transformation of the process of 
foreign policymaking in China from its 'vertical authoritarianism' to 'horizontal' or 
'collective authoritarianism'.^^ The same argument is made by Harry Harding (1987) 
who maintains that the political reforms coinciding with the economic reforms in China 
transformed the process of foreign policymaking from an absolute authoritarian process 
to 'a consultative authoritarian' process. A. Doak Barnett (1985) extended the 
argument by showing that the increasing salient of China's foreign economic relations 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: China and Mongolia, 1997-1998 (London: EIU, 
1998), p. 52. 
'^^  Christopher Findlay and Andrew Watson, 'Economic Growth and Trade Dependency in China', in 
David G. Goodman and Gerald Segal [eds.], China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, (London: 
Routledge, 1997), p. 113. The single largest source of foreign investment was Hong Kong (over 50%); 
Taiwan (8.4%), Japan (8.0%), and the US (7.9%) were distant second, third, and fourth respectively, in 
Country Profile: China and Mongolia, 1997-1998, p. 52. 
'''^  Brandy Womack and Guangzhi Zhao, 'The Many Worlds of China's Provinces: Foreign Trade and 
Diversification', in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal [eds.], China Deconstruct: Politics, Trade 
and Regionalism, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 141. 
Thomas W. Robinson, 'Interdependence in China's Foreign Relations', pp. 191-194. 
Zhao Quansheng, 'Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal 
Authoritarianism', p. 163. 
67 Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution, p. 200. 
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enhanced the role of China's Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
(MFERT) in China's policymaking process. According to him, the MFERT is 'the 
second most important ministry directly involved' in the conduct of foreign policy in 
China.^^ Allen Whiting (1994) argues that the policy of the opening to the outside and 
the subsequent dependency on foreign trade and technology together with foreign loans, 
grants and investments have increased the role played by modernisation in the 
determination of foreign policy. China's foreign policy has been adjusted to secure the 
flow of foreign investment, technology, aid and funds into China.^ ^ Guocang Huan 
(1992) indicates that China's needs to balance between its economic open areas and 
other parts of China requires the Chinese government to adopt foreign policies that can 
encourage foreign investments and bring funds into those poorer areas in China.^ ^ 
Responding to the severe, yet temporary, economic sanctions against China imposed by 
the West and Japan after Tiananmen massacre of June 4, 1989, the Chinese government 
understood that in order to sustain China's economic development, it had to keep its 
economic relations with the US, Japan and the international and regional organisations 
in a good and peaceful manner. Despite its rejection to foreign pressure on its internal 
affairs, the Chinese government used every possible opportunity to convince the West 
to lift its sanctions against China. Deng, for example, emphasised the need for China to 
restore its relations with the US in a talk with the special envoy of President George 
Bush on December 10, 1989, and said: 
^'^ A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China, p. 93. 
Allan Whiting 'The Future of China's Foreign Policy', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China and the World: 
Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 258-259. 
'^ ^ Goucang Huan, 'China's Foreign Economic Relations', in The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Sciences, volume 519, January 1992, p. 87. 
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I hope that as a special envoy you will tell President Bush that there is a retired 
old man in China who is concerned about the improvement of Sino-US 
relations. '^ 
The Western and Japanese economic pressure on China left its mark on China's foreign 
policy during the Kuwait Crisis. China supported all ten UN resolutions that ordered 
military and economic sanctions against Iraq and abstained on resolution 678 that 
permitted the use of force to compel an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.^^ Such co-
operative behaviour gathered some economic and diplomatic rewards. Economic 
assistance and loans from the World Bank, M F , ADB, UNDP, and others were 
resumed. " Diplomatic relations were established with South Korea in August 1992; 
China's relations with India was improved in a new peaceful manner particularly after 
Indian Prime IVIinister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1989;'''^  China 
became more involved with the South East Asian Countries to enhance security and co-
operation;^^ Beijing-lVIoscow relations were improved by signing, during Russian 
President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing in December 1992, accords with the Russian 
President ranging from the reduction of troops along their borders, to granting of loans 
'^ Deng Xiaoping, 'Sino-US Relations Must Be Improved', in Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, pp. 338-
339. 
''- Rosemary Foot, 'China's Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era', in Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove 
[eds.], China in the 1990s, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1995), p. 240. 
William R. Feeny, 'China and the Multilateral Economic Institutions', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China 
and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 116-221. 
For the joint press communique issued by the two governments by the end of Gandhi's visit to Beijing 
see Beijing Review, volume 32, number 1, 2-8 January 1989, pp. 5-6. 
''^  Samuel S. Kim, 'Mainland China in a Changing Asia-Pacific Regional Order', in Bih-jaw Lin and 
James T. Mayers [eds.]. Contemporary China in the Post-Cold War Era, (Colombia, South Carolina: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 263-305. 
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and economic and trade co-operations.^^ China's relations with the U.S. has also 
entered a new phase. U.S. Secretary of Commerce Barbara Franklin visited Beijing in 
1992 and economic co-operation talks have started for the first time since July 1989.^ ^ 
In sum, China's foreign policy in the post-Mao era has been shaped, according to this 
approach, by China's drive for modernisation. Foreign policy strategy of the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence has replaced the old foreign policy strategy of armed 
struggle and world revolution. The leadership of Deng and the post-Deng's leadership 
have repeatedly emphasised the Five Principles- mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's affairs, 
equality and mutual benefits, and peaceful coexistence- as the basis and guiding 
principles for not only good relations with other states but also as the basic guidelines 
for the establishment of a new international political and economic order.^ ^ 
2.2. External factors 
One of the most popular theoretical approaches that focus on the impact of the outside 
world on state's foreign policy in international relations is neo-realism, which will be 
the focus of this section. 
''^  For example a memorandum of understanding was signed to establish a 100-kilometre demilitarised 
frontier zone, a measure Moscow resisted in the past, Beijing Review, volume 35, number 52, 28 
December 1992, p. 4. 
Ibid., p. 6. 
''^  Xie Yixian , 'China's Foreign Policy: A 1980s Tune-up', in Beijing Review, volume 32, number 7-8, 
13-26 February 1989, pp. 12-17. 
World-system theory is also another approach that focuses its attention on the impact of outside factors 
on state's foreign policy. The world-system theory of international relations goes back to the works of 
Karl Marks and Lenin. It was however developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. The core of Wallerstein's 
analysis is the world-system, which he defines as 'a unit with a single division of labour and multiple 
culture systems'. He argues that the world system is 'the appropriate unit of analysis for the study of 
social behaviours' whether it is poverty in Africa, ethnic conflict in the Balkan, state's foreign policy or 
Chapter two: Theorising China's foreign policy 59 
2.2.1. Neo-realism 
The classical realist theory of international politics dominated the study of international 
relations during the first twenty-year period after the end of the Second World War. 
During that period, the U.S. and the Soviet Union emerged as the two major 
superpowers in the world dominating much of world affairs, and the Cold War 
determined the relationship between them. The birth of the bipolar international order 
and the Cold War, therefore, required a new way of thinking and dealing with 
international relations. The result was the realist theory of international politics, which 
shifted Western thinking on international relations away from the utopianism towards a 
resurgent realism, and from idealism to the elements of power. Nevertheless, another 
school of thought on international relations emerged in the seventies after the oil crisis 
of 1973. Its focus was on co-operation and interdependence in international relations. 
Its scholars define what they call 'the regimes' - namely international and regional 
organisations- as the best way to achieve the good of all. During the same period, there 
had been not only a revival interest in realism and interdependence but also the 
emergence of a broadly based neo-realism approach to the study of international 
relations. 
family life. According to him the capitalist world economy constitutes the appropriate unit of analysis in 
the modern world. It is divided into core, periphery, and semi-periphery, which are linked together by 
unequal exchange and characterised by unequal development. In sum, world-system approach argues that 
in order to understand the development of states' relations, we must keep our eye on the development of 
capitalism. We should, therefore, examine the world system, which is controlled by capitalism, in order to 
understand the fate of a particular country. Thus, states' foreign policy is shaped and guided by the world 
system and not by any other factor. See for details Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Immanuel Wallerstein, Unthinking Social Science: the 
Limits of Nineteenth-century Paradigms, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991). 
See the previous section- internal factor- for some details about it. 
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During and immediately after the Second World War the tradition of power politics was 
regenerated and reinvigorated in the US. John Herz, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, 
and Hans Morgenthau articulated what Morgenthau called 'political realism' in contrast 
to the utopianism or idealism in international politics. The works of E.H. Carr, Hans 
Morgenthau, George Kennan, Raymond Aron, Henry Kissinger, and Hadley Bull 
exemplify the realist tradition. They have built their works on the philosophical 
outlooks of the works of Thucydides (400 B.C.), Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), and 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). This kind of philosophy is not based only on the realm 
of 'what is' rather than 'what ought to be', but also on the realm of 'what can be'.^ ^ The 
measures of human beings, according to this philosophy, are their ability to extend their 
language of power and interests rather than of ideals and norms. 
Realist theory of international relations finds that the international system is based upon 
the following assumptions: 
• States are the key actors in international relations; 
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• States are unitary and rational actors; 
• Domestic politics can be clearly separated from foreign policy; 
• International politics is a struggle for power in anarchical international system; 
• Power is defined in terms of military capability only; 
83 
• There are gradations of capabilities among states; and 
^' Niccolo Machiavelli, for example, in The Prince suggested many strategies for the prince to adopt in 
order to enhance his sovereignty and maintain or regain the state's strength and independence. 
Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, pp. 
5-6. 
James Daugherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A 
Comprehensive Survey, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 81. 
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• Among the array of world issues national security tops the list for states as a 'high 
politics' issue. 
Having said this, realists rely heavily on the concept of power, rationality, and the 
balance of power. They characterised international politics as a struggle for power and 
that statesmen 'think and act in terms of interest defined as power'.Therefore, their 
focus on interests and power is central to their understanding of how nation-states deal 
and interact with each other. Morgenthau (1967) sees power not only as an instrument 
for the attainment of other ends in a competitive international system, but also as an end 
in itself. Due to the nature of human beings, realists assume that there is no essential 
harmony of interests among states. Instead, they argue that states often have conflicting 
national objectives, some of which may lead to war. Power to them is defined 
ultimately in military terms as recourse to force in war. 
Realists suggest that governments act rationally, that they have consistent, ordered 
preferences, and that they calculate the costs and the benefits of all alternative policies 
in order to maximise their utility in light of both of those preferences and their 
perceptions of the nature of reality. They recognise the problem of lack of information, 
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but they assume that decision-makers will try to achieve their best possible decision. 
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory, p. 7, and p. 36. 
Hans Morgentau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Alfred A 
Knopf, 1967), p. 5. 
Ibid., p. 25. 
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Relations Theory, pp. 35-36. 
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Furthermore, moral principles should not be applied to specific political action. 
Realists' concept of balance of power refers to a situation of equilibrium as well as to 
any situation in which power struggle takes place.^ ^ Its aim is to maintain stability of 
the system by preventing the emergence of any dominant state.^° Stability then depends 
on the preservation of power balance. 
The neo-realist approach to international politics came to introduce and define some key 
concepts of the classical realist theory differendy in order to integrate the classical 
theory into contemporary politics. Neo-realism identifies with the writings of Kenneth 
Waltz, particularly his book Theory of International Politics (1979). The writings of 
Robert Gilpin, George Modelski, Charles Kindleberger, and John Mearsheimer have 
also contributed to the development of neo-realist school of international relations. 
Waltz's aim in writing his book was 'to examine theories of international politics' and 
'construct a theory that remedies the defects of present theories'.Thus, he discussed 
what theories are, what they are not, and how they are made. Theories, to Waltz, are 
collections or sets of law pertaining to a particular behaviour. They are different from 
laws in a way that theories are statements that explain laws. Waltz argues that 'this 
meaning does not accord with usage in much of traditional political theory, which is 
concerned more with philosophic interpretation than with theoretical explanation'.^^ He 
Machiavelli, for example, justifies in his book The Prince the use of immoral means to achieve state's 
national ends. 
Hans Morgentau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 161-163. 
°^ James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 31. 
^' Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company, 1979), p. 
-^ Ibid., p. 6. 
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emphasises that 'in order to get beyond the facts of observation...we must grapple with 
the problem of explanation'.^'' Everyone can predict the sunrise and the sunsets, as he 
explained, on the basis of empirical findings without benefit of theories explaining why 
the phenomena occurs. To form theory requires first simplifications which 'lay bare the 
essential elements in play and indicate the necessary relations of cause and 
interdependency or suggest where to look for them'.^ "^ Simplification requires isolation, 
abstraction, aggregation, and idealisation. Second, theory requires also a set of common 
assumptions to make explanation possible. 
Waltz emphasises that a good theory of international politics must be systematic, since 
how the relationships among states are organised strongly affects governments' 
behaviours towards one another. A system, to him, consists of a set of interacting units 
exhibiting behavioural regularities and having identity over time. Thus, he rejects the 
'reductionist' theories and challenges the ideas of IVIorgenthau and Kissinger in 
believing that the preservation of peace and the maintenance of international stability 
depend on the attitudes and the internal characteristics of states. He also rejects 
Kissinger's argument of war and instability as a result of revolutionary states in 
international system, and argues that Kissinger looks at some states as war-like states. 
Waltz states: 
In order to turn a system approach into a theory, one has to move from the usual 
vague identification of systemic forces and effects to their more precise 
specification, to say what units the system compromise, to indicate the 
Ibid., p. 6. 
Ibid., p .10. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
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comparative weight of systemic and sub-systemic causes, and to show forces and 
effects change from one system to another. 
Thus, as he argues, we need to go beyond the description of international system to 
identify their structures, defined separately from the attributes of the relations between 
the units. To Waltz, 'system theories explain how the organisation of a realm acts as a 
constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it '.^^ They tell us about 
the forces the units are subjected to.^^ 'From them we can infer some things about the 
expected behaviour and fate of the unit'.^^ In other words, understanding the structure 
of the international system in Waltz's theory allows us to explain patterns of states 
behaviour, since they determine their interests and strategies on the basis of calculations 
about their own positions in the system. According to Waltz, we need first to 
understand the context of the action before we can understand the action itself. 
Since the structure of the international system shapes the political relations that take 
place among its members (states or units), it is important to know what Waltz means by 
'structure'. Waltz defines structure as the way in which the parts are arranged and 
ordered: 
Structure is not a collection of political institutions but rather the arrangement of 
them. ^  
Ibid., pp. 40-41. 
Ibid., p. 72. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 72. 
Ibid., p. 72. 
'"'^  Ibid., p. 81. 
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Waltz defines structure by three dimensions: 
1. By their ordering principles (hierarchical and anarchical) in which it is organised; 
2. By the specification of functions of formally differentiated parts; and 
3. By the distribution of capabilities among the units themselves. 
Waltz argues that since we live in an international system that is ordered by the 
principle of anarchy, we need not be concerned with the functions performed by the 
units, because they are functionally alike. There is no difference among units on the 
basis of their functions. Therefore, the key changes that we are to look for in 
international politics are changes in the distribution of capabilities among the system's 
units. As Waltz indicates: 
The structure of a system changes with the changes in the distribution of 
capabilities across the system's units...and changes in structure change 
expectations about how the units of the system will behave and about the 
outcome their interactions will produce.'^^ 
The most significant capabilities are those of the most powerful states. Small and large 
states differ f rom each other not by differences in the attributes and functions of the 
units but only by distinctions among them according to their capabilities. 
Neo-realism accepts the basic assumption of realism about the state being the main 
international actor in world politics and the assumption that states are mainly concerned 
about their survival. However, co-operation is not something impossible to achieve in 
the anarchical international society. States co-operate with each other in order to 
Ibid., pp. 88-101. 
Ibid., p. 97. 
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increase or upgrade their own capabilities.^^"^ Neo-realism explains state's international 
organisational behaviour by arguing that states are using international organisations to 
maximise their global status and increase their access to multilateral aid, information 
and technology while minimising sovereignty restricting conditionalities.'^"^ 
Waltz developed his theory of balance of power by using his understanding of 
international structure. To Waltz, a good theory wi l l not only point to the importance of 
power and the balance of power, as Morgenthau assumed, but wi l l account for the 
recurrent formation of balance of power in world politics, and can tell us how changing 
power configurations affect patterns of alignment, and conflict in world politics.'^^ 
From the anarchic nature of the international system and the assumption that states are 
'unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, 
drive for universal domination' Waltz infers that balance of power must necessarily 
emerge.'^^ And as states compete with each other in a competitive international system 
'they w i l l imitate each other and become socialised to their s y s t e m ' . A s a result of 
the absence of a universal authority capable of prohibiting the use of force, 'the balance 
of power among states becomes a balance of all the capabilities, including physical 
force that states choose to use in pursuing their goals'. '°^ 
'^ •^  See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985). 
Samuel S. Kim, 'China's International Organisational Behaviour', p. 29. 
'"-"^  Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 102-128. 
Ibid., p. 118. 
Ibid., p. 128. 
Kenneth N . Waltz, Man, the State, and War, (New Work: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 206. 
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According to Waltz, a system of two (bipolar) is more stable than a system of many 
( m u l t i p o l a r ) . W a l t z sees the problem of miscalculation by some or all of the great 
powers in the system of many may threaten the stability of the system. He found that 
both the U.S. and USSR depended militarily mainly on themselves, and balanced each 
other by their own capabilities, which is more reliable and precise than the external 
balancing and the capabilities of allies. Thus, he rejects the classical realists' view of 
bipolar system as an unstable system. 
Neo-realism argues that statesmen wi l l try to use all the means available to them in 
order to achieve their national ends . ' ' ° These means fal l into two categories: 
1. Internal efforts: move to increase economic capability, military strength, and 
develop clever strategies. 
2. External efforts: move to strengthen and enlarge one's own alliance or to weaken 
and shrink an opposition one. 
Neo-realism accepts all the assumptions made by the classical realists including the 
concept of power. However, the concept of power in neo-realism is not defined only in 
terms of military power. Instead, neo-realism defines power according to a wide range 
of capabilities. Waltz states: 
The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations can be sectored and 
separately weighted. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in 
one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the 
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 176-183. 
'"^ Ibid., p. 118. 
" ' Ibid., p. 118. 
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following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic 
capability, military strength, political stability and competence.^ 
Therefore, the measurement of a state's power in the international system is not only 
restricted to its military capability, as the classical realists would argue, but also to its 
performance in several different capabilities. Such combined-capabilities constitute a 
state's power in the international system. To neo-realism combined-capabilities is an 
important factor in providing the means of maintaining a state's autonomy in the face of 
force that others yield, permitting wider ranges of actions, and allowing wider margins 
of safety in dealing with the less powerful s t a t e s . ' T o illustrate this argument, Waltz 
later indicates that the lack of combined-capabilities has led to the disintegration of the 
former Soviet Union and the possibility of new comers to play the leading role in 
today's international system.''"^ Waltz argues that in order for a state to rise to great 
power status, through either challenging a leading state or attempting to reverse a state's 
decline, it has to rely on economic, political and military capabilities all together.''^ 
Therefore, states should use all their capabilities 'to serve their interests'.'*^ 
The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the neo-realist 
account threaten the bipolar status of the international system. Neo-realists have 
repeatedly emphasised since the end of the Cold War that main actors in the 
international system would work through realignment and enhancement of their own 
' " I b i d . , p. 131. 
Ibid., p. 194. 
Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International PoHtics', in International Security, 
volume 18, number 2, Fall 1993, pp. 44-79. 
Ibid., p. 76. 
'"^ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 131. 
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capabilities to prevent the emergence of a unipolar system dominated by one state. 
According to this analysis the shift f rom bipolarity towards unipolarity would mean the 
end of the anarchical system and the emergence of a hierarchical one. 
In sum, neo-realism asserts that i f we need to understand and explain states' foreign 
policies we should look at the structure - that is the number of poles- of the international 
system, which is said to be characterised of being anarchical and that distribution of 
capabilities is the only measurement that differentiate states' strengths in the 
international system. Within this framework, neo-realism argues that states' foreign 
policy w i l l be centred on their position in the system and their relationship with the 
main powers in it. States, therefore, w i l l work to either increase their capabilities 
relative to those main players in the system or strengthen their alliances. For example, 
during the Cold War era, the structure of the international system was dominated by 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. Therefore, states' foreign policies during 
this period were determined by their relations with these two powers. 
Like many other theories in international politics, neo-realism has received plenty of 
criticism. Christine Sylvester (1994) has argued that like many other international 
theories, neo-realism ignores women's role in world politics. She emphasises that neo-
realism tends to argue that state craft should remain 'man craft' because men have 
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ascribed to women qualities such as irrationality, intuition, and temptation. Richard 
Ashley (1986) argues that neo-realism is a static and conservative theory, which portray 
" C h r i s Brown, Understanding International Relations, (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997), p. 108. 
Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Post-modern Era, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
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the structure of the international system as though there is only one structure and its 
existence is independent of states rather than constructed by them. To him, neo-realism 
denies history as a process. ' A l l movement is confined within a closed field whose 
limits are defined by the pre-giving structure'. It denies men and women the practice of 
making their world. He said: 
Nowhere in neo-realist categories do we find room for the idea that men and 
women who are the subjects of theory can themselves theorise about their lives; 
are in fact engaged in a continuing struggle to shape and redefine their 
understanding of themselves, their circumstances, their agencies of collective 
action, and the very categories of social existence; do indeed orient their practices 
in light of their understandings; and, thanks to all of this, do give form and 
motion to the open-ended process by which the material conditions of their 
practices are made, reproduced, and transformed. Neo-realist structuralism 
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cannot allow this to be so. 
Robert Cox (1986) describes neo-realism as being a problem-solving theory that 'takes 
the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and 
institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action'. Its aim, 
according to Cox, 'is to make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by 
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dealing effectively with the particular source of trouble'. According to this analysis, 
neo-realism does not question the institutions as a whole, but seeks to 'solve the 
problems arising in various parts of a whole complex in order to smooth the functioning 
of the w h o l e ' . T h e r e f o r e , neo-realism to Cox is a theory that accepts the prevailing 
order and does not account for change in world order. John Ruggie (1986) has argued 
Richard K. Ashley, 'The Poverty of Neorealism', in Robert O. Keohane [ed.l, Neorealism and its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 291. 
'^ ^ Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', in 
ibid., p. 208. 
Ibid., p. 209. 
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against neo-realism and claimed that it cannot explain change and it must incorporate 
other variables - such as 'dynamic density' - to do this.'^^ 
2.2.1.1. Neo-realism and China's foreign policy 
Neo-realism, as we have seen above, would argue that states' foreign policy in 
international system is not nearly as complicated as observers make it sound, that all 
foreign policy behaviour can be explained and even determined by the structure of the 
international system. According to this school, states' national interests in an anarchical 
international system can be defined as securing their survival by increasing their 
economic, military and political capabilities in order to balance their power. Therefore, 
balance of power becomes an important principle in guiding the relations among states. 
To neo-realists, the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events, as 
the classical realists would argue, as it is imposed by events on statesmen. 
The Chinese leadership seems to function within the neo-realist's assumption of 
national interest (survival) and deploy all the efforts to increase its economic, military 
and political capabilities in the international system. Since its establishment, the PRC 
has given the issue of security high priority among all of its short-, medium-, and long-
range objectives in its foreign policy. The PRC has demonstrated its willingness to use 
military force and involve in military conflicts against any external threat to China's 
territorial security. This was evident in the Korean Peninsula where China militarily 
challenged the American troops in the early 1950s; in its 1962 war with India where 
John Gerard Ruggie, 'Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis', in ibid., pp. 131-155. 
'-^ Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War, p. 209. 
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Chinese troops penetrated inside the Indian territory and voluntarily withdrew later; in 
its border clashes with the Soviet Union in 1969 where many Chinese soldiers lost their 
lives; in its move to seize the Paracel (Xisha) Islands f rom Vietnam in 1974 in a brief 
naval battle; in its short war against Vietnam in early 1979 when the latter invaded 
Cambodia to overthrow the pro-Beijing regime of Pol Pot; and in its frequent military 
confrontations with the naval forces of the Philippines over the disputed Mischief Reef 
between the two countries throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The PRC has also 
demonstrated its seriousness to use force and any other means to protect the communist 
party and China's territory from any internal threat. The Chinese government's reaction 
to the Tiananmen Square's demonstrations of May 1989; its continued policy of 
arresting local human rights activists and prohibiting any opposition group to the rules 
and norms set by the CCP to work in China; and its continued belligerent rhetoric 
against Taiwan and its minorities indicate its basic policy towards internal threats. 
China's co-operation with other states is also centred on achieving its own national 
interest. Harvey W. Nelson (1981) and Donald W. Klein (1989) argue that China's 
changing alliances f rom the Soviet Union to the United States and its political and 
military supports for the Third World countries are guided by China's self interest to 
achieve its foreign policy objectives rather than promoting co-operation.^^"^ 
The post-Mao leadership has adopted the neo-realist's concept of power as capabilities. 
During the Cold War, the Maoist leadership saw power merely in military terms as the 
most dominant force in the international system and the relations among nations. The 
'^ "^  Harvey W. Nelson, The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People's 
Liberation Army, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 200-201; and Donald W. Klein, 'China 
and the Second World', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China and the World: New Directions in Chinese 
Foreign Relations, p. 144. 
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result was an increase in China's military capabilities by first, allying itself with either 
the Soviet Union to balance the power of the United States (1949-1959) or with the 
United States to balance the power of the Soviet Union (1970-1982); second, 
developing its own military capabilities, and promoting its objectives in the Third 
World through economic aid.^^^ Towards the twilight of the seventies, the Chinese 
leadership started to shift its understanding of the concept of power towards the neo-
realist's concept of capabilities. The proximity to the neo-realist's concept of power by 
the Chinese government is evident in China's Four Modernisations programme: the 
modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. In 
order for China to achieve superpower capabilities, the Chinese leadership has 
understood the significance of scoring well in all of these areas. Deng Xiaoping 
asserted in 1985 the importance of new capabilities to constitute power in the 
international system and stated: 
We should... recognise that the new revolution in science and technology all over 
the world is developing vigorously and that economic strength, science and 
technology play an outstanding role in world wide competition. Neither the 
United States and the Soviet Union, nor the other developed countries, nor the 
developing countries can afford to ignore this.^^^ 
Since then, China has embarked upon a foreign policy that would achieve a rapid 
increase in China's political, economic, and military capabilities relative to those of the 
main regional and international powers. 
'""^  For more details about China's aid programme to the countries of the Third World see, among many 
useful sources, John Franklin Copper, 'China's Foreign Aid in 1978', in Occasional Papers/ Reprints 
Series in Contemporary Asian Studies. 
'"'^ Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, p. 132. 
Chapter two: Theorising China's foreign policy 74 
The structures of the international system have affected the PRC's concept of balance of 
power. In the bipolar international system China was forced to balance its power with 
those of the two major superpowers by allying itself with either power. With the 
changes in the structure of the international system after the end of the Cold War China 
was obligated to upgrade its capabilities or yield new ones in order to prevent the 
transformation of the international system to a system dominated by a hostile country. 
This was evident in its efforts to increase its co-operation with the developed countries 
and Russia in order to create a common consent against the domination of the U.S. in 
world affairs; and in its efforts to work against the establishment of any form of 
strategic military alignment between a 'hostile' state and the countries of South and 
South East Asia. For instance, China has argued against trying to create a formal 
security regime in the region to parallel the organisation for security and co-operation in 
Europe; it has also campaigned against the U.S. promotion for the defence missile 
theatre to ensure the security of Japan, Taiwan, and all other U.S. allies in the region. 
China as Deng argued in 1990 should not belittle its importance in the multipolar world, 
instead it should be counted as one of the major poles in the post-Cold War international 
system. As a result, China has deployed all the efforts to speed up its Four 
Modernisations programme by involving in more economic and technological co-
operation with the developing countries and military co-operation with Russia and some 
other countries like Israel. The Four Modernisations programme is an effort to 
modernise China's economic and military capabilities. The Chinese government 
believe that in order for China to compete with the main actors in the international 
See Stephen A. Cambone, 'the United States and Theatre Missile Defence in Northeast Asia', in 
Survival, vol. 39, no. 3, Autumn 1997, pp. 66-84. 
'^^ Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, 341. 
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system it should, first of all, abandon many of its old rhetoric and, second, adopt new 
policies that can achieve a leading role for China in world affairs. Thus, as mentioned 
in the previous section, China adopted the 'open to the outside' policy, which has aimed 
at achieving a strong economy through co-operation and accepting foreign investments. 
But its involvement in international economic norms in the post-Cold War era reflects 
the neo-realist thinking. Denny Roy (1998) and Thomas J. Christensen (1996) have 
argued that China's co-operation in international and regional organisations is not 
governed by its commitment to the principle of political and economic integration 
among nations, but by the fact that China saw no other means of re-addressing its 
economic weaknesses.'^^ Therefore, By adopting the 'open to the outside' policy, the 
Chinese government has aimed at achieving a short-term and a long-term objective. 
The Chinese government's short-term objective was based on its willingness to achieve 
political stability inside China by creating more job opportunities for the Chinese. Its 
long-term objective, however, has been to achieve superpower capabilities that can 
allow China to assume a leading role in world affairs in general and Asian affairs in 
particular. 
China's drive towards modernising its economy coincided with efforts to modernise its 
military capability. As previously mentioned, the Chinese leadership has aimed also at 
strengthening its military capability and modernising its forces through achieving a 
strong economy. Despite the reduction in military spending in favour of more funding 
to modernise the economy during the 1980s, defence modernisation had not witnessed 
major setbacks. The Chinese defence and security specialists began in the mid-1980s to 
'•^ ^ Denny Roy, China's Foreign Relations, p. 229; and Thomas J. Christensen, 'Chinese Realpolitik', in 
Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 5, September/October 1996, pp. 37-51. 
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emphasise a new Chinese defence strategy. The new strategy viewed world conflict in 
terms of the inevitability of the old assumption of a global nuclear war to the possibility 
of more limited and regional wars.'^° Thus, superpowers' influence is reduced and the 
potential for local and regional wars are increased with the emergence of many regional 
powers.^''' The massive military action against Iraq and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union demonstrated the need for China's military determination to possess a 
modernised force capable of defending China against any internal and external threat. 
New and modern war conditions that were demonstrated by the West in the Gulf against 
Iraq articulated the need for China to modernise its own military strategy. Such new 
perspective of international conflict has left its mark on the Chinese defence budget. 
For the first time since the seventies, the official Chinese military expenditure had 
increased continuously between 1990 and 1996 despite the fal l in global military 
spending since 1992*^^ (see table 2.2). 
I t is important to note that the estimated figures of China's military expenditure are two 
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to four times higher than the official figures. The broad range of the Chinese 
People's Liberation Army's (PLA) commercial economic activities, its covert 
Shulong Chu, 'China and Strategy: the PRC Girds for Limited High-Tech War', in Orbis, Spring 
1994, pp. 177-178. 
Lin Qinggong, 'The Changing International Military Pattern from Old to New: Development Trends in 
the World Military Situation', in Foreign Broadcast Information System (hereafter FBIS), number 118, 
June 1992, pp. 26-27. 
For a good analysis of the PRC's defence budget increase see Nicole Ball, Bengt-Goran Bergstrand, 
Steven M . Kosiak, Evamaria Loose-weintaub, David Shambaugh, and Erik Whitlock, 'World Military 
Expenditure', in SIPRI Yearbook 1994: World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 441-448. 
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Table 2.2: China's military expenditures, official figures, 1976-1996 
Year b. Yuan, Current US$b., Constant Percentage of Share 
Values of Gross Domestic 
Product 
1976 13.4 7.0 5.0 
1977 14.9 7.6 5.6 
1978 16.8 8.5 5.6 
1979 22.3 11.1 6.6 
1980 19.3 9.0 5.3 
1981 16.8 7.6 4.3 
1982 17.6 7.8 4.1 
1983 17.7 7.7 3.7 
1984 18.1 7.6 3.2 
1985 19.1 7.2 2.7 
1986 20.1 7.1 2.4 
1987 21.0 6.8 2.3 
1988 22.0 5.5 1.5 
1989 25.0 5.4 1.6 
1990 29.0 6.1 1.6 
1991 33.0 6.7 1.6 
1992 38.0 7.2 1.6 
1993 43.0 7.1 1.4 
1994 55.0 7.5 1.4 
1995 63.0 7.4 1.6 
1996 75.0 8.2 1.6 
Numbers from 1976 to 1987 are based on 1988 prices. 
Numbers from 1988 to 1996 are based on 1990 prices. 
Sources: SIPRI Yearbook 1991: World Armaments and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 157; and SIPRI Yearbook 1997: World Armament and Disarmament, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), pp. 196-203. 
programmes, and the higher inflation figure make it very hard for analysts to know 
exactly what China's military spending actually is. China's defence modernisation 
programme has also shifted China's focus towards building quality arms rather than 
quantity, raising the level of education of the FLA officer corps, replacing elderly 
officers by younger men, decreasing military participation in politics, and reducing 
headquarters, staff and ground, air and naval f o r c e s . T o raise the level of its armed 
134 Lonnie D. Henley, 'China's Military Modernization: A Ten Year Assessment', in Larry M . Wortzel 
[ed.], China's Military Modernization: International Implications, (London: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 
100-107. 
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forces, China has moved far f rom strategies and military operations associated with 
'people's war' to military exercises conducted under nuclear conditions. 
Modernisation means also developing a more sophisticated nuclear capability. China's 
nuclear capability is estimated to contain about 395 warheads structured in short, 
medium, long and intercontinental ranges of land-based missiles, bombers and 
submarine launched missiles. " In 1997 China deployed the Dong Feng (East Wind)-
31 (DF-31) a land-based intercontinental missile with a range of 8,000 kilometres and 
ability to carry one 200-300-kt warhead. It is also developing the 12,000 kilometre 
range I C B M DF-41, which is scheduled for deployment around 2010, and the 8,000 
kilometre range Julang (Great Wave)-2, known to NATO as CSS-N-4, as a submarine-
launched ballistic missile to be available in the late 1 9 9 0 s . C h i n a has worked to gain 
foreign technology to modernise its military capabilities by purchasing the American F-
15-equivalent Sukhoi (Su)-27 fighter bomber f rom Russia in 1992 and increasing its 
military co-operation with Russia through signing a five-year military co-operation 
accord in 1993.''^^ Under another agreement Russia agreed to sell production rights to 
China to assemble and produce Su-27s in China. Reports indicated that China 
'^ ^ In late 1982 the Chinese military conducted exercises in the northern part of China useing simulated 
tactical nuclear weapons, Paul H. B. Godwin, 'People's War Revised: Military Doctrine, Strategy, and 
Operations', in Charles D. Loveijoy, Jr. and Bruce W. Watson [eds.], China's Military Reforms: 
International and Domestic Implications, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986), pp. 1-3; and for a 
good discussion about this topic see also Richard Fieldhouse, 'China's Mixed Signals on Nuclear 
Weapons', in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, volume 47, number 4, May 1991, pp. 37-42. 
'^^ SIPRI Yearbook 1997: World Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 401. 
Ibid., p. 401. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 401. 
'"'^  For Chinese-Russian military co-operation see Bin Yu, 'Sino-Russian Military Relations: Implications 
for Asian Pacific Security', in Asian Survey, volume 33, number 3, March 1993, pp. 302-316. 
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concluded in 1997 a new military agreement with Russia that included the purchase of 
two Sovermeny-class destroyers equipped with SS-N-22 submarine anti-ship cruise 
missiles (ASCMs) with a range of 100 kilometres. China has also received assistance 
f rom Israel in developing the American F-16-equivalent and the American-Israeli-built 
Lavi-equivalent J-10 fighter-bomber.'"^^ Many official and unofficial Western reports 
have concluded that Israel has supplied assistance to China in air defence, air-to-air 
missiles, upgraded Chinese combat aircraft, and improved Chinese tanks. ^ "^^ Israeli 
transfers of military related technology to China since 1982 is estimated to be valued at 
$2-3 billion.'"^^ In 1997 China signed an agreement with Israel in which the latter would 
install a radar system on the Russian Dyushin 11-76 aircraft, which was secretly 
transferred to Israel f rom Russia.'"^^ The development of the J-10, the purchase of the 
Su-27, and the efforts to own an early-warning spy plane are considered essential steps 
in strengthening China's air power. China has also gradually upgraded many of its 
Chinese-made weapon systems by acquiring more advanced technology from countries 
like France, Germany, Italy, Canada, the U.S.,'"^"^ and South Africa.'"^^ Its acquisition of 
some 100 Patriot-like S-300s surface-to-air missiles f rom Russia indicates that China is 
''^ ^ David A. Fulghum, 'New Chinese Fighters Nears Prototyping', in Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, volume 142, number 11, 13 March 1995, pp. 26-27; and David A. Fulghum, 'China Pursuing 
Two Fighter Plan', in Ibid., volume 142, number 13, 27 March 1995, pp. 44-45. 
Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, SIPRI Research Report No. 11: China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad: A 
Quest for 'Superb Secret Weapons', (London: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 81-86. 
142 Ibid., p. 83. 
'^^ ^ Due to U.S. pressure on Israel, the agreement remained unimplemented. See report by Israeli 
newspaper Ha'aretz on 2 November 1999, in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts (hereafter SWB), 
MEW/0614, WME, 9 November 1999, p.9; and BBC, SWB, MEW/0615 WME, 16 November 1999, p. 7. 
See Ibid., pp. 73-80; and Ngok Lee, China's Defence Modernisation and Military Leadership, 
(Oxford: Pergamon Press Pic, 1989). 
'"^ "^  China signed in February 1997 an arms deal with South Africa for the Chinese purchase of South 
African military equipment worth about 1 billion rands, BBC, SWB, FE/2834, 4 February 1997, p. G/1. 
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either upgrading its air system defence or starting a new missile defence effort.'"*^ In 
line with the PLA's new defence strategy, China has acquired in 1994 the Russian Kilo-
class submarine to safeguard its territorial waters in the South China Sea and to add new 
submarine technology to its own submarine programme.'"^^ 
All the above shows that China has adopted a neo-realist understanding to speed up its 
economic and military modernisation through its Four Modernisations programme in 
order to ensure the survival and security of the PRC and its communist party leadership. 
The Chinese understanding of the concept of balance of power is also neo-realist. Neo-
realists would argue that the balance of power is imposed by events on statesmen rather 
than by statesmen on events. In the case of the PRC, events such as the American 
military involvement in Korea, the Soviet military movements along the Ussri River, 
the Soviet penetration around the world, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
massive American victory against Iraq in the Kuwait Crisis, and the rapid increase in oil 
consumption in China all have determined the patterns in which China balances its 
power with the different actors in the international system. Due to such events, China 
has shifted its strategy from strengthening its military capability to building combined-
capability, and from the inevitability of a global nuclear conflict to developing a new 
understanding based on more advanced and limited regional conflicts. 
David B. H. Denoon and Wendy Frieman, 'China's Security Strategy: The View from Beijing, Asia, 
and Washington', in Asian Survey, volume 36, number 4, 4 April 1996, p. 425. 
Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, SIPRl Research Report No. 77, pp. 60-63. 
Chapter two: Theorising China's foreign policy 
Another neo-realist's assessment in China's foreign poHcy is the fact that the CCP 
leadership has always used the concept of power not as an end in itself, as the classical 
realist would argue, but as a means to achieve other ends. Domestically, power in terms 
of capabilities is very helpful in maintaining security and political stability. By 
strengthening its economy and preserving the internal political stability the CCP is 
going to rule without a strong opposition. Internationally, power in terms of combined-
capability is important to enhance China's international status, and enable it to achieve 
more influence in international affairs.^ "^^ 
Therefore, China's foreign policy is a reflection of the structure of the international 
system that China lives in. During and after the bipolar world system China worked to 
balance its power in the system by aligning itself with one power in order to undermine 
the power of the other, and by increasing its capabilities relative to those of the main 
powers in the system. Therefore, China's relations with the main powers in the system 
dictated China's foreign policy with the rest of the world. 
2.3. Conclusion 
From the above discussion we find that the study of China's foreign policy is based on 
several assumptions. The first is that theorising China's foreign behaviour is not 
something that can simply be explained by a single theoretical approach or model. 
Many aspects of China's foreign behaviour can be looked at differently through 
different theoretical perspectives. The second assumption is that the two factors 
Robert Gilpin, a leading neo-realist, emphasises this point by arguing that economic, military, and 
technological capabilities present the means for states to pursue not only wealth and economic gain but 
also political power in world affairs, Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
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(internal and external) are the most used frameworks by scholars and researchers in 
explaining China's foreign policy. Such focus paralleled with few studies that used a 
combination of both factors in studying China's foreign policy behaviour. The third 
assumption is that the aim in using a certain theoretical approach to explain China's 
foreign policy behaviour is to simplify and carry the researcher's argument coherently 
throughout the research. 
Therefore, the researcher believes that the neo-realist explanation of international 
relations is the most useful framework for the purpose of this study. Based on all the 
previous assumptions, the researcher finds that China's foreign policy behaviour 
towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region is largely consistent with the neo-realist 
theoretical approach of international relations (the external factor). China's perceptions 
and relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union on the one hand, and 
China's drive towards increasing its economic, political, and military capabilities on the 
other are the most dominant factors in shaping China's foreign policy towards the Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula region. Thus, the earlier discussions on the external factor, 
namely the neo-realist assumptions of foreign policy, will serve as our guide for the 
study of China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. 
The researcher's argument throughout this thesis can be summarised in the following 
manner: 
• China's foreign policy behaviour towards the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula region 
from October 1949 to 1999 had been guided by China's perception of, and relations 
with both the United States and the Soviet Union, and China's drive to upgrade its 
economic, political, and military capabilities. These two factors had formulated a 
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platform for the Chinese government's policy behaviour towards the Gulf and 
Peninsula countries during this period. 
In order for the researcher to carry this argument forward he shall first survey China's 
relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union so as to capture a clearer 
understanding of the effects of these relations on China's policy towards the Gulf and 
Peninsula region. Such a subject will be addressed in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER T H R E E 
CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, 
THE SOVIET UNION/RUSSIA 
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As shown in chapter two, the study of the PRC's foreign policy behaviour has witnessed 
different theoretical approaches by scholars and researchers. Since we argue that 
China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region depends on 
China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, this chapter is going 
to discuss China's foreign relations with both powers. China's relations with both 
superpowers and the superpowers interactions with each other along with its view of the 
world are the keys to understanding China's policy towards the Gulf and Peninsula 
region. And since China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union 
have changed, China's involvement in the Gulf and Peninsula region has also changed 
with time. The change reflects China's overall analysis of the international system and 
its relations with the main actors in it. China's relations with both powers will be 
discussed here chronologically. 
3.1. China's early interactions with the superpowers (1949-1954) 
China-superpowers relations have evolved throughout different stages since the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949. Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong's Thought played a 
profound role in the PRC's relations with both superpowers during the first three 
decades of their interactions. Mao Zedong's perception of the 'enemy' and his theory 
of contradictions' brought the PRC's leadership to view the Soviet Union as China's 
most trusted partner in the 1950s, and as China's most dangerous enemy in the 1970s. 
It also brought them to engage in a hostile relationship with the U.S. in the 1950s, and 
in strategic alignment in the 1970s. In addition to ideology, history, another component 
of China's foreign policy discussed in the previous chapter, had also guided the PRC's 
views and relations with both superpowers. Mindful of the past century of humiliation 
' See the ideology section in the previous chapter for further details. 
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and foreign domination, the CCP's leadership was very careful not to view the 
Americans positively. The CCP's leadership criticised the China Aid Act, which was 
approved by the U.S. Congress on April 2, 1948, to provide military and economic 
assistance to the national government in Taiwan.^ The CCP's leadership considered the 
act as a policy that contributed to the extension of the civil war, without it the nationalist 
government would have surrendered a long time ago and all China would have unified 
under the leadership of the CCP.^  
Mao Zedong saw the U.S. as the 'primary enemy' that contradicted the newly 
established communist state in China in its early days. In order for the PRC to advance 
further, according to Mao's theory of contradictions, it had to resolve its principle 
contradiction, the U.S., first before advancing to the next stage. As a result, the Soviet 
Union was viewed by the CCP's leadership as the best available alternative to ally itself 
with, in order to exploit the Americans, maintain its security, and achieve its national 
goals of restoring its lost territories. This policy was marked by the conclusion of the 
Chinese-Soviet alliance on February 14, 1950 with the signing of: 
1. A treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual assistance that bounded the two sides to 
assist one another against Japan or any state aiding Japan in aggression;"^  
^ See, among many, D.C. Gupta, The United States Attitudes towards China, (Bombay: S. Chan & Co., 
1969), p. 212. 
^ Robert Garson, The United States and China Since 1949, (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University 
Press, 1994), p. 24. 
The treaty concluded that: 1) the PRC and the USSR should 'take all necessary measures...for the 
purpose of preventing repetition of aggression and violation of peace on the part of Japan, directly or 
indirectly, in the act of aggression; 2) either side should not take part in 'any coalition or action or 
measures directed against the other'; 3) both would consult each other in regard to 'all important 
international problems affecting the common interests' of both countries; and 4) both should not interfere 
in each others internal affairs. For the text, see Grant F Rhode, Reid E. Whitlock, Treaties of the People's 
Republic of China, 1949-1978: An Annotated Compilation, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), 
pp. 15-16. 
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2. An agreement providing that after the signing of a peace treaty with Japan, and not 
later than 1952, the Soviet Union would transfer, free of charge, all of its rights in 
Manchuria to China and withdraw its troops from the Port of Arthur naval base; and 
3. An agreement on the granting of long-term credits to the amount of $300 million to 
the PRC. 
Recognising the weakness and vulnerability of its regime particularly in developing of 
modern industry and administrating large urban areas, the Chinese government looked 
to the Soviet experience and assistance to ful f i l its needs. It adopted the Soviet 
economic model in its first five-year plan in 1953. By the first half of the 1950s, more 
than half of China's annual foreign trade was with the Soviet Union.^ Throughout the 
1950s more than 100,000 Soviet technical specialists and advisors went to China to 
train and supervise Chinese personnel; and during the first plan period over 7,000 
Chinese were trained in Soviet enterprises, in addition about 10,000 Chinese scientists 
were trained by the Soviet Academy of Science.^  The Chinese also adopted the Soviet 
methods of agriculture and received Soviet assistance in the field.^ The Soviet Union 
provided training programmes for Chinese pilots and soldiers.^ Some writers accounted 
that during the Korean War the Soviet Union supplied China with military assistance to 
the value of $2,000 million, including about 1000 MiG-15 aircraft, aid to war industries 
in Manchuria, and to China's transport system.^  The Soviets despatched to China in 
O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia: 'The Great Game', (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 
p. 392. 
A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, (Washington, D.C.: the Brookings 
Institution, 1977), p. 28. 
^ Peter Mayer, Sino-Soviet Relations Since the Death of Stalin, (Kowloon, Hong Kong: Union Research 
Institution, 1962), pp. 118-121. 
^ Ibid., pp. 59-64. 
^ Alan J. Day, China and the Soviet Union, 1949-84, (Essex: Longman Group Limited, 1985), p. 3. 
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1952 1,000 to 25,000 Soviet experts each for the Chinese airforce and navy, and 5,000 
to 10,000 for the Chinese army in 1953.^ ^ Nonetheless, the Chinese were required to 
pay for the military supplies they received from the Soviet Union during the Korean 
War." PRC-USSR collaboration was advanced by Moscow's offer to China and other 
communist countries in January 1955 to extend the Soviet's scientific and technological 
assistance in connection with the utilisation of atomic energy for peaceful uses. 
Walter C. Clemens Jr. (1968) argues that by the late 1950s the Soviet Union had 
13 
delivered short- and medium-range missiles to China. Even the death of Stalin in 
March 1953 did not slow down the PRC-USSR relationship. Instead, there was a 
substantial increase in the economic and technological co-operation between the two 
countries that allowed the relationship to reach its highest level of friendship and co-
operation between 1953-1956. This period was highlighted by Nikita Khrushchev's 
visit to Beijing in 1954 during which he agreed to help build 156 production enterprises 
in China. 
Unlike the close PRC-USSR relationship, the PRC-USA relationship in this period was 
extremely hostile. This relationship was marked mainly by the United States 
involvement in the Korean Peninsula and its pohcy in Asia. With the outbreak of the 
Korean War, U.S. President Henry Truman, who was prior to the war unwilling to 
challenge the Chinese communists over Taiwan, declared on June 27, 1950 that a 
Immanuel C.Y Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, Sixth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
p. 661. 
' ' A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 30. 
O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia, p. 408. 
'•^  Walter C. Clemens Jr., The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, (Stanford University, California: the 
Hoover Institution Publication, 1968), p. 32. 
'"^  Immanuel Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 661. 
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communist attack on the island would be viewed as a threat to U.S. interest in Asia. He, 
therefore, sent the U.S. seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait to block any attempt by 
China to seize Taiwan.'^ The Chinese government referred to the American action as 
an American 'occupation' of Taiwan.'^ As a consequence, the USA became China's 
primary enemy leading the 'imperialist camp' against the 'socialist camp'. The conflict 
between the two camps, to the CCP's leadership, would lead to a victory for the 
socialists.'^ Meanwhile a 'united front' with the socialist camp was a desirable strategy 
for the CCP leadership to defeat U.S. imperialism. As a result, the PRC-USA 
relationship was severely constrained in the 1950s. The two sides engaged in a bloody 
conflict in Korea, dangerous crises in the Taiwan Strait, and an intense war in Vietnam. 
While the U.S. viewed China as a Soviet agent trying to promote the communisation of 
Asia, PRC viewed the U.S. as an imperialist power seeking to dominate and exploit 
third world countries. 
As a result, the USA waged an extensive campaign to isolate and contain the PRC. This 
policy was marked by the following: 
1. The U.S. negative perception of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the belief that any 
18 
communist victory anywhere was a threat to the USA; 
2. The rapid increases in the U.S. defence budget to maintain the troops in Korea and 
to strengthen the U.S. naval forces in Asia; 
For more details, see Lewis McCarrol Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy: McCarthyism and the 
Diplomacy of Hysteria, 1947-1951, (New York: New Viewpoints, 1976). 
Harold C. Hinton, 'Peking-Washington: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United States', in The 
Washington Papers, volume IV, (London: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 16. 
For more details see the previous chapter.. 
See Robert Jervis, 'The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War', in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
volume 24, number 4, December 1980, p. 584. 
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3. The establishment of U.S. military bases, bilateral and multilateral alliances, and 
military and economic aid programmes with the friendly states in Asia. These 
included bilateral defence treaties with Japan and the Philippines in 1952, Taiwan in 
December 1954; and by 1954 the U.S. had organised two alliance systems: the 
Australian-New Zealand-United States alliance in 1951 and the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO); 
4. An increase in the U.S. commitment to the security of Eastern European countries 
against any Soviet attack by militarising NATO; and 
5. An increase in the U.S. efforts to prevent the PRC from developing external 
contacts, gaining recognition in the UN, and conducting state-to-state diplomatic 
and trade relations with the rest of the world. 
The CCP's leadership viewed this U.S. containment policy as aggressive and a threat to 
China's security. Therefore, along with increasing its ties with the Soviet Union in the 
first half of the 1950s, China began in the second half of the 1950s to woo, for the first 
time, the non-communist states of Asia and Africa. China's foreign policy strategy was 
shifted from continuing its hostile propaganda against the non-communist states of the 
Third World towards attempting to win their sympathy and create an international 
united front against U.S. policies. This foreign policy strategy reached its peak around 
the time of the Bandung conference in 1955. 
3.2. China and the changing of its foreign policy strategy (1955-1969) 
PRC's foreign policy towards the superpowers started to change in the second half of 
the 1950s. This movement was reflected by the change in China's view of the Soviet 
Union after its adoption of Khrushchev's new policy of peaceful coexistence with the 
United States. Khrushchev introduced this policy at the 20^ ^ Congress of the Soviet 
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Communist Party on February 14-25, 1956. His new policy stemmed from the 
following arguments: 
1. That the establishment of friendly relations with the capitalist nations based on the 
'five principles of peaceful coexistence' would be of great importance for world 
peace; 
2. Rejection of Lenin's theory that war is inevitable as long as capitalism exists. He 
argued that wars could be prevented through social and political forces; and 
3. Unlike Beijing, Moscow believed in the peaceful transformation of capitalist 
countries to socialism.'^ 
Khrushchev's new foreign policy contrasted Mao's thought of advocating struggle for 
resolving contradiction, namely the United States and the capitalist camp. The Chinese 
feared that Khrushchev's new policy and his attack on Stalin in the 20^ *^  congress would 
weaken the unity of the communist block in its struggle against the capitalist world. In 
an attempt to pull the Soviet's leadership away from its policy of peaceful coexistence 
with the West, Mao travelled to Moscow during its celebration of the fortieth 
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1957. During his visit, Mao 
made his remark on 'the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind'. Mao's 
assessment was that the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union, with its 
development of a hydrogen bomb in 1953, ICBM capability, and technological 
advancement with the placement of first earth satellite into orbit in 1957, had become 
technologically stronger than the imperialist camp headed by the United States. His 
remarks were directed towards the argument that the Soviet Union should share its 
For the discussion of Khrushchev's report see Bertran D. Wolfe, Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost: Text, 
Background and Meaning of Khrushchev's Secret Report to the Twentieth Congress on the Night of 
February 24-25, 1956, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1957); A. Avtorkhanov, 'The 
Political Outlook after the Twentieth Party Congress', in The Bulletin, volume 3, number 5, May 1956, 
pp. 3-19; and Hermann Achminov, 'Social Conflicts at the Twentieth Party Congress', in ibid., pp. 20-29. 
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technological advantage with the rest of the socialist countries and advance the cause of 
communism throughout the world even at the risk of nuclear war.^ ^ However, the 
Soviet's leadership did not favour the Chinese strategy. They viewed it as unprofitable 
to the Soviet's interests and believed that it could lead to vast destruction. By 1957 the 
CCP's leadership became convinced that the Soviet's leadership was not willing to 
challenge militarily the imperialist camp, nor was it prepared to transfer its technology 
to the task of turning the PRC into a major military and economic power. Therefore, 
despite Soviet disapproval, the CCP's leadership decided in February 1958 to use 
China's own energy to build and develop PRC economy over the next three years 
through the Great Leap Forward. The Great Leap Forward was marked by a general 
turning-away from the Soviet Union. The Soviet model in military training was 
abandoned, and the PRC previous policy of relying for its industrial development on 
large industrial complexes built with Soviet aid was cancelled and replaced with a 
policy of constructing hundreds of thousands of small and medium plants all over 
China.^' 
The divergence in the PRC-USSR foreign pohcy escalated in 1958 after the following: 
1. The CCP's leadership was distressed at Khrushchev's 'soft' response to the Western 
landings in the Middle East, Lebanon and Jordan, in the summer of 1958. While the 
Chinese advocated the use of force against the Western military action, the Soviets 
adopted a political approach to solve the situation and accepted the Western 
For a good discussion of this issue see, among many, David Floyd, Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short 
History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1963), pp. 48-60; 
Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), pp. 160-165; and John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and 
Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967, (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 79-84. 
^' R. K . I Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short History, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p. 
122. 
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proposal for emergency summit meetings within the framework of the UN Security 
Council ;^ ^ and 
2. The CCP's leadership was disappointed at the value of their alliance with the Soviet 
Union during China's military attack on the Quemoy Island in August-October 1958 
in an attempt to seize Taiwan. During the crisis, the Soviet Union limited its 
support to issuing a statement of warning; and not until the crisis had passed the 
danger point did Khrushchev threaten the use of nuclear weapons in the event of a 
nuclear attack on China. Other than that the Chinese received no Soviet military 
assistance to enable them to recover the island."^ ^ The crisis demonstrated to the 
Chinese that the Soviet Union was not prepared to give China the support it desired. 
Despite the signing of several agreements between the PRC and the USSR in 1958 and 
1959,^ "^  the PRC-USSR relationship continued to spiral downwards from 1959 troubled 
by disagreement over the following issues: 
1. The Soviet refusal in mid-1959 to supply China with a sample of an atomic bomb 
and technical data related to its manufacture;^^ 
2. The Soviet declaration of neutrality between China and India in their border clashes 
in August 1959, and its continuing economic and military assistance to India 
"^ Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, pp. 195-199; and John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet 
Dispute, pp. 89-92. 
-^^  Ibid., pp. 200-217. 
'^^  This included the signing of protocol to govern their scientific and technical collaboration on July 4, 
1958; the signing of agreement on August 8, 1958 for providing Soviet aid to China in designing and 
installing industrial plan; and the signing of agreement on February 7, 1959 to supply China with 
equipment, materials, technical assistance, and training programmes. 
See ibid., pp. 102-109. 
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including the transfer of eight four-engine troop transports in 1961, and helicopters 
and MiG-21 jet fighters in 1962;^ ^ 
3. Khrushchev's visit to Washington in September 1959 and his appeal for a peaceful 
coexistence and universal disarmament; 
4. The establishment of friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 
May/October 1962; 
5. The Cuban Crisis of October 1962; 
6. The Soviet Union signing of nuclear test-ban treaty on July 25, 1963 with the USA 
and UK in Moscow. 
In April 1960 the Chinese government made public for the first time its ideological 
differences with the Soviet Communist Party. An article written in the April issue of 
1960 of Red Flag titled 'Long Live Leninism!' warned against the idea that the nature 
of imperialism had changed in any way since Lenin's time and contrasted Khrushchev's 
views of peaceful coexistence and his argument on the inevitability of war. 
Furthermore, despite the attempts to resolve differences within the communist 
movement during the Bucharest Conference of June 20-26, 1960, Peng Zhen, head of 
the Chinese delegation to the Conference, contested in his speech Khrushchev's 
argument that war was no longer inevitable. Peng declared that 'as long as imperialism 
A. Doak Barnett, China and the Major Powers in East Asia, p. 37, and p. 46; and for the nature of 
China-India conflict see Chih H. Lu, The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, (New York: Greenwood Press, 
1986). 
See Allen S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split', in Roderick Macfarquhar and John K. Fairbank [eds.], 
The Cambridge History of China, volume 14, part 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 
521; O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia, p. 469. 
See Red Flag, 16 April 1960; or Peking Review, number 17, 1960. 
Chapter three: China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia 94 
exists there will always be the danger of war'.^^ The Soviets criticised the Chinese 
position in a letter sent to the CCP. The Chinese replied by criticising the Soviet party 
position in ignoring Stalin's policies and putting forward a new policy without 
previously consulting the other communist parties.^° Since then the Chinese 
government began to refer to the Soviet government as 'revisionist'. In July 1960 the 
Soviet specialists started to depart from China because of the 'mistreatment and 
disregard to their expertise' as the Soviet reported.^' 
In 1962 and 1963 the PRC-USSR conflicts escalated further over the nuclear arms 
control agreements. On July 31, 1963 the CCP issued a strongly worded statement 
denouncing the test-ban treaty agreement. The statement said: 
This treaty signed in Moscow is a big fraud to fool the people of the world. It 
runs diametrically counter to the wishes of the peace-loving people of the world. 
The people of the world demand a genuine peace; this treaty provides them with 
a fake peace.'''^ 
On behalf of the Chinese government, Premier Zhou Enlai sent a letter to the leaders of 
all states on August 2, 1963 proposing a world conference of heads of governments to 
discuss the matter.'''' 
'Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation', The China Quarterly, number 3, July-September 1960, pp. 
114-115; and Edward Crankshaw, The New Cold War: Moscow V. Peking, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 
1965), pp. 97-110. 
Alan J. Day, China and the Soviet Union, pp. 20-21; and ibid., John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet 
Dispute, pp. 123-128. 
^' O. Edmund Clubb, China & Russia, pp. 445-446. 
Quoted in ibid., John Gittings, Survey of the Sino-soviet Dispute, p. 187. 
China Reconstructs, volume 12, number 10, October 1963, p. 1. 
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By 1963 the Chinese leadership became convinced that the nature of the threat had 
fundamentally changed towards both the 'imperialist power' of the United States and 
the 'revisionist government' of the Soviet Union. Many attempts to bring about a 
measure of reconciliation between the two sides were rejected by the Chinese party 
including several proposals for a world communist conference and a united front to aid 
North Vietnam."^ "^  The PRC boycotted a number of communist conferences in Moscow. 
Challenging the Soviets, the Chinese carried their own aid programmes to revolutionary 
movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.''^ It also sought to influence Third 
World countries through promoting the second Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference to be 
held without the presence of the Soviet Union.'^ ^ The Chinese stressed the need for an 
international united front against both superpowers. Lin Biao's Peking Review article 
'Long Live the Victory of People War' on 3 September 1965 criticised Khrushchev's 
view that the Soviet line of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition would lead to 
'a world without wars'. It argued that 'the general line of the Khrushchev revisionists is 
nothing other than the demand that all the oppressed peoples and nations and all the 
countries which have won independence should lay down their arms and place 
themselves at the mercy of the U.S. imperialists and their lackeys who are armed to the 
teeth', the article went to say that 'to win the struggle against U.S. imperialism and 
carry people's wars to victory, the Marxist-Leninists and revolutionary people 
throughout the world must resolutely oppose Khrushchev revisionism'.^^ 
34 Allan J. Day, China and the Soviet Union, pp. 47-59. 
For example, the PRC provided North Vietnam with MiG-17 jet fighters and trained Vietnamese pilots 
in China; it also granted Tanzania with credit of $42 million, and Pakistan with a long-term interest free 
loan of $60 million in 1964, see ibid., Allan S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split', pp. 529-536. 
Charles Neuhauser, Third World Politics: China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, 
1957-1967, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: East Asian Research Centre, Harvard University, 1968). 
37 Peking Review, number 36, 3 September 1965, pp. 9-30. 
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The CCP, temporarily and for the first time, proved wilHng to readjust its view of the 
Soviet Union after the removal of Khrushchev on October 14, 1964. The CCP 
congratulated Leonid Brezhnev, and hoped that the new leader would bring the Soviet 
Communist Party closer to the Chinese Communist party. Zhou Enlai made a state visit 
to Moscow on November 5-13, 1964 for the celebration of the anniversary of the 
Bolshevik R e v o l u t i o n . A day after Zhou's arrival, Brezhnev made a public speech in 
which he stated that Moscow would continue its foreign policy laid down by 
Khrushchev. This declaration along with their differences on how to resolve the 
Vietnam war''^  led the Chinese to criticise the Soviet's new leadership directly for the 
first time since the dismissal of Khrushchev. An editorial published in Peking Review 
on June 18, 1965 declared that the Soviet's new leaders 'have not departed from the 
essence, namely of Khrushchev's revisionism, splittism, great power chauvinism, and 
Soviet-U.S. co-operation for the domination of the world'. 
With the introduction of the Cultural Revolution, at the 11^ *^  Plenary Session of the 
Chinese Party's Central Committee held on August 1-12 1966, the PRC isolated itself 
diplomatically, economically, and socially from the outside world. Thomas Robinson 
(1991) argues that despite its isolationism, the PRC's foreign policy during the Cultural 
Revolution was in line with its overall previous foreign policy."^' Following the session, 
the Chinese party's central committee adopted, on August 12, a communique that 
'Quartedy Chronicle and Documentation', in The China Quarterly, number 21, January-March 1965, 
pp. 208-209. 
The Soviet Union made repeated efforts to bring about negotiated settlement to the war, the Chinese 
consistently opposed any suggestion of compromise to settle the Vietnam War, see Orbis, Summer 1965, 
p. 9-2. 
Peking Review, number 25, 18 June 1965, pp. 5-10. 
Thomas Robinson, 'China Confronts the Soviet Union: Warfare and Diplomacy on China's Inner Asian 
Frontiers', in Denis Twitchett and John F. Fairbank [eds.j, The Cambridge History of China, volume 15, 
part I I , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 219-220. 
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reaffirmed the Party's hostility to the Soviet 'revisionism', and its refusal to co-operate 
with the Soviet Union on the Vietnamese question."^ ^ During the Cultural Revolution 
the PRC had expressed its displeasure at the Soviet policies through allowing huge 
demonstrations to be staged in front of the Soviet embassy in Beijing."^ "^  At the same 
time, officials on each side made their countries' displeasure of the other sides policies 
very obvious. For instance, at the celebrations of the 17'^  anniversary of the PRC on 
October 3, 1966 the Soviet representatives left the ceremony when Lin Biao criticised 
the Soviet party for co-operating with 'imperialism' against the Vietnamese people. 
The Chinese acted similarly during the celebrations of the anniversary of the Russian 
Revolution in Moscow when the Soviets criticised the Chinese policies in Vietnam."^ "^  
Several factors had played a major role in changing the nature of the PRC-USSR 
dispute in the 1960s from being an ideological one to a political and strategic one. First, 
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 20, 1968 followed by the Brezhnev 
Doctrine frightened the CCP's leadership. Zhou Enlai, in a speech at Rumania's 
National Day reception in the Rumanian embassy in Beijing on August 23, delineated 
his government's stand on the Soviet action. Zhou said that: 
The Chinese government and people strongly condemn the Soviet revisionist 
leading clique and its followers for their crime of aggression and f i rmly support 
the Czechoslovak people in their heroic struggle of resistance to Soviet military 
occupation."^^ 
For the text of the communique see Peking Review, number 34, 19 August 1966, pp. 4-8. 
'^ ^ See Thomas Robinson, 'China Confronts the Soviet Union', pp. 236-237. 
Allan J. Day, China and the Soviet Union, p. 75. 
"^'^ Peking Review, number 4, 23 August 1968, p. 3. 
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The Chinese government's support for the Czech government came despite their 
displeasure at the Czech communist party's leader Alexander Dubcek's political 
programme. The CCP's leadership, also, refused to accept the Soviet contention that 
Moscow had the right to intervene in any country where socialism might be threatened. 
Its initial response was a massive propaganda campaign against the Brezhnev 
Doctrine."^^ 
Second, the border clashes between the PRC and the USSR in March 1969 along the 
Ussuri river brought China to view the Soviet Union as its principal threat to its security 
and national goals. The Chinese started another massive anti-Soviet propaganda 
campaign featuring nation-wide demonstrations and criticism of the 'aggressive nature 
of the Soviet revisionism and Social imperialism',"^^ meaning that they were socialists 
who were behaving like an imperialist power. 
Third, the rapid expansion of Soviet power and influence in Asia compared to the 
decline of American power in Asia with the beginning of its withdrawal from Vietnam 
in 1969. Between 1966 to 1969 this expansion was evidenced in the Soviet Union 
increasing aid to North Vietnam. The Soviets, also, began, in 1968, making efforts to 
improve Soviet ties with the non-communist countries of Southeast Asia. Plus, 
Moscow improved its bilateral economic and political relations with Singapore in 
January 1968, Indonesia in August 1969, and Malaysia and Australia in September 
1969. In April 1969 the Soviet foreign minister visited Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and 
For more details, see Kenneth W. Rea, 'Peking and the Brezhnev Doctrine', in Asian Affairs: an 
American Review, volume 3, number 1, 1975, pp. 22-30; and see also Kenneth W. Rea and Yawsoon Sim, 
'An Attitudinal Analysis of China's Response to the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Asian Collective Security 
System', in Asian Forum, volume 7, number 3-4, pp. 1-10. 
47 See Peking Review, number 10, 7 March 1969, p. 4 and pp. 5-11. 
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Japan, while in May 1969 the Soviet president visited the People's Republic of 
Mongolia and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea."^ ^ The Soviets worked also 
towards strengthening its naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In 1968 Soviet 
warships visited India for the first time, patrolled the Indian Ocean, and paid visits to 
ports along the East African Coast, the Arabian Gulf, the Red Sea, the South China Sea, 
and the Philippine Sea.^° 
Finally, the Chinese perceived the collaboration between Washington and Moscow in 
the area of nuclear weaponry as anti-China. The Chinese feared the two superpowers' 
co-operation in concluding the nuclear test-ban treaty in August 1963, the non-
proliferation treaty in July 1968, the development of anti-China anti-ballistic missile 
(ABM) systems in 1967, and the beginning of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) 
in November 1969.^' They believed that all of these efforts were strategies to balance 
the superpowers' nuclear capabilities and prevent either the U.S. or the USSR 
retaliating on China's behalf in the event of a nuclear attack on China by either side.^ '^  
Therefore, all of these four factors upgraded the nature of the PRC-USSR dispute from 
being merely ideological to include political and strategic dimensions. 
John W. Garver, China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1968-1971, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 9. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
Ibid., pp. 26-28. 
John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1993), p. 72. 
See, for instance, Chiao Kuan-hua's Speech at the UN General Assembly on November 13, 1972 
printed in Peking Review, number 46, 17 November 1972, pp. 5-5 and pp. 7-9. 
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3.3. China and the poHcy of leaning towards the U.S. (1970-1981) 
PRC's fear of the Soviet Union efforts to contain China continued throughout the 
1970s. As a result, the CCP's leadership took action to adjust its foreign policy in a 
way that could prevent the Soviets from succeeding in isolating and containing China. 
The Chinese first continued their anti-Soviet propaganda. They repeatedly described 
the Soviet Union as 'hegemonic' by which they meant that Moscow would try to 
expand its military, economic, and political influence on the world stage at the expense 
of the sovereignty of other countries. An article published in Peking Review in 1970 
presented China's view concerning the international nature of the Soviet system. The 
article stated that: 
The Soviet revisionists...have tumed a number of East European countries and 
the Mongolian People's Republic into their colonies and 
dependencies.. .attempted to occupy more Chinese territory.. .stretched their arms 
out to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa and even Latin America and sent 
their fleets to the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Pacific and the Atlantic in 
their attempt to set up a vast Soviet revisionist empire spanning Europe, Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.^ "^  
Thus, the CCP's leadership was persuaded to tilt towards a strategic alignment with the 
U.S. The Nixon administration's decision to reduce its involvement in Asia made the 
Chinese perceive the U.S. as no longer a threat to China.^ "^  
The U.S. initiative to ease travel and trade restrictions with China in July and December 
1969, the termination of the regular two-destroyer patrol in the Taiwan Strait in 
November 1969, and the U.S. announcement that all nuclear weapons on Okinawa 
would be removed by 1970 showed the Chinese that the Americans were willing to start 
53 Cited in Peking Review, number 17, 24 April 1970, pp. 5-15. 
'^^  Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972, (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 37. 
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a new era of relationship with China.^ ^ Despite a short break in the improvement of the 
PRC-USA relationship, because of the U.S. and South Vietnamese troops invasion of 
Cambodia in May 1970, Mao Zedong at the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central 
Committee meeting in August-September 1970 gave his support for rapprochement 
with the U.S. 
The Chinese government's initiatives to get closer to the U.S. were presented in April 
1971 when an American Table Tennis team and a high-level American envoy were 
invited to visit China.^^ After many direct and indirect talks, Beijing welcomed, 
secretly, in July 1971, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's national security advisor, to China.^ ^ 
In February 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited Beijing after which the two 
sides issued the Shanghai Communique on February 27. The Taiwan issue remained 
the main obstacle. However, the Chinese leaders saw that the Soviet Union had become 
a threat to the point that working with the U.S. through a strategic alignment against the 
Soviets was, at least for the time being, more important than the dispute over Taiwan. 
In the communique both sides agreed that there was to be further progress towards 
'normalisation' and to maintain contact with each other. The Chinese continued 
opposing any form of separation of Taiwan from China, and requested the withdrawal 
of American troops from the island and the reunification with the 'motherland'. The 
Americans, who shared with the Chinese the need for one China, made their military 
withdrawal conditional on the PRC's continued commitment to a peaceful resolution to 
'China-U.S. Policy Since 1945', Congressional Quarterly, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc., 1980), pp. 6-8. 
For more details, see John W. Garver, China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, p. 
135. 
Ibid., p. 39. 
The visit took place due to the efforts of the Romanian President Nicolae Ceausesco and Pakistani 
President Mohamed Yahya Khan. 
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the Taiwan question. Most importantly, the two sides agreed that 'neither should seek 
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to the efforts by any other 
country or group of countries to establish such hegemony'.^^ This initiative was 
directed mainly against the Soviets attempt to control the region. Henry Kissinger in a 
talk with Chairman Mao Zedong and Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaopeng during his 
visit to Beijing in October 1975 summed up U.S. interest in China by saying that: 
In terms of strategy we are trying to contain Soviet expansionism, and this is why 
in strategy China has priority for us.^° 
However, U.S. commitment to the security of the Nationalist regime in the Republic of 
China, and the PRC's insistence on severing U.S. relationship with the island continued 
to prevent the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Beijing and 
Washington. The need for continuing contacts between the two countries led them to 
agree, in 1973, to establish a liaison office. 
PRC-USA relations continued to improve after the signing of the Shanghai 
Communique. The volume of their trade rose from $5 million in 1971 to $95.9 million 
in 1972, then $805.1 million in 1973, and $933.8 million in 1974.^ ^ By 1973, the U.S 
had become China's second largest trading partner. 
'^^  For the text of the communique see ibid., Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, Appendix B, pp. 373-
377. 
'^ ^ Cited in William Bur, [ed.], The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, 
(New York: The New Press, 1999), pp. 392-393. 
Harold C. Hinton, Teking-Washington', p. 54. 
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Despite the slow down in China-U.S. relationship during Gerald Ford's presidency,^" 
the Chinese government was very much concerned about the declining U.S. power in 
Asia with the closing down of its bases in Thailand and its inability to support its allies 
in Cambodia and South Vietnam. They were worried about the possible shift in global 
/TO 
balance of power to the Soviet advantage. At the same time, the Chinese were 
worried about President Jimmy Carter's policy of avoiding close ties with the Chinese, 
for fear of angering the Soviets.^ "^  The rising Soviet threat with its support for the 
Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975 and in Ethiopia in 1976 and 1978; the Soviet's 
unwillingness to accept deep cuts in its strategic arms; the Soviet's support for the 
Vietnamese initiative in Cambodia; and their growing modern weaponry along China's 
northern border, had led the new Chinese leadership of Deng Xiaoping to adopt a more 
pragmatic policy towards the U.S. and to view the Americans as an important strategic 
partner in an international alignment against Soviet expansionism. Meanwhile, Carter 
shared the Chinese fear of Soviet expansionism and started to tilt towards Zbigniew 
Brzezinski's, Carter's National Security Advisor, view of containing the Soviet through 
establishing close ties with the Chinese. As the perceived Soviet threat was rising, both 
the U.S. and China agreed to establish diplomatic relations in December 1978. 
Washington met Beijing's three conditions for normalisation: 
1. Withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Taiwan; 
2. Elimination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan; and 
Gerald Ford, who replaced Nixon, was not willing to make any important concession on USA-PRC 
relationship. 
John W. Carver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, pp. 85-86. 
'^"^  Carter's policy was encouraged by Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance who argued for not to 
establish close ties with China because it would harm U.S. relations with the USSR. On the other hand, 
Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski argued for establishment ties with China in order 
for the U.S. to contain Soviet threat. President Carter, who succeeded President Ford in January 1977, 
preferred Vance's argument during his early years in office. For Vance-Brzezinski's debate see Harry 
Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 61-11. 
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3. Termination of U.S. Taiwan mutual security treaty of 1954 65 
At the same time, the Chinese accepted Washington's conditions that the U.S. would: 
1. Continue to provide Taiwan with defensive military equipment; 
2. Maintain extensive unofficial relations with Taiwan; 
3. Terminate its defence treaty with Taipei after one year's notice; 
4. Keep in force all other treaties and agreements with Taiwan; and 
5. Make a unilateral statement calling for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and 
that the Chinese would not contest such a statement.^ ^ 
The Chinese government accepted the American conditions because of the importance 
of preventing a further shift of the global balance of power in Moscow's favour. The 
two sides issued, on the evening of December 15, 1978 in the United States and on the 
following morning in China, the agreement on the normalisation. In a joint 
communique the U.S. 'acknowledged' that Taiwan is part of China.^ ^ 
After the signing of the normalisation agreement the Chinese government was 
disappointed over President Carter's reaction to the following developments: 
1. The Chinese invasion of Vietnam on February 17, 1979 and Carter's call, on the 
following day, for immediate withdrawal of the Chinese troops. The Chinese 
government felt betrayed by Carter's reaction, as he had showed no opposition to 
"^^  John W. Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, p. 91. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 77. 
Ibid., p. 81. 
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the PRC's plan to invade Vietnam during Deng Xiaoping's visit to the U.S. in early 
1979;^ ^ and 
2. The modification to the content of the Taiwan Relation Act (TRA) by the U.S. 
Congress, in which the U.S. would be responsible for maintaining the security of 
Taiwan against any foreign threat,^ ^ and President Carter's approval of the act.^° 
Nonetheless, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 renewed the 
significance of the PRC-USA strategic relationship. Co-operation between the China 
and the U.S. rose substantially after the event and many Chinese and American officials 
visited Washington and Beijing. The PRC allowed the Americans to establish 
electronic listening stations in China to monitor Soviet nuclear missile tests. '^ Both 
sides, also, collaborated in extending their support to the anti-Soviet Afghan resistance 
group, the Mujahideen, and Pakistan.^^ The Americans granted the Chinese the most-
favoured-nation status on January 24, 1980. On the same day, the U.S. Department of 
Defence announced that the United States would sell selected military equipment to 
China.^'' Meanwhile, China terminated its ties with revolutionary communist parties in 
the Third World and supported U.S. military presence abroad to contain Soviet 
expansionism.^ "^ 
John P. Copper, China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle, (Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1992), pp. 46-47. 
For the text of the TRA see ibid., 'China-U.S. Policy Since 1945', pp. 343-345. 
John F. Copper, China Diplomacy, pp. 67-69. 
^' The New York Times, 3 January 1980; and 20 January 1980, p. A l . 
~^ John W, Garver, Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, p. 92. 
'China-U.S. Policy Since 1945', p. 264. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 93-94. 
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In addition to China's continuing efforts to improve its relations with the United States 
as a direct counterweight to Soviet expansionism in Asia and elsewhere, the Chinese 
continued their anti-Soviet propaganda. The CCP's leadership began to play down the 
direct Soviet military threat to China and emphasised instead that the direct Soviet 
military threat was in the direction of Europe, the Middle East, the United States, and 
Japan .Such propaganda reached its peak when the Soviet invaded Afghanistan.^^ 
The Soviet Union was described by the Chinese as 'an aggressive and expansionist 
power'. In addition, the Chinese government persuaded active diplomacy throughout 
Asia to restrict Soviet influence and promote a united front. Deng Xiaoping visited 
Japan in October 1978 as the first visit of a top-ranking Chinese leader to Japan.^ ^ This 
was followed by Prime Minister and CCP Chairman Hua Guofeng's visit to Japan in 
May 1979 and July 1980.^ ^ In August 1978 a Chinese-Japanese treaty of peace and 
friendship was signed to oppose Soviet hegemony.^ ^ In the same month, Hua visited 
Romania, Yugoslavia, and Iran respectively.He also paid visits to France, Italy, West 
Germany, and Britain in October and November 1979 as the first top ranking PRC 
leader to visit Western Europe.^' Deng Xiaoping paid an official state visit to Burma in 
''^  See, for instance, Peking Review, number 3, 17 January 1975, pp. 6-8; Peking Review, number 5, 31 
January 1975, pp. 16-18; and Peking Review, number 16, 16 April 1975, p. 17. 
See Beijing Review (formerly known as Peking Review), number 1, 7 January 1980, p. 3 and pp. 10-11; 
Beijing Review, number 2, 14 January 1980, pp. 9-12; Beijing Review, number 3, 21 January 1980, pp. 
10-12; and Beijing Review, number 4, 28 January 1980, pp. 9-10, and pp. 15-26. 
'Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation', in The China Quarterly, number 77, March 1979, pp. 190-
193. 
Beijing Review, number 29, 21 July 1980, pp. 7-8; see also 'Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation', 
in The China Quarterly, number 84, December 1980, pp. 817-818. 
Peking Review, number 33, 18 August 1978, pp. 6-10. 
Peking Review, number 34, 25 August 1978, pp. 6-15; Peking Review, number 35, 1 September 1978, 
pp. 4-15; and Peking Review, number 36, 8 September 1978, pp. 5-9. 
^' Beijing Review, number 43, 26 October 1979, pp. 8-14; Beijing Review, number 44, 2 November 1979, 
pp. 8-14; and Beijing Review, number 45, 9 November 1979, pp. 8-14. 
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January 1978,^ ^ and Nepal in February 1978.^ '' In all these trips, the Chinese officials 
worked to strengthen anti-Soviet unity. China, also, had improved its relations with 
India and diplomatic relations had been restored at the ambassadorial level in 1976.^ "^  
China gave strong verbal support to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). It supported President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt in his efforts for 
rapprochement with the U.S.A. after the October War of 1973, and in his visit to 
Jerusalem in November 1977. The Chinese government was satisfied with the Egyptian 
government after the abolishment of its friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. After 
the signing of the Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty in November 1978, and following the 
85 
Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in December, China terminated its aid 
programme to Vietnam and started to provide non-communist countries of Asia and 
86 
Africa with the same amount of aid as to the communist countries. 
In short, China's foreign policy towards both superpowers during this period was a 
reflection of China's fear of the Soviet expansionism throughout the world. The 
Chinese government felt the need to adjust its foreign policy strategy in accordance with 
its new understanding of the threat to China's security and interests. The most 
important adjustment was the adoption of a new pragmatic policy towards the United 
States. The U.S., which was seen as the primary enemy of communist China in the 
Peking Review, volume 21, number 5, 3 February 1978, p. 3. 
Peking Review, volume 21, number 6, 10 February 1978, pp. 4-5. 
'^^  See John W. Garver, 'The Indian Factor in Recent Sino-Soviet Relations', in The China Quarterly, 
number 125, March 1991, pp. 55-85. 
For the Soviet-Vietnamese strategic relationship see, among many useful discussions, Donald S. 
Zagoria, 'The Soviet Vietnamese Alliance and its Strategic Implications', in June Teufel Dreyer and 
Ilpyong J. Kim [eds.], Chinese Defence and Foreign Policy, (New York: Paragon House, 1989), pp. 167-
213. 
John Frankin Copper, 'China Foreign aid in 1978', pp. 1-3. 
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1950s, had become China's most important strategic partner to counter Soviet 
expansionism. As a result, different foreign policy strategies had been adopted by the 
Chinese government to suit China's new foreign policy objectives during this period. 
3.4. China's independent foreign policy (1982-1990) 
In the early 1980s several major developments influenced the Chinese government to 
re-craft its foreign policy towards the two superpowers and adopt its independent 
foreign policy. In terms of China's relations with the Soviet Union the logic of China's 
modernisation programme required a peaceful international environment. The Chinese 
government saw limited detente, or rapprochement, with the Soviet Union as a 
significant step that would allow China to concentrate its limited resources on its Four 
Modernisation programmes. Meanwhile, the Chinese government perceived the 
policies of limited detente with the Soviet Union as an effective way of managing the 
Sino-Soviet conflicts and securing stability in their relations with the S o v i e t s . I n 
addition, the deterioration of Soviet-American relationship and the rapid increase in the 
military build up by the two superpowers, as well as the deterioration in China's 
relations with the U.S. in the early eighties, encouraged the Chinese government to 
strike a more independent posture in its foreign policy towards the United States and the 
Soviet Union. The PRC's 'independent foreign policy' was launched at the 12'"^  CCP 
Congress in September 1982 to allow China attain greater degree of manoeuvrability 
within the Sino-American-Soviet triangle relationship and to avoid China from being 
drawn into conflicts between the two superpowers.^ ^ At this time, the Chinese 
Chi Su, 'China and the Soviet Union', in Current History, volume 83, number 494, September 1984, 
pp. 245-247. 
Ibid., pp. 246. 
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government began to emphasise that it would not allow any superpower to use it as a 
'card' against the other power.^ ^ 
In terms of China's relations with the U.S. there was a slow down in the relationship in 
the early 1980s. Ronald Reagan's pro-Taiwan stand annoyed the Chinese government. 
Although it approved Reagan's aggressive anti-Soviet stance, the Chinese government 
criticised the flow of U.S. arms to Taiwan. It called upon Reagan's administration to 
reduce the supply of arms gradually and to set a date for the termination of all arms 
sales to T a i w a n . T h e Reagan administration understood the importance of China as a 
valuable counterweight to the Soviet Union. As a result, the two sides reached a joint 
communique on August 17, 1982 to 'reduce gradually' the U.S. sale of arms to Taiwan 
and that the arms sales to Taiwan would not 'exceed, either in qualitative or in 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries'.^' However, while the Chinese 
government reaffirmed support for peaceful reunification, the U.S. government refused 
to accept Beijing's demand for a fixed date for the termination of its arms sales to 
Taiwan. The Chinese government saw no need to ally itself with the Americans against 
the Soviets, since the Americans were engaging in a huge military build up. Therefore, 
it adopted a foreign policy of independence from the two superpowers that would allow 
it to benefit from both powers without engaging itself with one against the other. 
See Robert Legrold, 'Sino-Soviet Relations: The American Factor', in Robert S. Ross [ed.], China's the 
United States, and the Soviet Union Tripolarity and Policy Making in the Cold War, (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 1993), pp. 65-88. 
Robert Garson, The United States and China Since 1949, p. 172. 
^' For the text see ibid., Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 383-385. 
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On the other side, the Soviet's fear of a possible strategic partnership between the 
United States and China led the Soviet government to woo the Chinese especially at a 
time when Beijing was unhappy with Reagan's administration earlier stand on the 
Taiwan issue. In March 1982 and prior to China's adoption of the independent foreign 
policy, Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev delivered a speech in Tashkent in which he 
appealed to the Chinese by affirming that the Soviet 'have not denied...the existence of 
a socialist system in China', and that they 'have fully recognised...the PRC's 
sovereignty over Taiwan island'.^^ 
Following the adoption of China's independent foreign policy China's relations with 
both superpowers improved significantly. Several talks and social and educational 
contacts took place between the Chinese and the Soviets.^ ^ However, their effectiveness 
in resolving outstanding issues was very limited as China continued to insist on the 
removal of the three obstacles to better relationship: 
1. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; 
2. The reduction of Soviet troops along Chinese-Russian border; and 
3. The withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia. 
Quoted in Alan J. Day, China and the Soviet Union, pp. 175-176. 
•^^  See Roy Medvedev, China and the Superpowers, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), pp. 156-168; and 
William deB. Mills, 'Gorbachev and the Future of Sino-Soviet Relations', in Political Science Quarterly, 
volume 101, number 4, winter 1986, pp. 535-557. 
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After a low bilateral trade in the 1970s, PRC-USSR trade volume rose from 
approximately $50 million in 1980 to $363 million in 1982 and $750 million in 1983 
then $1,327 million in 1984.^ ^ 
The most important development in the PRC-USSR rapprochement began with the rise 
of Mikhail Gorbachev and the proclamation of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy. 
Gorbachev's speech in Valdivostok on July 28, 1986 was important to the Chinese as it 
addressed two of the three main obstacles of the PRC-USSR normalisation process that 
the previous Soviet regimes were not willing to discuss and make concessions. 
Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would soon withdraw troops from 
Afghanistan, and that the Soviets were prepared to discuss reduction of force level along 
the border.^ ^ Although PRC-USSR relations then began to take a positive turn towards 
peaceful collaboration on solving the three obstacles, Beijing remained cautious and 
sceptical and demanded the removal of the three obstacles.^ ^ In February 1988 Soviet 
Defence Minister Dimitrii Yazor announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw a 
large number of its troops from the Chinese-Soviet border areas. Concerning 
Afghanistan, Gorbachev announced in March 1988 that Soviet troops would be 
withdrawn from Afghanistan starting on May 15, 1988 and issued a ten month period 
The volume of trade between the two countries declined steadily from $2.1 billion in 1959, to $47.2 
million in 1970, S. H. Chou, 'China's Foreign Trade Policies', Current History, volume 83, number 494, 
September 1984, pp. 261-264. 
Chi Su, 'The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy', in ibid., Robert S. Ross [ed.], China and 
the United States, the Soviet Union and Tripolarity and Policy making in the Cold War, p. 51. 
See Herbert J. Ellison, 'Soviet-Chinese Relations: The Experience of Two Decades', in ibid., pp. 93-
119. 
The Chinese were worried that any Soviet troops reduction along their frontier would be more than 
offset by the modern Soviet weapons and increased number of Soviet SS-20 missiles backing the troops 
that remained, Business Week, number 2960, 18 August 1986, p. 55. 
Chi Su, 'The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet Policy', p. 55. 
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for the complete with draw al.^^ Then, in a speech at the UN General Assembly on 
December 7, 1988 Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would reduce 
unilaterally Soviet force by 500,000 men, approximately 200,000 troops from Asia, 
with a substantial reduction of conventional weapons in two y e a r s . I n December 
1988, Vietnam announced that it would withdraw 18,000 of its 120,000 troops from 
Cambodia; and in April the following year Hanoi declared its intention to withdraw all 
its troops from Cambodia by September.'^' Therefore, the pull out of Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan, the reduction of Soviet troops along its frontier with China, and 
Gorbachev's efforts to speed up Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia set the stage for 
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May 1989 summit meeting between Deng and Gorbachev. Despite that the summit 
did not reach a border agreement, full diplomatic relations had been restored and troops 
along the frontiers had been r educed .The meeting was significant to both sides. It 
helped Gorbachev enhance his image as a man of peace and pragmatism, especially in 
East Asia, a region of growing political and economic interest to Moscow.'^ "^ For 
Beijing, the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the continued reduction of Soviet 
troops along the border, and the continued progress in Soviet efforts to encourage Hanoi 
to pull out of Cambodia, meant that the PRC succeeded in keeping the Soviets away 
from establishing hegemony across Asia.'^^ Since the May summit, PRC-USSR 
relations had improved, and Chinese premier Li Peng paid an official visit to Moscow 
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, volume XL, number 6, 9 March 1988, pp. 1-4. 
The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, volume XL, number 49, 4 January 1989, pp. 1-7. 
Chi Su, 'The Strategic Triangle and China's Soviet policy', p. 56. 
See The Economist, volume 311, number 7602, 13 May 1989, pp. 13-14. 
"^"^  During the meeting Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would withdraw 120,000 soldiers 
from their border with China by the end of 1990, Andrew Bilski and Louise Doder, 'Setting a Bitter Feud: 
Gorbachev's Visit Open a New Era', in Maclean's, volume 102, number 22, 29 May 1989, p. 35. 
104 U.S. News & World Report, volume 106, number 19, 15 May 1989, pp. 30-32. 
'^"^ Business Week, number 3057, 20 June 1988, p. 67. 
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from April 23 to 26 of 1990. His visit marked the first visit by a prominent Chinese 
leader to the Soviet Union in 26 years since Zhou Enlai's visit in 1964. During the visit 
the two sides signed six agreements.PRC-USSR economic relations also accelerated 
with a trade volume totalled at $3.8 billion in 1989, a 20 percent increase over the 
previous year.'^ "^  
Despite the slow down in PRC-USA relations in the first half of the 1980s, the relations 
witnessed the most productive era of co-operation in the second half of the decade. 
Economic relations, military co-operation, and educational exchange increased rapidly 
between the two countries. Economically, the U.S. had become a very important 
partner for China's economic development. By 1989 bilateral trade between China and 
the United States accounted for 16 percent of China's total trade compared to 11 percent 
by 1985 and 8 percent in 1979. Their trade volume rose from $2.3 billion in 1979 to 
$7.7 billion in 1985 and to $17.8 billion in 1989, with China enjoying significant trade 
surpluses since 1986.'°^ U.S. investment in China rose from $18 million in 1983 to 
$751 million in 1985 and reached $1.6 billion by the end of 1988.^°^ 
Numerous high-level visits by officials of both sides had helped the development of 
military co-operation between the PRC and the USA. By June 1989 the PRC acquired 
'^ "^  These include: 1) an agreement on the long-term co-operation and development programme of 
economy, science, and technology; 2) an agreement on the co-operation of peaceful use and studies of 
space; 3) an agreement on the mutual reduction of military forces in the border areas and guiding 
principles of enhancing trust in the military field; 4) an agreement on consultation between the two 
foreign ministers; 5) and agreement on governmental credit for daily-use commodities provided by China 
to the Soviet Union; and 6) an agreement on the construction of a nuclear power plan in China and a 
Soviet loan to China, Beijing Review, volume 33, number 19, 7-13 May 1990, pp. 7-9. 
Beijing Review, volume 33, number 36, 3-9 September 1990, pp. 12-16. 
In the first half of the 1980s the U.S. enjoyed a favourable trade balance of approximately US$8 
billion in its trade with the PRC. See Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 364. 
Ibid., p. 147 and p. 368. 
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military equipment from the U.S., including 24 S-70c Black-hawk helicopters, L M 2500 
gas turbine engines for naval ships, coastal defence radar, and communication 
equipment. PRC-USA military co-operation had increased in areas of anti-tank, 
artillery, air defence, and surface ship anti-submarine w a r f a r e . V a l u e of U.S. arms 
sales to the PRC rose from $8 million in 1984, when China was first made eligible for 
the U.S. foreign mihtary sales programme, to $106 milHon in 1989.^ '^  The United 
States became an essential partner for China's military modernisation particularly after 
the Chinese government's decision to change the orientation of its strategic doctrine 
from the inevitability of a global war to the possibility of local and regional conflicts. 
Educational exchange visits multiplied with some 75,000 Chinese students and scholars 
receiving visas to enter the United States between 1979 and 1989.^ ^^  Thus, economic 
relations, military co-operations, and educational exchanges had replaced in the second 
half of the 1980s, the traditional PRC-US strategic alignment of the 1970s and early 
1980s. 
In addition to the existing issue of Taiwan, several new issues had dominated the 
development of the PRC-USA relations during the second half of the 1980s. Most 
importantly, PRC's assistance to some Third World countries in developing nuclear 
programmes and its sales of Silkworms to Iran and CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles, capable of reaching Israel to Saudi Arabia, bothered the United States. The 
United States suspended the liberalisation of controls on the export of advanced 
"° Edward W. Ross, 'United States-Chinese Military Relations: Implications for Japan', in Janos 
Radvany [ed.], The Pacific in the 1990s: Economic and Strategic Changes, (New York: University Press 
of America, 1990), p. 94. 
" ' Rosemary Foot, The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China since 1949, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1995), p. 236. 
Harry Harding, 'China's Co-operative Behaviour', in Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh 
[eds.], Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 379. 
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technology to China, but relaxed it in August 1988 after receiving assurance that China 
had stopped the delivery of Silkworms to Iran.''^ The Americans were also bothered by 
China's military co-operation with Israel particularly in the transferring of western 
military technology by Israel to China. This was mainly because of the transfer of such 
technology to Pakistan and Iran by China. ^ '"^  Another issue had been the issue of trade 
and investment barriers to American firms. U.S. traders and investors were faced with 
high tariffs, restriction and control, standard and certification requirements, import 
licensing requirements, and import quotas imposed by the Chinese government. The 
increasing trade imbalance with China had also dominated the focus of the PRC-USA 
relations during the second half of the 1980s. According to U.S. Department of 
Commerce, U.S. imports from China increased from $3.5 biUion by 1985 to nearly $15 
billion by 1991. From 1987 to 1991 U.S. imports from China had grown at an annual 
rate of 35 percent and about five times as fast as overall U.S. import growth, while U.S. 
exports to China had expanded by about 11 percent annually during the same period.''^ 
China's trade surplus with the U.S. rose from $1.7 billion in 1986 to $3.5 billion in 
1988 and left the U.S. faced with a trade deficit of $126 billion in 1988.^ '^  Despite U.S. 
discontent about its trade deficit with China, no major decision was adopted to restrict 
the flow of Chinese exports to the U.S.A.'Protection of U.S. intellectual property had 
also been another issue that dominated the relations between the two countries. U.S. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 187. 
""^  Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett I I , Year of the Rat, (Washington, D.C.: Regnery 
Publishing, Inc. 1998), pp. 1-4. 
James Orr, 'Evolution of U.S. Trade with China', Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly 
Review, volume 16, number 4, winter 1991-1992, pp. 47-54. 
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 190. 
The U.S. government adopted in July 1984 new regulations redefining the country-of-origin of 
imported clothing. Chinese products that were sent to Hong Kong for modification would be sent to the 
U.S as under China's quota not Hong Kong as it was before. The U.S. Congress in 1985 considered a bill 
to reduce the current import quotas for textiles but President Reagan vetoed it. 
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efforts to get the PRC comply with the USA-PRC Bilateral Trade Agreement of 1979, 
which initiated the protection of copyright, patent, and trade mark did not achieve a full 
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satisfactory result from the Chinese. 
Unlike PRC-USA relations, PRC-USSR relations were not harmed by the suppression 
of the students' demonstrations by the Chinese government in Tiananmen Square on 
June 4, 1989. Gorbachev did not want to sever Moscow's relationship with Beijing or 
to offend the CCP. Therefore, the Soviet government issued a declaration on June 7, in 
which it described what had happened as 'internal affairs' of China.^'^ By early August 
however it because clear to Gorbachev that the Soviet position contrasted with that of 
the Western official and public opinion which he was seeking to woo. Gorbachev 
continued to avoid direct official criticism to the policies of the Chinese government, 
stressing instead the need for dialogue. He stated his government's position by saying: 
We are in favour of the most acute problems being solved through political 
dialogue between the authorities and the people. That is our behef. Such is the 
method we have chosen for ourselves. But a people solve its problem on its own. 
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This is our principle and, I believe, irreversible position. 
Premier Li Peng visited Moscow, then a military delegation, led by the Central Military 
Commission vice Chairman Liu Huaging, paid an official visit for two weeks in May 
1990 to discuss Chinese purchase of Soviet military technology.'^' In the following 
month, a Soviet army delegation headed by Rear Admiral Valdimir Khuzhokov, head of 
Nicholas R. Lardy, China and the World Economy, (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International 
Economics, 1994), p. 79. 
See Alexander Lukin, 'The Initial Soviet Reaction to the Events in China in 1989 and the Prospects for 
Sino-Soviet Relations', in The China Quarterly, number 125, March 1991, p. 121. 
'-° Quoted in ibid., p. 124. 
John R. Faust and Judith F. Kornberg, China in World Politics, (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1995), p. 111. 
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the foreign relations department of the Soviet defence ministry, visited Beijing for the 
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first time in thirty years. At the same time, economic relations and educational 
exchanges continued. China-Soviet trade volume had increased from $3.8 billion in 
1989 to $5.3 bilhon in 1990 and to more than $6 bilhon in 1991. Between 1988 and 
1990 China sent more than 1,300 Chinese post-graduate students to study in the Soviet 
Union, while the Soviet sent more than 800 students to China. 
On the other hand, the Chinese military crackdown of the demonstrations in Tiananmen 
Square severed U.S. relationship with the Chinese government. The Bush 
administration imposed on June 5 and 20 of 1989 a series of sanctions against China. 
These included: 
1. The suspension of all government-to-government sales and commercial exports of 
weapons including export, manufacturing, and technological assistance licenses. 
2. The suspension of high-level U.S. and Chinese exchanges. 
3. The freezing of new loans to China by the multilateral development banks. 
4. The extension stays for Chinese students in the United States.^ "^^  
The Chinese government was divided on how to respond to the American actions 
against it. The hard-liners called for retahation and strengthening of China's ties with 
the Soviet Union and Third World countries opposed to the United States. In contrast, 
the pragmatists encouraged the Chinese leadership to maintain its foreign policy, re-
establish stability within China, and stress China's dissatisfaction to the U.S. reaction 
Lowell Dittmer, 'China and Russia: New Beginnings', in Samuel S. Kim [ed.], China and the World: 
Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), p. 101. 
'-^ Ibid., pp. 101-102. 
Richard L. Williams, 'U.S. Response to Changes in China', in Department of State Bulletin, volume 
89, number 151, October 1989, pp. 27-30. 
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without severing a complete dis-linkage with the Americans. The Chinese leadership 
adopted the pragmatist view. It announced that 'what is happening in China is China's 
internal affair', and that the 'Chinese government is completely capable of quelling the 
current rebellion in Beijing'. It further said that the Chinese government would 
continue implementing the policy of reform, opening up towards the world and its 
126 
independent policy. Several Chinese official statements, including a statement by 
Deng Xiaoping, emphasised the PRC's willingness to restore relations with the U.S.'^^ 
3.5. China's relations with the United States and Russia in the post-Cold War era 
(1991-1999) 
The Chinese government and its communist party watched the collapse of one socialist 
regime after another in Eastern Europe with alarm. Publicly, the Chinese leadership 
avoided criticising Soviet policy. Privately, however, the Chinese leadership blamed 
Gorbachev's 'misguided reform' as the reason for the collapse of socialism in Eastern 
Europe.'^^ They had issued, since the fall of 1989, a number of documents for internal 
circulation criticising Gorbachev and Russian President Boris Yeltsin, in addition the 
post-communist leaderships in Eastern Europe. In another reaction, the CCP's 
leadership had tried to woo the hard-liners in the communist party of the Soviet Union. 
Several meetings had taken place between high Chinese officials and Soviet hard-liners. 
This included a visit by Anatoliy Lukyanov, a leading opponent of Gorbachev's 
policies, to Beijing in September 1989; a visit by Ivan Polozkov, Yeltsin's hard-line 
Regarding this debate see ibid., Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, pp. 235-239. 
'^^ Beijing Review, volume 32, number 24-25, 12-25 June 1989, pp. 235-238. 
'"^ For examples see Chapter 1, p. 42. 
'^ ^ See John W. Carver, 'The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism', in The 
China Quarterly, number 133, March 1993, pp. 1-5. 
'^ ^ Guocang Huan, 'The New Relationship with the Former Soviet Union', in Current History, volume 
91, number 566, September 1992, p. 254. 
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Opponent, to Beijing m June 1991; a meeting between Jiang Zemin and Soviet vice 
president Yanayev, later a key figure in the August coup;^ ^^ a visit by Deputy General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Vladimir Ivashko, a hard-liner, to 
Beijing in February-March 1991;^ ^^ and a visit by PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian to 
Moscow a week before the August coup, where it was reported that, in his meeting with 
Soviet Defence Minister Dimitri Yazov, the Chinese military leader had emphasised his 
country's adherence to the principle of non-interference in Soviet internal affairs in the 
event of any internal attempt to change the leadership. 
When the coup attempt began on 19 August to overthrow Gorbachev and restore 
socialism in the Soviet Union, Chinese news coverage was generally sympathetic and 
supportive of the attempt.''''^ But, when the coup attempt collapsed, the Chinese leaders 
switched their support gradually towards Gorbachev. To them, Gorbachev was the best 
available alternative to counter Yeltsin's liberalisation reform. As the Soviet Union 
disintegrated after the coup attempt, the Chinese responded quickly to the new 
development. A day after Gorbachev resigned as president of the Soviet Union, PRC 
announced on December 27, 1991 its recognition of the Russian Federation, Ukraine, 
Polozkov's visit was announced shordy after Yeltsin's election victory as President of Russia and was 
timed to coincide with Yeltsin's visit to Washington, ibid., John Garver, 'The Chinese Communist Party 
and the Collapse of Soviet Communism', pp. 5-6. 
Jiang Zemin met with Yanayev during his April visit to Moscow while Yeltsin's request for a meeting 
with Jiang was denied, ibid., Lowell Dittmer, 'China and Russia: New Beginning', p. 103. 
'•'^  During the meeting China offered the Soviets credit worth about $700 million to be made up of 
Chinese foodstuffs to go along with the earlier credit of $334 million for purchases of Chinese light 
industrial goods, Beijing Review, volume 34, number 10, 11-17 March 1991, p. 8. 
'^ ^ John Garver, 'The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism', pp. 12-13. 
Ibid., pp. 12-14. 
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Byelorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. ^ '^ ^ 
For the Chinese leadership, the disintegration of the Soviet Union into several newly 
independent republics had both positive and negative consequences. The development 
had the following positive roles repercussions for China: 
1. Neither Beijing nor Moscow viewed the other as a security threat; 
2. Russia had become China's most valuable source of military technology including 
the transfer of Su-27 jet fighter technology to China and the recruit of several 
hundred of Soviet scientists to work on China's military development 
programme;'"^^ 
3. Russian Republic had reduced the size of its armed forces and destroyed some of its 
nuclear weapons, and Kazakhstan had committed itself to reducing the number of its 
nuclear weapons; 
4. Russia had cut off its economic and military aid to India and Vietnam, and had 
encouraged them to improve their relations with the PRC; 
5. Russia was no longer competing with Beijing for greater influence in the Korean 
I 37 
Peninsula; ' 
6. China's modernisation programme had proved a more successful reform programme 
than Gorbachev's political and economic reforms, particularly for those in China 
concerned with the unity of the PRC as a unitary political and cultural entity; 
See Beijing Review, volume 35, number 1, 6-12 January 1992, p. 6. China recognised all the newly 
independent states and established diplomatic relations with them to prevent any diplomatic ties between 
the newly independent states and Taiwan. 
Guocang Huan, 'The New Relationship with the Former Soviet Union', p. 254. 
"''^  For more details see Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, 'Gorbachev and Post-Gorbachev policy towards the 
Korean Peninsula: The impact of Changing Russian Perceptions', in Asian Survey, volume 32, number 8, 
August 1992, pp. 757-772. 
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7. Economically, Central Asia's new states presented potential markets for Chinese 
exports. • The region also emerged as a cheap source for raw materials, and an 
important bridge for Chinese exports to the Middle East and Europe; and 
8. China's development model had become something to which many leaders of the 
new republics, like Karimov of Uzbekistan, aspire. For China, this meant that its 
expertise became valuable to the implementation of development programmes in the 
new republics. 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union had negative repercussions that led the Chinese 
leadership to worry over the following points: 
1. An increase of political instability in the new independent republics could lead to 
foreign intervention from Muslim countries which would impact on China's large 
Muslim population in its western provinces 
2. There was a possibility for a regional arms race with Russia selling advanced 
weapons for hard currency; 
3. A possible Russian-American collaboration against China's international 
interests. "^^^ To the Chinese a united Soviet Union is more likely to remain 
For instance, it was reported that half of Kazakhstan's consumer imports in 1992 came from China, in 
1994 some 25 percent of Kyrgyzstan's official trade was with China, and China's trade with Tajikistan 
rose from $2.7 million in 1992 to $4.4 million in 1993, see Rose H. Munro, ' Central Asia and China', in 
Michael Mandelbaum [ed.], Central Asia and the World, (New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 
1994), pp. 230-233; and Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia's New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, 
and Regional Security, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 82 and 109. 
139 Ross Munro, 'Central Asia and China', p. 234. 
''^ ^ See Gerald Segal, 'China and the Disintegration of the Soviet Union', in Asian Survey, volume 32, 
number 9, September 1992, pp. 848-854. 
John W. Garver, 'The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of the Soviet Communism', pp. 19-
20. 
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independent of the Western alliance system than disintegrated Soviet states in much 
need for U.S. economic and financial assistance;'"^ ^ and 
4. The Chinese leadership was also worried that the USA and the West would turn 
their attention to China as the next target after the Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping 
described the effect of the breakdown of communism on China by saying that 
'everyone should be clear under present international circumstance all enemy 
strength will be directed against China and will use every sort of pretext to create 
new difficulties and pressures for us'.'"^ "^  
Despite the continuing strain in the PRC relations with the USA following Tiananmen 
massacres, the U.S. government worked to limit the damage to the USA-PRC 
relationship. President George Bush said: 
I do not want to see a total break in this relationship [USA-PRCl and I will not 
encourage a total brake in the relationship.''^ '^  
He, therefore, did not withdraw the U.S. ambassador from Beijing and secretly sent his 
National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence 
Eagleburger to Beijing to meet with Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping.'"^^ In 
July he permitted the sale of four Boeing 757 commercial aircraft to China.'"^^ Despite 
many U.S. legislators proposing that the administration should consider China's human 
rights record before it issued the required certification for renewing MFN status, 
'''^ John W. Carver, 'China and the New World Order', in William A. Joseph [ed.], China Briefing 1992, 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 60-80. 
''^"^ Zhengming, number 151, 1 May 1990, p. 7. 
''^'^ Congressional Quarterly, volume 47, 10 June 1989, p. 1426. 
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Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship, p. 228. 
Ibid., p. 228. 
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President Bush extended the MFN unconditionally to China in 1990. Bush's also 
renewed China's MFN in 1991 with only a promise to use diplomatic tools to address 
U.S. concerns in China, this policy is known as 'Bush's constructive engagement 
policy'. Bush policy was driven by his administration's belief that after the collapse of 
the communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the wind of 
liberalisation would move towards China. Therefore, the U.S. government should 
engage China increasingly in the world's economy and should seek to ensure China's 
economic modernisation did not collapse.^ "^ ^ It was through engagement that Bush's 
administration believed that political changes would take place in China.'"^^ Bush 
expressed his policy by saying: 
The most compelling reason to renew MFN and remain engaged in China is not 
economic, it's not strategic, but moral. It is right to export the ideals of freedom 
and democracy to China...it is wrong to isolate China if we hope to influence 
China.''' 
Following Bush, President Bill Clinton has adopted the policy of engagement. Like 
Bush, Clinton has renewed China's MFN status every year since becoming president of 
the USA. Most importantly. President Clinton on May 26, 1994 announced that no 
longer would the future renewals of the MFN be linked to human rights conditions in 
'"^ ^ Robert G. Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World Affairs: The Role of the United States, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996), pp. 74-75. 
'"^ ^ Other schools of thought dealing with the issue of U.S. policy towards China criticise Bush's policy 
of constructive engagement and argued for either an 'unconditional engagement' or a 'conditional 
engagement' in U.S. relations with China, for more details on the different arguments see James Shinn 
[ed.], Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, 
(New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1996); and Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, The 
Coming Conflict with China, (New York: Vintage Books, 1998). 
149 New York Times, 28 May 1991, p. A l . 
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C h i n a . T h e Chinese government, which earlier criticised Clinton's negative views of 
China during his campaign for presidency and his promises to push the issue of China's 
human rights by using the MFN card against China, welcomed Clinton's decision to de-
link the two issues. President Clinton's engagement policy sought: 
1. Constructive Chinese participation in the UN Security Council and in the resolution 
of regional conflicts to enhance global security; 
2. Active participation by China in multilateral non-proliferation regimes; 
3. Economic and Trade relations with China that meet U.S. economic interest; 
4. Respect for internationally recognised standards of human rights; and 
5. Chinese co-operation on global environmental issues. 
Since the Tiananmen Square massacre of June 1989, the following issues have 
dominated the development of the PRC-USA relations: 
1. Issues of human rights including political prisoners, freedom for Tibet, treatment of 
Chinese dissidents, China's birth control law, and treatment of Chinese intellectuals 
have dominated the relationship since June 1989. The U.S. governments of Bush 
and Clinton (until May 1994 in Clinton Administration) had attempted every time to 
use the MFN status as a political instrument against China's human rights record. 
Furthermore, when Clinton de-detached the MFN status from human rights record, 
he stressed the importance of bringing up the issues of human rights in every official 
meeting with the Chinese; 
2. Trade issues have moved to the centre of the USA-PRC relations. The driving force 
is the growing U.S. deficit in its trade with China. From 1984 to 1994 U.S. annual 
Many have argued that the economic significant of China to the United States led the U.S. government 
to de-link the renewal of MFN status to human rights issue, see David S Cloud, 'Renewal of China's 
MFN Status Angers Some Lawmakers', in Congressional Quarterly, 28 May 1994, p. 1372. 
'U.S.-China Relations', on www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/fs-us-china-relations.html, ^. 1. 
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exports to China rose from $3 billion in to $8.8 billion. Meanwhile, China's exports 
to the USA increased from $3.1 billion to almost $38 billion. This left the USA 
with a $29.2 bilUon trade deficit with the PRC.^ ^^  According to the U.S. estimate, 
the trade deficit in 1996 was about $39.5 billion, exceeded only by the U.S. bilateral 
trade deficit with Japan. ^ "^^  The deficit stimulated demands in the USA that China 
improve its intellectual property protections ^ "^^  and liberalise access to its domestic 
market; 
3. PRC's transfer of advanced missiles to Third World countries has also dominated 
the development of the USA relations with the PRC. The CIA reported that the 
PRC had delivered in 1991 and 1993 Chinese M-11 missile components and 
technology to Pakistan.'^^ The United States responded with imposing military and 
trade sanctions on China. In 1994, however, the sanctions were lifted after receiving 
assurances from the Chinese government to curb missile sales to other countries. 
Bush and Clinton administrations have also had concern over reported Chinese sales 
of missiles, missiles components, and missile fuel to Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, and Iraq.'^^ The CIA has reported that by 1996 China had delivered to 
Pakistan more than 30 ready-to-launch M-1 Is;'^^ and 
4. The Taiwan issue has always been a point of contention in the PRC-USA 
relationship. The Chinese leaders were annoyed in 1992 by the U.S. decision to sell 
'"''^  Laurence J. Brahm, China As No. 1: The New Superpower Takes Centre Stage, (Singapore: 
Butterworth-Heinmann Asia, 1996), p. 100. 
'U.S.-China Relations', p. 2. 
U.S. losses from China's violation of intellectual property rights were estimated to be more than $800 
million in 1993, see Nicholas R. Lardy, 'U.S.-China Economic Relations', in Thomas A. Metzger and 
Ramon H. Myers [eds.], Greater China and U.S. Foreign Policy: The Choice Between Confrontation and 
Mutual Respect, (Stanford, California; Stanford University, 1996), pp. 72-73. 
Douglas Waller, 'The Secret Missile Deal', in Time, 30 June 1997, p. 58. 
'"^ ^ Robert Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World Affairs, pp. 108-110. 
157 Douglas Waller, 'The Secret Missile Deal', p. 58. 
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150 F-16 fighters, twelve advanced antisubmarine helicopters, and other technology 
to Taiwan. The PRC viewed the sales as a violation of the 1982 PRC-USA 
communique on Taiwan in which the U.S. stated that it 'does not seek to carry out a 
long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan', and that its arms sales to the island 'will 
not exceed...the level of those supplied in recent years...and that it intends to 
reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final 
resolution'.^'^^ The Chinese government protested the U.S. arms sales, and linked its 
policy on missile sales to Pakistan and other countries with the U.S. decision to sell 
Taiwan the F-16s.^ '^^  U.S. decision on 22 May 1995 to allow President Lee Teng-
hui of Taiwan to unofficially visit the United States sparked tensions in the PRC-
USA relationship. Due to Lee's policies to drive Taiwan away from the idea of 
unification with the mainland as a subordinative special administration region under 
a central government in Beijing and his democratisation process led the Chinese 
government to view his visit as an attempt to establish international recognition for 
independence.'*'^  As a result, China responded by suspending arms control talks, 
cancelled the forthcoming visit of the Chinese Defence Minister, Chi Haotian, to the 
United States, recalled its ambassador in Washington for consultation, and delayed 
for several months U.S. process to replace its ambassador to C h i n a . I n addition to 
that, China conducted in July 1995 missile and live-fire tests in several areas around 
'"''^  Regarding the types of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, United States-
Taiwan Security Ties: from Cold War to Beyond Containment, (London: Praeger, 1994), pp. 77-79; and 
also Martin L. Lasater, The Changing of the Guard: President Clinton and the Security of Taiwan, 
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 195-197. 
'•^ ^ John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratisation, (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1977), p. 36. 
Robert Sutter, Shaping China's Future in world Affairs, pp. 13-66. 
William Van Kemenade, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Inc., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), p. 47. 
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Taiwan. This led to the March 1996 military face off between the United States 
and China in the Taiwan Strait. The U.S. deployed two-aircraft-carrier battle groups 
to the vicinity of Taiwan to protect the island from the massive Chinese military 
exercises, which was designed to intimidate the first presidential election in the 
Republic of China. 
In the post-Cold War era China has tried to benefit from its relations with both the 
United States and Russia. China continued to advance its economic and technological 
co-operation with the United States. This was obvious in its efforts to co-operate with 
the UN and the West in restoring Kuwait's independence by voting for all UN Security 
Council resolutions on Kuwait and abstaining from resolution 678, which called for the 
use of force to liberate Kuwait. The Chinese government calculated that the economic 
and technological benefits of its abstention would be much more significant than if it 
vetoed the resolution. In its relation with Russia, China worked to limit the possible 
direct and indirect threat to its security from the newly independent republics. In 
addition to the previously mentioned Chinese efforts to cumulate good relationship with 
Russia, PRC-newIy independent republics relations have developed rapidly after the 
Chinese government recognition of the new central Asian states. Kazakhstan's Prime 
Minister Tereshchenko paid a five-day official visit to Beijing in February 1992. Eight 
agreements were signed including agreements on the movement of citizens along the 
border, on China providing commodity loan, and on establishing economic, trade, and 
scientific co-operation.'^ "^ In March 1992 President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan 
"^ ^ Robert Sutter, Shaping China's Future in World affairs, p. 74. 
'^ ^ See ibid., pp. 96-110; and John Garver, Face O f f . 
164 Beijing Review, volume 35, number 10, 9-15 March 1992, p. 9. 
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visited Beijing and both sides signed fourteen bilateral agreements.Kyrgyzstan's 
President Askar Akayev paid an official five-day visit to China in May during which 
economic and cultural agreements were signed, and a free trade zone was established 
along the b o r d e r . I n November Turkmenistan's President Supramurad Niyazov 
visited Beijing and signed eight co-operation agreements and a joint communique. In 
April 1994, Chinese Prime Minister L i Peng paid an official visit to four central Asian 
states - Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan- and Mongolia. To 
reduce the perceived threat from China in the region, L i laid down China's basic 
principles towards the region and emphasised that 'China will never seek hegemony or 
power politics even when it becomes more advanced and prosperous in the future. 
Instead China will always maintain equal and friendly relations with its neighbours'.^^'' 
By 1996 PRC had reached agreements on setting boundaries and related issues with the 
four major central Asian states bordering it - Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Kazakhstan. This includes the April 26, 1996 agreement on confidence building in the 
military field in the border area. In this agreement they agreed to mutual non-use of 
force or threat of force against one another, establish regulations for conducting military 
exercises along the borders, and mutual force reduction in the border areas. 
In the second half of the 1990s, China-U.S. relations seemed to have gathered 
momentum. U.S. Vice-President Al Gore visited Beijing in March 1997, followed by 
the Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich who visited Beijing a month later. President 
Jiang Zemin paid an official state visit to the U.S. from October 26th to November 3rd, 
Ross Munro, 'Central Asia and China', p. 234. 
'^ ^ Ibid., p. 232. 
167 Beijing Review, volume 37, number 18, 2-8 May 1994, pp. 18-19. 
"'^  James Mulvenon [ed.], China Facts & Figures: Annual Handbook, volume 21, (Florida: Academic 
International Press, 1997), pp. 114-120. 
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1997. It was the first visit by the President of China to the U.S. in 12 years. In June 
1998 Clinton visited Beijing as the first American president to visit China in a decade. 
Premier Zhu Rongji visited Washington in April 1999 to smooth the way for China's 
entry to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).'^^ However, all these visits did not 
produce a dramatic change in China-U.S. relations. Instead, relations witnessed a set 
back throughout the second half of the 1990s. The following issues have contributed to 
the souring of relations between the two countries in the second half of the 1990s: 
3.5.1. The human rights issue 
U.S. officials have continued in their meetings with Chinese officials to discuss China's 
human right records and the continued arrests and trials of Chinese pro-democracy 
movements leaders and advocators as well as political activists in China;'^^ in addition 
to the arrest of followers of religious groups like the Falun Gong. U.S. officials, 
including President Clinton, continued to meet with the Dalai Lama, which has always 
angered the Chinese government. In response to American pressure, China issued its 
own report on the dire human rights situation in the U.S., which was portrayed as an 
'abyss of racial discrimination' with a manipulated press, low voter turnouts for 
elections and rampant c r i m e . C h i n a also voiced strong resentment to the U.S. 
government decision to allow the Dalai Lama to visit the U.S. in November 1998. A 
Foreign Ministry spokesman said: 
"'^ Bruce Gilley and Shawn W. Crispin, 'Limited Engagement', in Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Volume 162, Number 16, 22 April 1999, pp. 12-14. 
'''^ For example, the U.S. government criticised the Chinese government arrests on July 7, and 21-22 July 
1998 of pro-democracy activists; and the arrest of Xu Wenli, Qin Yongmin and other political activists on 
November 11 and 30 1998. The U.S. State Department issued in December 1998 its annual human rights 
report sharply criticising China, Time, 24 May 1999, pp. 40-41. 
Anthony Spaeth, 'Wanna Dance? Warming up for his Washington Trip, Zhu Rongji Tangoed and 
tangled - with Madeleine Albright on Tough Issues. Can China and the U.S. Get in Step?', on 
http://cnn.com/ASIANOW/time/asia/magazine/1999/990315/chinal.html, p . l . 
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China demands that the United States adhere to its stance of recognising Tibet as 
a part of China and of not supporting the 'independence of Tibet', and that it 
immediately puts a halt to its erroneous acts of interference in China's intemal 
172 
affairs concerning the Tibet issue. 
3.5.2. The security issue 
China criticised the U.S. Senate's decision in July 1998 to authorise the sale of 
American arms to Taiwan worth $550 m i l l i o n . C h i n a also criticised the passing of a 
bill in March 1999 by both U.S. houses for the establishment of the National Missile 
Defence (NMD) to go along with the Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) system, which is 
scheduled to be voted on in June 2000.^ "^^  The TMD is designed to neutralise a strike on 
U.S. forces or their allies by destroying incoming enemy missiles.''^ ^ Suspecting that its 
expanding may be the ultimate target, China has blasted the programme, A Chinese 
Foreign Ministry Spokesman said that the TMD: 
Does not conform with the trend of the time, is not conductive to work toward 
arms control and reduction and w i l l produce an extensive and negative effect on 
global and regional strategic balance and stability in the 21^ ^ century. China is 
gravely concerned about this.'^^ 
China is also concerned about the U.S. plan to draw Japan under the TMD umbrella. 
Japan's co-operation in the system according to the Chinese perspective: 
W i l l greatly enhance the overall offensive and defensive level of the U.S.-Japan 
military alliance, thus promoting Japan to violate the guarantee inscribed in its 
Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 35, 30 August 1999, p. 7. 
'^^ Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 33, 16 August 1999, p. 5. 
'^ "^  See Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 25, 21 June 1999, p. 9. 
Jim Wolf, 'Going Ballistic', in Far Eastern Economic Review, Volume 162, Number 7, 18 February 
1999, p. 26. 
176 Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 25, 21 June 1999, p. 9. 
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no-war constitution restricting it to a limited military capability for defence only, 
and expand once again into a military power. 
China is even more alarmed at the inclusion of Taiwan into the future shield. A Foreign 
Ministry spokesman said: 
Any country providing Taiwan, a province of China, with any weaponry system 
including the TMD will seriously encroach upon China's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and will firmly be opposed by the Chinese people. The 
Chinese side demands that the U.S. side observes the three Sino-U.S. joint 
communiques and relevant promises and will not proliferate the TMD and its 
178 
related technology to Taiwan in any form. 
On August 20"\ 1999, The Chinese Foreign Ministry also strongly condemned 
Taiwanese President Lee's remarks stressing the importance of the TMD for Taiwan 
and saying that the system 'not only meets the needs of the current situation, but is also 
in line with the long-term interests of the country'. The Chinese reaction to this remark 
was presented by a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman saying: 
The Taiwan authorities must understand that splitting the country and seeking 
independence for Taiwan is a dead end and, even with the TMD, such attempts 
are doomed to failure. 
China strongly expressed its strong opposition to NATO's military operations in 
Yugoslavia in March 1999. The Chinese Foreign Ministry emphasised that 'the issue of 
Kosovo is an internal affair of Yugoslavia and should be settled by the relevant 
Yugoslav parties'; and that 'all countries should respect Yugoslavia's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity'. 'The Chinese government strongly demands that NATO should 
immediately stop its military strikes against Yugoslavia, calling on the international 
177 
178 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
79 Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 36, 6 September 1999, p. 7. 
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community and Yugoslavia's relevant parties to make joint efforts to calm the tense 
situation, resolve crisis and restore peace in the Balkan region as early as possible', the 
spokesman said.'^° 
China's opposition stems from fear for its own security. Regardless of the friendly 
relations between Beijing and Belgrade, China itself is in fact faced with the local 
question of separatist tendencies and struggles in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. 
Therefore, NATO's U.S.-led interference in Kosovo, which was never authorised by the 
UN Security Council, worried China about the integrity of its own national 
independence given China's potential internal regional instability. The Chinese 
government believed that under such conditions the independence of individual states 
would be adversely redefined and within NATO the U.S. would be able to impose 
destructive wars on countries that obstruct its interests. Their concern is so series that 
the idea of forming a preventive force composed of China, Russia, India, and Iran 
against NATO is gaining Chinese suppo r t .The Chinese press interpreted the NATO 
U.S.-led operations in Yugoslavia as an attempt to establish NATO (USA) control of 
Europe and the World. An article by Li Bian in Beijing Review entitled 'NATO 
Changes International Laws' argued that the end of the Cold War meant the collapse of 
America's leading role in the European Atlantic strategy and the loss of control over the 
security situation in Europe and the rest of the world. Therefore, U.S.-led military 
action against Yugoslavia, according to the article, was intended both to 'maintain its 
hegemony in the world' and to 'see if its " new strategic concept" will work in the 
coming century'. The article continued: 
Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 15, 12-18 April 1999, p. 12. 
BBC, SWB FE/3500, 5 April 1999, p. A/4. 
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By examining NATO's military intervention in international affairs, the tolerance 
of the United Nations or countries like Russia and the degree of unity among 
members of NATO, the United States is trying to expand its defence sphere and 
strength NATO's military function in order to serve U.S. interests around the 
world. ^ "^^  
Another article in Fortnightly Review called NATO's action an imperialist act aimed at 
U.S. domination of the world. It said: 
NATO's raids on Yugoslavia, in the name of 'humanitarianism', are an out-and-
out imperialist action. It is obvious that the attention of the United States and 
other Western powers is actually to do with the strategic significance of the 
Balkan Peninsula, which is considered as important as oil in the Middle East and 
the Panama Canal. Yugoslavia blocks the eastward expansion of NATO. It was 
only a question of time before NATO would want to eliminate this blockage. 
Thus, the Kosovo issue has been an excuse for NATO. 
China-U.S. relations reached their lowest point since 1972 after U.S. bombers launched 
an attack, and destroyed, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in May 1999. 
Three Chinese correspondents were killed during the attack. Immediately after, the 
Chinese government issued a statement to the U.S. government protesting the action: 
The action is a gross violation of Chinese sovereignty and tramples on the Vienna 
convention on diplomatic relations and the basic norms of international relations. 
This is a rare event in diplomatic history. The Chinese government and people 
express their utmost indignation and severe condemnation of this barbaric act and 
lodge the strongest protest against it. U.S.-led NATO should bear full 
184 
responsibility for anything arising there from. 
In addition to large public demonstrations with the approval of local public security 
organs in cities like Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Chengdn, where the U.S. 
embassy and U.S. consulates are located. President Jiang refused to take President 
Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 17, 26 April- 2 May 1999, p. 7. 
'^ •^  Ban Yue Tan, 'New Imperialist in the Post Cold War Era', in Fortnightly Review, Number 7, 1999; 
republished in Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 19, 10 May 1999, p. 27. 
Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 21, 24 May 1999, p. 9. 
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Clinton's phone call to apologise about the 'mistaken' action by the U.S.'^^ The 
Chinese government postponed high-level military contact between the Chinese armed 
forces and the U.S., and consultation with the U.S. in the fields of proliferation 
prevention, arms control and international security. China also suspended its dialogue 
186 
with the U.S. in the sphere of human rights. 
3.5.3. Allegations 
China-U.S. relations have also been affected by allegations that China has attempted to 
influence American politicians through campaign finance, and that China has spied and 
stolen U.S. military technology. In May 1999 a selected committee of the U.S. House 
of Representatives published the Cox Report on U.S. National Security and Military 
Commercial Concerns with the PRC. The report is a little over 700 pages long and it 
argues that China is building the political, economic, and military leverage to push the 
U.S. out of Asia and the Pacific Basin, and put American cities at risk. The report 
found that China has stolen design information on the Americans' most advanced 
thermonuclear weapons since the early 1970s, including information on every currently 
deployed thermonuclear warhead in the American ballistic missile arsenal, classified 
design information for an enhanced radiation weapon and classified information on U.S. 
W-88, W-87, W-78, W-76, W-70, W-62, and W-56 warheads. The report also found 
that China stole U.S. missile and space technology that could improve Chinese military 
and intelligence capabilities. According to the report, China has acquired U.S. 
technology by using espionage techniques, controlled commercial entities, and a 
network of individuals and organisations that engage in scientific, business and 
'^-'^ Time, Volume 153, Number 20, 24 May 1999, pp. 40-41. 
'^^ Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 21, 24 May 1999, p. 11. 
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academic activities. Therefore, the report concluded that communist China might pose 
an even greater threat to the U.S. than the Soviet Union did.^^^ 
The Chinese government rejected the Cox Report's findings and called it a scheme by 
anti-China politicians in the U.S. Zhao Qizheng, Minister in Charge of the Information 
Office of the State Council, said: 
The Chinese government and People are strongly indignant over this groundless 
attack that fabricates facts and confuses black and white. This is a great slander 
against the Chinese nation and is typical racial prejudice...China has never 
'stolen' secrets from the U.S. nuclear weapon laboratory...This is another 
adverse current against China among the series of anti-China events created by 
some people in the U.S. over recent years. Their purpose is to divert public 
attention, fan anti-China feelings, defame China's image and try to hold back 
Sino-U.S. relations so as to stop China's development. This attempt is doomed to 
188 
fail. 
The three issues discussed above presented obstacles in the promotion of better relations 
between China and the U.S. in most of the second half of the 1990s. However, by the 
end of the century and particularly in November 1999, China-U.S. relations began to 
gather some positive momentum. Despite their disagreement over the above issues, on 
November 15, 1999 the two sides reached an agreement that 'will help accelerate the 
process of China's accession to the WTO and the development of China-U.S. economic 
co-operation and trade relations'.'^^ According to the agreement, China has agreed to 
open its markets in industries ranging from banking and insurance to telecommunication 
and internet sectors. The agreement cuts duties on a wide range of products, gives 
foreign companies the right to distribute their goods within China and allows foreign 
'^ ^ Kenneth deGraffenreid [ed.]. The Cox Report: The Unanimous and Bipartisan Report of the House 
Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military Commercial Concern with the People's 
Republic of China, (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing Company, 1999). 
'^^ Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 24, 14 June 1999, pp. 9-11. 
'^ ^ See Beijing Review, Volume 42, Number 47, 22 November 1999, pp. 4-5. 
Chapter three: China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia 136 
automobile manufacturers to provide car financing. The agreement also allows for 
increased imports of foreign films on a revenue-sharing basis. 
While China's relations with the U.S. was riddled with difficulties in the second half of 
the 1990s, China's relations with Russia were characterised by common understanding 
and mutual agreements over many international issues. Russian Defence Minister Igor 
Nikolayevich Rodionov's visit to Beijing in April 1997, which resulted in a 'long-term 
strategic partnership' according to the visiting official. His visit was to promote 
military and technological co-operation between the two countries and more importantly 
to discuss NATO's 'eastward expansion' policy. Rodionov said that Moscow 
'appreciates the fact that China shares Russia's concerns over the eastward expansion of 
NATO'. '^ ' President Jiang Zemin visited Moscow in April 1997 for a two-day state 
visit, which articulated the development of a 'strategic partnership of equality and 
mutual trust' orientated towards the 21st century. On 22>^'^ April the two sides issued a 
joint statement on international issues which called for: 
1. The promotion of the 'multipolarisation' of the world as well as a new international 
order; 
2. The respect of every country to choose the way in which it developed, with no 
country seeking hegemony; 
3. The drive towards establishing a new and universally applicable concept of security 
in which the Cold War mentality should be abandoned and 'bloc politics' should be 
opposed; 
4. The strengthening of the role of the UN to promote peace in the world; and 
Susan V. Lawrence and Lorien Holland, ' Deal of the Century', in Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Volume 162, Number 47, 25 November 1999, pp. 80-84. 
BBC, SWB FE/2895, 17 April 1997, p. G/4. 
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5. The entitlement of the developing countries, as well as the non-aligned movement, 
to take their rightful place in a new international world order on an equal basis with 
1 ' 1 9 2 
Other countries. 
On 24"^  April during President Jiang Zemin's visit to Moscow, the two countries along 
with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed an agreement for the mutual 
reduction of military forces in border areas. Jiang described the agreement as having 
'major political and military significance', and said that it: 
Offers a security model different from the Cold War mentality in safeguarding 
peace, security and stability in the Asia Pacific region and the world at large, 
thereby opening up a useful way for the enhancement of mutual trust among 
states.'^ '' 
The two countries also signed a contract in May on the drafting of a detailed design for 
a nuclear power station to be constructed in Jiangsu province. Russia also started the 
construction of the second stage of a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant.'^ "^ A 
joint project for gas supply from Siberia to Shanghai was also s i g n e d . O n September 
29''\ 1997, China and Russia agreed to jointly regulate border trade. The measure was 
said to resolve the problems of unfair competition and trade monopoly. 
Russian President Boris Yeltsin visited Beijing for a two-day state visit in November 
1997. Yeltsin's meeting with Jiang took place within just ten days of Jiang's meeting 
BBC, SWB FE/2901, 24 April 1997, pp. G/ 1-2. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB FE/2902, 25 April 1997, p. G/1. 
194 Ibid., p. G/7. 
BBC, SWB FE/2903, 26 April 1997, p. G/3. 
196 BBC, SWB FE/3038, 1 October 1997, p. G/3. 
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with Clinton in Washington. The two presidents signed a joint declaration stating that 
all questions related to the demarcation of the eastern section of the Chinese-Russian 
border had been settled. The meeting called for international relations to be conducted 
on the basis of multipolarity, mutual respect and equity of right for all. It also called for 
greater bilateral co-operation in the spheres of energy, outer space, transportation and 
communication, banking and insurance and for enhancing military ties.*^^ Chi Haotian, 
China's Defence Minister visited Moscow in January 1998.^ ^^  Premier Li Peng visited 
Moscow in February 1998.^ ^^  In July 1998 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy 
Primakov visited Beijing.^"^^ 
All of these highly ranked visits by officials from both countries have helped the 
development of relations between the two countries and brought both sides closer on 
many international issues. Two main factors could be discussed here to explain why the 
two countries have devoted more efforts to foster political contacts between officials 
from the two countries in this period. 
1. Both countries were worried about the NATO's 'eastward expansion' policy. Their 
meetings, therefore, could be designed to reach understanding on this issue or even 
to foster an alliance to counter NATO's p o l i c y . T h i s was evident in China and 
Russia's identical reactions to the NATO's operation in Yugoslavia. 
2. China has always wanted to secure its border areas with Russia and the newly 
independent Central Asian Republics. Therefore, these meetings could be directed 
'"^ ^ BBC, SWB FE3073, 11 November 1997, pp. G/2-3. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB FE/31333, 24 January 1998, p. G/3. 
'^ •^  BBC, SWB FE/3156, 20 February 1998, p. G/1. 
BBC, SWB FE/3287, 24 July 1998, p. G/1. 
J. L. Black, Russia Faces NATO Expansion: Bearing Gift or Bearing Arms?, (Boston: Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000), pp. 130-133. 
Chapter three: China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia 139 
towards settling China's unsettled border disputes with Russia and ensuring the 
security of its border areas. 
These two issues seemed to have been ranked as a top priority in China's relations with 
Russia. This is evident in the re-occurrence of these two issues in the meetings between 
Chinese and Russian officials. It is also evident in China's continued efforts to 
eliminate deterioration in China-Russia relations. President Jiang ensured Yeltsin that 
China's commitment to developing ties with Russia was not 'makeshift' and would not 
be harmed by 'any temporary incident'.^^^ Even when a Russian patrol boat in the 
Baring Sea fired on a Chinese fishing vessel killing two Chinese in May 1998, the 
Chinese government and people did not react strongly and as violently as when U.S. 
bombers attacked its embassy in Belgrade. The Chinese official's reaction was limited 
to expressing regret over the incident.^^^ 
While relations with the U.S. continued to further deteriorate, China-Russia relations 
have continued to improve. President Yeltsin visited Beijing in December 1999, and 
signed with the Chinese president a joint communique in which they: 
• Called for international disputes to be settled peacefully through the UN, respecting 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. 
• Condemned attempts to amend the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and 
the proposed plan to build an anti-missile defence system in violation of the treaty. 
• Warned that any attempt to extend the MDT to protect Taiwan would cause 
instability in Asia and was firmly opposed. 
BBC, SWB FE/2902, 25 April 1997, p. G/1. 
^^ -^  BBC, SWB FE/3240, 30 May 1998, p. G/1. 
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• Expressed regret that the U.S. had not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban 
Treaty. 
• Expressed a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, the prevention of a space 
arms race and the banning of chemical weapons. 
• Warned that any country undermining the current disarmament framework would 
have to bear ful l responsibility. 
• Warned that 'negative momentum' in international relations was growing. They 
condemned the 'unipolar world' and 'single model of culture, value concepts and 
ideology' being promoted by the West which they said was undermining the UN 
and replacing international law with 'power polities'. 
• Rejected the concept that 'human rights are superior to sovereignty'; the 
justification used by NATO for military intervention in Kosovo and the reason for 
strong Western condemnation of Russia's offensive in Chechnya. 
• Demanded China and Russia's entry to the WTO on terms that would ensure their 
'equal status in the world trade system'. 
• Promised to work together to combat 'international terrorism, religious extremism 
and ethnic separatism' as well as international cross-border crime. 
• Called for a foreign ministers meeting of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan in order to foster closer co-operation.^ ^"^ 
They agreed on the need for a multipolar world and refuted the U.S. efforts to solely 
'dictate how the world should live, work and play'.^^^ They exchanged support for each 
other's handling of territorial problems. Yeltsin reiterated the Russian government's 
China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, Volume 3, Number 61, 11 December 1999, p. 1. 
China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, Volume 3, Number 60, 10 December 1999, p. 1. 
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consistent adherence to its principled stance on the Taiwan issue. Jiang, in turn, re-
affirmed China's support for Russia's move in suppressing the Chechen separatist group 
and said that the Chechen war is Moscow's internal affair and rejected the West 
criticism of Moscow's a c t i o n . T h e y also agreed to work together to further develop 
KYI 
their strategic co-operative partnership. 
Thus, China- Russia relations have found new interests in the 1990s. Rajan Menon 
(1997) noted that the days of Chinese-Russian animosity are over. Their substantial 
political, economic, and military ties in the 1990s are not bound by an alliance as the 
case in the early days. Today Chinese-Russian relations are based on a calculation of 
self-interest and desire for leverage vis-a-vis third parties, such as the US, Japan, or 
India.^»« 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter the argument has been that the Chinese government's view of the United 
States and the Soviet Union/Russia and its perception of the threat to China's security 
and interests, had largely determined China relations with both superpowers. PRC's 
relations with both powers have developed through different stages. At each stage 
China's foreign policy strategies have been adjusted to suit the changes in China's 
foreign policy objectives. During PRC's early interaction with the superpowers from 
1949-1954 China's objective was to protect and sustain its new status as an independent 
and sovereign state under the Chinese Communist Party control. Therefore, all of 
^-^^ China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, Volume 3, Number 61, 11 December 1999, p. 1. 
China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, Volume 3, Number 60, 10 December, p. 1. 
Rajan Menon, The Strategic Convergence Between Russia and China', in Survival, vol. 39, no. 2, 
Summer 1997, pp. 101-125. 
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China's foreign policy strategies were conducted towards achieving such an objective. 
The Chinese leadership found the policy of leaning towards the Soviet Union as their 
best option to achieve their objectives. The Chinese leadership viewed the United 
States as its primary enemy who was trying to contradict China's progress to the next 
stage, as it did throughout the history of Western domination of China. By 1955 PRC's 
relations with both powers, particularly the Soviet Union, started to take a new turn. 
This time China's view of the Soviet Union began to change after the adoption in the 
Soviet government of Khrushchev's new policy of peaceful coexistence with the United 
States. China, therefore, adopted several new foreign policy strategies in order to 
promote unity in the communist block to counter the capitalist block led by the United 
States. China's relations with the Soviet Union continued to spiral downwards and both 
parties severed their political, economic, ideological, and strategic relationship by the 
end of the 1960s. This disintegration of China's relationship with the Soviet Union 
escalated throughout the 1970s. China's ideological perception of 'the enemy' 
expanded to include the Soviet Union. After several developments, discussed earlier, 
the Soviet Union had become China's primary enemy, replacing the United States as the 
most dangerous threat to not only China's security but also to world security and 
stability. Therefore, China adopted foreign policy strategies aimed at containing 
Soviet's efforts to contain China and dominate the world. The most significant strategy 
being their willingness to sympathise with U.S. policy in Asia in particular and the rest 
of the world in general. Disregarding past allegiances, China leaned towards 
Washington, to counter Moscow, in a strategic, political, economic partnership. This 
partnership continued between China and the United States throughout the 1980s. But 
in the 1980s China began to realise the importance of balancing its relationships with 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. China's independent foreign policy was 
aimed at achieving such a balance. The Chinese believed that a better relationship with 
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the Soviet Union could help China express its dissatisfaction with the United States' 
continued military support of the nationalist regime in Taiwan. Further, it would allow 
China to concentrate its limited resources on its modernisation programme by reducing 
tension between the two sides. This policy achieved its aims by the end of the 1980s. 
In the post-cold war era China's relations with the United States and Russia entered a 
new phase. Despite its unhappiness over the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 
Chinese government had no choice but to work with the new governments in Central 
Asia. China's foreign policy objective at this time was to establish good political, 
economic relationships with the new states in Central Asia. This objective was driven 
by China's need to prevent establishing any political relationship between Taiwan and 
the newly established states in Central Asia. It was also driven by its efforts to reduce 
tension along the border areas and to take every possible opportunity to benefit 
economically from the new republics. Russia was important to China because it was the 
only place China could obtain more advanced and sophisticated weapons. In terms of 
China's relations with the United States, the United States remained a very important 
source of capital and technology. Thus, the Chinese worked to improve their 
relationship with the Americans but at the same time remained unchanged on Taiwan. 
Thus, China's relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union, later Russia, 
had been a changeable relationship. This change was a reflection of China's views and 
perceptions of its relations with both powers and of relations between the two powers 
themselves. 
PART III 
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In the previous chapter we discussed China's pohcy towards both the United States and 
the Soviet Union (and Russia). We argued that China's relations with the two powers 
were dominated by the change in China's own perceptions of its relations with both 
powers. In the Maoist era China carried every possible policy to undermine the 
influence of either each or both superpowers in the world. In the post-Maoist era, 
China's policies have transformed to reflect its own perception of change of power in 
the international system. Different foreign policy tactics and strategies have been 
carried out by the Chinese to suit the changes in the international system and to foster 
the achievement of China's own foreign policy objectives. Changes in China's relations 
with both Washington and Moscow have been coupled with internal change. China, 
who enjoyed a substantial level of economic growth in the 1990s, had found itself in 
need of independent international suppliers of energy and sources of investments and 
financial assistance. Thus, China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region could be explained in terms of the following two factors: 
1. China's perceptions of and relations with the United States and the Soviet Union; 
and 
2. China's drive to increase its economic capabilities by ensuring the supply of oil to 
its own thirsty economy. 
In order to explore this argument, the PRC's involvement in the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region will be divided into three main phases. In each of these stages China's 
motives, objectives, and tactics have changed according to the changes in China's 
relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union and to its efforts to increase 
its economic and political capabilities. These phases are: 
Phase one: China's early involvement in the region (1949-1970) 
Phase two: China's pragmatic foreign policy towards the region (1971-1989) 
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Phase three: China's economic interest in the Gulf region (1990-1999) 
4.1. China's early involvement in the region (1949-1970) 
When the PRC was established in late 1949, its founders main concern was to ensure 
the survival of the newly established communist state as an independent political entity. 
This aim was the focus of the CCP leadership particularly after the United States 
invasion of North Korea, under the flag of the UN, less than a year after the 
establishment of the PRC. Chinese troops entered the Korean Peninsula to prevent 
American troops from invading the fragile new communist regime in China and protect 
its friendly, regime in North Korea. On the other hand, the United States was increasing 
its efforts to arm and protect the Nationalist regime in Taiwan and intensifying its 
campaign to isolate China politically and economically throughout East and South East 
Asia. Therefore, the CCP leadership found itself with no alternative but to ally itself 
with the Soviet Union against the United States. PRC's foreign policy in the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region, during most of this period, reflected its 'lean to one side' 
policy, in favour of the Soviet Union. 
Against this background, China's interest in the Gulf region, mainly prior to the 
Bandung Conference of 1955, was very limited. East Asia instead captured most, i f not 
all, of China's foreign policy attention. Almost all of China's news coverage in the 
early 1950s circulated around the developments in East and South East Asia. Issues like 
the U.S. and the West's involvement in Korea, the U.S. close ties with Japan, the U.S. 
efforts to strengthen its alliance in East and South East Asia, and the Chinese-Soviet 
alliance were the main focuses of China's foreign policy. Despite China's 'Intermediate 
Zone' analytical classification of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region as being in 
between the capitalist camp, headed by the United States, and the socialist camp, headed 
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by the Soviet Union, the Chinese always associated the region with the capitalist camp 
opposed to the socialist camp. They described the governments of the region as 
'puppets' in the hand of the West. China's association of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region with the West was due to the following two reasons: 
1. The Gulf region was either under British colonial rule or ruled by reactionary 
monarchs closely allied to the West. Thus, the Chinese believed that the Western 
grip on them was strong enough to influence the direction of their foreign policy in 
favour of the West. 
2. Some Gulf regimes, like Iran and Iraq, condemned China as aggressor in the Korean 
War and supported the U.S. action in Korea. 
Thus, the Chinese saw themselves unable to penetrate in the region. Even when they 
had tried to exploit what they had believed to be some signs of anti-Western activities in 
the region, the Chinese shortly came to realise that they were wrong. Signs like the 
nationalisation of the oil industry in Iran, the Saudi and Yemeni abstention from voting 
on the UN General Assembly resolution 498 6V on February 1, 1951 to condemn China 
as an aggressor in Korea, and the Saudi and Yemeni abstention from the US-sponsored 
resolution to postpone consideration of any proposal to exclude Taiwan from the UN on 
October 25, 1952, elevated China's hope that the region was beginning to take some 
anti-West stands. The Chinese welcomed all of these developments. But the events 
that transpired, fell short of their expectations. This disappointment was marked by Iran 
and Iraq, two of the major independent Gulf states, engagement in a security alliance 
with Great Britain and the United States under the Baghdad Pact in 1955. Even more 
disappointing to the Chinese government was that the possibility of establishing 
political relations with the states of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region appeared 
impossible. The region maintained political and economic relations with the Republic 
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of China and did not support the exclusion of Taiwan from the UN in favour of the 
PRC. The four formally independent states of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the 
Sultanate of Muscat and Oman refused to recognise the PRC. 
In addition to the above, PRC's isolation from the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
was also due to the following reasons: 
1. PRC's own classification of the world into two camps and its insistence on 
favouring the Soviet Union, as the main insurance for independence of all Third 
World countries, distanced China from the British-controlled Gulf region. The 
failure to acknowledge any third way limited China's ability to exploit those states 
of the world that were maintained close relations with the capitalist camp, including 
the countries of the Gulf. 
2. The independent Gulf states' impression of the PRC during that early stage was 
centred around their fear of the atheistic communist ideology. China's hope for the 
assimilation of all ethnic minorities into one national identity, led to the harsh 
treatment of Muslim population in China in the early 1950s. This, subsequently, 
had added to the unfavourable sentiment towards China in the region. 
3. PRC's recognition of Israel and its efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Tel 
Aviv convinced the states of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region to maintain their 
relations with the Nationalist regime in Taiwan and reject the establishment of 
political relations with the communist regime in China. 
In parallel with the lack of political relations, China's trade relations with the countries 
of the region in the early 1950s were also limited. Between 1950 and 1955, China's 
total trade volume with the countries of the region, namely Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, amounted to only $1.7 million. Chinese imports constituted 
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over 75 percent of that total. This volume of Chinese trade with the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region accounted for less than 0.5 percent of China's world trade volume. 
More importantly, it was less than 2 percent of China's total trade with the Arab non-
Gulf countries of the Middle East and Africa.' These numbers suggest that China's 
economic relations with the Gulf region were marginal. 
In sum, the PRC's isolation from the region in the first half of the 1950s had both 
political and economic consequences. Politically, China failed to gain any political 
recognition from the governments of the region who favoured the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan over the Communist government in Beijing. Economically, 
China failed to establish an adequate trade relationship with the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. 
PRC's interest in the Gulf region transformed in the mid-1950s however. This shift was 
a reflection of changes in China's own interests. During this time, the Chinese began to 
lean towards wooing the countries of the Third World. Unlike the past, the Chinese 
believed that improving relations with the vast majority of the Third World countries, 
including the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula states, could mean a tremendous blow to the 
West. The Chinese government found a great opportunity to interact at high level, and 
for the first time, with the countries of Asia and Africa at the Bandung Conference of 
April 1955. The Gulf and Arabian Peninsula countries were part of such development. 
The Gulf region was represented by official delegations from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, 
and Yemen. The Chinese delegation to the conference sought to exploit this 
opportunity, to show the participants that China was part of them, shared the same 
' Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, (Hong Kong: China 
Resources Trade Consultancy, 1984), pp. 817-871. 
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experiences with them, and that they should not fear it, but work with it. In his speech 
at the conference. Premier Zhou Enlai, head of the Chinese delegation to the conference, 
stated: 
In the interest of defending world peace, we Asian and African countries, which 
are more or less under similar circumstances, should be the first to co-operate 
with one another in a friendly manner and put peaceful coexistence into practice. 
The discord and separation created among the Asian and African countries by 
colonial rule in the past should no longer be there. We Asian and African 
countries should respect one another, and eliminate any suspicion and fear which 
may exist between us.^  
Following Bandung, China accelerated its efforts to establish cultural, economic, and 
political ties with the Gulf countries. Culturally, China succeeded in persuading Saudi 
Arabia to accept Chinese pilgrims on the hajj. Between 1956 and 1959, China sent six 
different cultural delegations to Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. Economically, the 
volume of China's trade with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region also rose 
dramatically to a total of $34 million from 1956 to 1960. Chinese exports to the region 
constituted over 80 percent of that total. 
However, the most important development in China-Gulf relations following Bandung 
was the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR) in August 1956. The establishment of political relations with the YAR 
marked China's first diplomatic recognition by a Gulf and Arabian Peninsula country, 
and third by any Arab country after Egypt in May 1956 and Syria in July 1956. 
^ People's China, 16 May 1955, p. 10. 
^ Despite this increase in China-Gulf's trade volume the Gulfs share of the total Chinese world trade 
volume remained less than half percent. 
Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, pp. 817-871. 
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China's efforts to establish relations with the Gulf countries and the Arab countries in 
the Middle East and Africa were driven by China's worry of the U.S. efforts to 'drag' 
more Arab countries into the Baghdad Pact. The People's Daily, a Chinese official 
paper, published an article on March 14, 1956, which stated: 
The United States and Britain [are] doing all they can to split and create 
antagonism among the Middle and Near Eastern countries; they are in a mid 
summer madness, oppressing and threatening these countries, hoping to smother 
the movement for national independence. With this end in view the British and 
American colonialists are making a great effort to cajole or jockey more countries 
into the Baghdad Pact.^  
Importantly, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt had 
helped the Chinese to foster their efforts in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. It 
was through the Chinese embassy in Cairo that the YAR recognised the PRC. A few 
days before the Yemeni recognition of China, the Yemeni Premier Amir al-Badr met 
with the Chairman of the China Islamic Association, Burhan Shahidin, in Cairo.^ This 
meeting is believed to have pushed the Yemeni decision to recognise the PRC. It was 
also through the Chinese embassy in Cairo that China first contacted for the Omani 
revolutionary group.^ It is also important to notice that China exploited Islam as a 
foreign policy tool to build political contacts with the region. China's toleration of 
Muslim activities following the Bandung meetings and its encouragement for Chinese 
Muslim leaders to make contacts with the Muslim countries of the Middle East is a clear 
indication that China hoped to use Islam as a stepping stone to reach the Arab world 
(more detailed analysis of this issue will be discussed in China-Saudi Arabia section, 
chapter six). 
^ The article was republished in People's China, 1 April 1956, pp. 44-45. 
^ Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, pp. 44-45. 
^ Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, pp. 166-167. 
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In March 1958 the YAR became the first Gulf or Arab country to sign a treaty of 
friendship and to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC. China offered Yemen a 
non-interest loan of 70 million Swiss Francs and increased its economic assistance to 
the country. China's involvement in Yemen was simplified by the role played by the 
Soviet there. China's assistance to Yemen was based on the Sino-Soviet efforts to seize 
the opportunity from the Americans and the British and prevent them from succeeding 
in that country. 
The Iraqi revolution of July 1958 presented China with another opportunity to further its 
relations with the countries of the Gulf. Abd-al-Karim Qasim's regime was at first a 
victory for the Chinese. The Chinese welcomed Qasim's detachment of Iraq from the 
Baghdad Pact. They were also satisfied with Qasim's tolerance of the Iraqi 
communists, while, however, Jamal Abdul Nasser was suppressing the Arab 
communists in Egypt and Syria. More important was the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between China and Iraq, just a few days after the proclamation of the new 
republic in Iraq. Iraq became the second Gulf state, after Yemen, to establish 
diplomatic relations with Beijing. 
A l l of the above success for China following Bandung suggests that: 
1. China successfully broke U.S. economic embargo by establishing trade relations 
with the Asian and African countries, including the countries of the region, 
following Bandung; 
2. China also successfully broke its political isolation by getting involved with the 
countries of the Third World; and 
John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, p. 13. 
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3. China succeeded in rivalling Taiwan's presence in the Arab world by establishing 
diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations with Egypt, Syria, Yemen, Morocco, 
Iraq, and Sudan. 
By the end of the 1950s the Sino-Soviet alliance began to deteriorate. The Chinese 
started to regard the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region as an arena of Chinese-Soviet 
rivalry as well as a stage to wage a campaign against Western imperialism.^ China's 
foreign policy, therefore, took upon itself the duty to challenge both Moscow and the 
West in the region. As a result of their political and ideological disputes, the Sino-
Soviet convergence of interests began first in Yemen. China began to challenge Soviet 
aid to Yemen by providing massive assistance of its own to YAR. Then, China offered 
political and moral support to Imam Ghalib's movement against the Sultan and the 
British in Oman.^ ^ It also extended pohtical support to the Iraqi government's efforts in 
the early 1960s to take control of the direction of its oil exports from the British, the 
Americans, and the French.'' China also worked towards holding a second Bandung 
meeting without the participation of the Soviet Union. 
Yet, its failure to convince the Arab countries to hold a second Bandung Conference 
without the participation of the Soviet Union and its disappointment over Nasser and 
Qasim harsh treatments of Arab communists, and its unsuccessful attempt to pursue the 
'people's war' throughout the Arab World following the June 1967 war, China 
narrowed its interest in the Middle East to those countries that appeared to have 
^ John Calabrese, 'From Flyswatters to Silkworms: the Evolution of China's Role in West Asia', in Asian 
Survey, volume 30, September 1990, pp. 862-876. 
'° Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, pp. 164-175. 
" See Beijing Review, volume 5, number 8, 23 February 1962, p. 22. 
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revolutionary potential. While its relations with Egypt and Syria were severed, China 
looked to the Gulf region as a potential revolutionary region. South Yemen and Oman 
captured most of China's interest in the region. Unlike the Soviet Union, who sought to 
maintain government to government ties, China moved towards supporting the anti-
Western imperialism struggle in South Yemen and the guerrilla war in Dhofar. 
4.1.1. South Yemen 
Prior to the independence of the People's Republic of South Yemen (PRSY) on 
November 30,1967, (later the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)) China 
supported the proclamation of the YAR in September 1962 and the inclusion of Aden, 
which was under the British control. This support was guided by China's hope that 
Yemen could present a great opportunity to wage struggle against the West particularly 
after the launching of the National Liberation Front of Occupied South Yemen's (NLF) 
guerrilla resistance in October 1963, four months after its foundation. China criticised 
the British-sponsored 'Constitutional Conference' for Aden held in London. The 
Chinese described the conference as a 'new trick of the British colonialists to maintain 
their position' in South Yemen. The British were aiming, as the Renmin Ribao, 
September 7, 1962, pointed out, at: 
Strengthening their domination over the Arab East, and bringing the region, f rom 
the south part of the Arabian Peninsula to central and East Africa, under their 
control; and therefore, they would be able to suppress the national liberation 
movements there. 
At a banquet in the Great Hall of the People in honour of the visiting YAR President 
Abdullah al Sallal, Chairman Liu Shao-chi paid tribute to the people of Yemen for their 
The article was reappeared in Beijing Review, volume 5, number 37, 14 September 1962, p. 20. 
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Struggle to 'oppose imperialism and to win and safeguard their national independence'. 
Liu declared: 
We support the people of Aden, South Yemen and Oman in their struggles 
against colonialism in demanding the dismantling of all foreign military bases.'•^ 
After the last British forces left Aden on 30 November 1967, the NFL assumed power 
and declared the birth of the PRSY. China welcomed this development and contributed 
this victory to Mao's philosophy: 
Paying attention to the study of Chairman Mao's great military thinking on 
guerrilla warfare, they [Yemeni people in the south] smashed the British raids 
and blockade and using flexible tactics wiped out large numbers of the enemy. 
After its recognition of the PRSY, China offered financial, economic, and military aid 
to the new republic.''^ From 1968 onward the PRSY, or the PDRY (1970), became a 
major focus for competition between China and the Soviet Union as both supplied 
military and economic aid. China's support for the PDRY can be explained by the 
following reasons: 
1. China wanted to undermine the presence of the British in the South; 
2. The independence of South Yemen could present China with an outstanding 
opportunity to impose its own presence and influence in the region, particularly after 
the break down of diplomatic relations between the PRSY and the USA; 
3. South Yemen's foreign policy programme was favourable to China, particularly its 
support for the liberation movements in the Gulf and the Third World and it 
identification with the socialist camp; and 
'"^ Beijing Review, volume 6, number 23, 5 June 1964, p. 5. 
Beijing Review, volume 10, number 50, 8 December 1967, p. 36. 
' ^  See Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy the Case of South Yemen, 1967-1987, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 219. 
Chapter four: China's perception of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 155 
4. South Yemen's successful armed struggle could set a good example for the rest of 
the Gulf and could convince them that independence can be achieved in this way. 
China, therefore, wanted to undermine the presence of the British in the South. 
4.1.2. The Dhofari rebellion 
Hashim Behbehani (1981) traced China's relations with the liberation movement in 
Oman to China's first initiatives in the Arab World after the Bandung Conference. Its 
involvement with the movement began as early as Sino-Egyptian contacts in the 1950s. 
It was through the Imamate office and the Chinese embassy in Cairo that the two sides 
contacted each other for the first time. Imam Ghalib Bin All's movement's aim to wage 
struggle against the Sultan of Oman and the British, who were aiding the Sultan, 
captured China's a t tent ion.The Chinese committee for Afro-Asian solidarity, in a 
message to Imam Ghalib on Omani Day on July 18, 1962, expressed its deep respect for 
the Omani people and resolute support for their 'protracted and valiant resistance to 
British imperialist aggression'. The message described the Omani people's armed 
struggle for national independence against the 'British occupationists' as 'wholly just'. 
This political support was also matched with military assistance. As early as 1957 the 
Chinese offered military aid to the Imamate movement through its envoy in Egypt. 
Even though the Chinese offer was rejected by the Imamate, the Chinese presented 
themselves successfully as a potential arms supplier to the movement. 
Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, pp. 164-175. 
Beijing Review, volume 5, number 30, 27 July 1962, p. 20. 
Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 165. 
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China-Imamate contacts through their offices in Cairo played a major role in planning 
for Salih bin Isa's, Deputy Imam of Oman, visit to Beijing from January 29'^  to 
February 20^ "^ , 1959, in response to an invitation from the Chinese Islamic Association. 
During his stay in Beijing, Salih met Mao and Zhou. China's support for the Omani 
struggle was reaffirmed during these meetings and also in a China-UAR joint 
communique on December 1963, during Zhou's visit to Cairo.^^ 
As a result of increasing Chinese support for the theory of 'people's war' particularly 
after Lin Biao's speech 'Long Live the Victory of People's War!' in September 1965, 
China worked to improve its relations with the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF). The 
DLF launched its armed struggle in June 1965 against the rule of the Sultan of Oman, 
Said bin Taimur. In June 1967 the DLF's first delegation visited Beijing upon an 
invitation by the Chinese People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. It was headed by 
Ahmad al-Ghsani, a member of the DLF Council. The Chinese promised to provide the 
DLF with light armaments, $35,000, and Mao's writings and Marxist literature. 
Subsequently, following the Hirmin Conference of September 1968, the DLF's name 
was changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf 
(PFLOAG). This change was reflected by the broadening of the movement's aim to 
extend the revolution from Dhofar to Kuwait. The change of aim and name was made 
after the British announcement in January 1968 of its intention to withdraw its armed 
forces from the Gulf region by the end of 1971. China supported the PFLOAG's armed 
struggle strategy to defeat 'imperialism and its lackeys' in the Gulf region. Several 
other delegations were sent by the PFLOAG to China. The Chinese provided the 
Beijing Review, volume 6, number 52, 27 December 1963, pp. 9-11. 
Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 176. 
Ibid., p. 145. 
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PFLOAG with finance, food and medical and military assistance. The Chinese embassy 
in Aden played a major role in transferring Chinese aid to the rebels in Oman. But 
whether Chinese personnel ever served in Dhofar is still unclear. Since its 
establishment in 1969 in Aden the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported 
frequently on the PFLOAG's military operations in Oman.^ ^ 
China's objective in providing political, economic, and military support to the PFLOAG 
was mainly driven by the following: 
1. China wanted to find a foothold for itself in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
particularly as its relations with many countries of the Arab World, like Egypt and 
Iraq, became strained. 
2. China was hoping to advance revolutionary changes throughout the Gulf region. 
3. The Chinese hoped to encourage the PFLOAG to adopt the Chinese model of 
revolution and accommodate Marxist ideology in order to set an example for the 
revolutionary movements in the rest of the world. 
4. China sought to undermine the Western presence and influence in the region. 
5. China wanted to prevent the Soviet Union from taking the initiative towards the 
movement and therefore ensuring China's isolation from the Gulf. 
6. China wanted to ensure the independence of the newly established PDRY and 
prevent any possible British-Omani invasion of South Yemen via Dhofar. Thus 
Dhofar was used as a buffer zone between Oman and South Yemen by both China 
and South Yemen. 
2- See, among many, BBC, SWB part 3, 12 June 1970, p. A4; BBC, SWB, part 3, 17 June 1970, p. A4; 
BBC, SWB, part 3, 17 July 1970, p. A4; BBC, SWB, part 3, 22 July 1970, p. A4; BBC, SWB, part 3, 30 
July 1970, p. A4; and BBC,SWB, part 3, 1 June 1971, p. A4. 
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4.2. China's pragmatic foreign policy towards the region (1971-1989) 
By 1971 several developments had taken place, and had forced the Chinese government 
to re-adjust its world outlook. The Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia; the Brezhnev 
Doctrine was announced; and the Sino-Soviet border arms clashes and hostilities 
escalated. All these developments forced the Chinese leadership to reconsider the 
Soviet Union as China's principal enemy and the world's most dangerous source of 
instability. China's foreign policy aim then shifted towards building an extensive front 
of resistance to Soviet penetration in the Third World. China's interest in the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region was reflected by this pattern of foreign policy. The Chinese 
leadership was afraid that the Soviet Union might succeed in persuading some Gulf 
States to join the Soviet-proposed Asian collective security system, which would 
enhance Soviet advancement in the Indian Ocean and would benefit the Soviet strategy 
of encirclement of China. In addition, the Chinese government was worried that the 
Soviet Union was attempting to refill the 'power vacuum' in the Gulf region following 
the British withdrawal. Thus, the Chinese initiated both a shift towards accepting U.S. 
policy in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region and a move to cultivate amicable 
relations with the independent states of the region. 
Fear of Soviet Union advancement in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region led the 
Chinese government to consolidate its relations with Kuwait and Iran particularly after 
the signing in August 1971 and April 1972 of the Soviet-Indian and the Soviet-Iraqi 
treaties of friendship and co-operation respectively. China's moves towards these two 
Gulf states were motivated by its desire to create a balance against Iraq and, therefore, 
the Soviet Union penetration in the region. ' 
Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, pp. 171-172. 
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The Soviet Union supported the idea that the affairs of the Gulf region should be 
managed by the states of the Gulf themselves and without any foreign interference, 
namely American or Chinese. However, the Soviets were worried about the close 
relationship between the United States and Iran, since the latter was given the green 
light to play a supervisory and protectionist role in the region by the Americans. The 
Soviets were particularly concerned about the Americans gaining influence in the Gulf 
region through the unprecedented armament of Iran. 
China sought to prevent the Soviet Union from filling the power vacuum in the Gulf 
region. Ji Pengfei, China's Foreign Minister supported Iran's foreign policy position on 
the issue of the Gulf's security. In a speech on 14 June 1973 in Tehran, Ji stated: 
At present, the situation in the Persian Gulf is arousing general concern. The 
intensified expansion, infiltration, and rivalry by certain Big Powers are gravely 
menacing the peace and security of this part of the world. Iran is an important 
country in the Persian Gulf and you have every reason to feel uneasy at this 
situation. We have consistently held that the affairs of a given country must be 
managed by the country itself, and the affairs of a given region must be managed 
by the countries and peoples of that region, and the world affairs must be jointly 
managed by all countries. Iran and some other Persian Gulf countries held that 
the affairs of this region should be joindy managed by the Persian Gulf countries 
and broke no outside interference. This is a just position and we express our firm 
support for it.^ "* 
China's position on the issue of the Gulf's security was intended to achieve the 
following two major foreign policy objectives in the region: 
1. By supporting the principle of non-interference in the Gulf's affairs by outsiders, the 
Chinese aimed to keep the Soviet Union from establishing influence or presence in 
the region. 
Cited partly in Peking Review, volume 16, number 25, 22 June 1973, pp. 3-5; and in A. H. H. Abidi, 
China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1982), p. 113. 
The Chinese saw the Soviets increasing their efforts to stretch their 'claws of aggression into the 
Persian Gulf where they were trying their utmost to grab oil resources and strategic points'. See Peking 
Review, number 37, 14 September 1973, pp. 17-18. 
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2. By stating and supporting the position that the affairs of the region should be jointly 
managed by the Gulf countries, China aimed to project a favourable image of itself 
for the future among certain Gulf States, namely Saudi Arabia and Oman. 
Significantly, this period was the most productive period in China's relations with the 
countries of the region. During this period, China succeeded in establishing diplomatic 
relations with Kuwait in March 1971, Iran in August 1971, and Oman in May 1978. 
Kuwait, Iran and Oman were motivated to establish diplomatic relations with China by 
their common fear of Soviet Union expansionist efforts in the Gulf region, mainly 
through Iraq, South Yemen, and Afghanistan. China shared Kuwait, Tehran, and 
Muscat fear of Moscow penetration in the region. This was evident in China's decision 
to terminate its support of the revolutionary movements in the region in favour of good 
ties with the governments of the region. To some extend, China's new policy was 
motivated also by Beijing effort to counter Taiwan presence in the region and to open 
new markets for its goods. 
China also continued its aid programmes to North and South Yemen. China's fear of 
Soviet presence in both North and South Yemen intensified its interest in these two 
Arabian Peninsula countries. The Chinese believed that if the Soviet Union established 
itself in the Horn of Africa it would enhance its ability to move into southern Africa and 
the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, China welcomed the YAR's decision to expel Soviet 
military advisors and the YAR's efforts to modernise its armed forces through Saudi 
Arabia and the West. The Chinese also launched a campaign of polemics warning of 
26 Yitzhak Shichor, the Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, p. 173. 
Charles T. Creekman, Jr., 'Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens', in Naval War College Review, 
volume 32, number 4, 1979, pp. 73-81. 
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Soviet expansionism and third world domination after the PDRY granted the Soviets the 
use of naval facilities.^^ 
One of the most significant aspects of China's modified foreign pohcy towards the Gulf 
region was its temiination of political and military support for national liberation 
movements in the region. The Chinese believed that the increasing Soviet influence in 
South Yemen and Iraq could only be matched through establishing good ties with the 
governments of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. China's continued support for 
the PFLOAG presented an obstacle in China's efforts to achieve diplomatic relations 
with the countries in the region. Therefore, since 1971 the Chinese gradually began to 
cease their support for the PFLOAG. China even supported measures taken by 
countries in the region against the PFLOAG activities. For example when Ji Pengfei 
visited Iran in June 1973, he supported Iran's decision to send troops to aid the Sultan of 
Oman against the PFLOAG and gave assurances that China had no ties with 
revolutionary groups in the Gulf region. By ceasing its support for the PFLOAG, 
China hoped to cultivate a good relationship with Kuwait, which supported the Sultan 
of Oman against the insurgents. 
Thus, China's turn to the governments of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region was 
initiated by its fear of the massive Soviet naval build up in and around the region. Hua 
Guofeng's Political Report to the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP in August 
1977 stated: 
Ibid., p. 78. 
Ibid., pp. 115-117. 
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The Soviet Union has massed its troops in Eastem Europe and at the same time 
accelerated its plunder of strategic resources and its scramble for strategic basis 
in Africa and the Middle East in an attempt to encircle Europe from the flanks by 
seizing the Persian Gulf in the east, thmsting round the Cape of Good Hope in the 
south and blocking the main navigation routes of the Atlantic Ocean in the 
west. 30 
Besides its success in establishing political relations with North Yemen, South Yemen, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Iran, and Oman China improved its economic relations with the countries 
of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. As shown in figure 4.1, China's trade 
volume with the Gulf countries increased dramatically after 1971. It jumped from 
$59.37 million in 1968 to $140.27 million in 1972, and to $483 million in 1975. This 
increase in the trade volume with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula countries was not 
limited to those Gulf states with which China had diplomatic relations. China's trade 
volume with Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE also increased 
substantially since the early 1970s, although these states had no diplomatic relations 
with China at that time. According to the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade (1984), China's trade volume with those five Gulf states jumped 
from $14.41 million in 1969 to $27.20 million in 1972, and to $100.95 million in 1975. 
Figure 4.1: Value of China's trade with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region (in $10,000), 1968-1975 
60,000 
50,000 
« 40,000 
I 30,000 
^ 20,000 
10,000 
0 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Year 
Source: Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
(Hong Kong: China Resource Trade Consultancy, 1984), pp. 817-871. 
30 Peking Review, number 35, 26 August 1977, pp. 40-41. 
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China also began to approve of U.S. policy in the Middle East, and particularly in the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. The Soviet Union dominated most of China-U.S. 
discussions in the 1970s. In a memorandum to President Nixon in March 1973, Henry 
Kissinger, Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, summed up his 
meetings with Mao and Zhou in February 1973; 
In literally every region of the world the Chinese see the Soviet hand at 
play...Mao and Zhou urged us to counter the Russians everywhere, to work 
closely with our allies in Europe and Japan, and to take more positive action to 
prevent the Soviets filling vacuums or spreading their influence in an area like the 
Middle East, Persian Gulf, Near East, south Asia and Indian Ocean. 
In a meeting with Kissinger, now Secretary of State, in November 1973, Mao Zedong 
emphasised that his country 'welcome[s] the U.S. putting the Soviet Union on the spot' 
so 'that the Soviet Union cannot control the Middle East'.^ ^ 
By mid-1970s China completely ended its support to the rebels in the Gulf; and in 
March 1976 the front collapsed which ended the r e b e l l i o n . I n 1975 Kuwait 
despatched its first ambassador to Beijing. China also improved its relations with Iraq. 
The renewal of Chinese interest in Iraq from 1975 onward was prompted by the decline 
of Iraqi dependence on the Soviet Union and the improvement of relations between Iraq 
and Iran. China extended its construction activity to Iraq, while Baghdad became an 
WilHam Burr [ed.]. The Kissinger Transcripts: the Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow, p. 112. 
Ibid., pp. 187-188. 
'^^  Aryeh Y. Yodfat, The People's Republic of China and the Middle East', Courrier de 1' Extreme-
Orient, (Bruxelles, 1977), p. 10. 
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alternative supplier of sulphur to China.'''^  Despite the unmatchable Soviet aid to both 
Yemens, China continued its economic aid to both countries 35 
The Chinese leadership of Deng Xiaoping was faced with an 'expansionist' Soviet 
power which, in their opinion, was increasing its influence in South Yemen and moving 
towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region through Afghanistan. To the Chinese 
government, containing Soviet influence in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
could be achieved by adopting a foreign policy that favours the following: 
1. A de facto entente with the United States; 
2. Maintain its political relations with the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region; and 
3. Increase its economic ties with the countries of the region. 
This policy was accompanied with Chinese support of the Mujaheddin resistance group 
in Afghanistan through Pakistan. It also maintained economic and political relations 
with PDRY, where the Soviet Union was enjoying a large influence. China watched 
carefully the developments in the Gulf region with the coming of the Islamic regime in 
Iran and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war. 
4.2.1. Revolution in Iran 
The Islamic revolution in Iran caught the Chinese leadership with surprise. They did 
not know what to expect out of the new Republic. China, who had enjoyed a promising 
relationship with the Shah, was worried that the new Islamic regime's anti-US stand 
could favour the Soviet Union over the United States and, therefore, present the Soviets 
John Calabrese, 'From Flyswatters to Silkworms', p. 869. 
See Charles T. Creekman, Jr., 'Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens', p. 77. 
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with another foothold in the region. Ayatollah Khomeini's regime of revolutionary 
militancy, worried the Chinese, that the stability of the Gulf states, which China had 
improved ties with, could be threatened. At the same time, the Chinese saw Moscow on 
the offensive and Washington on the defensive in the region. An article in Beijing 
Review criticised the Soviet strategy towards the new regime in Iran as follows: 
The Soviet Union, which shares 1,800 kilometres of border with Iran, has always 
dreamed of bringing Iran under its control and seizing the Persian Gulf as an 
outlet. The recent upheaval provided Moscow with an opportunity to meddle in 
Iran's internal affairs. Moscow took advantage of the tensions in Iran to 
vigorously support the pro-Soviet forces it had fostered, to fan up workers' 
strikes, and to instigate armed clashes, thus aggravating the situation. 
Meanwhile, at the bidding of the Kremlin, pro-Soviet Iranians who had been 
living in the Soviet Union and Eastem Europe clandestinely retumed to Iran and 
infiltrated various factions and groups which stood opposed to the Shah. 
Immediately after the Iranian Provisional Govemment was formed, the Soviet 
press played up the role of the pro-Soviet forces and called for ensuring complete 
freedom for all organisations so that the pro-Soviet forces could maintain their 
legal status and seize political power at an opportune moment. 
The article went on to remind the United States that: 
For a long time, Iran has been the military pillar of the US policy to contain the 
Soviet Union's southward expansion and ensure the safety of the West's oil 
routes. In addition, the United States imports 900,000 barrels of Iranian oil per 
day, which accounts for 10 percent of its imported oil. If Washington wants to 
protect its vested interest in Iran, it has to resist Moscow's expansion. 
These concerns were elevated by Khomeini's regime tense actions against the US. The 
seizing of over 60 American hostages from the U.S. embassy in Tehran; the banning of 
oil exports to the United States; and the banning of U.S. aircraft or ships from entering 
Iran's territorial air or waters could only mean, to the Chinese, that Iran was moving 
towards the Soviet Union. 
36 Beijing Review, volume 22.1, number 15, 13 April 1979, pp. 19-20. 
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In light of these developments, China became concerned about how to preserve its 
relationship with Iran without harming its relations with the United States. To the 
Chinese, it was obvious that the US was the only force that they could rely on to counter 
Soviet expansionist efforts in the Gulf. However, they did not want to be pictured as 
the enemy in the eye of the Khomeini regime. Thus, they exploited every possible 
opportunity that they could in order to engender a good relationship with Iran, and to 
prevent the Soviets from establishing influence on Iran's new regime. This was 
encouraged by what the Chinese perceived to be some anti-Soviet signs in Iran. First, 
the Chinese welcomed Khomeni's opposition to Moscow's intervention in Iran's 
internal affairs and his demand to stop such intervention. Second, the Chinese also 
welcomed Khomeini's refusal to accept a Soviet offer of military aid to Iran.^^ Lastly, 
the Chinese applauded Tehran's expulsion of a Soviet diplomat for espionage."^ ^ As a 
result of these indications, China did not vote on the United Nations Security Council 
resolution for economic sanctions against Iran on January 13**^ , 1980."^ ° Chen Chu, 
China's representative to the UN, argued that: 
We [the Chinese government] stand for the implementation of the provisions of 
Security Council resolutions calling on Iran to release immediately the 
Americans being held as hostages in Iran...The application of economic 
sanctions against Iran may not necessarily lead to the relaxation of tension and 
the release of hostages...Therefore, we appeal to the parties concerned to 
exercise restraint, avoid taking any action that may aggravate existing 
contradictions and refrain from blocking any channels that may lead to the 
release of hostages through consultation and mediation." '^ 
" See Beijing Review, volume 22.1, number 25, 22 June 1979, p. 27. 
See Beijing Review, volume 23.1, number 4, 28 January 1980, pp. 11-12. 
See Beijing Review, volume 23.2, number 29, 21 July 1980, pp. 9-10. 
"^"^  The Soviet Union vetoed the Resolution. 
41 Cited in Beijing Review, volume 23.1, number 3, 21 January 1980, pp. 11-12. 
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The Chinese also repeatedly stressed their hope that the United States and Iran would 
peacefully solve their differences and emphasised that the break of the relationship 
between the two countries was not in the interest of either side. Commentary in Renmin 
Ribao of April 13"\ 1980 stated: 
It is necessary to be vigilant as the Soviet Union is quite pleased by the 
unfortunate situation and is setting its propaganda machinery into motion in an 
all-out effort to widen the US-Iranian split for its own purpose.'*^  
Al l of these Chinese concerns were elevated by the continuing presence of the Soviet 
Union in Afghanistan. In the Chinese view, the Soviet Union was engaged in a 
'southward drive' to win control over the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region and the 
important sea routes in Asia and Africa. The Vietnamese military occupation of 
Cambodia was also linked to the Soviet Union strategy of the 'southdrive'."^^ Therefore, 
from the Chinese perspective the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had made the Gulf 
region more salient. However, lacking sufficient economic, military, and political 
influence in the region, China had no alternative but to rely heavily on: 
1. Creating propaganda against the Soviet Union intervention in Afghanistan and its 
threat to the security of the Gulf region; and 
2. Supporting the Americans to act with greater authority in the region against the 
Soviet Union policies in the Gulf region in particular and the Middle East in 
general."^ "^  
Cited in Beijing Review, volume 23.1, number 16, 21 April 1980, p. 11. 
Beijing Review, volume 23.1, number 4, 28 January 1980, pp. 15-19. 
'^ '^  Michael B. Yahuda, 'Dilemmas and Problems for China in the Middle East', in Colin Legum [ed.], 
Crisis and Conflicts in the Middle East: the Changing Strategy, (New York: Holmes & Meier Publisher, 
Inc., 1981), p. 109. 
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4.2.2. The Iran-Iraq war 
On 22"^ September 1980 Iraqi forces entered Iran and began a large-scale war against 
Iran. At first, Iraqi advances into Iran was marked by some military success. But by 
the end of the year the Iraqi forces stopped their advance and waited for Khoemeini's 
regime to fall and for the opposition to grow. This did not happen. By the end of 1981 
the Iraqi forces retreated after they were unable to achieve their political aim, and this 
time Iranian forces accelerated into Iraq in an attempt, as many have had argued, to 
overthrow Saddam Husayn's regime and to establish a shi'ite Islamic republic in Iraq. 
The war began to threaten the flow of oil from the region. This was marked by the 
tanker war in late 1983, Iran's threat to close the Strait of Hormuz and the re-flagging of 
Kuwaiti oil ships. Prior to Iran's acceptance of a cease-fire under the United Nation 
Resolution 598, several military clashes took place between the Iranian and the 
American forces in the Gulf. 
China's first official reaction to the eruption of the Iran-Iraq war was presented in 
China's Premier Zhao Ziyang's statement on September 23, 1980. Zhao stated that Iran 
and Iraq are both friendly countries to China. He said: 
We are very much concerned about the recent armed conflicts between 
them...We hope that they will settle their disputes peacefully through 
negotiations, guard against superpower interference and prevent the situation 
from worsening. This is not only in the interests of the people of Iran and Iraq 
but also conducive to peace and stability in the area. 
Their fear has always been centred around the Soviet Union. The Chinese repeatedly 
argued that the continuation of the war in the Gulf region served the interest of the 
Soviet Union. They argued that: 
'^ ^ Cited in Beijing Review, number 39, 29 September 1980, p. 5. 
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The Soviet Union can use this war to advance its southward strategy by taking 
advantage of its geographical proximity and relations with the two belligerents. 
By stout manoeuvres in both camps it can make its influence felt to bring long 
term goals nearer."^ ^ 
Throughout the war China's foreign policy was clearly guided by the following two 
main objectives: 
1. Preventing Moscow from gaining benefits out of the war. 
2. Preventing the war from spreading to the other Gulf States. 
In order to achieve these two foreign policy objectives, China had adopted an official 
policy of neutrality. Early in the war China recognised the limitation of the US 
influence on Iran and feared that Iran might turn to the Soviet Union. As a result, the 
Chinese decided not to leave Iran isolated, which might easily force it into the Soviet 
hands. Instead, China refused to support UN imposed arms embargo against Iran, 
following the passing of the UN Resolution 598."^ ^ China's decision was influenced by 
its fear that the Soviet Union could gain foothold in Iran, particularly after some reports 
had argued that, despite no direct Soviet arms reached Iran in 1981 and 1982, Soviet 
advisors were involved in training the Revolutionary Guard and in organising Iran's 
Intelligence Services."^ ^ In addition to its refusal to support the UN effort to impose an 
arms embargo on Iran, China continued its propaganda against the Soviet Union. China 
accused the Soviet Union of being behind the war and argued that the Soviets sought to 
exploit the conflict to their own interests."^ ^ The Chinese hold that the Soviet Union 
46 Cited in Beijing Review, number 44, 3 November 1980, pp. 10-11. 
'^^  Shireen T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolution Decade, (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1990), p. 161. 
'^^  See Shahram Chubin, 'Gains for Soviet Policy in the Middle East', in International Security, volume 6, 
number 4, spring 1982, pp. 122-152. 
Michael B. Yahuda, 'Dilemmas and Problems for China in the Middle East', p. 104. 
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wanted the war to continue, providing it did not lead to a direct confrontation with the 
U.S. and Western Europe.'^° Thus, the Chinese repeatedly called upon the two sides to 
solve their problems peacefully and to bring to an end the war that, according to the 
Chinese, neither Iran nor Iraq was benefiting from. They even argued that the 
continuation of the war was helping their common enemy, Israel, by diverting the 
world's attention from focusing on Israeli policies against the Palestinians to the Iran-
Iraqi war.''' More importantly, the Chinese encouraged the rapprochement of relations 
between the United states and Iran as the best for the security of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region and for containing the Soviet Union. 
China's second foreign policy objective was related to the Chinese government's 
concern about the stability of the region. China supported the United States' efforts to 
prevent the war from spreading to the neighbouring Gulf States, whom China had good 
economic and political relations with. The official Chinese paper the Renmin Rihao 
said that the war between Iran and Iraq: 
Is a war of mutual slaughter between brothers in which both sides suffer. If this 
war is further internationalised, it will no longer be confined to two countries but 
will spread to the entire Gulf region. More and more countries will then be 
involved until this region is drawn into the whirlpool of the superpowers' global 
contention. This will then constitute a serious threat to peace in the Middle East 
region and the world as a whole. If the situation develops to such extent, both 
Iran and Iraq will become pawns in the chess game which the superpowers are 
52 
playing and will become victims of the superpowers' contention. 
China, who declined Kuwait's request to hire Chinese ships or have Kuwaiti oil tankers 
registered with Chinese authorities, pursued an 'active mediation' between Iran and 
See Beijing Review, number 44, 3 November 1980, pp. 10-11. 
'^ See, for example, Beijing Review, number 49, 8 December 1980, p. 12. 
52 FBIS-CHI-84-101, 23 May 1984, p. 11. 
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Iraq. Unlike all other UN Security Council permanent members, China's good relations 
with both Iran and Iraq and its refusal to get involved in the acute oil tanker escorting 
war created a special position for China in its mediation efforts. China was the first UN 
Security Council member to send a special envoy to Iran following the UN Security 
Council adoption on 20^ *^  July 1987 of resolution 598 which called on Iran and Iraq to 
ceasefire and start talks to seek peaceful settlement of their disputes. Qi Huaiyuan, 
China's special envoy and deputy foreign minister, visited Tehran on August 25^ *^ , 
1987.^ "* In all their meetings with the Iranian and the Iraqis officials, the Chinese 
officials had always urged the two sides to cease their fighting and seek peaceful 
negotiations. 
It was the superpowers' presence in the Gulf and Peninsula region and involvement in 
the conflict that inspired the Chinese government to pursue its 'active mediation' 
between Iran and Iraq. China believed that the continuation of the war was the main 
obstacle to limiting the big powers' presence and involvement in the region. Therefore, 
the Chinese continued their call for the parties to solve their differences peacefully. 
However, China opposed the military involvement of the big powers in the region and 
did not agree that they should send their planes and warships to the region, even for the 
purpose of escorting ships. To the Chinese, the superpowers' involvement was mainly 
'to seek military hegemony in the region and would only add more trouble to that region 
as well as make the situation more tense'."^ "^  
When an Iran Airlines passenger plane flying over the southern part of the Gulf was 
brought down by the U.S. Navy forces in the Gulf on 3'^ '^  July 1988, the Chinese 
FBIS-CHI-87-166, 27 August 1987, pp. 3-4. 
See FBIS-CHI-88-128, 5 July 1988, pp. 13-14. 
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government, through its media, criticised the action. It emphasised that its analysis of 
the superpowers' involvement in the region was correct. It believed that the airline 
incident 'underlined the urgency for the removal of big power's military meddling' 
from the region 'and for the peaceful settlement between the warring nations'. 
When Iran announced on July 8'*^ , 1988 its acceptance to the UN Security Council 
resolution 598, China welcomed the Iranian decision and sent its deputy foreign 
minister to Tehran for talks with Iranian officials on the post cease-fire negotiations.^^ 
Following the cease-fire China continued to reaffirm its position to support the 
mediation efforts of the UN General Secretary and to provide the 'best possible' co-
operation for his work.^^ 
4.2.3. China's arms sales to the region in the 1980s 
Meanwhile, China sought to benefit from the United States and the Soviet Union 
preference for a stalemate rather than a decisive victory, by exploiting the war to its own 
economic and political advantages. The eruption and continuation of the war had made 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region China's top arms customer in the 1980s. As 
shown in Table 4.1, China's arms exports to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
from 1982 to 1986 amounted for almost 70 percent of China's total arms transfer to the 
world. Furthermore, the region's share of China's total arms from sales from 1987 to 
1991 reached 77 percent (see Table 4.2). 
Ibid., p. 14. 
FBIS-CHI-88-158, 16 August 1988, p. 18. 
The remark was made by Premier Zhao in a meeting with the visiting Iranian foreign minister Velayati 
in December 1988, FBIS-CHI-88-245, 21 December 1988, p. 17. 
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Table 4.1: China's main arms customers by region, 1982-1986 (million of current 
US$) 
Region Value Share of China's Total 
Arms Sales (%) 
The Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Region 
4,505 69.85 
The Arab Countries of the 
Middle East and Afr ica 
1,135 17.5 
South Asia 380 6.0 
East Asia 285 4.5 
Af r i ca 135 2.0 
East Europe 10 .15 
Total 6,450 100 
Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military expenditures and Arms Transfers, 
J987, (Washington: ACDA, 1987), pp. 127-130. 
Table 4.2: China's main arms customers by region, 1987-1991 (million of current 
US$) 
Region Value Share of China's Total 
Arms sales (%) 
The Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula Region 
7,320 77.0 
The Arab Countries of the 
Middle East and Afr ica 
265 2.8 
South Asia 880 9.24 
East Asia 720 7.5 
Af r i ca 300 3.15 
North America 30 .31 
Total 9,515 100 
Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992, pp. 131-134. 
Iran and Iraq became the major recipients of Chinese arms not only in the Gulf region 
but also in the world; these two countries accounted for about 70 percent of China's 
total arms sales from 1982 to 1986 and 45 percent from 1987 to 1991. This made China 
become the fifth-largest seller of military equipment in the world. 
Table 4.3: China's top arms customers, 1982-1986 (mi lion of current US$) 
Country Value Rank 
Iraq 3,300 1 
Iran 1,200 2 
Egypt 625 3 
Libya 320 4 
Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987, pp. 127-130. 
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Table 4.4: China's top arms customers, 1987-1991 (mil lion of current US$) 
Country Value Rank 
Saudi Arabia 3,000 1 
Iran 2,600 2 
Iraq 1,700 3 
Pakistan 600 4 
Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992, pp. 130-134. 
As shown in tables 4.2 and 4.4, China's arms transfers to the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region continued to dominate China's total arms transfer by 1991. While Iran 
and Iraq remained China's major arms customers in the region, Saudi Arabia had 
emerged as China's new primary arms customer in the Gulf region by the end of the 
1980s. This was mainly due to China's estimated $3-3.5 billion deal with Saudi Arabia 
in 1987 to sell about 36 Dong Feng-3 (East Wind-3), known to NATO as CSS-2, 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), with ranges of 2,800 kilometres. 
During the Iran-Iraq war, China, despite its denial of any official arms sales to either 
side in the war, had sold Iran and Iraq fighters, bombers, artillery, armoured vehicles, 
and other military equipment worth $11-12 billion. 
During the war, China was Iran's largest single arms supplier. For Iran, the low cost of 
Chinese weapons made China an attractive selling point. For China Iran presented a 
great economic opportunity to gain some hard currency to support China's drive for 
economic and military modernisation; politically, it was an irresistible opportunity to 
establish a friendly relationship with the Islamic regime in Iran, thus creating an 
importance for itself in the region. China and Iran signed a secret nuclear co-operation 
agreement, under which many Iranian nuclear engineers were trained by Chinese 
About this deal see, among many, The Independent, 2 May 1988, p. 12; Far Eastern Economic Review, 
2 June 1988, pp. 26-27; and Congressional Research Service, 'Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation: 
Issues for Congress', on http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/92-056-l.htm. 
See Yitzhak Shichor, 'Unfolded Arms: Beijing's Recent Military Sales Offensive', in The Pacific 
Review, volume 1, number 3, 1988, pp. 320-329. 
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experts in nuclear reactor design and research.They also signed their first large arms 
deal in 1984, in which China would transfer F-6 fighters, Type-59 tanks, field artillery 
and shells, multiple rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles worth $1.6 billion.^' 
Another deal was signed in 1986 in which China transferred to Iran, F-7 fighters, more 
Type-59 tanks, and Hai-Ying-2 (Silkworm) anti-ship missiles for $1.5 billion^^ (see 
table 4.5). 
Table 4.5: China's arms sales to Iran from 1981 to 1988 
No. 
ordered 
Weapon 
designation 
Weapon 
description 
Year of 
order 
Year(s) of 
deliveries 
No. 
delivered 
Comments 
F-6 Fighter 1981 1986-1988 30 Possibly via 
North 
Korea 
60 F-7 Fighter 1986 1986-1988 60 Chinese 
version of 
the Soviet 
MiG21 
T-59 MBT 
(Main 
Battle 
Tank) 
1986 1987-1988 240 
Type-501 APC 
(Armored 
Personnel 
Carrier) 
1986 1986-1988 300 
Type-63 
107 mm 
MRL 1982 1983-1988 900 
Hai-Ying-
2L 
Anti-ship 
missile 
1986 1987-1988 8 Coast, ship 
and air 
launched 
versions 
Hai-Ying-2 Anti-ship 
missile 
1986 1987-1988 124 NATO 
designation: 
Silkworm 
Hong Jian-
73 
Anti-tank 
Missile 
1982 1982-1988 6500 
Hong Ying-
5 
Portable 
SAM 
(Surface-to-
air Missile) 
1985 1985-1988 600 
PL-2A A A M 
(Air-to-air 
Missile) 
1986 1986-1988 540 Arming F-6 
and F-7 
fighters 
PL-7 A A M 1986 1986-1988 360 Arming F-7 
fighters 
Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett I I , Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military 
Threat to America, (Washnigton, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999), p.100. 
Business Week, 29 December 1986, p. 47. 
62 Yitzhak Shichor, 'Unfolded Arms:' p. 323. 
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Source: Adapted from SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armament and Disarmament, (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 252. 
In January 1990 China and Iran signed a ten-year 'military technology transfer 
agreement'. Edward Timperlake and William Triplett n argue that under this 
agreement Chinese nuclear specialists began to appear at the Qazvin Nuclear Research 
Centre west of Tehran, and later at Karaj, another location where the Chinese were 
believed to have supplied nuclear assistance.^ '' 
In its pursuit for economic and political leverages China also sold jet fighters, tanks, 
artillery, and missiles to Iraq (see Table 4.6). Some have reported that China helped 
Iraq build sophisticated magnets for stabilising uranium enrichment centrifuges.^ "^ Iraq 
reportedly sought Chinese assistance after failing to obtain the specific magnets from 
British sources. Others have argued that from 1984 to 1986 China conducted a 
feasibility study on building a clandestine nuclear reactor for Iraq.^^ 
Table 4.6: China's arms sales to Iraq from 1981 to 1988 
No. 
ordered 
Weapon 
designation 
Weapon 
description 
Year of 
order 
Year (s) of 
deliveries 
No. 
delivered 
Comments 
4 B-6 Bomber 1987 1988 4 
T-59 M E T 1981 1982-1988 700 
T-69 M E T 1982 1983-1988 600 1000-2000 
ordered in 
early 1980s 
Type-531 APC 1981 1982-1988 650 
Type-59/1 
130mm 
Towed 
Gun 
1981 1982-1988 720 
C-601 AshM 
(Anti-ship 
Missile) 
1987 1988 128 
Hai Ying-2 ShShM/SS 
HM 
1986 Arming 
Osa-2 class 
FACs 
Source: Adapted from SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armament and Disarmament, p. 252. 
Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett I I , Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military 
Threat to America, p. 100. 
64 The Washington Time, 14 December 1989. 
65 Congressional Research Services, 'Chinese Missile and Nuclear Proliferation', p. 12. 
Chapter four: China's perception of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 177 
In summary, during this phase China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region remained close to China's relations with both Washington and 
Moscow. Beijing's fear of Moscow penetration in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region led China to foster closer ties with Washington's allies in the region. It also 
prompted the Chinese government to abandon its support for the revolutionary groups. 
China's foreign policy, therefore, succeeded during the seventies in establishing 
diplomatic relations with Kuwait, Iran, and Oman. Despite the proclamation of the 
independent foreign policy in 1982, China's foreign policy towards the region 
continued to stress the potential of a Soviet manoeuvre to dominate the region 
particularly since Moscow troops remained in Afghanistan. Thus, China stressed time 
and time again the need to solve the Iran-Iraq war peacefully so that the Soviets would 
not have an opportunity to exploit either side in the war for their own advantage. While 
Washington was supporting Iraq, China felt for the need to back Iran to prevent Tehran 
from moving towards alignment with Moscow. China, therefore, provided a substantial 
amount of military assistance to Iran throughout its war with Iraq; and focused most of 
its attention in the region towards generating more political and economic ties with Iran 
at the same time keeping good relations with Iraq. This period also witnessed China 
pushing further for political ties with the remaining countries of the region which with it 
had no diplomatic relations - namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. 
However, China succeeded only in establishing diplomatic relations with the UAE in 
November 1984, Qatar in July 1988, and Bahrain in April 1989, but not Saudi Arabia. 
However, China increased its military and economic co-operation with the Kingdom in 
the eighties. Its objective was to eliminate Taiwan politically from the region. The 
Kingdom during this period had recognised Taiwan as the legitimate representative of 
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China and established diplomatic relations with. The Kingdom was one of the two most 
prominent states that Taiwan enjoyed diplomatic relations with- the other being South 
Africa. Therefore, China's rapid military and economic relations in the second half of 
the eighties were driven by China's hope to score some political gains against Taiwan in 
the region. Such policy achieved its objective in the early nineties when the Kingdom 
decided that the political and strategic importance of the PRC was greater than that of 
the ROC. 
4.3. China's new interest in the region (1990-1999) 
During the 1990s several important developments had taken place in and around the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region and influenced China's foreign policy towards the 
region. The real direct Chinese-perceived Soviet threat to the region was illuminated 
following the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Kuwait crisis was 
erupted. China had become a net importer of oil for the first time in its 43 years history. 
During this phase, China began to establish a long-term co-operation with the countries 
of the region in order to meet its own current and future needs for oil from the region. It 
has co-operated with in Tehran's efforts to break the deadlock of American political and 
economic sanctions against Iran. It has repeatedly called for the peaceful resolution of 
regional disputes. It has also continued to upgrade its military co-operation with Iran, 
despite Washington opposition, to a level where Beijing could remain an influential and 
dependable supplier of arms to the region. Thus, China's Gulf foreign policy, during 
this period, can be defined in terms of China's needs to increase its capabilities and 
achieve its Four Modernisations programme. China's need for a long-term independent 
supplier of energy to sustain its high level of economic growth characterised China's 
relations with the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region during this period. 
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4.3.1. The Kuwait crisis 
The Kuwait crisis erupted as a result of the Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait on 
August 2"^ ,^ 1990. World-wide condemnations of Iraq followed the Iraqi action. A 
series of resolutions requiring Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from 
Kuwait and calling for economic sanctions against Iraq were adopted by the UN 
Security Council. Several efforts had been made by the Arab countries and the 
international community to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis and avoid a 
disastrous war in the region. Meanwhile, the US had begun its 'Operation Desert 
Shield' on August 7*, 1990 sending troops to the Gulf region. Iraq, however, refused to 
implement the Security Council resolutions or to accept the peaceful resolutions. 
Subsequently, this had led to the adoption and the implementation of the UN Security 
Council Resolution 678, which authorised member states 'to use all necessary means' 
including the military force, to uphold and implement the Security Council's previous 
resolutions unless Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait on or before January 15, 1991. 
Iraq continued its refusal to withdraw its troops from Kuwait.^^ As a result, a coalition 
led by the US began a massive air offensive on the Iraqi troops in Kuwait and Iraq, 
followed by moving ground troops into Kuwait.^^ This action forced the Iraqi troops to 
move out of Kuwait and restore Kuwait's independence, sovereignty, and legitimate 
government. Following the liberation of Kuwait, the UN has maintained sanctions 
against Iraq and worked on limiting the military capability of Iraq. 
'^^^ For more information on the crisis see, among many useful sources, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim 
Krash, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber and Charles R. H. Tripp, 
[eds.], The Iraqi Aggression against Kuwait, Strategic Lessons and Implications for Europe, (Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1996). 
For information on the coalition air and ground attack on Iraqi troops see, among many, Khaled Bin 
Sultan and Patrick Scale, Desert Warrior: a Personal View of the Gulf War by the joint Forces 
Commander, (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1995). 
Chapter four: China's perception of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 180 
To China, both Iraq and Kuwait were important states in the Gulf region for the 
following reasons: 
1. China's drive for implementing its modernisation programme required a stable 
world, including the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. China depended heavily 
on the strength of the Western and Asian economies for its own economic 
modernisation including foreign capitals and technology. Not yet a major importer 
of Gulf oil, China was concerned about the impact of the crisis on the supply and 
demand of oil and, therefore, the subsequent impact on China's economy. 
2. Prior to the crisis, China had a substantial increase in its trade relations with the 
countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. In 1989, 26 percent of its total 
volume with the region came from its trade relations with Kuwait and Iraq. Kuwait 
was the third largest trade partner with China, after Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
respectively, in the Gulf region. China's trade volume with the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula countries reached $5074 million from 1985 to 1989, Kuwait accounting 
for $719 m i l l i o n . M o s t notably, China's trade volume with Kuwait showed an 
increase in almost every year since 1985. Plus, China's exports to both Kuwait and 
Iraq exceeded its imports from the two Gulf states, which provided the Chinese with 
much needed hard currency. 
3. Iraq was a source of investment to many Chinese companies and a source of income 
to many Chinese workers who profited from the process of reconstructing Iraq's 
infrastructures that were destroyed during the eight-year war with Iran. Yitzhak 
Shichor noted that Iraq's share of China's labour exports surpassed 50 percent 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p. 135. 
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reaching $678 million by 1987. China also supplied Iraq with construction services 
amounting to more than $ 1 billion from 1976 to 1987.^ ^ 
4. Iraq, as mentioned in the previous section, was one of China's top arms customers 
in the world during the 1980s, which provided China with much needed hard 
currency to modernise its economy and military. 
5. Kuwait was also a source of income for over 7,700 Chinese construction workers 
for contracted projects, where the amount of labour service contracts with Kuwait 
reached $500 million prior to the c r i s i s .Kuwai t was also a source of soft loan to 
many of China's development projects. From 1982 to 1989 the Kuwait Fund for 
Arab Economic Development provided China with $310 million in soft loans for the 
construction of 13 projects in different provinces.''' 
China's official reaction to the crisis was presented in Premier Li Peng's report to the 
15 '^ Session of the Standard Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress in 
August 28, 1990. Li stated that China is firmly opposed to Iraq's invasion and 
annexation of Kuwait and to the military involvement of 'big powers'. He emphasised 
that China maintains that the disputes between Iraq and Kuwait should be resolved by 
peaceful means within the Arab countries, utilising the UN mediation role to its 
fullest.^^ This position reflected China's foreign policy principles that state-to-state 
relations should be based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and that 
Yitzhak Shichor, 'China and the Gulf Crisis: Escape from Predicament', in Problems of Communism, 
volume 40, November 1991, pp. 81-82. Others also estimated that by August 1990 there was 5,000 
Chinese nationals working in Iraq, Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy 
and War in the New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 140. 
Beijing Review, number 37, 10-16 September 1990, pp. 10-11. 
^' Yitzhak Shichor, 'China and the Middle East since Tiananmen', in The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, volume 519, January 1992, pp. 95-97. 
Beijing Review, number 37, 10-16 September 1990, p. 7. 
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differences between states should be solved peacefully instead of resorting to force. 
Thus the Chinese government opposed the Iraqi action against Kuwait and urged for 
peaceful restoration of Kuwait's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and 
legitimate government. The Chinese government ensured the visiting Kuwaiti Emir 
Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah in late December 1990, that China would never change its 
'principled stand' against the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait.^^ China 
supported all the UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq except resolution 678 from 
which it abstained, which legitimised the use of force against Iraqi troops in Kuwait. 
The Chinese government's behaviour in supporting, or at least not opposing, the UN 
Security Council's resolutions on the crisis can be explained in terms of the following 
points: 
1. The Gulf crisis provided the Chinese government with a unique opportunity to 
rehabilitate its international image and lift the economic and political sanctions that 
were imposed following its suppression of the student demonstrations in Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989. Most importantly, China used the crisis as a useful gesture to 
improve its bilateral relationship with the United States, which was harmed after 
Tiananmen. Thus, foreign investment, capital, and technology, mainly from the 
West and Japan, were China's primary aims, needed to continue its modernisation 
programme. The Chinese government saw foreign investment, capital, and 
technology as more important, in the short and long term, than losing $2 billion in 
arms exports to Iraq.^ "^  Following its support or non-opposition to the Security 
Council resolutions the U.S. resumed its high level meetings with China and lifted 
"^^  See, Beijing Review, number 1, 7-13 January 1991, pp. 11-12. 
'^^ The Financial Times (London), 2 November 1990, p. 4. 
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its economic sanctions, resulting in Europe, Japan, and South East Asia following 
suit. 
2. China, for the sake of its own modernisation drive, was concerned about the damage 
that the crisis might do to international economic relations and its own future oil 
needs. 
3. China was unwilling to harm its improving relations with the Gulf states, who did 
not participate in the worldwide campaign to condemn the Chinese government 
action in Tiananmen Square or in its violation of other human rights. Therefore, to 
preserve and expand its relations with the Gulf states and to prevent any tilt by the 
Gulf states towards the ROC, China had no other choice but to co-operate.^ ^ 
Following the outbreak of the war in the region in January 1991, the Chinese 
government continued to emphasis its opposition to the Iraqi invasion and demanded 
that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait immediately. At the same time, it continued to 
advocate the need for achieving a peaceful solution to the crisis through political and 
diplomatic means and avoiding the use of force. This Chinese policy stemmed from the 
following rationales: 
1. China wanted to strengthen its position as a Third World advocate and distance itself 
from military defeat in the region. Its hope for a positive role to solve the crisis had 
led the Chinese government to: 1) receive Iraqi first Deputy Premier Taha Yasin 
Ramadan on September 6; and 2) despatch Chinese Foreign Minister to Iraq and 
othei" Arab capitals to explore the 'possibility of a peaceful solution of the 
worsening Gulf crisis'. 
For example, China, despite its criticism of US presence in the Gulf region, did not criticise Saudi 
Arabia's decision to allow US troops to enter and operate from its own territory. 
'^^  For Qian Qichen's, China's Foreign Minister, trip to the Middle East see, Beijing Review, number 47, 
19-25 November 1990, pp. 7 and 8. 
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2. A military victory by the US-led coalition forces against Saddam Hussain could 
threaten China's position as one of the leading arms suppliers to the Gulf region by 
establishing a predominant US-led security system in the region. 
3. China has always been very sensitive about the issue of using force against a 
sovereign state. Its emphasis on the need for the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence, as the main principles to govern relations among nations, is driven 
largely by its concern over its own quest for Taiwan and its policies in many 
unstable regions inside its own territory. Therefore, this has always been part of 
China's international positions, due to its own ambitions. 
China's concern this time was also over the danger that the war could spill and expand 
over the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region and, thereafter, the Middle East. This 
concern was stated in Premier Li Peng's statement; 
The Chinese government and people strongly appeal to all parties concerned to 
exercise a great restraint to prevent the escalation and expansion of war, so as to 
protect the people of the Middle East countries from a greater catastrophe and 
provide opportunities and favourable conditions for the international community 
to continue its search for a peaceful settlement to the conflict. 
In its own effort to bring the crisis to an end peacefully and to keep itself involved in the 
developments in the Gulf region, the Chinese government set out on February 24'^ , 
1991, the same day that the ground troops started to move into Kuwait, a six-point 
proposal for a peaceful solution to the crisis. The proposal called for the following 
points: 
1. Iraq should unconditionally withdraw its troops from Kuwait; 
''^  See, for instance, Qian Qichen's statement in Beijing Review, number 41, 8-14 October 1990, pp. 10-
11. 
Cited in Beijing Review, number 4, 28 January, 3 February 1991, p. 7. 
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2. The parties involved should show a willingness for peace; 
3. The urgent task at this moment is to prevent the war from expanding and escalating 
and to create favourable conditions for peaceful efforts. Al l sides involved in the 
conflict should do their best to avoid any actions which cause an increase of 
personnel casualties and destruction of civilian installations; 
4. Matters concerning the security of the Gulf region in the aftermath of the conflict 
should be consulted and solved primarily by the regional countries. Foreign troops 
should withdraw from the region, and Arab and Islamic countries should play a 
more important role; 
5. As for the Middle East issue, there can never be a real and lasting peace in the 
Middle East and the Gulf region as long as the conflict between the Arab countries 
and Israel remains unsolved. The international community should focus its full 
attention on this issue; and 
6. The above five issues may not be linked with each other, but they can be dealt with 
one after another. However, all these issues should be given equal consideration 
and attention. 
This Chinese proposal and other Chinese efforts to peacefully resolve the crisis 
illustrates the point that China was concerned about the military activities in the Gulf 
region and the continuing U.S.-led attack on Iraq. That is why China welcomed the 
suspension of the allies operations against Iraq in March 1991.^° Following the Iraqi 
troops withdrawal from Kuwait and the suspension of the military operations by the 
West, China's policy towards the new arrangements was addressed by the Chinese 
Assistant Foreign Minister Yang Facheng. Yang emphasised his country's position, by 
Cited in Beijing Review, volume 34, number 9, 4-10 March 1991, p. 4. 
BBC, SWB, Part 3: Far East, 4 March 1991, p. A4/1. 
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arguing that the Gulf's affairs must be dealt with mainly by the countries in the region 
through dialogue. He stressed that the independence, sovereignty, and security of the 
Gulf States' territories must be respected and that interference in the internal affairs of 
the Gulf States must be rejected. He added that the arrangements issue must be dealt 
with by the Gulf States themselves, adding that the Security Council could play a 
positive role regarding this issue. He expressed China's support for the Gulf States in 
'boJstering their unity and strengthening themselves to maintain peace and stability' in 
the region. He also expressed China's understanding and respect for the defence 
o 1 
measures the Gulf States have taken for their security arrangements. 
In short, China's co-operation with the international norms during and after the Kuwait 
crisis suggests that China is interested in the stability of the region, in order to protect its 
own modernisation. It signifies Chinese acceptance of the principle that development is 
unachievable in a climate of instability, in one of the world most important regions. 
Stability of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region is vital to China's drive to modernise 
its economy, and therefore sustain or increase its capabilities relative to others. Unlike 
the past, China's actions in the 1990s were not preoccupied with its criticism of the 
American presence in the region. Instead, its focus was shifted towards maintaining 
stability in the region and the prevention of domination of the region by a hostile 
country. 
4.3.2. Market for Chinese military goods 
China, like other weapon producers, needed to sell arms as a way of generating a higher 
scale of economy, thus helping to subsidise some costs associated with running an 
indigenous defence industry, and to stay influential in the region against the other big 
FBIS-CHI-91-122, 25 June 1991, p. 15. 
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powers. The termination of the Iran-Iraq war, the end of the cold war, and the high-tech 
weapons systems demonstration in Operation Desert Storm, all combined to decrease 
demand for China's lower technology weaponry, in a region where China generated a 
large amount of profit in the 1980s. Russia's advanced technology weaponry attracted 
China's major arms buyers in the Gulf, namely Iran. China's arms supplies to Iran from 
1987 to 1991 exceeded that of Russia's arms supplies to Iran by $500 million. 
However, from 1991 to 1995 Russia's arms supplies to Iran increased substantially to 
reach $3,300 million, and China's arms supplies to Iran dropped to $1,365 million. 
Therefore, in order for China to compete against the Russians and others for markets for 
its military industry in the Gulf region, it has to upgrade its service to co-operate with 
the buyers in the development of high-level weaponry despite U.S. opposition. This 
was obviously China's new strategy to keep itself, not only competing for markets, but 
also to continue its presence in the region as an influential power and to create friendly 
relations with the countries of the region to ensure the spread of their crude oil to China. 
China's position on the arms sales issue to the Gulf region was presented by the Chinese 
delegation to a conference on arms control in the Middle East held by the five 
permanent members of the UN Security Council in Paris on July 9^*^, 1991. The Chinese 
delegation stressed that China 'has all along adopted a responsible and prudent attitude 
towards international arms trade and complied with the following principles: (1) the 
sales should be helpful to the justified defence capacity of the countries concerned; (2) 
the sales should not be harmful to peace, security and stability in the region; and (3) no 
arms trade should be used to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries'. The 
delegation added that ' i f all countries concerned stop selling weapons to the Middle 
ACDA, World Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1991-1992, p. 133; World Military 
Expenditure and Arms Transfers, 1993-1994, p. 141; and World Military Expenditure and Arms 
Transfers, 1996, p. 153. 
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East region, China will have no difficulty to do likewise'. As we will see, China, 
reportedly, continued to sell arms and military technology to the region. 
4.3.2.1. Missile technology sales to Iran 
Reports indicated that China continued in the early 1990s to assist Iran's HY-2 anti-ship 
missile programme and assisted an Iranian missile production facility near Isfahan 
capable of producing the HY-2 missile.^ "^ Sawt al-Kuwayt reported in November 1992 
that Iran had signed an agreement with China in the same month, under which it would 
sell Beijing over 100 Iraqi military aircraft in return for Chinese technological 
equ ipment . In 1996, U.S. media reported that China supplied C-802 anti-ship cruise 
missiles to Iran, with a range of 120 kilometres with a 165-kilogram warhead. It is 
reported that China's Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation had sold and 
delivered about 40 of the C-802's, China's 'top-of-the-line' anti-ship cruise missile, to 
Iran by March 1996, plus Huadong fast attack boats to carry them. The U.S. was 
concerned about the transfer of the C-802's to Iran because: 
1. The missiles were considered to be a threat to U.S. ships in the Gulf; and 
2. The missiles were built with assistance from the U.S., which created a continued 
debate in the U.S. government over the transfer of U.S. technology to a hostile 
power via China. 
BBC, SWB, Part 3: Far East/1124, 15 July 1991, p. A4/1. 
Bates Gill, 'Chinese Arms Exports to Iran', in P.R. Kumaraswamy [ed.], China and the Middle East: 
the Quest for Influence, (London: Sage Publications, 1999), pp.121-123. 
FBIS-NES-92-223, 18 November 1992, p. 49. 
Bi l l Gertz, 'Iran Obtain Patrol Boats from China', in Washington Times, 1 March 1996, p. A12. 
87 The first shipment of the missile was delivered in July 1995, ibid. 
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The CIA reported delivery of a Chinese missile guidance system and computerised 
machine tools to Iran in 1994 and 1995, which, according to the report, could improve 
the accuracy of Iran's Scuds and enable it to develop more of its own.^^ The 
Washington Times of November 21^ ,^ 1996, cited another CIA report, which claimed 
that China agreed in August to sell to Iran's Defence Industries organisation 
gyroscopes, accelerometers, and test equipment that could be used to build and test 
components for missile guidance. Besides this, it was reported that China helped Iran in 
building the Semnan launch and missile test range in 1990, and assisted Iran in two 
missile tests at Semnan in 1991. It was also reported that despite the fact China did not 
provide complete M-9 or M-11 missile system to Iran, it helped Iran in building a 
Silkworm and M9 plant near Isfahan and providing technologies and assistance, as well 
as providing a Silkworm anti-ship cruise missile to Iran in 1992. China delivered 20 
CSS-8 ballistic surface-to-surface missiles (M-7) to Iran in 1994, with a range of 150 
kilometres.China is believed to be assisting Iran with the technology to produce the 
solid-propellant unguided Mushak-120, with a range of 130 kilometres and 500 
kilogram, and the longer range version, the Mushak-160, with a range of 160 kilometres 
and 500 kilogram, as well as the 200 kilometres Mushak-200.^* 
4.3.2.2. China's nuclear co-operation with Iran 
During President Rafsanjani's visit to Beijing in September 1992, China and Iran 
reached an agreement on nuclear energy co-operation. China reportedly agreed to build 
See Elaine Sciolino, 'China Targeted on Missile Exports', in International Herald Tribune, 23 June 
1995, p. 1. 
Bates Gill, 'Chinese Arms Exports to Iran', pp. 125-127. 
See 'Can the US Rely on China's Export Promises?' in Risk, May 1996, p. 9; and Elaine Sciolino, 'CIA 
Report Says Chinese Sent Iran Arms Components', in The New York Times, 22 June 1995, p. A l . 
^' FAS Intelligence Resource Program, 'Missile Proliferation-Iran', on 
http://wwwfas.org/irp/threat/missile/iran.htm, p. 2; and Bill Gertz, 'Iran-China Missile Co-operation', in 
Washington Times, 18 June 1997. 
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two 300-megawatt nuclear reactors in about ten years in Iran. This deal, however, 
remained on hold. Others reported that the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation 
has agreed to sell Iran a facility to convert uranium ore into uranium hexaflouride gas,^ ^ 
which can be enriched to the weapons-grade level.^ "^  It was also reported that China has 
agreed to sell Iran a 25 to 30 megawatt reactor, which is an ideal size for making a small 
number of nuclear weapons per year.^ '^  The Washington Times reported that Chinese 
technicians had built an electro-magnetic isotope separation system for enriching 
uranium at the Karaj nuclear research facility.^^ In 1993-1994 the Institute of Plasma 
Physics of the Chinese Academy of Science transferred nuclear fusion research to the 
Azad University in T e h r a n . I t was reported by the CIA in 1997 that 'China is a key 
supplier of nuclear technology to Iran', exporting more than $60 million worth 
annually. It was also said that a number of Chinese nuclear experts had worked at 
Iranian nuclear facilities in 1997.^ ^ Both the Chinese and the Iranian officials insisted 
that these items could be used only for peaceful purposes. 
Shirley A. Kan, 'Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis', in 
Congressional Research Service, p. 33. 
The hexaflouride plant is essential to enrich uranium for use in atomic bombs, such bombs are easier to 
make than those, fuelled by plutonium because uranium is easier to work with. 
See Jonathan S. Landay, 'China to Halt Nuclear Deal with Iran, US Official Says', in Christian Science 
Monitor, 19 December 1996, p. 1. 
1997 Congressional Hearings, 'Special Weapons, Nuclear, Chemical, Biological and Missile', on 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997-h/s970410m.htm, p. 3. 
'^^ Washington Times, 25 September 1995, p. A . l . In April 1996 the U.S. defence department confirmed 
that the Iranians have purchased an electronic isotope separation unit from China, see 
http://www.fas. org/spp/starwars/crs/980717CRSWeapons.htm. 
1997 Congressional Hearings, on http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997-h/s971008m.htm, p. 
Congrassional Record, 'China's Proliferation Activity', on 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998/s980313a.htm. 
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Table 4.7: China's arms sales to Iran from 1990 to 1997 
No. 
ordered 
Weapon 
designation 
Weapon 
description 
Year of 
order 
Year (s) of 
orders 
No. 
delivered 
Comments 
8 HQ-2B 
SAMS 
SAM 
system 
surface-to-
air missile 
1989 1990-1993 8 Coastal air 
defence 
batteries 
96 HQ-2B SAM 1989 1990-1993 96 For 8 HQ-
2B SAMS 
75 F-7M 
Airguard 
Fighter 1991 1993-1994 50 
10 ESR-1 Surveillance 
Rader 
1992 1994-1996 10 For 10 
Hudong 
Class fast 
attack craft 
10 Rice Lamp Fire control 
radar 
1992 1994-1996 10 For 10 
Huadong 
Class fast 
attack craft 
10 Huadong 
Class 
FAC(M) 
(fast attack 
craft) 
1992 1994-1996 10 
C-802 ShShM 1992 1995-1996 80 For 10 
Huadong 
Class 
FAC(M)s 
7 C-801/802 
ShShMS 
ShShM 
System 
(1995) 1996-1997 2 For refit of 
7 
Combattant 
e-2 Type 
(Kaman 
Class) FAC 
80 C-802/Css-
N-8 
Saccade 
ShShM (1995) 1996-1997 16 For 10 
refitted 
Combattant 
e-2 Type 
(Kaman 
Class) FAC 
Source: SIPRI, SIPRl Yearbook 1992, p. 338; SIPRI Yearbook 1994, p. 526; SIPRl 
526; SIPRI Yearbook 1996, p. 502; SIPRI Yearbook 1997, p. 311; and SIPRI Yearbook 
Yearbook 1995, p. 
1998, p. 339. 
4.3.2.3. China's chemical and biological sales to Iran 
In March of 1996 The Washington Post reported that Chinese companies were 
providing Iran with complete factories suited for making chemical weapons .The 
Washington Times cited a CIA report claiming China, in the summer of 1996, delivered 
nearly 400 metric tons of chemicals, including carbon sulfide 'used' in the production 
99 R. Jeffery Smith, 'Chinese Firms Supply Iran with Gas Factories', in The Washington Post, 8 March 
1996, p. A26. 
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of nerve agents, to Iran.'^^ Between 1993 and 1996, there had been several reports 
indicating that China was providing precursor agents, along with technical assistance on 
chemical weapons development to Iran. China was also suspected by the US 
intelligence sources of selling Iran a complete weapons factory to manufacture chemical 
weapons. 
The Washington Times reported that an U.S. intelligence report stated China Nanjing 
Chemical and Industrial Group completed in June 1997, a plant in Iran for making 
glass-lined equipment used in producing chemical w e a p o n s . T h e Washington Post 
reported that U.S. intelligence learned, through intercepted communication in 1997, of 
negotiations between a Chinese state-run company and Iranian officials for the sale to 
Iran of hydrofluoric acid, which is used to refine uranium to weapons grade. The 
Washington Post also reported similar negotiations in January 1998 between the China 
Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation and Iran's Isfahan Nuclear Research Centre to 
provide a 'lifelong supply' of hundreds of tons of anhydrous fluoride (AHF), or 
hydrofluoric acid. It said that the AHF chemical could be used to produce uranium 
hexafluoride used in uranium conversion facilities.'^"^ Despite the Chinese 
government's repeated assurance to the U.S. government that it stopped the sale of the 
AHF to Iran, some have argued that the Chinese government is using such a statement 
to deny its involvement with Iran and deceive the American government. The London 
"^ "^  Bil l Gertz, ' China Sold Iran Missile Technology', in The Washington Times, 21 November 1996, p. 
A l . 
Bil l Gertz, 'Beijing Flouts Nuke-Sales Ban', in The Washington Times, 9 October 1996, p. A l . 
' http://www.fas. org/spp/starwars/crs/980717/CRSWeapons. htm. 
http://www.fas.org/news/iran/1998/980313-iran.htm. 
' http://www.fas. org/spp/starwars/crs/980717/CRSWeapons. htm. 
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Daily Telegraph of May 24, 1998 reported a Chinese sale to Iran of 500 tons of 
phosphorus pentasulphide, which is useful for production of nerve agents. 
4.3.2.4. Other possible sales 
The Observer of 28^ *^  April 1991 reported that China shipped arms to Iraq through Iraq's 
office in Jordan. China denied the report and called it 'totally groundless'.'^^ Later, an 
Iraqi Kurdish opposition group alleged, in April 1994, that China was supplying Iraq 
with chemical weapons through a 'neighbouring' third country. According to this 
allegation the 'Kurdish poHce intercepted two trucks carrying 19 tonnes of sodium 
phosphate used to make chemical weapons'. According to the allegation, the truck 
drivers admitted they were trying to smuggle the chemicals through Kurdish-controlled 
northern Iraq to regions controlled by the Iraqi central government .Western 
intelligent reports have also argued that China has aided Iraq's military establishments 
in countries like Algeria and Mauritania with advanced nuclear and chemical weapon 
technology.'^^ According to another report published in The Sunday Times of August 
7, 1994, Saudi Arabia tried to buy experimental nuclear reactors from China as part of a 
secret 20-year programme to become a nuclear power. 
Following the UN arms embargo on Iraq, China's major arms customer, along with Iran 
in the 1980s, and after the GCC states dependency on the U.S. protection in the region, 
'°-^Ibid. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, Part 3: Far East/1060, 1 May 1991, p. A4/1. 
FBlS-NES-94-084, 2 May 1994, p. 63. 
'"^ Edward Timperlake and William Triplett I I , Red Dragon Rising: Communist china's Military Threat 
to America, pp. 85-95. 
For more details, see The Sunday Times (London), 1 August 1994; or FBIS-NES-94-154, 10 August 
1994, pp. 27-28. 
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China found itself unable to compete against the U.S. for military markets in the Gulf 
region except in Iran. Iran's political and economic isolation from the United States 
presented the Chinese with the only viable arms customer in the region for China's 
military sales. Therefore, China's military sales and co-operation with Iran has 
dominated China's military sales programme to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. 
This can be explained by the following points: 
1. China viewed Iran as a potential counterbalance to the influence of any hostile 
power in the region. 
2. China needed to develop a good relationship with Iran in order to prevent Russia 
from exacting influence in that country. 
3. Iran is a major source of energy needed for China's current and future economic 
development. 
4. China may have feared the influence that Iran could exert on China's 20 million 
Muslims that live in the Western provinces and hoped to prevent Iran from 
supporting that minority faction in a bid for autonomy. In addition, China sees 
Iran's support for the opposition group in the southern part of Afghanistan as an 
important tool for keeping Talaban away from pursuing an intensive support for 
Chinese Muslim quest for independence. 
5. China needed to keep its military co-operation with Iran and any other Gulf country 
as a 'wild card' in dealing with U.S. support and assistance to Taiwan. 
6. China was interested in Iran for its geopolitical importance. Iran could be used as 
bridge connecting central Asian oil to China, and as a gateway for Gulf oil reaching 
China. 
7. China needed to generate profits in order to keep its military modernisation 
programme going. 
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From the Iranian perspective, Iran needed every possible supplier of more advanced 
weapons in order to modernise its own military capability. China, along with Russia, 
was the only available supplier of advanced military technology and weapons of mass 
destruction that was willing to provide and co-operate with Iran in the purchase and the 
development of such weapons for hard currency and influence. Plus, China was the 
cheapest supplier of arms and military technology that Iran could find. 
4.3.3. Oil 
In the 1980s, arms sales to the Gulf countries dominated China's interaction with the 
Gulf region. In the 1990s, however, China's increasing demand for oil has readjusted 
its interest in the Gulf region. China's former status as a net oil exporter was now 
changed to that of a net importer. In 1993, for the first time in over a twenty-five year 
period, Chinese imports of oil exceeded exports by around 10 million tonnes, which 
marked China's new status as a net importer of oil.'^^ China began importing crude oil 
in 1988, but its imports increased substantially in 1993. The deficit between China's 
own productions of oil contrasted with its consumption and export of oil (see Table 
4.8). 
Table 4.8: China's production, consumption, export and deficit of crude oil from 
1991-1997, in thousand barrels per day 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Production 2,804.6 2,814.5 2,910.9 2,974.7 2,996.2 3,173.2 3,252.4 
Consumption 2,368.5 2,561.9 2,962.5 3,040.8 3,218.2 3,542.4 3,963.5 
Export 452.8 429.8 391.2 373.2 377.9 406.6 397.7 
Deficit -16.7 -177.2 -442.8 -439.3 -599.9 -775.8 -1108.8 
Sources: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1997, (Austria: OPEC, 1998), p. 84, 86 and 76; OPEC 
Annual Statistical Bulletin 1992, (Austria: OPEC, 1993), p. 84, 86 and 76. 
I iO Petroleum Times Energy Report, volume 14, number 20, 14 October 1994, p. 7. 
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China's economic growth is expected to be the highest among Asian countries at 8 to 9 
percent from 1992 to 2000 and at 7 percent from 2000 to 2010. As a result, China's 
energy demand is expected to increase. China, which only has about 2.4 percent of the 
world's total oil and gas reserves, future sources of energy supplies are going to be a 
significant factor in its continued ability to sustain a high level of economic growth. 
China's net external requirement for oil imports is expected to rise from the level of 
600,000 barrels per day in 1995 and 1996, to 1 million by 2000, 3 million by 2010, and 
7 million by 2015."' It is estimated that by 2020 about 90 percent of China's oil will 
112 
have to come from the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. This rise is due to the 
expanding gap between China's domestic oil production and demand for oil. 
Thus, the Chinese government began to realise the importance of oil for China's 
economic development. As a result, the Gulf and Peninsula region continued to assume 
a great degree of importance to China. In addition to that, the Gulf's large oil reserves 
and the relatively low development and production costs, shifted China's interest from 
the South East Asian producers to the Gulf region.''"^ In 1994 the Gulf region supplied 
about 40 percent of China's crude oil imports. This share rose to around to about 60 
percent in 1997, and was expected to reach 77 percent in 2000, and 92 percent in 
' ' ' Kent E. Calder, 'Asia's Empty Tank', in Foreign Affairs, March/April 1996, p. 58. 
' G e o f f r e y Kemp, 'The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize' in Survival, volume 40, number 4, 
Winter 1998-99, p. 138. 
"•^  For a good discussion of China's oil production and demand, see Ken Koyama, 'Growing Energy 
Demand in Asian Countries; Opportunities and Constraints for Gulf Energy Exporters', in The Emirates 
Centre for Strategic Studies and Research, Gulf Energy and the World: Challenges and Threats, (Abu 
Dhabi: ECSSR, 1997), pp. 45-63. 
John Calabrese, 'China's and the Persian Gulf Energy and Security', in Middle East Journal, volume 
52, number 3, summer 1998, p. 356. 
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2005.^ ^^ Li Yizhong, executive vice president of China Petrochemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC) told China's news agency Xinhua that in the past most, of China's import 
of oil came from Southeast Asian oil producers, but now China is focusing its interest 
on the Gulf, whose oil was marked by a large proved reserve and low-sulphur character. 
He added that 'the Middle East countries, particularly the Gulf States will be the 
potential key sources of China's crude oil import'. 
Therefore, China tried to reach agreements with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
countries to increase its imports of oil from them and to secure a long-term relationship 
with the oil producing countries of the Gulf region. In May 1995 China has reached an 
agreement with Iran to triple its oil imports to reach 60,000 barrels per day, in which 
Iran would earn more than $400 million a year.^ '^  It was expected that Iran would 
increase its oil exports to China to around 70,000 barrels per day in 1997, 100,000 
barrels per day in 1998, and to nearly 200,000 barrels per day in 2000.^'^ China also 
reached an agreement with the Omani government to increase Oman's crude supplies to 
China from less than 20,000 barrels per day in 1995, to 100,000 barrels per day in 1996. 
Later Oman's crude oil supplies to China jumped to about 230,000 barrels per day in 
1997, enabling China to replace Japan as the primary importer of Omani crude. 
Saudi Arabia's ARAMCO signed an agreement with the China Petrochemical 
" ^ These numbers are according to a study conducted by Kang Wu and Fereidun Fesharaki from the East-
West centre in Honolulu and quoted in Oil & Gas Journal, volume 93, number 35, 28 August 1995, p. 
105. 
FBIS-CHI-94-209, 28 October 1994, pp. 89. 
'China Said to Triple Oil Imports from Iran', in New York Times Current Events Edition, 31 May 
1995, p. D15. 
'China Turns to Gulf for Crude, Praises UAE's Marine Progress', in 
http://www.uaeinteract.com/newsreport/19970612.htm, p. 2. 
"^Ib id . 
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Corporation in October 1997 to increase Saudi crude supplies to China from its current 
level of around 30,000 barrels per day to over 60,000 barrels per day.'^ ^ 
China's interest in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region was not confined only to its 
purchases of crude oil, but also included joint oil exploration and development. Since it 
was suggested that China's oil sector needs $180 billion in investment for increasing 
refining capacity and expanding oil exploration, prospecting and production operations, 
China had been paying great attention to encouraging governments and private 
companies from the Gulf region to invest in China's oil and gas sectors. 
This demonstrates China's interest in the region was reality. Its interest in the Gulf oil 
has even influenced many of its policy decisions towards the Gulf countries particularly 
Iran and Iraq, which contain 20 percent of the world proven oil reserves. China's arms 
and technology supplies to Iran and its continued co-operation with Iran in the military 
fields, despite U.S. opposition, stemmed from the fact that China needed Iranian's oil to 
improve or sustain its economic development at levels that enabled China to feed and 
support 1.2 billion people in its own territory. With regards to Iraq, China called on the 
UN several times to l if t or ease its sanctions against Iraq.^ ^^ China was interested in 
promoting co-operation with Iraq in the oil, irrigation, transportation, communications, 
123 
industrial, and commercial fields. The real consequences of China's concern over its 
future oil supplies will be visible in the event of any future U.S.-led effort designed to 
'^"Ibid. 
It is said that China's energy market needs $1 trillion in investment over the next two decades, 
OAPEC Bulletin, volume 21, number 8-9, August/September 1995, pp. 12-13. 
'^ ^ See, for instance, FBIS-NES-94-066, 6 April 1994, p. 17; FBIS-NES-95-045, 3 March 1995, p. 16; and 
FBIS-NES-95-070, 12 April 1995, pp. 53-54. 
'^^ FBIS-NES-95-075, 19 April 1995, pp. 34-35. 
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contain or pressure major oil suppliers in the Gulf region including Iran and Iraq, which 
China is unlikely to support. However if an overwhelming international consensus 
existed supporting such action, China might prefer to move towards abstaining from 
voting in the UN Security Council, but it is still unlikely that it would actively support 
such an action. During the Gulf crisis China had no other alternative but to support the 
UN Security Council resolutions on Iraq. But it has remained unsupportive of the 
military actions against Iraq during and after the crisis. This can be understood largely 
in terms of China's interest in Gulf oil. China's need of energy from the Gulf region 
and Peninsula has also influenced China's decision to follow the line set by the UN, and 
fully supported by the GCC countries, in regards to the resolutions on the arms and 
economic embargo against Iraq. Except a very few reports, China did not break the UN 
embargo against Iraq since mid-1990s. 
4.4. Conclusion 
The researcher has discussed in this chapter China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region by dividing China's interactions with the region into three 
main phases. In phase one, China's early involvement in the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region was started only after the Bandung Conference. After the conference, 
China had tried to establish relations with the countries of the region, which had 
participated in the conference. But its ability to do so was limited due to the existing 
strong ties between most of the Gulf countries and the West, namely Great Britain and 
the United States, as well as to the Gulf countries' early unfavourable perceptions of 
China. Therefore, China found it easier for itself to influence the region through 
supporting the idea of armed struggle throughout the region. Its support for the 
liberation movements in the Gulf region stemmed from China's ideological principle to 
defeat Western imperialism and its lackeys in the region. As a result, China did not. 
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during this period, enjoy good relations with the governments of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula countries. Thus, its support for armed struggle through the liberation 
movements in South Yemen and Oman limited China's ability to pursue good ties with 
the countries of the Gulf. 
In phase two, China's fear of the Soviet Union had influenced China's decision to shift 
its foreign policy objectives in the Gulf region away from supporting the armed struggle 
and the liberation movements and towards establishing political and economic ties with 
the countries of the Gulf region. Once China had begun suspending its support for the 
liberation movements in the region the doors had started to open for China to establish 
diplomatic relations with some of the Gulf countries. This was marked by the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuwait and Iran in the early 1970s and Oman 
in the late 1970s. China, during this period, started to become closer than ever before to 
Kuwait and Iran in perceiving the growing influence of the Soviet Union in and around 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, particularly in Iraq and later in Afghanistan, and 
its impact on the security of the region. China continued to push for isolating Moscow 
from the region by encouraging both Iran and Iraq to peacefully settle their disputes and 
by providing available military assistance to Iran as an alternative to Moscow. China 
enjoyed its first substantial profits from the situation in the Gulf region following the 
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war where China accumulated economic and political assets. 
China's diplomatic relations with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula countries increased to 
include establishing diplomatic relationships with Oman, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. 
In addition, China, during this period, made itself very attractive to Saudi Arabia by 
showing its willingness to supply the Kingdom with advanced weapons. 
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In phase three China's interest in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region was motivated 
by China's drive to increase its economic capabilities particularly after becoming a net 
oil importer. As a result, the Gulf's oil attracted China's foreign policy makers. They 
became willing to co-operate with some of the countries of the region in the military 
fields to secure the supply of crude oil to China, generate hard currency by selling 
advanced military technology, and expand their trade relations with the region. 
Therefore, China during this phase sought to use every possible means to upgrade its 
relations with the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region and to promote 
better economic and political ties with the region. In short, it was the Chinese economic 
need that prompted China's interest in the region in the 1990s. Oil and market were 
China's main interests. China wanted to secure long term independent suppliers of oil 
in order to meet the continued rise in China's oil consumption. China also saw the 
region as a place where it could generate hard currency by selling military equipment 
and technology and increase the volume of its commercial exports. Therefore, in the 
Chinese perspective Gulf's oil and market are essential for their country to stay a strong 
competitor in today world economy and sustain the well being of over 1.2 billion 
Chinese. 
In sum, China's foreign policy towards the Gulf region throughout the three phases has 
been influenced by China's interactions and relations with the United States and the 
Soviet Union, and its drive to increase or sustain its economic and political capabilities 
by fostering better ties with the countries of the region. 
CHAPTER F I V E 
CHINA'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ, 
IRAN, AND Y E M E N 
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In the previous chapter we discussed China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region in general. We concluded that China's foreign policy towards 
the Gulf region was a reflection of its relations with the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and China's drive to increase its economic capabilities by deepen its economic 
and political ties with the countries of the region. In the following two chapters the 
researcher is going to survey China's relations with each of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula country and discuss the different variables that influenced China's foreign 
policy towards them. The researcher will argue here that China's foreign policy 
towards each country of the region has been a reflection of China's overall foreign 
policy in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. It is true that China at certain periods 
treated some countries of the Gulf region better than others; but this was largely a 
product of its overall foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. 
Some countries of the region, at certain times, were seen by the Chinese government as 
closer to China's view of both superpowers than others. Therefore, the Chinese 
government would pay more attention to those countries to establish good ties with and 
try, as much as it could, to pull them away from the influence of either power. On the 
whole, China might have used different strategies to get closer to the countries of the 
Gulf region but its relations with each country in the region had been a reflection of 
China's overall foreign policy towards the whole Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. In 
the coming chapter we are going to examine China's bilateral relations with Iraq, Iran 
and Yemen. Chapter six will examine China's relations with the member countries of 
the Gulf Co-operation Council. 
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5.1. China and Iraq 
5.1.1. Chinese-Iraqi relations in its early days (1949-1957) 
When the PRC was established in late 1949, Iraq and all Arab League members 
maintained their diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime, which had made 
Taiwan its new headquarter, as the legitimate sole representative of all China. Iraq 
voted with the Arab League members in August 1950 to recognise the nationalist 
government in Taiwan, rather than the communist government on the mainland as the 
legitimate sole representative of all China. Iraq, despite the abstention of many Arab 
countries, voted on February 1, 1951 in favour of the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 498 6V to condemn the PRC for aggression in Korea. In addition to that, 
Iraq, one of the major independent Gulf states at that time, was engaged in a security 
alliance with the United States and Great Britain under the Baghdad Pact of 1955. 
Therefore, politically China had no chance to set an influence for itself in Iraq in order 
to prevent the West from succeeding in the Gulf region. Economically, the two sides 
had nothing to offer to each other. Their trade relations prior to 1955 were almost non-
existent. Thus, recognising its weakness to influence Iraq, the CCP classified the Iraqi 
regime as part of the capitalist camp 'controlled by Western imperialism'. 
Following the Bandung Conference of 1955, the Chinese began their attempts to 
improve their relations with the participants, including Iraq. In their account, the Third 
World was believed to have potential for the Chinese to wage an international struggle 
against the capitalist camp. However, following the conference, Egypt captured most of 
China's attention in the Arab World; and Iraq was not regarded as a potential ally in the 
struggle against the West. As a result, China-Iraq relations did not witness an 
immediate improvement. This slow down in the development of China-Iraq relations, 
following the conference, was largely due to the continuing American and British 
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presence and influence in Iraq, as a result of the Baghdad Pact. China, therefore, was 
unable to create good ties with Iraq because of the strong presence of the United States 
and Great Britain in that country. 
5.1.2. China's changing relations with Iraq (1958-1959) 
It was only in July 1958 that China's policy towards the Arab World, in particular and 
the Third World in general began to view Iraq as a potential ally in the struggle against 
the West in the Arab World. This shift in China's foreign policy towards Iraq was due 
to the success of the July 1958 revolution in Iraq headed by General Abd-al-Karim 
Qasim against the royalist regime. China's immediate reaction to the development in 
Iraq was f u l l support to Qasim. China's support to Qasim can be explained as the 
following: 
1. China saw Qasim as a new revolutionary leader that could challenge Nasser for 
Arab World authority, particularly after the Chinese dissatisfaction with Nasser's 
harsh treatment of the Arab communists in Egypt and Syria; with his neutralist 
policy between the two camps; and with his support for the Tibetan nationalists. 
2. Qasim's decision to withdraw Iraq f rom the Baghdad Pact was viewed by the 
Chinese as a strong Iraqi challenge to American and British authorities in the Gulf 
region in particular and the Arab World in general. 
3. Unlike Nasser, Qasim, particularly f rom July 1958 to March 1959, gave the 
communists in Iraq some key positions in Iraqi public life. Although they were not 
represented in the principal political offices, the communists enjoyed a large 
influence on Qasim during that period of time.' 
' See Angus James Powles, What Were The Factors That Contributed Towards Qasim's Overthrow in 
1963, unpublished M A thesis,(Durham: University of Durham, 1991). 
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4. Unlike many Arab states including Egypt, Iraq did not support the Tibetan 
nationalists revolt against the Chinese communist government in 1958 to 1959.^ 
To China, the Iraqi revolution represented an encouraging step towards the liberation of 
the entire region f rom Western domination. 
Diplomatic relations between China and Iraq were established in August 1958, which 
marked China's fourth recognition by an Arab state since its establishment in 1949. 
Furthermore, China was eager to verbally defend Qasim's regime and launch its first 
harsh attack on Nasser when Egypt supported an unsuccessful coup attempt to 
overthrow Qasim in March 1959.'^  
5.1.3. New challenges in China-Iraq relations (1959-1974) 
A l l of the above reasons, plus China's need to use the region to undermine Soviet 
rapprochement with the West, marked China's willingness to support Qasim's regime in 
Iraq. However, political and economic relations began to develop slowly after March 
1959. This was due to the following reasons: 
1. China was accused by the Iraqi regime of being behind the communist-inspired 
rioting in the Iraqi cities of Mosul in March and Kirkuk in July 1959. 
2. The Iraqi regime's persecution of communist party members following the Kirkuk 
riots angered China. 
3. China was unhappy about the Iraqi delay in sending an ambassador to Beijing, who 
was appointed only in Apr i l 1960. 
" Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East, p. 104. 
^ China's criticised Nasser's policies towards Iraq and compared them to Chiang Kai-shek's anti 
communist policies, see Beijing Review, number 12, April 1957. 
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Despite all these developments and as China began to perceive both the United States 
and the Soviet Union as the main threat to its own security and world stability, the 
Chinese government sought to maintain its support of the Iraqi government in order to 
l imi t a f u l l separation between China and Iraq and, therefore, l imit the Western and the 
Soviet influence in Iraq. This support included offering Iraq vehicles for civi l defence, 
however Baghdad ultimately favoured more generous American aid. The Chinese 
government also supported the Iraqi government's efforts to control the direction of 
Iraqi oi l exports. An article in Renmin Ribao on February 16*^ , 1962 stated that: 
The British, U.S, and French [are] seeking to use the Iraq Petroleum Company 
and other monopolies to keep their hold on the country's economy and prevent it 
f r om developing an independent national economy; and they [are] exerting 
pressure on Iraq to prevent it f rom enforcing its o i l law against foreign 
monopolies."^ 
Zhou Enlai, in his message of greetings to Qasim in July 1962, stressed that the growing 
friendly relations between China and Iraq were in conformity with the common desire 
of the Chinese and Iraqi peoples and were important in promoting solidarity among 
Asian and African nations as well as preserving world peace. He finished his message 
wishing the Iraqi people 'new success in their fighting against imperialism and old and 
new colonialism'."^ Chinese Vice Premier Chen Y i , speaking at the National Day 
reception given by the Iraqi Ambassador, reiterated that the 'Iraqi people's just struggle' 
to 'oppose imperialism and safeguard national independence would always have the 
support of the Chinese people'.^ China and Iraq signed on January 10'"^ , 1963 an 
agreement to renew for another year the trade agreement that was signed between them 
Cited in Peking Review, volume 5, number 8, 23 February 1962, p. 22. 
Peking Review, volume 5, number 29, 20 July 1962, p. 21. 
Ibid. 
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in March 1960. Under the agreement China would export various commodities 
including industrial equipment, electrical appliances, silk and cotton, steel and timber, 
while Iraq would export dates, crude oi l , oil products, wool and other products.^ As a 
result, trade volume between the two sides increased substantially from $8.5 million in 
1959 to $17.61 mil l ion in 1963.^ 
Despite Iraqi governments, including the new Iraqi regime that China recognised on 
February 12^ "^ , 1963,^ continuing the suppression of Iraqi communists, China continued 
its efforts to establish close relations with the Iraqi government. This can be explained 
mainly in terms of China's willingness to offset the United States and the Soviet 
Union's influence in that country. However, by 1965 China had become frustrated with 
Iraq's foreign policy and the Iraqi regime's continuing suppression of communists in 
Iraq. And after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war China became convinced that it would be 
problematic to work with the Iraqi government, who was dependent on the Soviet Union 
for political and technical support since the war, in waging struggle against Western and 
social imperialism in the Gulf in particular and the Arab World in general. Thus, 
national liberation movements captured most of China's attention in the Gulf region 
during most of the Cultural Revolution period. 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, China's world outlook had changed towards 
perceiving the Soviet Union as the main threat to China's security in particular and 
world stability in general. In the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, the Chinese were 
afraid that the Soviet Union would be able to sway the region to jo in the Soviet-
^ Peking Review, volume 6, number 3, 18 January 1963, p. 20. 
^ Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, p. 840. 
^ Peking Review, volume 6, number 7, 15 February 1963, p. 19. 
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proposed Asian collective security system as a step towards f i l l ing the power vacuum in 
the region. Thus, China's interests in Iraq in the early 1970s were manifested around 
preventing the Soviets f rom succeeding in Iraq. China tried therefore again to woo the 
Iraqi regime. This time the Chinese government tried to avoid criticising Iraq's foreign 
policy. Instead, it started to welcome some of Iraq's foreign policy positions including 
Iraqi opposition to a political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iraq's support 
of extreme Palestinian organisations. '° This had led to the signing of an agreement on 
economic and technical co-operation between China and Iraq on June 21, 1971. 
According to the agreement, China granted Iraq an interest-free loan of $36 million.'^ 
But these signs of improvement in China-Iraq relations in 1970 and 1971 did not last 
long. The signing in Apr i l 1972 of a Soviet-Iraqi Friendship Treaty had led once again 
to a cooling-off in China's relations with Iraq. Then China moved to consolidate its 
relations with some other countries in the Gulf region, Kuwait and Iran, who shared 
China's concern over Iraq's ties with the Soviet Union. It is important to note that the 
cooling-off of China-Iraq relations did not lead to a complete collapse in the 
relationship. This was mainly due to China's policy of keeping as many contacts as 
possible with the Iraqi government in order to prevent a total breakdown of relations 
with Iraq. This strategy was aimed specifically towards preventing the possibility of 
total Iraqi dependency on the Soviet Union. China continued its participation in Iraq's 
celebration of its national days. China also continued its economic relations with Iraq; 
this was obvious in the continuing trade relations between the two countries and in the 
Areeh Y. Yodfat, The People's Republic of China and the Middle East, p. 10 
' ' Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, p. 73. 
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signing of a protocol with Baghdad in December 1972 for technical and economic co-
operation between the two countries. " 
5.1.4. China's renewed interest in Iraq (1975-1979) 
Prior to 1975 China's interest in Iraq, as a revolutionary state, declined rapidly after the 
signing of the Soviet-Iraqi Treaty of Friendship. A renewal in China's interest in Iraq 
followed the decline in Iraqi dependency on the Soviet Union from 1975 onward and 
the improvement of Iraq-Iran relations f rom March of that year. The Chinese 
government welcomed the signing of a joint communique in March 1975 between Iraq 
and Iran, in which the two sides agreed that 'the region must be made immune from any 
13 
foreign interference'. ' 
This period witnessed improvement in economic relations between China and Iraq, and 
relaxation in their political relations. Economically, trade relations reached the highest 
point in 1975 than ever before. The total trade in 1975 was 8.5 times larger than that of 
1973, and almost $60 mill ion higher than that of 1974. In May 1975 China agreed to 
purchase more sulphur, dates, and chemical fertilisers f rom Iraq.^ "^ An agreement was 
signed in 1978 between the two countries for the imports to China of 100,000 tons of 
Iraq's sulphur.^'' China also worked in July 1975 on constructing the Mosul Bridge I , 
which was opened to traffic in July 1980, linking the Baghdad-Mosul express highway 
with the international road f rom Mosul to Turkey, and connecting Mosul city on the 
Ibid., p. 73; and also B^C,SWB FE 37161, p. A4/1. 
Peking Review, volume 18, number 12, 21 March 1975, p. 29. 
14 John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, p. 90. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 21, number 33, 5 June 1978, p. 7. 
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west bank of the Tigris and its developing outskirts on the east bank.*^ In November 
1976 China agreed to construct a sports hall in Baghdad as part of a new economic and 
technical co-operation agreement.'^ The Chinese also aided the building of a woollen 
washing and spinning mi l l in K i f r i in July 1978.'^ In August 1978 China signed a 
protocol with Iraq on the construction of the Sherquat highway bridge on the Tigris in 
northern Iraq.'^ 
Politically, several off icial visits took place between the two sides. The most significant 
of them being the visit to Beijing by Iraqi Vice President Muhyiddin Marouf in July 
1975. China's Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping, in his banquet speech, praised Iraq and 
welcomed the new Iraqi-Iranian consultation, and called upon all of the Gulf countries 
to resolve their differences among themselves in order to prevent foreign intervention.^^ 
The improvement in China's economic and political relations with Iraq during this 
period was a reflection of China's foreign policy. Prior to 1975 China had less chance 
to improve its ties with Iraq and, therefore, had no chance to influence the government 
of that country; this limitation was due to the strong political and security engagement 
of Iraq with the Soviet Union. But after the decline in Iraqi dependency on the Soviet 
Union and the new Iraqi-Iranian initiative, China found a great opportunity to establish 
new economic and political ties with Iraq without severing its ties with Kuwait and Iran, 
who shared China's fear of the Soviet-Iraqi ties. To China, Soviet-Iraqi ties presented a 
Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, p. 75. 
'^Ibid. 
Ibid., Nothing more was heard of this project. 
Ibid., Nothing more was heard of this project. 
20 Peking Review, volume 18, number 28, 11 July 1975, pp. 8-9. 
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great deal of insecurity concerning the Soviet penetration in the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. Thus, China was hoping for a cooling-off in Soviet-Iraq relationships 
in order to prevent Soviet threat to the Gulf region. Once the decline in Soviet-Iraq 
relationships began to occur, China could not resist the opportunity to take charge in 
improving its ties with Iraq and encouraging the Iraqi government to work with the 
countries of the Gulf region to settle their disputes peacefully and without foreign, 
mainly Soviet, intervention. 
5.1.5. Chinese-Iraqi relations in the 1980s 
Because of its fear of the Soviet intervention China never wanted to see a war in the 
Gulf region particularly a war that involved Iraq and Iran. To the Chinese government a 
war between Iraq and Iran would make the two vulnerable to Soviet penetration. Thus, 
after the war erupted China called upon the Iraqi and the Iranian governments to resolve 
their disputes peacefully through negotiation and avoid direct military confrontation.^^ 
China continued to argue the war was benefiting the Soviet Union and Israel instead of 
either Iraq or Iran. 
China, who perceived some signs of dechne in Iraq's dependency on the Soviet Union 
since 1975, did not want to see a return to the pre-1975 of Iraqi-Soviet relationship. 
Resolutely, China adopted a neutral position towards Iraq and Iran during their war. Its 
neutral policy in regard to Iraq was evident in China's political, economic, and military 
relations with Iraq. Politically, in its relations with Iraq, China focused its political 
efforts on: 
1. Avoiding criticising either side's military and political actions against the other; 
2. Stressing the need for a peaceful settlement for Iraq's disputes with Iran; 
See Beijing Review, number 35, 5 May 1980, pp. 11-12. 
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3. Welcoming the improvement of Iraq's relations with other Arab countries; 
4. Praising the Iraqi leadership's opposition to hegemonism and intervention by 
foreign power in Iraq's internal affairs; 
5. Welcoming the Iraqi leadership's opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; 
6. Applauding the flexibil i ty in Iraq's attitudes towards the United States;^^ 
7. Defending Iraq's 'legitimate right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful 
purposes', and criticising the Israeli air attack on the Iraqi Tuweitha nuclear plant in 
1981;^-^ and 
8. Identifying the Soviet Union as the ultimate beneficiary of the continuing conflict 
between Iraq and Iran.^ "^ 
On the economic front, several economic agreements were signed by the two sides. 
These included an agreement in 1980 for the import to China of Iraq's nitrogenous 
fertilisers worth $46 million.^^ An agreement on economic and technical co-operation 
that was signed on May 8, 1981 during Iraqi First deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin 
Ramadan's visit to Beijing and a Chinese-Iraqi economic and technical co-operation 
committee was established to further joint construction, agriculture, and high industry 
v e n t u r e s . A n agreement in December 1985 was formed in which China would import 
the next year Iraqi phosphate, sulphur, palm dates and other products, while Iraq would 
import Chinese textiles, light industrial products, metal ware and mineral products. The 
-^ See Beijing Review, 8 September 1980, pp. 15-16. 
Beijing Review, 25 August 1981, p. 12. 
'^^  See, for example, Beijing Review, number 4, 25 January 1984, pp. 14-15. 
The agreement was signed in Baghdad by representatives of the Chinese Import Corporation and the 
Iraqi State Organisation for Exports, Middle East Economic Survey, volume 23, number 45, 21 July 1980, 
p. 4. 
Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East, p. 223. 
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agreement stipulated that China would continue to take part in Iraq's construction.^^ A 
five-year agreement for China- Iraq economical, technical and trade co-operation was 
signed in 1986 during Chinese States Councillor Zhang Jinfu's visit to Baghdad.^^ 
Under the agreement, Chinese firms would contract projects for building irrigation and 
drainage facilities, highway, bridges and railways in Iraq.^^ China also furthered its 
joint construction project with Iraq. Chinese technicians began in May 1980 their 
preparations for construction of the number 4 bridge (the Saddam Bridge) on the Tigris 
River at Mosul. This project was completed in August 1984. In July 1986 three China-
contracted dams were completed on Shamiya. China worked on construction of the 
K i f i l Shinafiya irrigation project in May 1984. In March 1985 China agreed to 
construct its first three residential buildings in Baghdad. The project was completed in 
January 1987 by China's State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) at a 
cost of about $9.3 miUion.''^ China also agreed in August 1985 to rebuild the Dibis Dam 
about 40 km north of Kirkuk at a cost of $10 million."^' A Chinese team finished in 
November 1985 drilling three production wells in the al-Zubayr oilfield in southern 
Iraq.''^ Reportedly there were 20,000 Chinese workers and technicians working in Iraq 
by Apr i l 1986. They belonged to eight Chinese firms that provided labour services or 
contracted projects in Iraq.^^ 
'-^ FBIS-CHI-86-083, 30 April 1986, p. I 3. 
Xu Wei, 'Sino-Iraq Trade Relations', in China's Foreign Trade, number 3, March 1989, pp. 12-13. 
FBIS-CHI-86-083, p. I 3. 
FBIS-CHI-87-009, 14 January 1987, p. I 2. 
'^ Wofgang Bartke, The economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, p. 74; and 
FBIS-Chi-85, 157, 14 August 1985, p. I 1. 
The work was completed under a contract signed between the Chinese Petroleum Engineering 
Construction Corporation and Iraq National Oil Company. It was reported that Iraq had asked the 
Chinese side to send another team and extend the contract for one more year, see Middle East Economic 
Survey, volume 29, number 9, 9 December 1985, p. A.9. 
FBIS-CHI-86-083, p. I 3. 
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In the 1980s, China-Iraq trade relations experienced a setback. The prolonged Iraq-Iran 
war put the once-strong Iraqi economy in to decline (see Table 1, in appendix 1). In 
view of Iraq's wartime economy, China offered a two-year extension for Iraq to pay for 
Chinese exports so as to maintain China-Iraq trade and economic co-operation. Iraq, 
However, failed to repay China's trade loans on time, because it had run out of foreign 
exchange reserves during the Iraq-Iran war.^ "^  
Once the war was over, China was eager to participate in the post-war reconstruction of 
Iraq. Chinese Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun visited Iraq on March 13, 1989. His visit was 
said to encourage China's participation in Iraq's post-war reconstruction and to bring 
about the realisation of peace between Iraq and Iran. He was the most senior official to 
visit Iraq since the two countries established relations in 1958.^^ In Apr i l 1989 the 
CSCEC completed the Hindiya barrage project, which started in October 1984. The 
project cost $240 mill ion and was one of the largest projects China had ever built in a 
foreign country. The large-scale engineering complex included the barrage, a 
navigation lock, a fish passage, six bridges, a 60-megawatt power station and housing.^^ 
The CSCEC undertook another project to lay a 132-kilovolt electricity cable in 
Baghdad, which was worth $30.4 million. It also worked on the north Jazira irrigation 
scheme, which was worth a total of $170 million.''^ 
-^^ Xu Wei, 'Sino-Iraq Trade Relations', pp. 12-13. 
FBIS-CHI-89-048, 14 March 1989, p. 10; and FBIS-CHI-89-049, 15 March 1989, p. 11. 
FBIS-CHI-89-083, 2 May 1989, p. 5. 
37 Ibid. 
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While China-Iraq trade relations witnessed a deceleration, their arms trade reached its 
highest point. China's arms sales to Iraq became the dominant money-earner for China 
with Iraq in the 1980s. Between 1982 and 1986 Iraq became China's primary arms 
customer in the world with total imports of $3,300 m i l l i o n . I r a q along with Iran 
became China's largest arms recipients in the world receiving about 80 percent of 
China's total arms sales. 
Despite their denial of selling arms to Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war, many have reported 
that China had sold to Iraq f rom 1981 to 1988 4 B-6 bombers, 700 T-59 main battle 
tanks, 600 T-69 main battle tanks, 650 Type-531 armoured personnel carriers, 720 
Type-59/1 130 mm towed guns, 128 C-601 anti-ship missiles, and an unspecified 
39 
number of the Hai Ying 2 ship-to-ship missiles. 
In summary, China's policy towards Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, consisted of 
engaging Iraq in a better relationship with China. Politically, economically, and 
militarily China had sought to benefit f rom the situation in the Gulf by extending its 
political, economic, and military co-operation with Iraq. Its aim was to prevent, or at 
least l imi t the possibility of, Iraqi dependency on the Soviet Union. 
5.1.6. China and Iraq during and after the Kuwait Crisis (1990-1999) 
It was the Iraqi military involvement in the war with Iran that limited the improvement 
of China's economic and, to some degree, political relations with Iraq. Thus, when the 
war with Iran was ended China's hope for better economic and political relations with 
Iraq increased. Yet, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and the subsequent 
ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987, pp. 127-130. 
SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989, p. 252. 
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economic sanctions against China after the suppression of the pro-democracy student 
demonstrations of June 1989 in Tiananmen Square limited China's ability to manoeuvre 
in favour of closer ties with the Iraqi regime. During the Gulf crisis, China supported 
all the U N Security Council resolutions on Iraq except resolution 678, where it 
abstained f rom voting. China opposed Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called upon the 
Iraqi government to withdraw its troops f rom Kuwait and solve its disputes with the 
Kuwait i government peacefully. This Chinese stand was presented to the Iraqi officials 
during W u Xueqian's, Chinese State Council Vice Premier, visit to Baghdad in 
September 1990,^^ and in a written message f rom PRC President Yang Shangkun 
delivered to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen 
on November 12, 1990." '^ The Chinese government even presented its own six-point 
proposal for a peaceful solution to the crisis."^^ 
Chinese action within the U N was limited to either abstaining from voting on certain 
resolutions on Iraq or denouncing some of them but never to veto them. This policy 
was demonstrated clearly during China's support for all United Nations resolutions on 
Iraq. It never vetoed any resolutions on Iraq. It only abstained f rom voting on the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 678, which was adopted by the Security 
Council at its 2963*^ ^ meeting on 29^^ November 1990, and clearly authorised member 
states to use all necessary means to restore Kuwait's sovereignty. It also abstained from 
voting on the United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, which was adopted at 
the Security Council 2982"^ ^ meeting on 5'*^  Apri l 1991, on Iraqi suppression of the 
Kurdish rebellion on the grounds that Iraq was practising its sovereignty within its own 
FBIS-NES-90-178, 13 September 1990, pp. 27-28. 
^' FBIS-NES-90-220, 14 November 1990, pp. 21-22. 
See the previous chapter. 
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territory.'^'' This Chinese policy of not opposing the U N resolutions on Iraq was directed 
mainly by China's desire to see the easing and l i f t ing of western and Japanese economic 
and technical sanctions against China and to prevent further political and economic 
instability in the Gulf region. 
In the aftermath of the Western military operations against Baghdad China's relations 
with Iraq were limited by the United Nations sanctions against Iraq. The most 
significant Chinese loss in its relations with Iraq following the war, had been the loss of 
an important arms buyer and an economic partner. China had supplied Iraq with billion 
of US dollars worth of arms in the 1980s, generated a much-needed hard currency to 
develop China's military capabilities. After the United Nations military sanctions on 
Iraq, China found itself unable to redeem its status as one of the top arms sellers to Iraq. 
However, different reports have connected China with providing nuclear and 
technological assistance to Iraq through a third party (Jordan) or by providing such 
assistance to develop an Iraqi-sponsored nuclear facilities in Algeria and Mauritania."^"^ 
Economically, it was estimated that China's top four overseas construction companies 
had lost $1.7 bill ion during the crisis. The China State Construction Engineering Corp. 
reported a loss of $856 mil l ion, the China Road and Bridge Engineering Co. $109 
mil l ion, China International Water and Electricity Corp. $30 million and China 
Metallurgical Construction Corp. over $10 million."^^ These losses comprised payments 
for completed projects, lost deposits in local banks, abandoned plants and the costs of 
repatriating workers in both Iraq and Kuwait. The United Nations sanctions on Iraq had 
BBC, SWB, Part 3, FE/1043, 11 April 1991, p. A4/1. 
'''' Edward Timperlake and William C. Triplett I I , Red Dragon Rising: Communist China's Military 
Threat to America, pp. 85-96. 
Michael West Lake, 'Casualties of War', in Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 151, number 8, 21 
February 1991, p. 38. 
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caused China's trade relations with Iraq to reach its lowest level ever (see Table 1, in 
Appendix 1). It had also prevented the Chinese firms f rom extending their economic 
co-operations with Iraq."^^ 
Chinese officials had repeatedly called upon the United Nations Security Council to l i f t 
or at least ease the sanctions imposed on Iraq. Their interest is for China to expand the 
scope of commercial, industrial and oil co-operation with Iraq. Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen, for example, publicly stated he was in favour of a 'gradual' 
removal of sanctions against Iraq. After talks in Beijing with Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Muhammad Sa'id al-Sahhaf on March 2, 1995 the Chinese Foreign Minister declared 
that 'the international community should objectively evaluate Iraqi implementations of 
resolutions of the Security Council and consider the gradual l i f t ing of sanctions imposed 
on Iraq'. This Chinese position was reaffirmed during Iraqi Vice-President Taha Yasin 
Ramadan's visit to Beijing three months later."^^ A number of Chinese firms, reportedly, 
have already resumed their activities in order to implement contracts and agreements 
that have already been signed with the Iraqi side in the past. However, the Chinese 
want to be able to establish and implement new economic contracts and agreements 
with Iraq particularly in the field of reconstructing Iraq's infrastructures that have not 
been rebuilt since its destruction by the allied forces during their attacks on Iraqi 
buildings, bridges and highways."^^ 
See United Nations Resolution 661 that was adopted by the Security Council at its 2933"^ meeting on 6 
August 1990 and affirmed United Nations sanctions against Iraq. 
^'^ FBIS-NES-95-042, 3 March 1995, p. 16; and China News Digest, http://www.cnd.org/CND-
Global/CND-Global.95.2'"'/CND-Global.95-06-27.html, p. 4. 
'^^ FBIS-NES-95-070, 12 April 1995, pp. 53-54; and Beijing Review, volume 37, number 4, 24-30 January 
1994. 
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China, who reportedly has already signed a trade and economic co-operation agreement 
with Iraq that w i l l take effect when Iraq's oil-for-food deal with the United Nations is 
settled, welcomed the memorandum of understanding reached by Iraq and the United 
Nations for the implementation of the United Nations Resolution 986, oil-for-food.'^^ It 
also supported the U N Security-General's proposal in February 1998 to increase the 
l imit on Iraqi oi l e x p o r t s . C h i n a had a great opportunity to supply Iraq with food 
stuffs, medicine and other commodities in accordance with the memorandum, which 
allow Iraq to sell $2 billion worth of oil every six months to raise money to buy food 
and medicine.'^' Prior to China-Iraq agreement, China had donated medicinal raw 
materials to Iraq valued at $360,000 in 1995, and $500,000 in Apri l 1996. China also 
signed a production-sharing agreement with Iraq for the development of al-Ahdab oil 
f ield in August 1996. This was the first agreement to be initiated by Iraq, who had been 
carrying out upstream talks with foreign firms during the past five years. The 
agreement was signed in Beijing by the Iraqi oil Minister, Dr. 'Amir Rashid, and senior 
officials of the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). This agreement called 
for a four-year development plan. In the initial stage, the Chinese f i rm would 
undertake, outside Iraq, an analysis of seismic work already done on the field, while 
Iraqi firms would carry out the construction of infrastructional projects and drilling 
activities on behalf of the Chinese. CNPC would pay the Iraqi firms once the United 
Nations sanctions were lifted. The two countries also signed a trade, economic, and 
technical co-operation agreement during the Iraqi Minister of Trade, Dr. Muhammad 
Mahdi's visit to Beijing in August 1997. The agreement contained provisions related to 
BBC, SWB, FE/2622, 27 May 1996, p. A/4. 
'° BBC, SWB, FE/3142, 4 February 1998, p. G/1. 
China News Digest, http://www.cnd.org/CND-Global/CND-Global.96.3"^/CND-Global.96-08-06.html, 
p. 2. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 39, number 61, 25 November 1996, p. A3. 
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developing and diversifying trade between China and Iraq, promoting economic and 
technical co-operation in various economic sectors, and launching training programmes 
for experts and technicians. This agreement replaces the 1981 agreement. In 
appreciation of the friendly relations the Chinese government offered the Iraqi 
CO 
government a grant of 5 million Chinese yuan. 
The Chinese government had expressed its concern and was critical of the U.S. air 
attack on Iraq's military targets following the Iraqi troops attack on 31 August 1996 on 
the positions of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in the north.^ "^  It had also reaffirmed its 
position that China does not favour the use of force in handling international affairs. A 
commentary in Xinhua News Agency by its reporter Wang Zizhen entitled 'unjust causes 
find scant support' criticised U.S. and Britain for the 'unjust actions' against Iraq. It 
spoke against the U.S. air raid on Iraq and criticised the British drafted-resolution to the 
United Nations to condemn Iraq for using force against the Kurds in the northern part of 
the country.''^ The Chinese representative to the United Nations opposed the draft 
resolution submitted by Britain and made it clear that his country oppose the U.S. air 
attack on Iraq. China had continued to emphasise the need for respecting Iraq's 
sovereignty during Turkey's military action into northern Iraq to ehminate forces of the 
Kurdish Workers' Party. The Chinese Foreign Ministry called upon Turkey's 
government to immediately halt its 'military incursion' into Iraq and respect the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.^^ 
BBC, SWB, FE/2994, 11 August 1997, p. G/5. 
-^^ BBC, SWB, FE/2708, 4 September 1996, p. G/1. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2713, 10 September 1996, p. G/1. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2924, 21 May 1997, p. G/3. 
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On the issue of the Iraqi government dispute with the UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM)^^ China had emphasised its opposition to the use of force, the threat of 
force, or any method that further aggravated tension; and it had always urged the 
relevant sides to exercise self-restraint and properly resolve the issue through dialogue 
and co-operation. As the Iraqi government dispute with UNSCOM escalated in 
December 1997/ January 1998, as a result of the Iraqi sides refusal to allow the 
UNSCOM team to inspect what it called 'presidential' or 'sovereign' sites, the Chinese 
Foreign Ministry stated its position by saying: 
The UN Security Council's resolutions should be comprehensively and earnestly 
carried out; and Iraq should fully co-operate with UNSCOM and fully carry out 
its relevant obligations so that UNSCOM can accomplish the Security Council's 
mandate at an early date...The legitimate concerns of Iraq, a sovereign state, 
should be respected. It is essential for the UNSCOM to improve its operations, 
including the composition of the inspection team, which should as much as 
possible reflect the diversity of the UN, and should be composed of personnel 
from more countries. 
In the Security Council, China expressed its opposition to the U.S. plan to launch 
military attack against Iraq following the tensions caused by arms inspections in Iraq. 
Premier L i Peng while visiting Moscow in February 1998 issued, with the Russian 
leadership, a joint statement on the Iraqi situation that called for: 
A peaceful settlement of the crisis that would ensure Iraq's full compliance with the 
appropriate resolutions of the UN Security Council and guarantee that Iraq's mass 
destruction weapon potential is eliminated, and which would open the way for lifting 
the sanctions against Iraq, first of all, the oil embargo. 
" UNSCOM was founded in April 1991 in accordance with the UN Security Council's Resolution 687, 
which declares that Iraq shall accept unconditionally, under international supervision, the 'destruction, 
removal or rendering harmless' of its weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles with a range over 
150 kilometres, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/uns_chro.htm, p. 
1. 
-'^  BBC, SWB, FE/3127, 17 January 1998, p. G/1. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3155, 19 February 1998, p. G/1. 
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The above statement shows that China's concern about Iraq is centred on three main 
points. First, the peaceful settlement of the dispute. China continued to stress the need 
to avoid the use of force and to bring about a political solution to the UN disputes with 
Iraq. The major force behind this poHcy stemmed from China's fear that international 
forces could be legitimised to use forces against individual sovereign states such as 
China, which has ambitions over Taiwan and territories in the South China Sea. 
Second, the need to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This policy was 
motivated by two main factors: 1) China wanted to make its statement acceptable to the 
western governments, whose main concern was Iraq's weapon of mass destruction; and 
2) China wanted to eliminate Iraq's potential threat to the security of the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region, on which China had become largely dependent for its energy 
needs. Third, the need to l if t the sanctions, mainly the oil embargo, against Iraq. 
China's interest was mainly centred around Iraq's potential as a supplier of oil to China 
and a source of investment to Chinese oil companies willing to develop Iraq's oil 
industry. 
China welcomed the signing of the memorandum of understanding between the UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the Iraqi government on February 23, 1998^^  in 
connection with settling the issue of arms inspections in Iraq,^' and encouraged the 
Security Council to implement it as soon as possible. China also had joined Russia, 
'^^  The memorandum of understanding obligates Iraq to provide UNSCOM and the International Atomic 
Agency ( lAA) immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access for their inspections in Iraq. The UN 
reiterates the commitment of all member states to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. 
The memorandum also includes a ledge by the commission to respect the legitimate concerns of Iraq 
relating to national security, sovereignty, and dignity. It further provides for the establishment of special 
procedures that would apply to initial and subsequent entries at the eight presidential sites. It finally 
provides for the appointment of commissioner to head the special group established to oversee 
inspections at presidential sites, Ibid., Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/iraq/uns_chro.htm, pp. 7-8. 
^' BBC, SWB, FE/3I59, 24 February 1998, p. G/1. 
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France, and the Non-Alignment movement in opposing the draft resolution put forward 
by Britain and Japan, and supported by the United States on the issue of the use of force 
against Iraq. The draft resolution stated if Iraq violates the agreement reached between 
Annan and the Iraqi government, it would face the severest consequences; military 
strikes. The Chinese representative along with the Russian and the French 
representatives expressed their resolute objections to this draft. However, they 
suggested that the resolution instead should include the following four points: first, the 
agreement signed between Annan and the Iraqi government should be clearly approved; 
second, the agreement should be implemented as soon as possible and not be delayed by 
man-made factors; third, i f Iraq abides by the agreement it signed with Annan, there 
should be hope for lifting the sanctions on Iraq; and fourth, the opposition to the 
inclusion of the 'automatic authorisation on the use of force' clause into the resolution, 
and the UN Security Council should be the one to judge whether Iraq violates the 
62. 
agreement and whether to adopt any penalties. Generally speaking, whenever the 
Iraqi government limit or suspend UNSCOM activities in Iraq, the Chinese government 
would always urge the Iraqi government to resume full co-operation with the UN, and 
urge also the relevant sides to avoid the threat or the use of force and properly resolve 
63 
the issue through dialogue. 
When the United States along with Great Britain launched their military strikes against 
Iraq on December 17, 1998 following the UNSCOM unforced withdrawal from Iraq, the 
Chinese government condemned the U.S. and U.K. air strikes and urged them to halt all 
their military actions immediately. The Chinese criticised UNSCOM's unilateral 
BBC, SWB, FE/3165, 3 March 1998, p. G/1. 
See, for example, China's reaction to the Iraqi government suspension of the UNSCOM activities in 
October 1998, BBC, SWB, FE/3386, 17 November 1998, p. G/1. 
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decision to leave Iraq without consulting the Security Council.^ "^ They accused the 
United States and Great Britain of having no authorisation by the UN Security Council 
and unilaterally using force against Iraq. The Chinese Foreign Ministry described the 
action as 'a violation of the UN charter and the international n o r m s ' . T h e Chinese 
media carried its criticism and condemnation of the U.S. military actions against Iraq. 
Xinhua News Agency described the air strikes against Iraq as constituting 'a serious 
threat to international peace and security'. It said that: 
The Clinton administration chose this moment to strike was out of consideration 
for its own predicament. Clinton was facing impeachment by the U.S. House of 
Representatives on account of the sex scandal case. The Chnton administration 
could on the one hand shift the line of vision and on the other gain time for going 
all out to win over Republican congressmen who were still wavering. 
The Shanghai daily Jiefang Ribao said on the 18* of December that: 
The latest U.S. military action was carried out without the approval of the UN 
Security Council. While repeatedly accusing Iraq of failing to comply with the 
UN resolutions, Washington's own action has completely violated the UN charter 
and norms of international law. The conduct of the United States has set a very 
bad and extremely dangerous precedent. 
The Chinese Communist Party's newspaper Renmin Ribao stated in its December 18' 
issue: 
The use of force against Iraq by the United States has neither a just cause nor has 
a legal basis. The U.S. action neither has the authorisation of the UN Security 
Council nor is based on the consensus and confirmation of the intemational 
community. The use of force on the U.S. part under such circumstances is totally 
a unilateral action...Relying on one's powerful military force to wantonly go to 
war against a weak country, and even use force to overthrow the legitimate 
govemment of a country is typical hegemony and power politics. The 
international community cannot accept this. 
64 BBC, SWB, FE/34I3, 18 December 1998, p. G/1. 
Ibid., p. G/2. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3414, 19 December 1998, p. G/5. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3415, 21 December 1998, p. G/1. 
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The UN Security Council adopted on December 17, 1999 Resolution 1284 on the Iraqi 
issue, with 11 voting for and four abstentions. The resolution ended UNSCOM and 
replaced it with the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission 
(UNMOVIC). It offered partial suspension of sanctions in return for Baghdad's co-
operation with a new set of arms inspectors.^ ^ China along with Russia, France and 
Malaysia abstained from voting on the resolution. China could have used the veto, but 
under heavy pressure from the U.S., decided that abstention was the better part of 
valour. The Chinese government justified its abstention by arguing that Resolution 
1284 does not satisfy the 'reasonable proposal' put forward by China and other 
countries in terms of setting in motion the mechanism for suspending sanctions against 
Iraq and other issues.Moreover, one can argue that China's decision to abstain might 
have been motivated by the following factors: 
1. China wanted to see, in the short term, a full suspension of sanctions imposed on 
Iraq by the UN Security Council including financial and trade restrictions, and in the 
long run, military restrictions. 
2. China desired to ensure a long-term stable supply of energy from Iraq in order to 
diversify its import of oil and also to get oil development contracts in Iraq. 
3. China was eager to bring to an end the U.S. and British continuing interpretations of 
the related resolutions, to hold the right to use military means to enforce Iraqi 
compliance. 
Thus, China's foreign policy towards Iraq during the 1990s was a reflection of its 
overall foreign policy. Because of Iraq's economic potential the Chinese government 
See Middle East International, 24 December 1999, pp. 13-14. 
Beijing Review, number 52, 27 December 1999, p. 6. 
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supported the lifting or easing of sanctions against Iraq. Because of its principle 
opposition to foreign intervention in a sovereign state's internal affairs, the Chinese 
government politically supported Iraq against the U.S. military attacks. This support 
was out of fear that the United States would redefine state' sovereignty in terms that 
serve U.S. interests around the world, which would enable the United States to impose 
destructive wars on the countries which obstruct its interests. Therefore, this worried 
China who was faced with separatist tendencies and struggle in Tibet, Xinjiang, and 
also Taiwan. For this reason, China remained a strong opponent to the United States 
and the West military attacks and interventions in Iraq and remained a strong advocator 
of peaceful dialogue and co-operation in order to resolve differences between the UN 
and Iraq. 
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5.2. China and Iran 
5.2.1. China and Iran in the 1950s 
As previously suggested, the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China in the 
1950s was attached to, and subservient to, the power blocs led by the Soviet Union and 
the United States. As a result, China-Iran relations were vitiated by the Chinese sharp 
focus on ideology, which led Iranian government to show their unwillingness to start a 
relationship with the communist government in Mainland China. Both Mossadeq and 
the Shah's regimes were suspicious of China.^ ^ Two main factors had played a large 
role in Iran's opposition to a rapprochement with China. These factors were: 
1. Iran's position stemmed from fear of China's communist ideology and its alignment 
with the Soviet Union. Soviet and the Chinese support to the Iranian communist 
party (the Tudeh), which was operating unofficially in Iran, had increased the 
Iranian government's fears of communist-inspired subversion in Iran. 
2. The emergence of the United States as the most influential foreign power in Iran 
following the coup of 1953 against Mossadeq^^ contributed to Iran's hostility 
towards China. After the coup Iran had become an unambiguous client ally of the 
United States. The coup had not only restored a pro-Western government to power 
in Iran but it had also restored control over Iran's oil production to the West. Within 
one a year of the coup, a new consortium of Western oil interests was created to 
manage Iranian oil.'^'' To the United States Iran was seen as a strategic partner to 
°^ A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, p. 46. 
^' Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 217. 
When the Mossadeq's government began to take control over the oil fields in Iran, Britain sent several 
warships into the Gulf; and along with the U.S. they started to build up political and economic pressures 
to weaken Mossadeq's regime and, reportedly, supported the 1953 coup. The U.S. main goal in Iran was 
to keep that country from falling under Soviet domination. 
Hyun Sang Yoo, An Analysis of United States' Security Policy Towards a Third World State During the 
Cold War Era: Case Study of U.S.-Iran Relations, (Durham: Durham University PhD thesis, 1996), pp. 
230-259. 
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contain the threat of the Soviet Union and China. In May 1950 a Mutual Defence 
Assistance Agreement was signed between the U.S. and Iran for an average of $23 
million per year in military aid until 1956, and the agreement granted several 
economic loans to the Iranian government.^ "^  It also provided the Iranian 
government with $73 million in economic aid in the first week after the coup, and 
approximately $1 billion in U.S. military and economic aid in the first ten years after 
the coup.^'' 
Thus, China found itself unable to cultivate relations with Iran in the 1950s despite 
unofficial trade relations between the two countries. Iran supported the U.S. in Korea 
and condemned the PRC as an aggressor in the war. The Shah joined the West-oriented 
and sponsored collective security system known as the Baghdad Pact in 1955 as he 
wanted to preserve the monarchical system in Iran. Iran continued to oppose the 
question of China's admission to the UN throughout the 1950s and revived its 
diplomatic relations with the Nationalist Government in Taiwan. 
The Chinese government sought to soften its image and present itself as a state that the 
rest of the Third World could exist with. This was evident in China's continued 
'unofficial' trade relations with Iran in the 1950s. China's total trade of imports and 
exports with Iran from 1950 to 1959 was approximately $2.5 million (see Table 2, in 
Appendix 1). This strategy was also demonstrated by China's reluctance to attack the 
Iranian government policy of alliance with the West. In his statements to the Bandung 
Conference, Zhou Enlai denounced the U.S. scheme of creating an anti-Communist 
'^ '^  William E. Warne, Mission for Peace: Point 4 in Iran, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), p. 18. 
'^^  Hyun Sang Yoo, An Analysis of United States' Security Policy Towards a Third World State During 
the Cold War Era, p. 274. 
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alliance, and adopted a rational and softer tone towards Asian states, including Iran, 
which had associated themselves with the U.S. in opposition to the PRC. Zhou argued 
that differences between Third World countries could be solved through peaceful 
negotiations. According to Zhou, foreign intervention in the internal affairs of Third 
World countries must be stopped since it is the main cause of conflict and disagreement 
among the countries of the Third World and China.^ ^ However, the Iranian government, 
which participated in the conference, did not agree with the Chinese argument and 
continued its relationship with the U.S. and its opposition to the PRC. Therefore, China 
found itself unable to cultivate relations with Iran in the 1950s. 
5.2.2. China, Iran and changes in Chinese foreign policy 
The 1960s witnessed tremendous changes in the foreign policy of both China and Iran. 
China's foreign policy had been fundamentally changed by its perception of the United 
States and the Soviet Union as the main enemy of China and the rest of the world. New 
foreign policy strategies were implemented to achieve China's new foreign policy 
objectives of opposing both the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World. 
Iran's foreign policy had also begun to change. The emergence of the Shah as the 
prominent policy maker in Iran and his new 'independent national policy' influenced 
the direction of Iran's foreign policy. The Shah judged a decline in the importance of 
Iran to the United States following the U.S.-Soviet detente. Furthermore, the U.S. 
decision in 1964 to sell instead of handout arms to Iran convinced the Shah to adopt an 
independent foreign policy that could balance Iran's relations with the superpowers. 
For Premier Zhou Enlai's statement see People's China, 16 May 1955, pp. 7-10. 
Chapter five: China's relations with Iraq, Iran, and Yemen 230 
In July 1964 the Chinese interpreted the new Iranian foreign policy posture and the 
establishment of the Regional Co-operation for Development^^ as steps in the region 
towards challenging the West and as a new effort towards fostering Third World 
solidarity. China's interpretation was coupled with changes in Iran's voting behaviour 
concerning the question of China's admission to the UN. In the past Iran had voted 
against the PRC's admission to the UN, however since 1965 Iran began to abstain from 
-TO 
voting on the issue. Iran's abstention on this issue was a fundamental departure from 
its former pattern of voting for U.S. draft resolutions. However, it is important to note 
that Iran remained a member of the U.S.-sponsored Baghdad Pact (later known as the 
Central Treaty Organisation, CENTO, August 1959). Iran also remained suspicious of 
continued Chinese support for the Tudeh party and China's continued attacks on 
CENTO.^^ 
After the Arab defeat in the June 1967 war and the subsequent shift in the power 
balance from the Arabs towards Iran, the Iranian government felt comfortable to devote 
more attention to its relations with the PRC. The first direct Iranian statement on Iran-
China relations was made by the Shah himself in 1967. In his statement the Shah 
acknowledged de facto recognition of the PRC and argued for the admission of China to 
the UN.^^ In January 1969 the Shah declared for the first time that Iran would support 
China's application for membership of the UN.^' These changes in Iran's foreign policy 
towards China suggest that the Iranian government hoped that initiating relations with 
''^  Included Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. 
A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf pp. 87-92. 
Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 217. 
A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf p. 47. 
^' Ibid., p. 51. 
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the PRC would allow Iran to manoeuvre more easily between the two superpowers. 
The changes also suggest that Iran's fear of China was mainly because of its ideological 
and political connection with the Soviet Union. Once the Chinese had shifted their 
alliance with the Soviets and began their own massive propaganda campaign against 
them, the Iranian government felt much safer to deal with China. To the Iranian 
government, the Chinese could play the role of a counterpoise to Soviet penetration in 
Asia and the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. One could also argue that Iran was 
merely following the U.S. in its rapprochement with China. 
To summarise, changes in the foreign policies of both China and Iran in the 1960s 
helped the Iranians in particular to view the Chinese in a positive manner for the first 
time since 1949. Despite the absence of political relations between the two sides, trade 
relations increased dramatically in the 1960s. China's total trade of exports and imports 
with Iran in the 1960s was about twenty times greater than in the 1950s (see Table 2, in 
Appendix 1). 
5.2.3. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
As previously mentioned, China's foreign policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
altered to accommodate changes in its relations with both superpowers. China's interest 
in Iran, during this time, was reflected by the pattern of change in China's foreign 
policy. It was China's fear of the Soviet's attempts to refill the 'power vacuum' in the 
Gulf following the British withdrawal from the region, particularly after the signing of 
the Soviet-Indian treaty of friendship, that led the Chinese government to consolidate its 
relations with Iran. At the same time, Iran shared China's fear of the Soviet Union but 
waited for the Chinese to reduce and subsequently terminate China's political and 
military supports for the national liberation movements and all other forces which 
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opposed the ruling regimes in the Gulf region. Once the Chinese began to cease support 
for the PFLOAG in 1971 in order to cultivate relations with Iran and other Gulf states, 
Iran's government found itself in an unprecedented favourable position to consider 
establishing political relations with the Chinese government. Two major visits to China 
by Iranian Princess Ashraf Pahlavi on April 14, 1971, and Iranian Princess Fatamah 
Pahlavi on April 30, 1971 helped the Iranian government to hasten its decision to 
establish diplomatic relations with the PRC.^ ^ 
The establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries was announced on 
August 17, 1971 in the form of a joint communique simultaneously released in Beijing 
and Tehran. However, the document of recognition was signed in Islamabad a day 
earlier. The Iranian government saw the establishment and development of diplomatic 
relations with China as a natural progression. At a press conference on October 19, 
1971, the Shah of Iran emphasised this point in stating: 
The relations between our two countries, whether in the economic or cultural 
fields, have been long-standing. It is natural that these re-established relations 
not only should be resumed to the level reached in the past, but should also be 
84 
further developed. 
From China's perspective, the Chinese government viewed the new development in 
China-Iran relations as a victory against imperialism. In his speech during the Shah's 
birthday reception in Iran's embassy in Beijing, Ji Pengfei, Chinese Acting Foreign 
Minister said: 
See ibid., pp. 56-66. It is important to mention that the Pakistan's mediation role had also played a 
large role in the fostering the establishment of diplomatic relations between Iran and China. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3765, 19 August 1971, p. A4/1. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3818, 21 October 1971, p. A4/1. 
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We are very glad that the ties between China and Iran which were weakened and 
even once intermpted as a result of imperialist aggression have now been restored 
85 
and developed on new basis. 
Regardless of their perceptions, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China 
and Iran appeared to serve both countries' national interests. Iran was an important 
state to China for the following reasons: 
1. Iran's political and military strengths could serve as a counterpoise to Soviet 
advances in the Gulf region. 
2. Iran shared China's fear of the Soviets' presence and influence in India and later in 
Iraq, which both China and Iran interpreted as a Soviet move to contain China, Iran, 
and Pakistan. 
3. Both China and Iran were interested in maintaining the independence and the 
integrity of Pakistan. China and Iran accused the Soviet Union of attempting to 
trigger off the disintegration of Pakistan and the establishment of the independent 
states of Pakhtoonistan in north Pakistan and Baluchistan in the south. 
4. Iran's large market could serve as a potential market for Chinese goods; 
5. China could collaborate with Iran in such fields as petroleum technology and 
chemical fertilisers. 
6. Establishing diplomatic relations with Iran could create a positive image for China 
to help foster the development of its relations with other Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
countries. 
To Iran, China was an important state for the following reasons: 
1. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China, who graduated to the status of 
a nuclear power after the successful test of its nuclear device in 1964, could enhance 
-^^  BBC, SWB, FE/3824, 28 October 1971, p. A4/1-2 
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Iran's bargaining position in world affairs, particularly in its relations with the 
United States and the Soviet Union. 
2. China shared Iran's fear of the Soviet Union's advance into the Gulf region in 
particular and Asia in general. 
3. The Iranian government hoped that by establishing diplomatic relations and 
befriending China, Iran would be able to stop Chinese support for revolutionary 
communist and nationalist movements in the Gulf region. 
4. Iran had no reason to remain unfriendly with China particularly after the U.S. 
government had already began improving relations with China. 
5. The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Canada (October 
1970), Equatorial Guinea (October 1970), Italy (November 1970), Ethiopia 
(December 1970), Chile (January 1971), Nigeria (February 1971), Cameroon and 
Kuwait (March 1971) suggested to the Iranian leadership that China could co-exist 
with states of different socio-economic-political systems. 
Following the establishment of diplomatic relations many official and non-official 
political, economic, and cultural delegations visited the two countries in the 1970s. 
These included a visit to Iran in April 1972 by a Chinese government trade delegation 
headed by Chen Chieh, the Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade. This was the first 
Chinese government delegation sent to Iran since the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. During the visit a Chinese-Iranian trade agreement 
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and a payment agreement were signed. The following April an Iranian government 
economic delegation visited China, led by Hushang Ansari, the Iranian Minister of 
Economy. The first long-term trade and payment agreements were signed by both 
Shih Tsan-Yen, 'Development of Sino-Iranian Trade Relations' in China's Foreign Trade, number 4, 
1975, pp. 6-7. 
Chapter five: China's relations with Iraq, Iran, and Yemen 235 
governments.^^ The main feature of these agreements was that the Iranian rial would be 
the sole unit of accounting currency. China's Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei visited Iran in 
June 1973^^ and Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien visited Iran in April 1975. China 
reportedly began to buy Iranian crude oil in 1974. The arrangement is believed to have 
been made during a visit to Tehran in late 1974 by Li Chiang, the Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Trade. China also purchased 200,000 tons of crude oil from Iran in 1976 and 
300,000 tons in 1977. Al l Chinese purchases of Iranian crude oil were paid for in hard 
cash and at OPEC prices.^° In August 1978 Chairman Hua Guofeng visited Tehran. 
The Chinese Chairman's visit marked the first visit made by a high-ranking Chinese 
official to Iran since the establishment of diplomatic relations. However, the Chinese 
Chairman's visit came during a very sensitive and crucial time for Iran, as the Shah's 
regime was facing large-scale resistance from the opposition. 
In June 1972 the Chinese Red Cross Society donated blankets, tinned food, and 
medicine valued at 200,000 yuan RMB for the victims of the earthquakes in Southern 
Iran.^' China welcomed the Shah of Iran's announcement on July 31, 1973 of a new 
agreement between the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Western oil 
consortium in which Iran recovered all rights concerning production, management, and 
ownership of oil installations from the Western oil consortium. An article in Peking 
Review in August 1973 stated: 
Peking Review, number 16, 29 June 1973, p. 5. 
Peking Review, number 25, 22 June 1973, pp. 3-5. 
John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, p. 87. 
A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, p. 262. 
91 BBC, SWB, FE/4019, 20 June 1972, p. A4/1. 
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The 72-year long struggle by the Iranian people to safeguard their country's oil 
rights and interests has resulted in a resounding victory. It has turned a new page 
92 
in the annals of Iran's oil industry. 
China also welcomed the bilateral agreement signed between Iran and the Soviet Union 
on August 17, 1974 to raise the price of Iranian gas exported to the Soviet Union from 
30 to 57 U.S. cents per 1,000 cubic feet.^ '^  
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the total volume of imports and exports 
trade between the two countries increased sharply. The 1972 figure was approximately 
6 times greater than in 1971; the 1973 figure was more than 10 times greater than in 
1971; the 1975 figure was a little over 14 times greater than in 1971; and the 1978 
figure was about 20 times greater than in 1971 (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). From the 
beginning of 1970 until the end of 1973 the balance of trade was in favour of Iran. 
However this began to change in 1974 with China enjoying a small surplus in its trade 
with Iran. 
5.2.4. China and new developments in Iran 
As China's political and economic relations with Iran started to augment after the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, two major 
developments in Iran caught the Chinese government with surprise. First, the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran in 1979 followed by the eruption of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980. 
The Islamic Revolution overthrew the Shah's regime, ended the monarchical system in 
Iran and presented Ayatollah Khomeini's regime to the world as the new ruling 
authority in Iran. China had enjoyed a promising relationship with the Shah throughout 
^" Peking Review, number 33, 17 August 1973, p. 17. 
^"^ Peking Review, number 35, 30 August 1974, pp. 35-36. 
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most of the 1970s and did not know what to expect from the new regime in Iran. China 
feared that Khomeini's regime would offset the newly developed relationship between 
China and Iran because of its support for the Shah in the 1970s and particularly after the 
ill-timed Chinese Chairman Hua Guofeing's visit to the Shah in August 1978, when the 
Iranian crisis was reaching its peak. China was also concerned that Khomeini's 
regime's anti-U.S. stand would lead Iran towards a closer relationship with the Soviet 
Union. The Chinese were strongly opposed to such a development, therefore, they 
publicly criticised Soviet attempts to take advantage of the new development in Iran and 
to exploit it to Soviet interests in the region.^ "^  The Chinese government encouraged the 
United States to resist Moscow's 'expansionist' efforts in Iran and protect its interest in 
that country.^^ 
China itself did not publicly express its support or opposition to the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran. Chinese media coverage of the 'turmoil' or the 'turbulence' in Iran, as they 
referred to it, was expressed as quoting Iranian sources. Some have argued that in order 
to stay out of Iran's internal affairs, the Chinese media specifically adopted the practice 
of quoting the worst aspects of the revolution leadership from Iranian sources.^ ^ Thus, 
the Chinese in their first reaction to the new development in Iran did not applaud the 
establishment of a revolutionary regime in Iran, nor were they impressed by the anti-
imperialist and non-aligned postures of the revolutionary regime in Iran. However, in 
March 1979 the Lebanese weekly Al-Kifah al-Arabi alleged long co-operation between 
China, the Israeli secret services, and the Iranian secret services in exchanging 
'^ ^ See Beijing Review, volume 22.1, number 15, 13 April 1979, pp. 19-20. 
^•^Ibid. 
A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, p. 176. 
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information against the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The Chinese government however 
denied such allegations in an official statement on Tehran Radio.^ ^ 
Eventually, the Chinese government found itself with no choice but to recognise the 
new government in Iran. Chairman Hua Guofeng sent his congratulations and 
expressed the hope that 'traditional friendship' would continue between the two states. 
On January 21, 1979 Jiao Ruoyu, the Chinese Ambassador to Iran, met with the Iranian 
Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and the two expressed their desire to further develop 
relations between the two c o u n t r i e s . I t was reported that Chairman Hua Guofeng 
conveyed in July 1979 an apology to Khomeini, through a Pakistani mediator, for his 
visit to Iran the previous year.^^° China had started to celebrate Iran's Revolution and 
Iranian National Days as gestures towards improving its image with the Iranian 
government. However, political exchanges between the two countries were at minimum 
level. Culturally, China began to use Chinese Islamic Association members to foster its 
relations with Iran. Several Islamic delegations were sent to Iran and met with high-
ranking Iranians leaders.Economically, despite the signing of a memorandum 
between China and Iran during the Iranian Minister of Trade's visit to China in 1979, 
total Chinese exports and imports with Iran reached their lowest point since 1975. The 
total trade dropped from $118 million in 1978 to approximately $68 million in 1979 
(see Table 2 in Appendix 1). 
BBC, SWB, Middle East (henceforth ME) 6081, 31 March 1979, p. i . 
Richard Freeze, 'The Arabs and China', Ara^ Report, number 3, 28 February 1979, pp. 4-6. 
Xinhua News Agency New Bulletin, number 11056, 23 April 1979, pp. 1-2. 
'^ ^ A.H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf pp. 174-175. 
'"^  BBC, SWB, FE/6349, 19 February 1980, p. A4/1-2 
BBC, SWB, FE/6275, 19 November 1979, p. A4/3 
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The eruption of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980 presented the Chinese government 
with a dilemma. To China, both Iran and Iraq were important countries to counterpoise 
Soviet advances in the Gulf region. A war between them could make them more 
vulnerable to Soviet penetration in the region. Iran was coming out of a fundamental 
revolutionary change. Its revolutionary militancy and its disengagement from the 
United States could trigger off a leaning towards the Soviet Union policy in Iran. While 
the Chinese government was concerned with trying to restore its image in Iran, it 
adopted the same policy with Iran as it did with Iraq during the Iraq-Iran war. This 
policy was characterised by the following: 
1. It avoided criticising Iran's military and political actions against Iraq. 
2. It stressed the need for a peaceful settlement of Iran's disputes with Iraq. 
3. It praised the Iranian leadership's opposition to hegemonism and intervention by 
foreign powers in Iran's internal affairs. 
4. It welcomed the Iranian government's opposition to the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. 
5. It portrayed the Soviet Union as the ultimate beneficiary of the continued conflict 
between Iran and Iraq.'^ "^ 
6. It encouraged the rapprochement of relations between Iran and the United States. 
In addition, the Chinese government's foreign policy towards Iran's conflict with Iraq 
was also characterised by its attempts to prevent the Iranian government from leaning 
towards the Soviet Union. Recognising the limitation of the United States ability to 
For instance the Chinese government and media praised the Iranian leadership refusal to accept Soviet 
military aid and sales on the ground that Iran opposed to foreign intervention in its internal affairs. 
See Beijing Review, number 4, 25 January 1984, pp. 14-15. 
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Iranian vigilance and effective measures taken to guard against the Soviet Union 
are of immense importance for Iran in safeguarding its security and independence 
as well as in safeguarding peace and stability in the Persian Gulf area.^ ^^ 
The Chinese government criticised Moscow when it proposed to provide Iran with a 
radar system in exchange for permission to allow the Soviet Union to study the 
electronic devices on the wreckage of U.S. aircraft. The Chinese argued that had Iran 
accepted the deal, Moscow would gain not only technological information of U.S. 
aircraft and helicopters, but also Iranian telecommunication secrets. Instead, the 
Chinese emphasised that i f Soviet intentions to assist Iran were serious it should pull its 
forces out of Afghanistan so that there would be no excuse for U.S. military presence in 
the region. 
The Chinese also criticised the Soviet stand on the hostage crisis. Editorial in the Hong 
Kong's pro communist Wen Wei Po on 1 May 1980 stated: 
It [Soviet Union] is using the American military action to rescue the hostages to 
divert the attention of world opinion to plan out its suppression of guerrilla 
activities in Afghanistan with ease. The Soviet strategy of southward expansion 
to secure a warm water port was defeated when it got itself into Afghan 
quagmire. However, now it has been given an opportunity to expand into Iran by 
the deepening of the hostage crisis. In the whole course of the hostage crisis, the 
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Soviet Union is the real beneficiary. 
During Iran's period of domestic political instability in 1981 following the dismissal of 
President Bensadir and the election of Mohammad Ali Rajai as new president, China 
tried to exclude itself from Iran's internal affairs. The Chinese media reported the 
situation in general in Iran, and an article in Beijing Review stated: 
Beijing Review, number 36, 8 September 1980, pp. 14-15. 
Joint Publications Research Services (hereafter JPRS}- 75732-China Report, number 84, 20 May 1980, 
p. 47. 
109 JPRS 75672-China Report, number 82, 9 May 1980, pp. 20-21. 
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What road Iran w i l l choose is completely a matter to be decided by the Iranian 
people themselves. However, it is painful to see Iran embroiled in internal strife. 
Iran did not win independence easily. Its people had been long subject to 
imperialist and colonialist oppression and exploitation. The Third World 
peoples, who have had the same experience as the Iranian people, naturally wish 
to see the Iranian people restore internal peace in their country and embark on the 
road to happiness and prosperity as soon as possible. 
China-Iran relations started to develop rapidly after political stability was restored in 
Iran. Dr Al i Akbar Velayati, Iranian Foreign Minister, visited China in 1982, and the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian, travelled to Iran in November 1983.^ '^ The 
two visits helped to expand co-operation in cultural and economic endeavours between 
the two countries. A Chinese delegation headed by Zhang Jingfu, Chinese State 
Councillor, visited Iran in February-March 1985. Iranian President Seyyed Ali 
Khamenei said while meeting the visiting delegation that in national development the 
Third World countries cannot expect help from the superpowers, it can only be done by 
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relying on unity and co-operation among themselves. The two sides set up a 
ministerial joint committee for co-operation on economic, trade, science and 
technology. The establishment of the committee was said to lay down the foundation 
for stable and long-lasting co-operation between the two countries. In June Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly, visited 
China. Premier Zhao Ziyang said while meeting Rafsanjani that Chinese-Iranian 
friendship and co-operation 'are based on their common independence and anti-
hegemonism'.''"^ Ali Akbar Velayati visited Beijing in June 1987. His visit coincided 
Beijing Review, number 38, 21 September 1981, pp. 10-11. 
Beijing Review, number 50, 10 December 1984, pp. 6-7. 
FBIS-CHI-85-043, 5 March 1985, p. I 1. 
FBIS-CHI-85-044, 6 March 1985, p. I 1. 
FBIS-CHI-85-124, 28 June 1985, p. 1 1. 
Chapter five: China's relations with Iraq, Iran, and Yemen 243 
with Chinese consideration of a Kuwaiti request that Beijing co-operate with 
Washington and Moscow in protecting Kuwait's oil tankers against Iranian attacks in 
the Gulf.'^'^ The following month China's Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Qi 
Huaiyuan travelled to Kuwait and delivered his government's refusal to take part in 
protecting Kuwaiti vessels in the Gulf.'^^ 
China condemned the U.S. action that brought down an Iran Airlines passenger plane 
flying over the southern part of the Gulf on July 3, 1988. China Daily said: 
Now the fatal incident of the Airbus crash has once again underlined the urgency 
for the removal of big power's military meddling in the region and for the 
peaceful setdement between the warring nadons.^ ^^  
When Iran acknowledged UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 18, 1988, China 
welcomed the development. China's Vice Foreign Minister visited Tehran in August 
and expressed his country's support for the Iranian decision and stressed China's 
willingness to take part in the post-war economic reconstruction in Iran.^'^ 
Iran's President Khamenei visited China for a six-day visit in May 1989. His visit to 
China was the first by an Iranian head of state since the revolution. During his meeting 
with the Chinese President Yang Shangkun, Khamenei said that Iran in its 
reconstruction efforts following the end of the war 'seeks co-operation with countries 
that had left no unpleasant memories on the Iranian mind during the war'. For this 
reason, he added, 'we have chosen friendship and co-operation with China and we are 
FBIS-CHI-87-114, 15 June 1987, p. F 2. 
FBIS-CHI-87-J45, 29 July 1987, p. F l - F2. 
FBIS-CHI-88-128, 5 July 1988, p. 14. 
FBIS-CHI-88-158, 16 August 1988, p. 18. 
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ready to conduct further c o - o p e r a t i o n ' . W h i l e meeting with Deng Xiaoping, 
Khamenei ensured the Chinese leader that 'Iran sticks to its policy of neither East, nor 
West' in its foreign policy and that 'it is one of the fundamental bases of the Islamic 
revolution'. This re-assuring statement came after China's concern that Iran was 
moving towards the Soviet Union, particularly after the visit to Tehran by the Soviet 
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in late February 1989. During the visit, the two 
sides emphasised the need to further develop economic, trade, technological and 
cultural relations. 
In a meeting with the visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on 9 October 
1989, the Iranian Foreign Minister expressed his country's 'understanding of China's 
firm stand' towards the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square and voiced support for 
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China's drive to restore order and realise stability. 
Regarding trade relations, total Chinese exports and imports with Iran increased 
substantially since 1980. It rose from $67.9 million in 1979 to $179 million in 1980, an 
increase of about $111 million. The total trade between China and Iran in the 1980s 
reached $1,627 million compared to only $627 million in the 1970s (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 1). This shows that despite the prolonged war between Iran and Iraq, China-
Iran economic relations continued to progress. Throughout the 1980s China exported to 
Iran various kinds of manufactured goods and raw materials such as: machinery, tools, 
steel wires, yarns, textile fabrics, chemicals, aluminium, fishing equipment and ships. In 
"•^ FBIS-CHI-89-089, 10 May 1989, pp. 8-10. 
'-° FBIS-CHI-89-090, 11 May 1989, p. 10. 
FBIS-CHI-89-194, 10 October 1989, pp. 14-17. 
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return, China received crude oil from Iran.^ ^^ China's oil imports from Iran increased 
sharply from 300,000 tons/year in 1977^ ^^  to approximately one million tons/year 
(25,000 hid) in 1982*^ ^ and then to 2 million tons/year (40,000 b/d) in 1989-1990.'^ ^ 
Throughout the 1980s China also assisted Iran in constructing power stations, upgrading 
airport facilities, operating offshore drilling, constructing a dam on the Karoum River in 
Southeast Iran, and establishing factories in silk weaving, light industries and fishery 
p r o d u c t s . F r o m 1984 to 1989 China signed 19 projects with Iran totalling $66.74 
million.'^^ Cultural relations between the two sides were advanced. The two countries 
developed student exchange and scholarship programmes, scientific research 
programmes, art co-operation programmes, joint training programmes in fishing and 
tourism, as well as co-operation in archaeology and various fields of sports, in addition 
to mutual exemption of visas. The first Iranian women delegation since the 
revolution visited China in April 1989.^ ^^  Several religious delegations travelled 
between the two countries. 
Petroleum News Letter (Iran), volume 56, March/April 1990, p. 12. 
'^ "^  Chinese purchase of Iranian oil in 1976 was totalling 200,000 tons, Middle East Economic Survey, 
volume 20, number 46, 5 September 1977, p. 3. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 25, number 30, 10 May 1982, p. 3. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 32, number 32, 15 May 1989, p. A7; China signed an 
agreement with Iran on August 4, 1987 for the purchase of one million tons of crude oil from Iran, FBIS-
CHI-87-152, 7 August 1987, p. F . l . 
Petroleum News Letter, pp. 12-13. 
FBIS-CHI-89-226, 27 November 1989, p. 11. 
'^^ Beijing Review, number 2, 22-23 May 1989, p. 7. 
FBIS-CHI-89-065, 6 April 1989, p. 16. 
FBIS-CHI-89-176, 13 September 1989, p. 7. 
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This improvement in the economic and cultural fields was coupled with an increase in 
China's arms transfers to Iran. In the 1980s Iran became China's second-largest arms 
customer in the world with total purchases valued at $3,800 million from 1982 to 1991. 
China was Iran's largest single arms supplier during the Iran-Iraq war (see Table 4.2). 
The low cost of Chinese weapons made China an attractive arms source for Iran. While 
Chinese officials continued to deny Chinese arms transfers to Iran, western reports 
argued that the China had transferred arms to Iran throughout the 1980s. This transfer 
included F-6 (MiG-19 equivalent) interceptors and F-7 (MiG-21) fighters, Type-59 
main battle tanks, Type-501 armoured personnel carrier, surface-to-air missiles, rocket 
launchers, anti-ship missiles, and field artillery and s h e l l s . I t was alleged that by the 
end of the war with Iraq, Iran owned 12 F-6 and over 50 F-7 as well as some 260 T-
59.'''^ Despite China and Iran's denial of any direct Chinese arms transfer to Iran, some 
Iranian officials did not deny Western reports that China was one of Iran's principal 
arms suppliers in the 1980s. For instance, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for political 
affairs Hosey Sheykh al-Eslam said: 
We buy weapons from any country, with the exception of South Africa, Japan 
and Israel.'^'' 
China's foreign policy towards Iran in the 1980s was dominated by China's fear of the 
Soviet Union's penetration in the region. Editorial in Hong Kong Standard on 3 June 
1987 described China-Iran relations as a 'new alignment' that 'appeared to be 
emerging' as a result of the arms deals. The editorial went on to say that China's 
interest in Iran was not due to its oil requirements, instead it was China's desire to 
See Business Week, 29 December 1986, p. 47, and ibid., Yitzhak Shichor, 'Unfolded Arms', p. 323. 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Islamic Second Republic, (London: Routledge, 1995), 
p. 176. 
FBIS-CHI-87-101, 27 May 1987, pp. 11-12. 
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'blunt the Soviet Union's increasing ties with Iran' particularly after Soviet First Deputy 
Foreign Minister's, Georgiy M. Korinyenko, visit to Tehran in 1986. An article 
written in 1989 in Xinhua News Agency entitled 'Iran Chooses the East rather than the 
West' analysed the new trend in Iran's foreign policy towards the superpowers. It 
reported that Iran was moving towards the Soviet Union while its relations with the 
West were deteriorating. This shift, according to the article, was evident in 
Shevardnadze's visit to Tehran in late February 1989 and his meeting with Ayatollah 
Khomeyni. China was particularly concerned because Khomeyni's meeting with the 
Soviet Foreign Minister was his first meeting ever with a foreign minister of a major 
power since the revolution. Shevardnadze was also the highest ranked Soviet official to 
visit the Islamic Republic. As a result, the Chinese sensed a shift in Iran's foreign 
policy towards Moscow. Therefore, they sought to encourage Iran to maintain its 
neutral policy in terms of its relations with both powers: 
In the long-term, Iran will and must take what is useful from both West and 
East. 
Shortly after, the Chinese Vice Premier Tian Jiyun visited Tehran on March 7 for a 5-
day visit. He met with Rafsanjani who assured the visiting official that Iran's decision 
to develop relations with China 'is a result of careful consideration' and that the 
relations are not only of great significance for the time being, but also of far-reaching 
strategic importance. ^ '^ ^ 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-87-J07, 4 June 1987, pp. 11-12. 
FBIS-CHI-89-04I, 3 March 1989, p. 15. 
'^'^ FBIS-CHI-89-044, 8 March 1989, p. 3. 
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5.2.5. China and Iran in the 1990s 
The end of the Iraq-Iran war led many to believe that China's earnings from arms sales 
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could fall in the 1990s. ' This prediction proved to be correct, particularly after the UN 
arms embargo was imposed on Iraq, China's principal arms customer in the 1980s. 
China, therefore, began to focus its attention on Iran as a potential partner in the Gulf 
region after Iraq. The Chinese government regarded Iran as: 
1. A potential energy supplier and a source of investment. 
2. A potential large market for Chinese commercial goods. 
3. A potential buyer of Chinese arms and military technology. 
4. A potential investment avenue for Chinese companies to participate in the 
reconstruction of Iran. 
5. A potential ally against the 'New World system' dominated by the United States. 
Iran's interest in China in the 1990s emerged because of its aim: 
1. To secure a valuable arms and advanced military technology supplier. 
2. To increase its exports of crude oil and strengthen its economic relations with China. 
3. To obtain mutual co-operation with China in the agricultural, industrial, economic, 
and technological fields, in which the Chinese have achieved remarkable success, in 
order to counter the U.S. blockade of Iran. 
4. To strengthen its relations with countries that share Iran's view of the 'New World 
system' and opposes the domination of the United States in the new system. 
5. To use China's good relations with Pakistan to lobby Islamabad to curb the anti-
Iranian Taliban movement in Afghanistan. 
'"'^  See, for instance, Tai Ming Cheung, 'Unguided Missiles: China's Arms Exports Stir Consternation', in 
Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 155, number 5, 6 February 1992, p. 42. 
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Mindful of the reasons above, the Chinese and the Iranian governments continued their 
emphasis on the need for improving their political, economic and cultural relations. 
Several official visits by high-ranking officials of both countries took place in the 
1990s. Among them was the visit to Iran by the Chinese Premier Li Peng in July 1991. 
While meeting with Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and after praising the 
relationship between the two countries Li Peng said: 
We are not in favour of the world being dominated by America or any minority, 
and the establishment of a new order by America in intemational relations. We 
are in agreement with Iran on that score. 
It was reported by Sawt al-Kuwayt that during the Chinese premier visit, the two sides 
reached an agreement in which the PRC would replace West Germany and France in 
constructing the Iranian nuclear reactor. France and Germany had began constructing 
the reactor before the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution until the new Iranian 
government abandoned its financial commitment to German and French Companies. 
According to the report, Li Peng agreed in his talks with Rafsanjani to provide the 
necessary expertise and technology for the completion of the Iranian nuclear reactor in 
accordance with a comprehensive agreement confirming China as Iran's largest trading 
partner and arms supplier. The report also stated that China would launch a rocket-
launched space satellite for Iran to help it in the fields of radio and television 
transmission and in reconnaissance and observation.'"^^ In November 1991 Chinese 
President Yang Shangkun visited Iran. His visit marked the first visit to Iran by a 
Chinese head of state since the Islamic Revolution. The goal of Yang's visit was, 
reportedly, to encourage the expansion of China-Iran relations. The presence of the 
Chinese president in Iran, combined wit his previous visit to Pakistan, was considered 
FBIS-NES-91-131, 9 July 1991, p. 66. 
'^^ FBIS-NES-9I-I38, 18 July 1991, p. 38. 
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by many an opportunity for the three countries to review their policies towards recent 
developments in the international system, namely the U.S. taking the leading role in 
international affairs. It was argued that the expansion of co-operation and relations 
between these countries would lead to the establishment of a new system for the 
maintenance of regional security without the presence of the world powers, in the form 
of defence and military co-operations between China, Iran, and Pakistan.'"^^ Iranian 
President Rafsanjani visited China in September 1992 and an agreement was reached by 
China and Iran on the establishment of two 300-megawatt nuclear power plants for 
Iran.'"^' Concerning the objectives of the agreement it had been said that peaceful use of 
nuclear energy was intended. The agreement called for co-operation between the two 
sides in wide ranging fields such as basic and applicable research for peaceful utilisation 
of nuclear energy, designing, building, and operating of nuclear power plants, research 
on reactors, extraction and exploration of Uranium ore, radiation safeguard and 
ecological protection.'"^^ Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing visited Iran in May 1997. 
President Rafsanjani, while meeting with the visiting Chinese Vice-Premier, described 
Iran, China, and Russia as three important and strategic countries of the world, and 
stressed that many opportunities existed in the political, economic, industrial, and trade 
areas in those three countries. He added that trilateral co-operation between the three 
countries would not only satisfy the needs of these three countries, but would contribute 
significantly to the development of regional co-operation. ^ "^^ 
FBIS-NES-91-214, 5 November 1991, p. 80. 
FBIS-NES-92-I78, 14 September 1992, pp. 47-48. 
'^^ FBIS-NES-93-070, 14 April 1993, pp. 48-49. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2911, 6 May 1997, p. G/5. 
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In the military fields, China's arms supplies to Iran declined sharply in the 1990s due to 
competition from Russia, whose arms sales to Iran had increased, and other sources (see 
Table 5.1). This new competition convinced the Chinese government that in order for 
China to remain influential in Iran it would have to upgrade its services to Iran in spite 
of U.S. opposition. It was reported by an Iraqi newspaper, that the Chinese President 
Yang Shangkun promised, during his visit to Iran, to supply technology for enriching 
uranium to Iran.'"^ "^  It was also reported that in September 1992, during President 
Rafsanjani's visit, China agreed to help Iran in strengthening and expanding its armed 
forces under a strategic agreement worth billions of U.S. dollars. According to the 
report from the London-based newspaper Al-Sharq al-Awsat, China would sell Iran 
nuclear technology and participate in building no less than four nuclear power stations 
and one centre for advanced nuclear research. According to the report, China would 
also supply Iran with 100-150 Soviet-designed fighter bombers.'"^^ There was also an 
agreement to supply two 300-megawatt nuclear reactors to Iran that has remained on 
hold due to several points of disagreement between the two sides.'"^ ^ 
In his visit to Beijing in January 1993, General Mohsen Reza'i, the Commander of the 
Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, negotiated the purchase of new weapons with the 
Chinese Defence Minister and the Joint Chief of Staff, in particular new battleships for 
the Iranian navy.'"^^ The Paris-based newspaper Al-Watan al-Arabi reported that China 
'^^ FBIS-NES-91-219, 13 November 1991, pp. 54-55. 
'^^ FBIS-NES-92-180, 16 September 1992, p. 46. 
'"^ ^ The points of disagreement is believed not to be due to U.S. pressure on China instead: 1) China was 
not sure of its ability to provide all the technology and equipment necessary for the plant because of other 
countries involvement in such technology; Germany, Netherlands, and Czech Republic may not be 
willing to supply Iran with such parts; and 2) Iran was unable to produce detailed financial plans 
necessary for starting the work on the first two stations, FBIS-NES-95-099, 23 May 1995, p. 54 
'^^ FBIS-NES-93-023, 5 February 1993, p. 53. 
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had sold three kinds of Silkworm missiles to Iran: surface-to-sea, air-to-sea, and air-to-
surface. According to this report, China had also helped Iran build a military plant in 
Kerman Province in southeast Iran, which started assembling cruise missiles and M-11 
missiles with a range of300 km.^^^ It was also reported that China had supplied Iran 
with a CSS-8 ballistic surface-to-surface missile in 1992^^^ and a C-802 anti-ship cruise 
missile to Iran in March 1996,'^° and helped Iran build a Silkworm and M-9 plant. It 
was also reported that China is assisting Iran in developing the solid-propellant 
unguided Mushak-120, the Mushak-160, and the Mushak-200.'^' Different western 
reports also contended that China helped the Iranians manufacture chemical weapons.'^ ^ 
Al-Sharq al-Awsat reported on the 24^ ^ of August 1996 that China and Iran were 
expected to sign a new draft military agreement to be completed in December in 
Tehran. The new agreement concerned $4.5 billion worth of Chinese aircraft, missiles, 
rocket launchers, high-speed launchers, auxiliary vessels and armoured personnel 
carriers. The deal also included a further Chinese contribution to developing Iranian 
military industries and to build missiles and helicopters and manufactures artillery. Iran 
would repay China over the next five years in cash and oil. The report discussed 
China's past military supplies to Iran. It stated that under previous agreements, China 
provided Iran with military equipment worth approximately $3 billion, including 
Shenyang F-7 and F-8 aircraft. Silkworms missiles, HQ anti-aircraft missiles, and C-
"•^ FBIS-NES-95-064, 4 April 1995, p. 55. 
'^'^ The New York Times, 22 June 1995, p. A l . 
'-"^^ The Washington Times, 7 March 1996, p. A12. 
Ibid., http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/iran.htm, p.2. 
'"''^  See the previous chapter. 
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801 and C-802 advanced missiles, as well as the latest Type-69 tanks, artillery, rocket 
launchers, and the medium- and long-range 155 mm, 156 mm and 230 mm guns.'^ ^ 
Table 5.1; Iranian arms transfers by major suppliers 1983-1997 (in US$ million) 
Agreements 1983-1986 1987-1990 1991-1997 
Soviet Union/Russia 10 2,500 1,400 
China 1,845 3,400 1,300 
United States 0 0 0 
Major West 
European 
865 200 200 
A l l Other European 3,835 2,100 200 
A l l Others 2,385 2,000 1,200 
Total 8,940 10,200 4,300 
Deliveries 1983-1986 1987-1990 1991-1997 
Soviet Union/Russia 100 1,100 3,100 
China 1,165 2,500 1,900 
United States 0 0 0 
Major West 
European 
460 500 200 
A l l Other European 3,285 1,900 100 
A l l Others 2,250 1,800 500 
Total 7,260 7,800 5,800 
Sources: Adapted in Anthony H. Cordesman, Military Balance in the Middle East-IX, (Washington D.C. 
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), p. 15. 
China-Iran economic relations improved in the 1990s. Trade relations between the two 
countries from 1990 to 1996 reached $3,537 million compared to $1,627 million in the 
1980s (see Table 2 in Appendix 1). Several economic co-operation agreements were 
signed by the China and Iran to promote economic relations between them. This 
included an agreement in November 1991 to construct a copper-production factory in 
133 BBC, SWB, FE/2704, 30 August 1996, p. G/3. 
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Iran with an annual production capacity of 200,000 tonnes, and a cement factory with an 
annual production capacity of 1,000 tons.*^^ An agreement in June 1992 concerned the 
progress of joint projects, particularly the Yazd zinc project; the iron alloys project; the 
construction of a copper smelting factory with a capacity of 50,000 tonnes; manpower 
training; a new project for producing concentrated metals, graphic electrodes, and fire-
resistant materials; co-operation in geology; and the construction of a cement 
manufacturing plant on Qeshm Island with a daily capacity of 700 tons.'^ ^ A 
memorandum of understanding on railway co-operation was agreed between the two 
countries' railway officials in December 1992.'^ ^ China granted Iran two loans of $120 
million and $150 million to build a cement factory and procure equipment for the 
Tehran Metro.'^^ The two countries also reached an agreement for Iran to purchase four 
multipurpose cargo ships, each with a loading capacity of 22,000 tons of g o o d s . O n 
the 30*'^  May 1995 the Iranian news agency IRNA reported that Iran would increase the 
volume of its crude oil sales to China from the current 20,000 b/d to 60,000 b/d. The 
agreement was reached during the eighth China-Iran joint economic commission 
meeting held in Beijing during the last week of May. It was reported that Iran had 
agreed to invest approximately $25 million in China's oil refining industry in order for 
Iran to expand further its oil exports to China. Mr. Hamid Mirzadeh, head of the Iranian 
delegation, signed economic agreements with China worth more than $2 billion; 
including a $586 million'^^ contract with China to build a subway in Tehran, $425 
'•'^^ FBIS-NES-91-226, 22 November 1991, p. 53. 
FBIS-NES-92-I23, 25 June 1992, p. 53. 
'•'^^ FBIS-NES-92-245, 21 December 1992, p. 69. 
FBIS-NES-93-138, 21 July 1993, p. 50. 
'•'^ FBIS-NES-93-090, 12 May 1993, p. 67. 
'^ ^ Some said it was $573, see The Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1995, p. A6; and FBIS-NES-95-100, 24 
May 1995, p. 44. 
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million in crude oil sales and refinery investment, $120 million worth of investment in 
cement, glass, zinc, and copper production and processing, $264 million for the 
construction of a hydroelectric dam in Iran, $100 million for shipbuilding and $269 
million for the construction of a steel mill.'^° Shanghai's Electronic General Company 
signed a contract with Iran to export two generating units, each with a capacity of 
325,000 kw. This contract marked the first export of this type of power equipment to a 
country in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region.'^' While visiting Iran in May 1997 to 
participate in the ninth session of the Sino-Iran Joint Commission on Economic, Trade, 
Science and Technology, L i Lanqing, Chinese Vice Premier, signed a protocol for 
China to increase imports of Iranian oil from 70,000 b/d to 100,000 b/d over the 
following two years, with imports estimated to reach 200,000 b/d in 1999. The protocol 
also stipulated details concerning the completion of a project to build a cement factory 
with a 700 ton capacity in Iran, the transfer of satellite communication technology and 
technology needed to implement fluted glass projects in Iran and the increase of trade 
exchanges. The two countries also reached agreements on joint investment and 
expanding co-operation in the spheres of shipbuilding, fisheries, roads and transport. 
In May 1997 Iranian oil Minister, Gholamreza Aqazadeh, signed an oil, gas and 
petrochemicals agreement in Beijing. The agreement covers Iranian investments in the 
reconstruction of China's refineries in order to facilitate the processing of Iranian crude 
oil at these refineries. According to the Iranian Minister, this would increase Iranian 
crude oil exports to China to more than 170,000 b/d the following year (beginning 21^' 
March 1998), and they would reach approximately 270,000 b/d after the year 2000.'^^ 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 38, number 36, 5 June 1995, p. A9. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2873, 21 March 1997, p. G/4. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2912, 7 May 1997, p. G/3. 
"^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/2930, 28 May 1997, p. G/2. 
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China and Iran are also interested in building pipelines for the export of landlocked 
Central Asian-energy resources, which are dominated so far by American oil 
companies. China is interested in building a 1,000-km pipeline from the Uzen oil field 
in south-western Kazakhstan across Turkmenistan to Iran. From there, oil could be 
shipped to China and the rest of the world.^ ^"^ If the project was completed it would be a 
major blow to U.S. ambitions to build pipelines from Central Asia to Turkey. 
To summarise, China's efforts to foster political and economic relations with Iran 
coincided with Iran's own interests in pursuing political and economic relations with 
China. China's attention towards Iran increased as Iran began to pursue a firm policy in 
the face of America's strategy in the region. Iran's criticism of U.S. policy in the Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula region, and the Middle East in general, persuaded Beijing to pay 
greater attention to its relations with Tehran in order to counter U.S. and Russia's 
expansionist effort in the region. China's interest in Iran stemmed also from its need for 
oil, and its efforts to co-operate and stabilise relations with Iran's neighbouring 
countries and prevent them from being dominated by a hostile power. 
"^ "^  Ahmed Rashid and Lorien Holland, 'Shifting Sands', in Far Eastern Economic Review, volume 163, 
number 9, 2 March 2000, p. 26. 
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5.3. China and Yemen 
5.3.1. China and Yemen from 1950 to 1965 
The Republic of Yemen, as it is known today, is a product of two political entities that 
merged on May 22, 1990: the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) in the north and the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in the south. Prior to September 
1962 the northern part of Yemen was governed by the Imamat regime while the south 
was mainly under British control. PRC's early interest in Yemen was mainly facilitated 
by the China-Soviet alignment and the latter's initial involvement in Yemen. For 
China, Yemen in the mid-1950s constituted a region of strategic opportunity that could 
enable the socialist camp to seize the initiative from the capitalist camp. Therefore, the 
Chinese collaborated with the Soviets in exploiting anti-Western sentiments and 
providing economic assistance to the Imamat regime in Yemen. Imam Ahmad's dislike 
of the British and his policy of leaning towards the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
and China captured the latter's interest in Yemen. The two countries established formal 
diplomatic relations in August 1956. The establishment of formal relations with Yemen 
was PRC's most significant political development in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region at that time. Its significance is that Yemen was the first country in the Arabian 
Peninsula, and the third country in the Arab world, to acknowledge the PRC as the 
legitimate representative of all China, when most other countries in the world 
recognised the nationalist government in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of 
China. 
As China's perception of the Soviet Union was starting to take a new direction after 
Moscow's new policy of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist camp, the Chinese 
found it useful to extend their assistance to the Yemeni government. Therefore, they 
Chapter five: China's relations with Iraq, Iran, and Yemen 258 
continued to support the Yemen's claim to Aden and its opposition to Britain. 
Yemeni Crown Prince Mohamed al-Badr visited China in 1958 as the first Arab leader 
to visit the PRC. The two countries signed a treaty of friendship, which marked PRC's 
first friendship treaty in the Arab w o r l d . T h e y also signed in January 1958 an 
agreement on scientific, technical, and cultural co-operation, under which China granted 
Yemen an interest-free loan of $16 million repayable in ten y e a r s . W h i l e hundreds of 
Soviet technicians worked to construct Hodeida harbour and Hodeida hospital, the 
Chinese signed a protocol on January 23, 1959 for the construction of the Hodeida-
Sanaa road, a textile mill, and for China to provide an interest-free loan of $140,000. 
China's aid to Yemen did not slow down after the September 1962 pro-Soviet coup by 
Colonel Abdullah as-Sallal, who proclaimed the Yemen Arab Republic. President as-
Sallal visited China in June 1964 where he signed a new treaty of friendship to replace 
the treaty signed with the Imamat regime in 1958, and further agreements on economic, 
technical, and cultural co-operation. China granted the YAR a loan of $4.8 in 
November 1962 and another $28.2 million in June 1964.'^ ^ Many Chinese worked for 
many years in building highways in the YAR. 
Thus, China's early involvement in Yemen was reflected by China's overall foreign 
policy in the 1950s and early 1960s. Its alignment with the Soviets against the West 
compelled the Chinese to adopt the Soviet's policy in Yemen. But as China-Soviet 
"'^  Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, p. 75. 
'^ '^  Lillian Craig Harris, China Considers the Middle East, pp. 90-91. 
Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, pp. 139-
140. 
Ibid., p. 140. 
'^'•^Ibid. 
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relations started to deteriorate, the Chinese began adopting a policy that could challenge 
the Soviet position in Yemen. Although the Chinese provided more visible and 
successful aid to Imam Ahmad and to the YAR than the Soviets, they did not exert 
influence on the regime. However, China-Yemen relations yielded significant 
advantages for both sides. While the Yemenis received economic and financial 
assistance from China, the Chinese gained a valuable political recognition from an 
Arabian Peninsula country, that later became a member in the UN, at a time when China 
was isolated diplomatically. 
5.3.2. China's interest in South Yemen 
Southern Yemen was controlled by Great Britain since 1839, when the forces of the 
British East India Co. occupied Aden. In 1937 the area, which by then consisted of 24 
sultanates, emirates, and sheikhdoms, was designated the Aden protectorate and was 
divided for administrative purposes into the East Aden protectorate and the West Aden 
protectorate. In 1959 six small states of the West Aden protectorate formed the 
Federation of the Emirates of the South; it was later enlarged to ten members. Despite 
considerable opposition from its population, in 1963 the Aden colony became part of 
the federation, subsequently renamed the Federation of South Arabia. By 1965 sixteen 
tribal states had joined the federation. However, nationalist groups in Aden remained 
adamantly opposed to the federation and began a violent campaign against the British. 
Two rival nationalist groups emerged: the National Liberation Front (NLF) and the 
Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). Although Britain had 
promised to withdraw from the region by 1968, the Marxist oriented NLF, which had 
emerged as the dominant group by 1967, forced the collapse of the federation after 
taking control of the governments of all the component states. Britain accelerated its 
withdrawal, and Southern Yemen became independent in November 1967 with Qahtan 
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al-Shaabi of the NLF as its first president. The new state adopted the name the People's 
Republic of South Yemen (PRSY), which in November 1970 was changed to the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).^^^ 
In the 1960s, Chinese-Soviet disputes mounted into intense rivalry for leadership of the 
world socialist revolution in general and championship of Third World national 
liberation movements in particular. Therefore South Yemen captured China's attention 
as it could play a valuable role for the Chinese in their rivalry with the Soviets. In 
addition to that, South Yemen is strategically located at the junction of the Arabian and 
Red Sea and it dominates the sea lines of communications both from the Gulf oil fields 
and between the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean via the Suez Canal. This 
location was of significant importance for the Chinese who sought to prevent the 
domination of the Soviet Union or the United States over such an important part of the 
world. Thus, the Chinese government provided political and economic support for the 
government of the PRSY. Formal diplomatic relations was established between the 
PRC and PRSY on January 31, 1968. The agreement on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations was reached in Cairo between Huang Hua, the only high-ranking 
Chinese ambassador outside the country, and Muhammad Hadi 'Awad, plenipotentiary 
of the government of the PRSY. The establishment of formal relations with the PRSY 
was another breakthrough for the Chinese in the Arabian Peninsula. The Chinese 
government supported the armed struggle of the South Yemen and emphasised: 
Southern Yemen won its independence because its people persevered in a 
prolonged armed struggle and dealt the British imperialists very severe blows. 
See, among many useful sources, Edgar O' Ballance, The War in the Yemen, (London: Faber, 1971); 
Robert W. Stookey, South Yemen: a Marxist Republic in Arabia, (London: Croom Helm, 1982); Robin 
Bidwell, The Two Yemens, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); and Fred Holiday, Revolution 
and Foreign Policy: the Case of South Yemen 1967-1987, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
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But, according to the Chinese analysis, independence was not the end of the struggle for 
South Yemeni: 
The U.S. imperiahsts and Soviet modem revisionists too will try to get a foothold 
there. For the Southern Yemeni people, independence is not the end of their 
struggle, but a continuation of it in new conditions. 
Eight months after the establishment of diplomatic relations, in September 1968, an 
official high-ranking delegation from the PRSY visited China. The delegation was 
headed by Foreign Minister Saif Ahmad al-'Dal'i. In their meetings and statements 
with the visiting delegation, the Chinese criticised and attacked the U.S imperialism and 
'Soviet socialist imperialism and revisionism'. The Chinese also tried to convince the 
South Yemeni government to side with China against the Soviet Union. However, the 
South Yemeni delegation was not in a position to promise a policy of leaning towards 
China which would upset the Soviets. Therefore, unlike the Chinese, the South Yemeni 
delegation's statements did not attack the Soviets. Instead, they focused their attacks on 
the West and on what they called the 'reactionary' regimes in the Gulf region and 
Arabian Peninsula region, particularly Saudi A r a b i a . T h u s , the South Yemeni 
government did not want to align itself with either power against the other. The 
Yemenis wanted to learn from the Chinese experience in building socialism, but they 
also wanted to remain close with the Soviets. They preferred an independent foreign 
policy where they could balance between the two giant socialist states. At the end of 
the visit, the two sides signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation 
under which China granted a loan of $9.6 million.'^"^ The most significant aspect of the 
Peking Review, number 6, 1968, p. 9. 
See Hashim S. Behbehani [ed.], China and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: A Report, 
(London: KPI, 1985). 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/2889, 3 October 1968, p. A4/1. 
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visit and its outcome was that it took place in the midst of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution. There are very few examples of the Chinese involving themselves in 
agreements with foreign countries during the Cultural Revolution. Therefore, analysis 
of China's involvement with South Yemen suggests that the Chinese could not forgo the 
significant opportunity to tie themselves closer to the newly socialist-born state in the 
heart of the Arab world. 
Salim Rubay Al i , Chairman of the Presidential Council of the PRSY, visited China in 
August 1970. Recognising PRSY's strong ties with the Soviet Union the Chinese 
officials, this time, refrained from using the phrases 'Soviet social imperialism' or 
'Soviet social revisionism' in their statements and speeches. In a banquet speech, Tung 
Pi-wu, Vice-Chairman of the PRC, praised the South Yemenis long struggle against 
imperialism and their support for revolutionary armed struggle against imperialism 
around the world. He said: 
The government and the people of Southem Yemen, under the leadership of the 
National Front and Chairman Salim Rubay Ali, have continuously won victories 
in eliminating imperialist forces, strengthening national defence and carrying out 
national construction. In international affairs, the government and people of 
Southem Yemen support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their stmggle 
against US-Israeli aggression, support the people of the Arabian Gulf in their 
revolutionary armed struggle against imperialism, and support the three peoples 
of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos in their struggle against US aggression and for 
national salvation. Southern Yemen is among the earliest Arab countries which 
have recognised the Royal Govemment of National United Front of Kampuchea 
with Head of State Samdech Sihanouk as its Chairman. The Chinese govemment 
and people highly admire this noble stand of the govemment of Southem Yemen. 
We sincerely wish the govemment and people of Southem Yemen continuous 
new victories on their road of opposing imperialism and colonialism and of 
independent development.'^ '^  
'^ "^  His only mention of 'social imperialism' came only with reference to the issue of Palestine: 'Not long 
ago, with the co-ordination of social imperialism, US imperialism again dished up a 'political initiative' 
for a so-called peaceful settlement of the Middle East question', See BBC, SWB, FE/3447, 4 August 
1970, p. A4/4-5. 
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In his banquet speech Salim Rubay Ali praised the Chinese people's struggle against 
imperialist powers and said: 
We the people of Southern Yemen have benefited from the advanced experience 
of the Chinese people in defending our enemies, the colonialists and 
reactionaries, and fmstrating the aggressive schemes against the revolution and 
the progressive revolutionary regime of Southern Yemen under the leadership of 
the political organisation of the National Front... The essence of the imperialist 
challenge to the fighting peoples in the third world demands that the genuine 
revolutionary forces unite in one front which enjoys the support of the socialist 
camp.'^ '' 
The Chinese government recognised the sensitivity, particularly inside South Yemen, of 
criticising the Soviets in China's statements with South Yemen and of encouraging 
South Yemen to side with China against the Soviets as the Chinese had done two years 
earlier. South Yemeni leadership was divided into two major political schools of 
thought in regard to South Yemen relations with Moscow and Beijing. Rubay's school 
of thought was pro-China and sympathetic with the Chinese line of Marxism, however 
Abd al-fattah Ismail's, NFL General Secretary, school of thought was favourable to the 
Soviets and their line of Marxism. Each of these two leaders had used visits to China 
and the Soviet Union to cultivate support for the PRSY. Prior to Rubay's visit to China, 
Ismail visited Moscow in the same year. While the latter's visit yielded no significant 
new aid commitments, the former's visit elicited a Chinese aid offer of UK£43 million, 
and a promise to release another UK£12 milUon originally pledged in 1967.'^ ^ Thus, it 
appeared that China preferred to pay more attention to improving its ties with the 
government of the PRSY by trying to impress it with substantial economic aid. China 
signed several economic, trade and technical co-operation agreements with the renamed 
PDRY; and helped with constructing roads, bridges, and factories (see Table 2 in 
Appendix 2). The value of China's trade with the PDRY also increased after the 
'^ -"^  Ibid., p. A4/6. 
'^ ^ John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, pp. 57-58. 
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establishment of formal relations in 1968. The value of bilateral trade jumped from 
$1.5 million in 1967, to approximately $3.9 million in 1969 and approximately $11.20 
million in 1972 (see Table 4 in Appendix 1). 
5.3.3. China and the Yemens in the 1970s 
As China's fear of Soviet penetration of the world in general and the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region in particular rose in the early 1970s, China's foreign policy towards 
the YAR and the PDRY reflected its concern. China continued its economic aid to both 
Yemens, providing both sides with textile plants, road, building and hospital 
constructions, as well as financial, medical and agricultural assistance (see Table 1 and 
Table 2 in Appendix 2). It even provided the PDRY with a small-scale supply of 
arms.^ ^^  It increased its trade volume with the YAR from $1.25 million in 1970, to 
$30.74 million in 1974, and $66.30 million in 1979; and with the PDRY from $3.84 
million in 1970, to $12.59 million in 1974, and $20.37 million in 1979 (see Table 3 and 
4 in Appendix 1). However, China's continued commitment to aid and support for the 
PDRY did not lead to the establishment of a Chinese influence over the South Yemeni 
regime, nor the disengagement of the Soviets from that country. Instead, the pro-Soviet 
group gained the upper hand in South Yemen. Salim Rubay Al i was ousted in June 
1978 by Ismail, who signed a 20-year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 
October 1979.^ ^^ Soviet influence, including the presence of naval bases, became 
predominant in the PDRY.^^^ These developments cooled relations between China and 
South Yemen. This was evident in China's reaction to North Yemeni President al-
'^ ^ Charles T. Creekman Jr., 'Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens', in Naval War College Review, 
volume 32, number 4, 1979, p. 76. 
Stephen Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemens: Influence in a Symmetrical Relationships, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), p. 94. 
'^ ^ Charles T. Creekman Jr., 'Sino-Soviet Competition in the Yemens', p. 77. 
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Ghashmi's assassination. China showed its sympathy for the YAR by publishing the 
Sanaa government's version of the assassination instead of Aden's version in the 
media.^^° 
The PDRY government was leaning towards the Soviet Union because it perceived that 
the presence of the United States in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, which had 
been developing in the early and mid-1970s, posed an increasing threat to the South 
Yemeni regime during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The South Yemeni government 
believed that China could not offer the PDRY the much-needed sophisticated weapons 
and naval protection that the Soviet Union could provide to protect the South Yemeni 
regime. Although China continued its assistance to the PDRY in constructing roads and 
textile mills as well as in extending a loan of $12.5 million, its activities decreased after 
the Maoist-oriented Salim Rubay Ali faction lost in its struggle with supporters of the 
Soviet model of socialism. 
As in the South, China's economic assistance to the North did not lead to the 
establishment of significant Chinese influence on the regime. In November 1979, the 
North Yemeni government of Col. Al i Abdullah Saleh began purchasing arms from the 
Soviet Union. When Saudi Arabia offered Saleh $300 million in aid to keep the Soviets 
out, the Soviets responded with a $1 billion arms programme over the next half-decade 
for the North Yemeni military.'^' 
FBIS-CHI-78-123, 26 June 1978, p. A. 26. 
Robert D. Kaplan, 'The Batde for North Yemen', in The Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, 15 April 
1986, p. 1. 
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Thus, as the Soviets had already established themselves in the PDRY by providing 
military and economic aid to secure the survival of the new regime in South Yemen, and 
as they had started to gain some ground in North Yemen, the Chinese govemment 
renewed its interest in the China-U.S. strategic relationship. The Chinese began to 
support the American presence in the region. They also moved towards strengthening 
their ties with neighbouring countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region by 
terminating their commitment and support to the revolutionary group in Oman and the 
communist party in Iran. Such changes were mandated by China's desire to counter 
Soviet presence and influence in and around the region by encouraging the U.S. and the 
countries of the region to resist Soviet penetration. 
5.3.4. China and the Yemens in the 1980s 
The strategic threat to the survival of the South Yemeni regime was perceived by Aden 
to be on the rise in the early 1980s. The establishment of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC) was interpreted in Aden as a reinforcement of the pro-Western stance in the 
region through co-operation and mutual protection, and as opposition to the leftist 
groups in the region. In addition, the PDRY was concerned about increasing U.S. 
activity in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea basin, as a result of President Jimmy 
Carter's new determination to defend Western interests in the region. In 1981 and 1982 
the United States in co-operation with Sudan, Somalia, Egypt, and Oman conducted the 
'Bright Star' manoeuvres, which were perceived by South Yemen as a direct American 
threat to the South Yemeni regime. Therefore, the South Yemeni govemment 
continued its alignment with the Soviets and its support for Soviet penetration around 
'^ ^ See Joseph Kostiner, South Yemen's Revolutionary Strategy, 1970-1985, (Boulder: Westview Press, 
1990), pp. 92-93. 
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the world.'^"^ Soviet arms continued to reach South Yemen in the 1980s, the number of 
Soviet military advisors doubled and Soviet Union naval forces were stationed in the 
Gulf of Aden.'^ "^ As a result, PDRY relations with its neighbouring countries continued 
to deteriorate in the early 1980s. Despite South Yemen's economic difficulties, Saudi 
Arabia was not willing to promise aid as long as Aden was so close to Moscow and so 
hostile to the Sultan of Oman. Meanwhile, North Yemen wanted to maintain good 
relations with the Soviet Union in order to obtain Soviet arms and exert pressure on 
Aden. As a result, YAR relations with certain neighbouring countries, including Saudi 
Arabia, also declined. 
Against this background, the Chinese government found itself hmited to exert influence 
on both Yemens. As China attempted to cultivate better relations with the United States 
and the states of the Gulf region, relations with the South Yemeni government were 
limited to a few economic assistance programmes (see Table 2 in Appendix 2) and 
gradually developing trade relations in the early 1980s (see Table 4 in Appendix 1). 
However, China's economic relations with North Yemen continued to develop on a 
grand scale. Principally because China believed that, unlike the South, North Yemen 
was not a Soviet satellite. 
One of the most important features of China's foreign policy towards the two Yemens 
in the 1980s was China's insistence that both Yemens improve their relations with 
neighbouring Gulf and Arabian Peninsula countries in order to strengthen their unity 
'^ •^  For example, the PDRY was the only Arab state to vote with the USSR when the UN General 
Assembly voted on January 14, 1980 to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
'^ "^  Stephen Page, The Soviet Union and the Yemens, p. 97. 
'^ ^ Editorial Board, The Middle East and North Africa, 44"^  edition, (London: Europa Publications 
Limited, 1998), p. 1101. 
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against foreign intervention. China encouraged and welcomed the rapprochement of 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the two Yemens. Saudi Arabia resumed its aid to 
the YAR throughout the 1980s to help the country cover its budget deficit, and in 1989 
the Kingdom lifted almost all restrictions imposed on Yemeni migrant workers, giving 
them almost equal rights with Saudi citizens. The Kingdom also moved positively to 
ease its strained relations with the PDRY. China also welcomed the normalisation of 
relations between the PDRY and Oman, South Yemen's main rival, in October 1982. 
An article in Beijing Review stated: 
The U.S. and Soviet military presence in Oman and Democratic Yemen is a 
major cause of their long-standing hostility. This presence will continue for some 
time to come, but Oman and Democratic Yemen have agreed that this should not 
186 
be an obstacle to the normalisation of their relations. 
The Chinese viewed such developments as a positive strategy towards strengthening the 
security of the Peninsula region against Soviet and U.S. manoeuvres to dominate the 
region.^^^ 
In March 1987 PDRY Premier Yasin Sa'id Nu'man paid an official visit to China. The 
Chinese government agreed to offer more economic, technical and cultural aid to South 
Yemen and agreed to reschedule the repayment of Chinese loans to Aden.^ ^^ It also 
agreed to assist South Yemen in building a 44.5-kilometre highway, with a Chinese loan 
of $30 million.'^^ The Chinese government also continued to send delegations to 
participate in South Yemen's National Days. Meanwhile, China-YAR relations were 
strengthened even further. YAR President Ali Abdullah Saleh visited Beijing in 
Beifing Review, number 49, 6 December 1982, pp. 13-14. 
'^^ Beifing Review, number 16, 1980, pp. 11-12. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-88-020, 1 February 1988, p. 7. 
'^^ FBlS-CHI-88-191, 3 October 1988, p. 14. 
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December 1987. This was Saleh's first visit to China since he became president nine 
years previously. In their meetings with the visiting President, the Chinese officials 
focused their statements and speeches on praising North Yemen's non-aligned foreign 
policy and its distance from the Soviet Union. In a banquet speech to the visiting 
President, Chinese President Li Xiannian said: 
In international affairs, the Chinese government admires the Yemen Arab 
Republic's foreign policy. The Yemen Arab Republic has followed a policy of 
neutrality, nonalignment and good-neighbourliness and made an active 
contribution to strengthen the unity among Arab countries and to safeguard 
regional peace and stability. 
He added: 
We have treasured our friendship and co-operation with the Yemen Arab 
Repubhc.and we are willing to strengthen friendly relations and economic and 
technical co-operation between the two countries under the principles of equality 
and mutual benefit, stressing practical results, adopting various forms and 
190 
achieving common development. 
The Chinese agreed to provide North Yemen with a long-term interest-free loan of 
$40.32 million and to construct a 127-kilometre Heghana-Mareb road.^^' 
In summary, China's relations with both South and North Yemen in the 1980s were 
conducted on the basis of China's determination not to leave either country completely 
at the will of the Soviet Union. Therefore, China provided economic and technical 
assistance to both sides. However, China supplied more assistance to the North than to 
the South. This could be explained in terms of China's satisfaction with North Yemen's 
foreign policy of non-alignment particularly with the Soviet Union, and its 
dissatisfaction with South Yemen's alignment with the Soviet Union. 
FBIS-CHI-87-248, 28 December 1987, p. 14. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-88-242, 16 December 1988, pp. 17-18. 
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5.3.5. China and the Republic of Yemen 
The two Yemens were officially united on May 22, 1990. North Yemen's President Al i 
Abdullah Saleh became the president of the Republic of Yemen, and South Yemen's Ali 
Salim al-Baid became the vice-president. Sanaa was chosen as the nation's political 
capital while Aden became the nation's economic capital. China was among the first 
nations to extend its recognition to the newly estabhshed republic in Yemen. Yang 
Shangkun, Chinese president, sent a congratulatory message to Saleh, Chairman of the 
Presidential Council of the Republic of Yemen, on the following day of its 
proclamation. Yang Shangkun said: 
On the occasion of the deceleration of the establishment of the Republic of 
Yemen, I , on behalf of the Chinese people and on my own behalf, wish to extend 
my warmest congratulations to Your Excellency Mr. Chairman and through Your 
Excellency Mr. Chairman to the people of Yemen. Through friendly 
consultations the Yemeni leaders have fulfilled the great task of unification. This 
is an event of great significance in the history of Yemen. China has had very 
close relations of friendship and co-operation with both South and North Yemen 
and has always supported Yemen's unity, stability, and peace. The Chinese 
government and people respect this historical choice made by the people of 
Yemen. We wholeheartedly hope the unification of Yemen will help Yemen 
develop and help bring peace and stability to the local region. We wish the 
Republic of Yemen prosperity and its people happiness. May Sino-Yemeni 
relations of friendship and co-operation continuously consolidate and develop. 
The Republic of Yemen's President Saleh expressed his appreciation for China's 
support for the reunification of Yemen and China's assistance in Yemen's economic 
development. Saleh made the remarks at a meeting with the visiting Chinese 
government delegation led by Minister of Energy Resources Huang Yicheng, which had 
arrived to participate in the celebration marking the first anniversary of the Republic of 
Yemen.'^^ 
FBIS-CHI-90-10J, 24 May 1990, p. 12. 
FBIS-CHI-91-101, 24 May 1991, pp. 7-8. 
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During the Kuwait crisis, the Yemeni government sent a special envoy to China in the 
hope of gathering support to stop the U.S.-led military offensive against Iraq. Yemen's 
Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs met with China's Vice Premier Wu Xueqian 
and gave him a letter from the Yemeni President to be forwarded to President Yang 
Shangkun. The Yemeni minister briefed Wu on the Yemeni government's position on 
the Gulf crisis and its efforts to push for a peaceful settlement of the war as soon as 
possible.''^ "^ Throughout the crisis, both China and Yemen continued to advocate the 
need to stop the war and allow political means an opportunity to solve the crisis. Unlike 
the Yemeni government, the Chinese government was not willing to commit itself to 
challenging the western powers over this issue. 
China's support for the Yemeni unification emanated from its concern over Soviet and 
U.S. penetration in the region. To the Chinese government, a divided Yemen could 
easily bring more foreign interventions in Yemen's affairs, especially from the two 
superpowers. However, a united Yemen could prevent such a possibility. Therefore, 
the Chinese government continued to pay attention to Yemen's domestic developments 
following early 1994 disputes between the different parties over power in Yemen. As 
the disputes started to escalate, three Chinese workers were kidnapped in February 1994 
while working on a road project financed by China to link Hajana and Mareb. They 
were released on April 3.'^ ^ China proceeded to evacuate about 505 Chinese medical 
personnel and contract workers from Yemen by May.'^^ China-Yemen's relations 
however did not deteriorate as a result of the kidnapping. The Chinese officials were 
satisfied with the Yemeni government efforts to release the kidnapped Chinese, but their 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-91-024, 5 February 1991, p. 14. 
FBIS-CHI-94-074, 18 April 1994, p. 22. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-94-094, 16 May 1994, p. 10. 
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concern was over the continuing conflict in Yemen. When meeting with the visiting 
Yemeni Vice-Foreign Minister Abdul Kadir in March, Chinese Vice-Premier and 
Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said 
We are very much concerned about Yemen's domestic situation, hoping that the 
country will realise its social stability and enjoy a good environment for its 
construction... we believe that the Yemeni people will solve their own 
problems themselves. [emphasis added] 
Fear of foreign intervention, particularly from the Soviets, concerned the Chinese 
government over the impact of continued conflicts on the unified state. When Abd al-
Aziz Abd al-Ghani, Presidential Council member of Yemen, visited Beijing in June, the 
Chinese officials stressed again the importance of solving the differences through 
dialogue and preventing foreign intervention; and al-Ghani assured the Chinese that 
Yemen rejected any external attempt to intervene in its domestic affairs.'^^ China's 
support for the unity of Yemen was appreciated by various Yemeni officials. President 
Al i Saleh upon his arrival in Beijing on February 14, 1998 said: 
I would like to seize this opportunity to express my heartfelt appreciation for 
Chinese stands that are supportive of Arab rights, and also of the Yemeni people 
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and their revolution, unity, and development efforts. 
Chinese officials continued to speak highly of Yemen foreign policy throughout the 
second half of the 1990s. They stressed China's appreciation of Yemen's 'peaceful, 
neutral, good-neighbouring foreign policy' and its efforts to boost relations with 
neighbours and other Arab states. They also looked at Yemen as a major force to 
'^^ FBIS-NES-94-032, 16 February 1994, p. 20. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-94-II7, 17 June 1994, p. 12. 
'"^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/3I52, 16 February 1998, p. G/13. 
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maintain solidarity among Arab states and safeguard peace and stability in the Red Sea 
and Gulf region. 
In the economic realm, China and Yemen continued their meetings to review aspects of 
co-operation between the two countries in the economic and oil and gas sectors, the 
exchange of technical expertise in developing the free zone area, trade exchange and 
means of improving this co-operation. China and Yemen signed a memorandum of 
understanding in Sanaa on 16 May 1996, during Chinese Vice-Premier Wu Bangguo's 
visit to Yemen, for the development of co-operation in the fields of oil prospecting, 
production, marketing and refining. An economic and technical co-operation agreement 
was also signed. According to the agreement, China would grant Yemen 30 million 
yuan in aid to implement the economic and technical co-operation projects agreed upon 
by the two sides.^ "^ ^ During the meetings of the Joint Chinese-Yemeni Trade and 
Technical Co-operation Committee in Sanaa in June, the two countries signed the 
minutes of meetings and an agreement on economic and technical co-operation and the 
implementation of the Friendship Bridge project in the city of Sanaa.^ '^ They also 
formally signed a new co-operation agreement in Sanaa on 11 September, in which both 
sides signalled their intention to further increase co-operation in the field of news 
services. This was the first ever news co-operation agreement between the two 
coun t r i e s .On the 15 November a summary of talks between China and Yemen on oil 
co-operation was also signed. It stressed that both sides would make more effort to 
strengthening their co-operation in the oil sector. Under the sunrunary, China would 
'^ ^^  BBC, SWB, FE/2617, 21 May 1996, p. G/4. 
BBC, SWB, Weekly Economic Report (henceforth MEW) 0436 WMF, 2 July 1996, p. 12. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2718, 14 September 1996, p. G/4. 
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conduct oil exploration in Yemen and purchase crude oil direct from Y e m e n . I n 
1996, China's Zhenhai refinery began to purchase all the Yemeni government's 30,000 
b/d share of Mareb crude.^ "^^  Several economic, trade, medical, and cultural agreements 
were signed between the two countries when President Al i Saleh visited Beijing in 
February 1998.^°^ Throughout the 1990s the volume of trade continued to increase in 
an impressive fashion. From 1990 to 1996 the value of trade reached $2024 million, 
which was approximately 1.5 times higher than China's trade with both Yemens in the 
1980s (see Table 5 in Appendix 1). 
3.4. Conclusion 
The above discussion suggests that the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China 
towards Iraq, Iran, and Yemen from October 1949 to the late eighties had been guided 
by the direction of China's relations with the United States and the Soviet Union. In the 
nineties, however, the data suggests that China's relations with these three countries 
were more a reflection of China's own economic and political interests. 
In Iraq, Baghdad's close alignment with Washington and London prevented Beijing 
from furthering close relations with that country. Thus, China classified Iraq as part of 
the imperialist camp. However, China's interest in Iraq shifted in 1958 towards 
supporting the Qasim regime. China, who began to look for support from the Third 
World countries in its ideological and political struggle against the United States and 
later on the Soviet Union, regarded Baghdad as a potential strategic ally particularly 
after Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. China's hope was short lived. From 
BBC, SWB, MEW/0454 WME, 24 September 1996, p. 13. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 39, number 41,8 July 1996, p. A8. 
See BBC, SWB, MEW/0526 WME, 24 February 1998, p. 17. 
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1967 Moscow enjoyed strong ties with Baghdad, who shortly became very dependable 
on Moscow for military and political support. China's interest then shifted towards the 
revolutionary groups. After the signing of a treaty of friendship between Moscow and 
Baghdad in the early seventies, China started to develop strategic alignment with the 
United States and to pursue political ties with some other countries of the region. Its 
aim was to undermine the Soviet presence in Iraq. Once China perceived a decline in 
Moscow-Baghdad relations in the second half of the seventies, it began to further 
political and economic ties with Iraq. Its interest in Iraq continued throughout the 
eighties. China's policies towards Iraq in the 1980s were aimed at strengthening its 
relations with that country in order to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing a 
presence for itself in Iraq, so China provided military and economic assistance to 
Baghdad throughout its prolonged war with Iran. In the 1990s, China's foreign policy 
towards Iraq was limited by the UN resolutions against Iraq. China supported the UN 
resolution against Iraq and remained faithful to the imposed sanctions against Baghdad. 
China could not challenge the UN actions against Iraq because of its need for good ties 
with the oil producing countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. Thus, China 
did not want to be seen siding with Iraq, whom the oil producing countries of the region 
saw as a threat to their stability. However, Chinese foreign policy continued to call for 
the removal of sanctions against Iraq since, on one hand, Iraq held one of the largest 
proven oil reserves in the world and, on the other hand, it could provide Chinese 
companies with great opportunities for investment. Therefore, China's foreign policy 
towards Iraq in the 1990s was guided more by China's economic interests in the region 
than by its relations with either Washington or Moscow. 
In Iran, China's foreign policy in the 1950s was attached to the power blocs. The strong 
Western influence in Iran and China's closed alignment with Moscow prevented China 
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from establishing ties with Tehran. Throughout the 1960s China remained isolated 
from Iran. This was mainly due to China's support for the revolutionary groups in the 
region, including the communist party in Iran. However, as China's foreign policy 
towards Washington and Moscow changed in the 1970s, China's foreign policy towards 
Iran also changed. China stopped its support for the revolutionary groups in the Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula region, including those in Iran, in favour of accumulating better 
relations with the governments of the region to undermine Soviet influence. Such a 
change won China political recognition from Iran in August 1971. Since then, China 
had continued to expand its bilateral ties with Iran on all levels. The Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan urged the Chinese to accept the revolutionary changes that took place in 
Iran in 1979. It also encouraged China to neutralise its policy towards both Iran and 
Iraq during their lengthy war. Political, economic, and military co-operation between 
China and Iran in the 1980s reached its highest point in the two countries relations. Co-
operation with Iran was aimed at keeping Tehran away from leaning towards Moscow 
for help and assistance particularly since Washington was engaged in full-scale support 
to Iraq. In the 1990s, China's foreign policy towards Iran began to reflect China's own 
modernisation programme. Iran assumed a new significance to China as China's need 
for oil continued to increase throughout the 1990s. 
In Yemen, China's interest in the 1950s was initiated by Moscow's initial involvement 
there. China supported the Soviet Union's efforts to exploit anti-Western sentiment in 
Yemen and provided economic assistance to the North Yemen regime. China also 
supported North Yemen's claim over British-controlled South Yemen. But as Beijing-
Moscow relations began to diverge, the Chinese started to compete with the Soviets in 
Yemen. They offered a substantial amount of financial and economic assistance, which 
even exceeded the Soviet's assistance. As the Beijing-Moscow relations continued to 
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deteriorate. South Yemen assumed a greater significance in China's foreign policy 
strategy to take the leading role not only in the socialist camp, but also in the Third 
World. China, which was interested in the revolutionary activities of the South Yemeni 
forces, provided South Yemen with political, technical, financial, and military support. 
But as the Soviets increased their presence in the South, the Chinese opted for a 
strategic alignment with the United States and the countries of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region, including North Yemen, to counter Soviet influence in South Yemen. 
Thus, China's support and assistance to South Yemen decreased rapidly in the 1980s 
while its relations with North Yemen developed quickly. In the 1990s, China gave its 
backing to the creation of a unified Republic of Yemen. Its interest in Yemen was 
deepened by the fact that the republic assumed a leading role as one of the major oil 
suppliers to China in the 1990s. 
CHAPTER SIX 
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6.1. China and Kuwait 
6.1.1. China and Kuwait before recognition 
In the 1950s and most of the 1960s Kuwait was an important British concern and an 
area of considerable interest to the United States. This was mainly due to its oil 
potential. Kuwait had the world's largest oil reserves and was ranked fourth in world 
oil production. Kuwait's oil production assumed a substantial significance in the early 
1950s. The nationalisation of Iranian oil in 1951 and the subsequent Western boycott of 
Iranian oil created heavy demand for Kuwait's oil. Therefore, British firms and 
personnel dominated development planning in Kuwait.' The al-Sabah family favoured 
the presence of both the British and the Americans in Kuwait in the 1950s. Meanwhile 
China was engaging in a lean towards the Soviet Union policy against the U.S. and the 
rest of the capitalist camp. Against this background, Beijing's policy towards Kuwait 
was a reflection of its alignment with Moscow. Thus, recognising the socialist camp's 
weakness to exert any influence on Kuwait, the Chinese leadership classified the 
Kuwaiti regime as part of the capitalist camp headed by the United States. Even after 
the Bandung conference, China did not consider Kuwait to have the potential to wage 
struggle against the West in the Arab world. The Kuwaiti regime remained loyal to the 
British and did not oppose the establishment of the Baghdad Pact, which China 
criticised heavily. Despite its support for Nasser's nationalist pohcies in the Arab 
world, the Kuwaiti regime did not advocate Nasser's anti-British propaganda in 
Kuwait.^ While Egypt-Britain relations continued to deteriorate, Kuwait-Britain 
relations remained unharmed. 
' See Miriam Joyce, Kuwait 1945-1996: An Anglo-American Perspective, (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 
^ When Anwar Sadat, Nasser's closest associate, visited Kuwait in December in 1955, the Kuwaiti 
officials kept him busy so that he would not have a chance to promote anti-British sentiment to the 
Kuwaiti government. 
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However, one could argue that while the Chinese lacked direct political relations with 
Kuwait in the 1950s, they did not eliminate Kuwait from their foreign policy in the 
Arab world. Instead, they hoped to use their support for Nasser's nationalist policy and 
popularity to influence nationalist movements in the Gulf and Peninsula region. As 
Egyptian teachers travelled to Kuwait, pro-Nasser nationalist ideas started to spread 
among young Kuwaitis. Therefore, China's policy towards Kuwait in the 1950s can be 
explained in the context of China's foreign policy towards Egypt and Nasser's 
nationalist policy. 
When Kuwait gained its independence from Britain on 19 June 1961, the Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai sent a congratulatory message on 30'^  June to Sheikh Abdullah al-
Salim saying: 
On the occasion of the proclamation of independence of Kuwait, I have the 
honour, on behalf of the Govemment of the People's Republic of China, to 
extend hearty congratulations to the Govemment and people of Kuwait. May the 
people of Kuwait achieve further successes in the cause of opposing imperialism 
and colonialism, safeguarding national independence and building their country. 
May your country attain prosperity and its people enjoy happiness."^  
When Kuwait proclaimed its independence from Britain, China was prompted to 
support Kuwait. Therefore, the Chinese welcomed the independence of Kuwait and 
extended its recognition to the new state despite the fact that Iraq, China's closest Arab 
ally, was against the independence of Kuwait and was threatening military action. 
China's interest in supporting Kuwait's independence could be explained in terms of 
following two points: 1) China wanted to see the British military leave Kuwait as a first 
step towards a complete withdrawal of all foreign presence from the Gulf region; and 2) 
^ See Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 193. 
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China was frustrated with Iraq's close ties with the Soviet Union and its harsh 
treatments of Iraqi communists. 
However, events did not go the way that the Chinese had hoped for. Soon after gaining 
its independence, Kuwait, driven by the fear of an Iraqi attack, requested British 
military protection and assistance. On 31 June, British troops began to arrive in Kuwait. 
The Chinese press began to attack the reinforcement of British military forces in Kuwait 
but never criticised the Kuwaiti government. They described the British military 
presence as a 'British occupation of Kuwait';"^ and they began to be more sympathetic to 
the Iraqi claims. However, Chinese criticism subsided after the Arab League welcomed 
Kuwait as a new member on 20 July and decided to send Arab military forces to Kuwait 
to replace the British troops to keep peace and to prevent Iraqi invasion. The Chinese 
government welcomed the Kuwaiti decision to replace the British troops with Arab 
peacekeeping forces,^ * but its criticism this time was shifted towards the transfer of the 
British troops from Kuwait to other British military bases in the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. 
China's relations with Kuwait were very low in the 1960s. Several developments had 
contributed to the cooling of relations. First, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah's 
(Kuwaiti Minister of Finance, Industry and Commerce) visit to China in February 1965 
yielded no significant improvement in China-Kuwait political relations. Second, China 
became frustrated with Kuwait's closer alignment with the West and its unwillingness 
to reciprocate China's recognition of Kuwait in June 1961. Kuwait preferred not to 
rush to recognise the PRC. This was mainly due to the Kuwaiti government's 
Ibid., pp. 193-194. 
' i b id . , pp. 196-197. 
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unwillingness to sever its political relations with Taiwan who supported Kuwait in the 
UN Security Council throughout its dispute with Iraq. And third, China began to 
support revolutionary movements in the region in the Gulf and Peninsula region. 
Kuwait did not appreciate China's support for such groups in the region, therefore, 
bilateral relations throughout the 1960s never exceeded beyond trade relations. 
6.1.2. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
China's insistence on the termination of relations with Taiwan and its support for the 
revolutionary movements prevented the Kuwaiti government from pursuing political 
ties with China in the 1960s. However, this was about to change in the 1970s. China's 
foreign policy towards the government of Kuwait was reflected by changes in China's 
view of the international system. In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Soviet Union 
had become China's principle enemy and, to China, the Soviet Union replaced the U.S. 
as the world's most dangerous source of instability. The Chinese feared that the Soviet 
Union would penetrate the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region to refill the power 
vacuum following the British withdrawal. Meanwhile, Kuwait was following a more 
neutral foreign policy and shared the Chinese fear of the Soviets. 
The Kuwaiti government invited the Chinese ambassador to Iraq, Kung Ta-fei, to 
Kuwait where he held talks with Kuwaiti officials from 8 to 22 March 1971. Behbehani 
has stated that the Kuwaiti government tried to convince the Chinese official of their 
preference to keep political relations with both the PRC and the ROC. Although the 
Chinese official rejected the Kuwaiti demand, the Kuwaiti government decided on 22 
March 1971 to establish formal relations with the PRC. A joint communique said: 
The Government of the PRC and the Govemment of the state of Kuwait, in 
accordance with the principle of developing the common interests of the two 
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countries and the desire of promoting the relations between the two countries in 
all fields, in view of the noble stand of the PRC in supporting the Arab stmggle 
against imperialism and Zionism, in view of the stand of the Government of the 
state of Kuwait in recognising the Government of the PRC as the sole legal 
Government of China, have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the 
ambassadorial level and exchange ambassadors within the shortest possible 
period.^ 
Kuwait's decision to establish diplomatic relations with China originated in Kuwait's 
assessment that the PRC replacement of ROC in the UN Security Council was 
imminent. The Kuwaiti government recognised that the political importance of China 
as a permanent member of the UN Security Council exceeded the economic importance 
of Taiwan. To the Kuwaitis, China could not only enhance its support for the Arab 
causes, but also could support Kuwait's causes against Iraq. To the Chinese, the 
establishment of formal relations with Kuwait meant clearing the way for the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region states to follow suit. 
On the establishment of formal relations, the official People's Daily paid tribute in an 
editorial to the Kuwaiti government's decision and praised its effort to protect its 
national resources: 
The Chinese Government and the Government of the state of Kuwait have 
decided after friendly talks to establish diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. We welcome this heartily and extend our warm congratulations. Since 
their independence in 1961 the Kuwaiti people together with the people of other 
Arab countries have been opposing the US and Israeli aggressors and supporting 
the Palestinian people's just stmggle. To safeguard their state sovereignty and 
national resources, the Kuwaiti government and people together with other 
petroleum exporting countries carried out recently a powerful stmggle against the 
imperialist oil monopolist groups headed by the United States. The Chinese 
people resolutely support the just stmggle of the Kuwaiti Government and people 
and regard this support as our bounded intemationalist duty.^  
^ BBC, SWB, FE/3648, 31 March 1971, p. A4/1. 
^ BBC, SWB, FE/3649, 1 April 1971, p. A4/1. 
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On 25 October 1971 Kuwait was among the few Arab states that voted in favour of 
China's admission to the UN. China's first ambassador to Kuwait, Sun Sheng-wei, 
arrived in Kuwait on August 5. 
The Chinese welcomed Kuwaiti press criticism of the Soviet Union for allowing Soviet 
Jews to immigrate to Israel. They published many of the Kuwaiti press articles that 
attacked the Soviet Union's policies in the Arab world. For example, Peking Review 
published an editorial issued on March 9, 1973 by the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Rai al-
Amm, which criticised the Soviet Union's 'friendship' with the Arab world. The 
editorial said: 
We do not believe that the purpose of the Soviet investment of dozens of billions 
of US dollars in this area is only for God's sake...How can we believe Soviet 
friendship with us Arabs as 'gratuitous' when the Soviet Union has opened the 
door for the emigration of Jews to Palestine? Even if we were foolish enough we 
o 
cannot believe that a friend who brought our enemies for us is a friend indeed. 
The Chinese also praised Kuwait's oil policy and its efforts to protect its national 
resources. When the Kuwaiti government gained a 60 percent share in the Kuwait Oil 
Company (KOC) in January 1974, the Chinese government perceived this development 
as a blow to Western monopoly in the region. It stated: 
This was a new victory for the govemment and people in defending state 
sovereignty and national resources and another heavy blow to Western monopoly 
capital. 
On the Soviets' penetration the Chinese said: 
While continuing the stmggle against Western oil monopoly capital, the Kuwaiti 
people are on guard against the other superpower's predatory designs on the oil 
riches in the region. In recent years the Kuwaiti press has exposed the scandalous 
acts of the Soviet Union in making fabulous profits by reselling oil obtained from 
the Arab region to Western Europe. It has also sternly refuted Soviet nonsense 
Peking Review, number 11, 16 March 1973, pp. 19-20. 
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about the oi l in the Gulf being 'international property', pointing out that this 
fallacy is the 'latest imperialist logic' aimed at legalising Soviet plunder of Gulf 
oi l .^ 
The Chinese were also satisfied with the outcome of Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir 
al-Sabah's (Kuwaiti Minister of Foreign Affairs) visit to Beijing in May 1977 where he 
assured the Chinese government that: 
We are committed to preventing our Gulf f rom being an arena of political and 
military rivalry between the powers.'^ 
Despite the fact that Kuwait did not despatch its first ambassador to Beijing until 
August 1975, trade relations between the two sides continued to grow throughout the 
1970s. The volume of China's trade with Kuwait jumped from $20.44 million in 1970 
to $33.88 million in 1972, then to $78.48 million in 1974, reaching $174.97 million in 
1979 (see Table 6 in Appendix 1). Chinese imports consisted mainly of chemical 
fertilisers. The two sides reached on an agreement on 26^ *^  December 1977 on economic 
and technological co-operation. Since then the Chinese began to send Chinese medical 
groups to work in Kuwait. 
The establishment of diplomatic relations with Kuwait was China's other significant 
political achievement in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. China was emerging 
from political isolation during the Cultural Revolution, and was more than happy to find 
that there are some countries in the region willing to establish mutual diplomatic 
relations. China could not resist the opportunity to establish diplomatic relations with 
Kuwait in order to benefit from potential political and economic gains. Politically, the 
^ Peking Review, number 14, 5 April 1974. 
Peking Review, number 20, 13 May 1977, p. 20. 
' ' Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, p. 77. 
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Chinese government would be able to find further recognition for their authority as the 
legitimate government of all China. Economically, China would gain a new market for 
its goods and a potential supplier of energy and chemical fertilisers. However, China's 
relations with Kuwait in the 1970s did not witness a substantial political or strategic 
improvement. This might be due to Kuwait's neutral foreign policy. Kuwait was able 
to balance its relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. For instance, 
when Kuwait rejected an American arms sales proposal, it moved to purchase Soviet 
weapons. Such a move was not appreciated by the Chinese government who at the time 
perceived the Soviet Union as the most dangerous power to the security of the Gulf 
region. 
6.1.3. China and Kuwait in the 1980s 
The 1980s witnessed two important developments in China's foreign policy. First, 
China proclaimed its independent foreign policy. This new foreign policy was similar 
to Kuwait's neutral foreign policy. This similarity created few divergences in the 
foreign policies of both China and Kuwait towards many of the world's issues. Second, 
the Chinese government started to commit itself to the Four Modernisations 
programme, which raised the level of Kuwait's economic significance to China. 
Kuwait, resolutely, became an important source of loans and investments to China, and 
as an influential contributor to South-South co-operation in the Chinese view.^^ From 
the Kuwaiti point of view, China could bring another investment destination in order to 
diversify Kuwait's investments and expand its geographical presence. In an interview 
with the Kuwaiti daily Al Qabas on 18 May 1986, the Kuwaiti Minister of Finance and 
Economy Jasim al Khurafi said that Kuwait's investments in China were driven by the 
desire to expand the area in which Kuwaiti funds were invested in order to reduce risks 
Beijing Review, number 11, 14 March 1982, p. 14. 
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and to seek better revenue. ' The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 
(KFAED) provided China with over $150 million in loans from 1982 to 1983. A $30 
million low-interest loan was extended in 1984 for the construction of a hydroelectric 
power station in Fujian.'"^ Another loan was granted in July 1985 in which the KFAED 
would provide China with $13.2 million to finance construction of a mini vehicle plant 
in Tianjin in north China. 
As a result, China-Kuwait economic relations were expanded throughout the 1980s. 
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) acquired joint exploration rights in offshore 
China, including an agreement to build a production platform and an underwater 
pipeline costing an estimated $400 million from which 15 percent was to be paid by 
Santa Fe Minerals (Asia) Inc., a unit of the KPC-owned Santa Fe International.'^ In 
October 1985 KPC acquired a 15 percent equity interest in the development of a gas 
field off Southwest China's Hainan Island. An Arab-Chinese joint-venture firm was 
established, the Sino-Arab Chemical Fertiliser Company (SACF), to construct a 
fertiliser plant near the port of Quinhuandao for the production of 480,000 tons/year of 
diammonium phosphate and 600,000 t/y of nitrogen potassium phosphate. The plant 
would utilise phosphoric acid feedstock produced by the Kuwaiti-Tunisian joint-venture 
company Societe Industrielle d'Acide Phosphoriqueet d'Engrais (SIAPE) and ammonia 
produced locally. 60 percent ($15 million) of the capital would be held equally by 
Kuwait Petrochemical Industries Company (KPIC) and SIAPE, and the remaining 40 
FBIS-CHI-86-I00, 23 May 1986, p. I 2. 
John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, p. 142. 
FBIS-CHI-85-J30, 8 July 1985, p. I 2. 
Rosemary Brady, 'Moving Downstream', Forbes, volume 133, number 11,7 May 1984, p. 108. 
The Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, 30 September 1985, p. 1. 
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percent would be owned by the Chinese National Chemical Construction Company 
(CNCCC). On 23 November 1985, China and Kuwait signed an investment guarantee 
agreement providing for the promotion and protection of joint investment in the two 
countries.'^ On March 9, 1988, the KFAED director-general, Badr Mishari al-
Humaydi, signed the KFAED's tenth loan agreement with China to finance the Jinzhou 
Harbour project in Northeast China. This project, together with another nine projects, 
involved a total of $240 m i l l i o n . O n 13 December 1988 the two countries signed an 
agreement to build Yaoqiang Airport in Jinan with a $10 million loan provided by 
Kuwait.^' In September 1989 the KFAED agreed to provide a loan of $21 million to 
help China finance a ductile cast iron pipe project in north-eastern China.^^ It also 
agreed to grant China with a preferential loan of $28 million to buy navigation 
instruments and equipment for the Shenzhen Airport.^^ By 1989 China had received a 
total of $300 million of long-term and low-interest loans from Kuwait for the 
construction of 13 projects in China.^ "^  
China and Kuwait also signed a civil aviation accord, a trade agreement, a cultural 
exchange accord, and an economic and technical co-operation accord. The two 
countries were also engaged in co-operation regarding the provision of labour services. 
By the end of 1989 Kuwait had signed a total of 175 contracts for labour service with 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 30, number 7, 24 November 1986, p. A6. 
''^ Middle East Economic Survey, volume 29, number 8, 2 December 1985, p. A5. 
2" FBIS-CHI-88-047, 10 March 1988, p. 9. 
^' FBIS-CHI-88-241, 15 December 1988, p. 11. 
^- FBIS-CHI-89-184, 25 September 1989, p. 17. 
FBIS-CHI-89-203, 23 October 1989, p. 9. 
^'^ Beijing Review, number 52, 25-31 December 1989, p. 4. 
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China.^^ According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, 
at the peak there were as many as 20,000 Chinese, mostly construction workers, in 
Kuwait prior to the Iraqi invasion. China constructed projects in Kuwait at a value of 
more than $530 million prior to the Iraqi invasion. 
Trade relations between the two countries increased impressively in the 1980s. The 
value of trade in the 1980s was almost twice that of the 1970s. China's imports mainly 
consisted of chemical fertilisers from Kuwait. In 1985 China bought 200,000 tons of 
urea fertilisers from Kuwait and 400,000 tons in 1987. This was the largest Chinese 
import of fertilisers from Kuwait since KPIC began fertiliser exports to China in 1969. 
The first Chinese regular full container cargo ship arrived in Kuwait in November 1985 
marking the start of the service of the full container transportation between China and 
28 
the Gulf region. 
In addition to the increase in economic co-operation between the two countries, social 
relations had also improved. Both Chinese and Kuwaiti Muslim delegations exchanged 
visits throughout the 1980s.^ ^ Journalist delegations visited each other's capital. 
News exchanges were established between China's news agency, Xinhua, and Kuwait's 
Ibid., p. 5. 
Beijing Review, number 10, 11 March 1991, p. 8. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 30, number 7, 24 November 1986, p. A6. 
FBIS-CHI-85-229, 27 November 1985, p. 1. 
See FBIS-CHI-84-188, 26 September 1984, p. I 4; and FBIS-CHI-85-130, 8 July 1985, p. I 2. 
^° FBIS-CHI-85-095, 16 May 1985, p. I 1. 
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news agency, Kuna.^' The two countries also shared expertise in controlling 
desertification and developing agriculture in land transformed from desert."^ ^ 
Throughout the 1980s China-Kuwait relations remained unharmed despite China's 
decline of a Kuwaiti request to join Moscow and Washington in protecting its oil 
tankers in the Gulf against Iranian attacks. Qi Huaiyuan, China's Vice Foreign 
Minister, when visiting Kuwait in July 1987 explained his country's decision by stating 
that 'the problem is that China does not maintain a large shipping fleet and has no spare 
tankers to lease'; he then added that China 'does not agree with the military presence 
and involvement of the big powers in the Gulf and Gulf affairs'. On the other hand, he 
said that China was sympathetic with and understands Kuwait's situation and the 
measures taken by Kuwait in safeguarding its security. Thus, the stability in political 
relations between the two countries throughout the 1980s can be explained in terms of 
China's political weight in regard to its relations with both Iran and Iraq. The Kuwaiti 
government understood that China was the only UN Security Council member to have 
good relations with both Iran and Iraq. Therefore, Kuwait hoped that China would exert 
some efforts to mediate between Iran and Iraq to bring about a peaceful settlement to 
their dispute. In fact, during meetings with Chinese officials, Kuwaiti officials always 
stressed their hope to see China become more involved in the peace process between 
Iran and Iraq. Qi, for example, promised the Kuwaiti government that China would 
actively mediate between the two sides."^ "^  
^' FBIS-CHI-85-180, 17 September 1985, p. I 3. 
^2 FBIS-CHI-86-141, 23 July 1986, p. I 3. 
FBIS-CHI-87-145, 29 July 1987, pp F 1- F 2. 
See Ibid. 
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Chinese President Yang Shangkun visited Kuwait on December 24, 1989, for a 45-hour 
official goodwill visit at the invitation of the Kuwaiti government. His visit was mainly 
to assure the Kuwaiti government that the situation in China was stable, despite the 
Tiananmen Square episode. The Kuwaiti government voiced understanding to the 
measure that was taken by the Chinese government to restore stability in China. In its 
October 1, 1989 issue the Kuwaiti English daily Kuwait Times presented the Kuwaiti 
official reaction, which criticised the economic sanctions imposed by the west upon 
China and asked Western countries to take a second look at their policies towards 
China."*^  The Chinese President again stressed his government's willingness to mediate 
between Iran and Iraq in order to solve their disputes peacefully. In its 25^ *^  December 
issue The Kuwait Times said: 
At a time when the U.S. and the Soviet Union are concentrating their entire 
attention on East European changes, the Arabs would expect China to enhance its 
role in the conflict-ridden Middle East.^ ^ 
The 1980s was a very productive decade for China-Kuwait relations. Kuwait was the 
only Third World country that has ever extended loans to China. Joint ventures 
between the two countries were expanded and trade relations were increased 
substantially. Throughout the 1980s Chinese officials praised the development of 
relations with Kuwait and described it as a model for south-south co-operation. In 
support of Kuwait's position in OPEC China did not increase its oil export in 1987.^ ^ It 
did not even criticise Kuwait's purchase of Soviet arms in 1984 and its admission of 
Soviet technicians. Therefore, China remained pragmatic in its relations with Kuwait in 
the 1980s, particularly as China did not perceive Kuwait as aligning itself with Moscow. 
In FBIS-CHI-89-193, 6 October 1989, p. 12. 
In FBIS-CHI-89-246, 26 October 1989, p. 11. 
John Calabrese, China's Changing Relations with the Middle East, p. 142. 
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Kuwait's neutral foreign policy kept China satisfied with Kuwait's policy of balancing 
itself between the two superpowers. However the Kuwaiti government perceived China 
as having political importance to the Iran-Iraq dispute because of China's good relations 
with both countries. 
6.1.4. China and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
As discussed above, China-Kuwait relations developed steadily during the 1980s. 
China accumulated economic benefits from its developing relations with Kuwait. Even 
when China's relations with the West and Japan started to deteriorate following the 
Chinese government crackdown of the peaceful demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, 
China-Kuwait relations remained unharmed. Unlike the West and Japan, Kuwait 
emphasised that what was happening in China was China's internal affairs and Kuwait 
abided by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 
China was completely shocked by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The 
Iraqi invasion was against China's long-held belief that there is no conflict of 
fundamental interests among Third World countries, and also against its principles of 
peaceful coexistence that should govern relations among nations. The Chinese 
ambassador to the UN, Li Daoyu, presented his country's position on the Iraqi action 
and said that Iraq should cease its action of invasion immediately and withdraw its 
forces to the positions where they were located on 1 August 1990. China continued to 
emphasis that the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Kuwait should 
BBC, SWB, FE/0443, 27 June 1989, p. A4/1. 
FBIS-CHI-90-150, 3 August 1990, p. 4. 
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be respected.'^ ^ China's immediate support for the restoration of Kuwait's independence 
and legitimate government can be explained by the following three points: 
1. China's foreign policy principle that no party should resort to forces of arms in 
resolving its disputes with others obligated the Chinese government to stand against 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Chinese have always believed that relations 
among nations should be governed by the five principles of peaceful coexistence. 
2. China had been enjoying fruitful economic relations with Kuwait, and faced the 
possibility of losing, even temporary, most of its economic benefits. China had 
planned to use Kuwaiti funds for the development of Shenzhen Airport, phase two 
of Xiamen Airport, Jinzhou Harbour in Liaoning and Jinan Airport in the eastern 
province of Shandong. Therefore, the continuation of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait 
meant China was unable to draw down loans from Kuwait."^' 
3. The continuation of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait could also mean that thousands 
of Chinese nationals in Kuwait who were engaged in economic, trade and other 
activities could lose their jobs and be evacuated from Kuwait;"^^ and that many 
Chinese companies with investments in Kuwait would lose millions of US dollars."^ ^ 
The Chinese government's financial and economic co-operation with the West and 
Japan had terminated following the Tiananmen crackdown, so China was eager to work 
with the international community on the Gulf issue in order to restore economic 
relations with the West and Japan. China also wanted to avoid jeopardising its relations 
with most of the Arab governments, which had preferred military action against Iraqi 
FBIS-CHI-90-151, 6 August 1990, pp. 12-13. 
^' FBlS-CHI-90-155, 10 August 1990, p. 8. 
^2 FBIS-CHI-90-163, 22 August 1990, pp. 12-13. 
Michael West lake, 'Casualties of War', pp. 36-38. 
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troops in Kuwait. China therefore voted for all the UN Security Council resolutions 
concerning the Gulf crisis except resolution 678 on which it abstained on the grounds 
that China stood for peaceful resolution of the conflict. China's non-opposition to the 
UN Security Council efforts to give Western powers the right to use force in the Gulf 
was confirmed during Kuwaiti Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister's, Sabah al-
Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, visit to Beijing in August 1990. Chinese Premier Li Peng 
emphasised in a meeting with the visiting Kuwaiti official that his country firmly 
opposed Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait and also opposed to military 
involvement by the big powers; moreover, the Chinese official indicated that his 
country will neither vote for nor against the UN Security Council proposal for the use of 
force against Iraq."^ "^  
Three weeks prior to January 15, The UN Security Council's deadline for Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait, Kuwaiti Amir Jaber al- Ahmad al-Sabah visited Beijing. His 
visit was to ensure that: 
1. China would not change its position on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait when the U.S.-
led coalition forces begin its military opposition to liberate Kuwait; and that 
2. China would not supply Iraq with arms once the military operations started. 
The Kuwaiti Amir's visit achieved these two objectives. The Chinese government 
assured the visiting Amir that China would never change its principled stand against the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and that China would not sell arms to Iraq under such 
circumstances.'^ *' When Kuwait was liberated the Chinese immediately congratulated 
the Kuwaiti government on the restoration of Kuwait's independence, sovereignty, 
FBlS-CHI-90-163, pp 12-13. 
Beijing Review, volume 34, number 1, 7-13 January 1991, pp. 7-8. 
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territorial integrity and its legitimate government. They also assured the Kuwaiti 
government that China would continue to work in the UN Security Council to solve the 
unsettled issues between Kuwait and Iraq. 
6.1.5. China and Kuwait after the Kuwait War 
Once the Kuwait war ended, China began to involve itself in the international efforts to 
rebuild the war-damaged structures in Kuwait. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Economic Relation and Trade (MOFERT) indicated that Kuwait had already invited 
China to play an active role in its reconstruction. MOFERT official said: 
We plan to supply workers, technicians and engineers to help rebuild Kuwait."^^ 
In March, China sent a 10-member team of experts in oil fire and environmental control 
to help put out oil fires in Kuwait."^^ Another Chinese fire fighting team arrived in 
Kuwait in August. The team consisted of 63 members to work in Burgan field, the 
second largest oil field in the world."^^ China also donated equipment to help the oil 
spill clean up efforts in the Gulf."^ ^ 
In every official meeting between the two countries following the liberation of Kuwait, 
Chinese officials had always expressed their country's willingness to conduct multi-
level and multi-form co-operation with Kuwait. This was evident in Kuwaiti Minister 
of State for Cabinet Affairs A. R. al- Awadhi's visit to Beijing in March 1991;^° in 
Beijing Review, number 10, 11 March 1991, p.8. 
FBIS-CHl-91-064, 3 April 1991, p. 9. 
FBIS-CHI-91-164, 23 August 1991, p. 13. 
49 Ibid. 
Beijing Review, number 13, 1-7 April 1991, p. 8. 
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Chinese Premier Li Peng's visit to Kuwait in July;^' and in Kuwaiti Amir Jaber al-
Sabah's visit to China in Novemebr.^^ During all of these visits, Chinese officials 
stressed that their government would continue its support for Kuwait to secure its 
independence, state sovereignty and integrity of its territory. Kuwaiti officials stressed 
their country's appreciation for China's stand in opposing Iraqi aggression against 
Kuwait. The Kuwait government worked to reach a military agreement with China 
similar to those signed with the U.S., Britain, and France. In March 1995, the two 
governments reached a memorandum of understanding on military co-operation in 
Beijing. The agreement called for the two countries to co-operate in the military 
domain and it also called on China to develop the Kuwaiti armed f o r c e s . T h i s 
agreement is China's first military co-operation agreement with a GCC country. Such 
an agreement was a new achievement not only in China-Kuwait relations but also in 
China's policy in the Gulf region. With this kind of agreement China's military experts 
would become directly involved in training and maintaining the armed forces of 
Kuwait, an involvement that used to be carried out secretly with many of the countries 
of the region. In March 1998 China reached its first arms deal with Kuwait. Kuwait 
defence ministry announced, according to the Al Wafd Egyptian newspaper, that the 
Kuwaiti government had approved an arms deal with China. The deal included the 
supply of one battery of 155-mm Chinese artillery guns, and ammunitions worth $186.5 
million. The paper said that the Kuwaiti government favoured the Chinese offer over 
" FBIS-CHI-91-135, 15 July 1991, pp. 17-18. 
^" Beijing Review, number 47, 25 November 1991, p.5. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2262, 27 March 1995 p. G/2; and SWB, MEW/0430 WME, 9 April 1996, p. 8. 
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several other offers from the U.S., Britain and South Africa for technical, military and 
financial reasons.'^ "^  
In the post-Kuwait war era Kuwait continued to present its economic significance to 
China. China's Petrochemical Corporation (SINOPEC) won the contract to renovate 
the Kuwaiti al-Ahmadi refinery.''^ In late 1992 KFAED agreed to provide China with a 
$18 million loan to expand Xiamen Airport, which was built in 1982-1983 with a 
Kuwaiti loan of $22 m i l l i o n . W h e n Kuwaiti Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh 
Saad Abdullah al-Salem al-Sabah visited China in April 1995 the two sides signed an 
agreement, according to which Kuwait would grant China loans worth $24 million for 
the construction of a new airport in Zhengzhou, capital of Henan Province in central 
China.^^ On 30 December 1995 KOC signed a $398 million contract with the Chinese 
state-owned firm China Petroleum Engineering Construction Company (CPECC) for 
the construction of two large oil tank farms in West Kuwait and the laying of 10 oil 
pipelines with a total length of over 270 kms. Construction was scheduled for 
completion in October 1998. CPECC was also awarded a $390 million contract by 
KOC for the construction of two new gathering centres, Nos. 27 and 28, with capacity 
of 410,000 b/d to service the Minagish and Umm Gudair oil fields in west Kuwait.^^ 
Chinese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Qian Qichen said when 
visiting Kuwait in March 1996 that loans granted to China by Kuwait following the 
Kuwait war amounted to over $600 million for financing approximately 20 construction 
Note that China offered 10 percent discount on its offer, Al Wafd, Cairo, 31 March 1998, in BBC, SWB, 
FE/3200, 14 April 1998, p. G/2. 
•^-^ FBIS-CHI-94-209, 28 October 1994, p. 9. 
The Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, 2 November 1992. 
Beijing Review, number 17, 24 April 1995, pp. 4-5. 
"'^ Middle East Economic Survey, volume 39, number 18, 29 January 1996, p. A12. 
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projects in C h i n a . O n August 10, 1996 the Chinese Maritime Engineering Company 
signed a 16-month contract with Kuwait for the construction and reparation of the 
Shu'aybah refinery loading quay. The Shu'aybah refinery's capability was about 
150,000 b/d in 1996 compared to 195,000 b/d prior to the Iraqi invasion.^^ China 
National Petroleum Company's (CNPC) officials reported that in Kuwait, China had 
passed a preliminary qualification examination for undertaking five petroleum and 
petrochemical projects in 1997, with a total investment topping $3 billion.^' 
Trade relations between the two countries also increased substantially after the 
liberation of Kuwait. The amount of trade between the two countries jumped from $19 
million in 1991 to $100 million in 1993, and to $130 million in 1995 (see Table 6 in 
Appendix 1). 
To summarise, both China and Kuwait needed each other following the Kuwait war. 
China needed Kuwait's investments, loans, and economic co-operation to continue to 
foster its own modernisation programme. Kuwait needed China's political support in 
the UN Security Council against Iraq and needed to ensure that China continued to fulf i l 
its obligations as a responsible member of the UN Security Council and prevent China 
from supplying arms to Iraq. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2568, 23 March 1996, p. G/2. 
BBC, SWB, MEW/0449 WME, 20 August 1996, p. 11. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2832, 1 February 1997, p. SI . 
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6.2. China and Oman 
6.2.1. China's early involvement in Oman 
During its first decade as an independent state, communist China was politically 
isolated from most of the governments of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, 
including Oman. China's interest in Oman during the 1950s and 1960s was a reflection 
of the direction of its foreign policy during that period. When China was in close 
alignment with the Soviet Union, the Chinese government regarded Oman as a 'puppet' 
of the West. This prevented China from establishing relations or pursuing connections 
with Oman. However, this began to change by the end of the 1950s. As China's 
alliance with the Soviet Union began to breakdown, the Gulf and Peninsula region 
started to assume a new significance in China's foreign policy. The Chinese began to 
view the Gulf and Peninsula region as a potential theatre to wage a revolutionary 
campaign against Western imperialism and as an arena of Sino-Soviet rivalry.^^ 
This new analysis in China's foreign policy towards the two superpowers prompted the 
Chinese government to extend relations to the Omani nationalist movement. The 
Chinese supported Imam Ghalib Bin All's movement against the Sultan of Oman, 
whom the Chinese had always associated with British and US imperialism. They even 
offered Bin Al i military aid.^ ^ Many meetings between Chinese officials and the Omani 
movement's leaders took place in Cairo and Aden; several delegations from the Dhofar 
Liberation Front's (DLF), and later the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied 
Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), visited Beijing. 
John Calabrese, 'From Flyswaiters to Silkworms', pp. 862-876. 
''^  Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 165. 
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Throughout the 1950s and 1960s China provided political, economic, and military 
support to the revolutionary movement in Oman. By 1970 the PFLOAG was believed 
to be almost completely dependent on China for political, military and ideological 
support. This support had led the Chinese to enjoy an ideological and political influence 
within the movement, which was evident in regional and international perceptions of the 
movement as a Maoist movement.^ "^  This influence was also manifested in the 
movement's leader's statements which emphasised the Chinese ideological strategies to 
wage struggle against colonialism. Muhammed Ahmad Ghasani, a responsible member 
of the executive committee of the general command of the movement, stated: 
In accordance with the experience of the Chinese revolution under the leadership 
of the great leader of Chairman Mao, our People's Front has formulated a line of 
self-reliance, depending on the broad masses of poor people to carry out a 
protracted people's war, and using the countryside to encircle the cities and seize 
the cities ultimately, thus developing the revolution to the whole of the Arabian 
Gulf to defeat and drive out the British colonialists... 
The colonialists can no longer succeed in stamping out the flame of the '9'** June' 
[1965] revolution, because we have the weapon of Mao Zedong's thought. The 
great truth that 'political power grows out of the barrel of a gun' has taken deep 
root in the hearts of our people. We the people of the Arabian Gulf don't believe 
in the fallacies of 'parhamentary road' and 'peaceful transition'. Our 
unshakeable belief is: the counter-revolutionary violence of colonialism can be 
liquidated only with the revolutionary violence of the people; the independence 
of the motherland can be achieved only through the barrel of a gun; and the 
liberation of the people can be obtained only through battles of bloodshed.^^ 
Speaking about the movement's friendly relationship with China, Ghasani praised 
China's support for the armed revolution and said: 
This support w i l l give an impetus to the development on a still larger scale of our 
armed revolution in the crucial year of 1970.^^ 
Ibid., p. 178. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3402, 12 June 1970, pp. A4/2-3. 
Ibid., p. A4/5. 
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As a result of this Chinese connection with the opposition movement in Oman, in Apr i l 
1972 the Sultan of Oman, Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id al-Sa'id, declared that despite the 
establishment of formal relations between China and Kuwait and Iran, his country 
would have nothing to do with China.^^ Therefore, relations between the Sultanate of 
Oman and China, prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations, were limited to 
indirect trade consisting mainly of imports of Chinese goods. 
Thus, China's early involvement with Oman and its support for the revolutionary 
movement in that country originated at a time when the Chinese government advocated 
a certain international militancy aimed at discrediting the Soviet Union and countering 
the US. Due to this Chinese connection with the Omani revolutionary movement, 
China-Oman relations did not exist until 1978. 
6.2.2. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
China and Oman established diplomatic relations three years after the end of the Dhofar 
war. A joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the 
Sultanate of Oman and the PRC was signed in London and issued in May 1978. It said: 
The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the 
Sultanate of Oman have decided to establish diplomatic relations at 
ambassadorial level as from May 25, 1978, and to exchange ambassadors. The 
Government of the People's Republic of China firmly supports the Government 
of the Sultanate of Oman in its just cause of safeguarding national independence 
and developing the national economy. The Govemment of the Sultanate of 
Oman recognises the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole 
legal government representing the entire Chinese people. The two governments 
have agreed to develop friendly relations and co-operation between the two 
countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's 
internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence.^^ 
Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, p. 252. 
FBIS-CHI-78-103, 26 May 1978, p. A37. 
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Although the communique recognised Beijing as the sole legitimate representative of all 
China, a Taiwanese trade mission was allowed to remain in the Omani capital of 
Muscat.^^ 
Welcoming the new ties with the Omani government, an editorial in the People's Daily 
underlined the strategic and political significance of Oman by stating: 
Oman situated in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula occupies a position 
of strategic importance as it is the threshold linking the Gulf with the Indian 
Ocean. It suffered historically from aggression and oppression by imperialism 
and colonialism, and its people have waged heroic struggle against imperialism 
and colonialism in order to achieve national independence. Today, the Omani 
Government is dedicating its efforts to the struggle in defence of national 
independence and for the development of the national economy. Following in 
foreign affairs the principles of neutrality and non-alignment, Oman advocates 
unity and co-operation among the countries in the gulf and Red Sea and opposes 
big power contention there. Al l this earns the firm support of the Chinese 
Government and people. 
And in a statement directed towards easing the other Gulf and Peninsula countries' fear 
of China, the editorial went on to emphasise that: 
The Chinese Government always maintains that all countries, whether big or 
small, should be equal. The people of each country have the right to choose their 
own road in accordance with their own aspirations. It is our hope to establish and 
develop friendly relations with all other countries on the basis of the principles of 
mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-
aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equity and mutual 
benefit, and peaceful co-existence. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and Oman has opened excellent prospects for friendly co-
operation in many fields between our two countries and it will be conductive to 
the further development of our friendly ties with the Arab countries and people.^^ 
There were several decisive factors that played major roles in the two governments' 
decision to establish diplomatic relations. To the Chinese government the establishment 
of formal relations with Oman was driven mainly by the fol lowing factors: 
FBIS-CHI-78-J23, 26 June 1978, p. A26. 
^° FBIS-CHI-78-105, 31 May 1978, p. A30. 
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1. China feared Soviet Union penetration in South Yemen, Iraq, India, and Zaire and it 
presumed that Soviet penetration in these countries, under its southward policy, was 
aimed at dominating the Gulf and Peninsula region. Moscow itself criticised the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries because it perceived 
it as an effort to form an anti-Soviet alliance in the region.^' 
2. China was not wil l ing to harm its established political relations with Kuwait and 
Iran. China, who supported the revolutionary group in Oman, did not want to 
appear against Iran's policy in Oman, where Iran was supporting the Sultan against 
the revolutionaries. Therefore, by establishing diplomatic relations with the 
government of Oman, China would be able to improve its relations with Iran and 
halt the Kuwaiti government's fear of the revolutionary movement in the region. 
3. China hoped that the establishment of formal relations with Oman would open the 
doors for the other remaining Gulf and Peninsula states to establish relations with 
China and eliminate their ties with the government of the ROC. 
To the Omani government, the establishment of diplomatic relations with China was 
driven by the following factors: 
1. The Omani government shared China's fear of Soviet penetration in and around the 
region and wanted, therefore, to improve its relations with China as a counterpoise 
to the Soviets, particularly after China's relations with the US, Oman's close ally, 
had already improved. Sultan Qaboos said: 
The Soviet Union is pushing forward a scheduled and fixed policy of 
expansionism in this region. This policy is no way different from the savage acts 
of the old colonialists during their time. This has been obvious for some time, 
undoubtedly, the Soviet Union has two intentions: ultimately gaining control of 
'^ Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman And the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy, (Santa 
Monica: Rand PubUcations, 1995), p. 190. 
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the Middle East, in particular, the oil region; and second, carry out expansion 
towards the Indian Ocean in order to control the African countries and then the 
entire Far East.^ ^ 
2. The Omani government hoped that by establishing a formal relationship with China 
it would be able to completely stop China, the primary source of political, 
ideological, and military support to the Omani rebels, f rom continuing its 
commitments to support the revolutionary movement in Oman. 
Shortly after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, Qais 
'Abd al-Munim al-Zawawi, minister of state for foreign affairs of Oman, visited China 
in June 1978. During his visit, he met with the CCP's Chairman Hua Guofeng, who 
expressed the view that Oman could be directly threatened by Soviet ambitions to 
control the oil route. The Chinese leader encouraged Oman to work with the Gulf and 
Peninsula region countries, to put aside their differences and strengthen their unity in 
order to prevent Soviet intervention in the region.^^ A similar argument was made 
earlier by the Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua. In a banquet given in honour of the 
Omani guests, Huang said: 
The distinguished guests come from the coast of the Gulf and the Red Sea, an 
area of strategic importance with rich strategic resources. The two superpowers 
are fiercely intensifying their contention in this area in order to seize petroleum 
resources and control navigation channels and strategic positions. Bloated with 
wild ambition, the superpower flaunting the signboard of 'sociahsm' is making 
trouble everywhere and stepping up all-round expansion in an attempt to place 
the area under its control. 
Interview with Xinhua in JPRC-76746-China Report, 3 November 1980, p. 16. 
" FBIS-CHI-78-123, 26 June 1978, p. A26. 
''^ FBlS-CHI-78-12], 22 June 1978, pp. A22-A23. 
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China's first Ambassador to Oman, Yuan Lulin, arrived in Muscat in Apri l 1979, and 
Oman appointed Ibrahim Hamud al-Subayhi as envoy to the PRC.^^ 
6.2.3. China and Oman in the 1980s 
China's relations with the Sultanate in the 1980s continued to reflect China's overall 
foreign policy in the region. China's fear of the Soviet Union, particularly after the 
latter' invasion of Afghanistan, led the Chinese government to welcome the conclusion 
of an agreement between Oman and the U.S. to provide military facilities to the 
Americans in the event of a crisis in the region and, in return, the US would help re-
equip Oman's armed forces. It also welcomed the signing of the Oman-Britain 
agreement to provide Oman with more arms, including jet fighters, missiles and mine 
sweepers. 
These Omani defence measures were viewed by the Chinese government as Omani 
efforts to safeguard the security of the Gulf region against Soviet penetration in and 
around the region: 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its southward thrust to the Persian Gulf 
have underlined the need for Oman to strengthen its defence and diplomatic 
efforts to safeguard its security and that of the region. 
The Chinese applauded the Omani government's stand on Soviet penetration in the 
region: 
Oman has taken a clear-cut stand against hegemonism. It has openly denounced 
Moscow's aggression and expansion, maintaining that the Soviet strategic 
southward drive gravely threatens Oman and other Gulf states as well as the rest 
of the world.^^ 
FBIS-MEA-79-08I, 24 April 1979. 
Beijing Review, number 29, 21 July 1980, p. 10. 
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China, which had began in the early 1980s to stress the importance of improving 
relations among the Gulf and Peninsula region countries as a step towards preventing 
Soviet intervention, welcomed the Sultanate's decision to normalise relations with 
South Yemen in October 1982. The Chinese viewed this development as a positive step 
towards strengthening the unity among the Gulf and Peninsula region countries.^^ 
During the 1980s political relations between the two countries developed rapidly. Both 
sides saw a great significance in each other's political role in the G u l f s affairs. With 
regard to the Soviet Union, which was trying to use the situation in the region to its own 
advantage, China and Oman shared the same objective which was to prevent the Soviet 
f rom achieving its goal in the region. Another reason was the Iran-Iraq war and China's 
good relations with both belligerents. Oman saw China as having a great deal of 
influence in the region because: 
1. It was the only great power that enjoyed close relations with both Tehran and 
Baghdad during their war; and 
2. Large quantities of Chinese weapons were deployed on the battlefield. 
As a result, several official visits took place between the two governments. The 
Chinese Vice Premier Ji Pengfei visited Oman in October 1980. Fahr bin Taimur, 
Omani Deputy Prime Minister for Defence and Security visited China in November 
1982.^^ Among many of the issues that he discussed with Chinese officials was Oman's 
concern that China was providing Iran and Iraq with Scud missiles and Silkworm 
capable of destroying fixed petroleum facilities or super tankers moving through the 
Beijing Review, number 49, 6 December 1982, p. 14. 
Ibid., p. 10. 
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Strait of Hormuz. Fahr promised to seek GCC support in fostering formal relations with 
China, in exchange for China's promise to halt any missiles transfers to either Iran or 
Iraq.^^ W u Xueqian, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister, visited Oman in 
October 1983 to formally invite Sultan Qaboos to visit China. The visit never occurred, 
however Sa'id Thuwainu ibn Shehab, special representative of the Sultan, toured China 
in July 1984 where he was received by high-ranking Chinese officials eager to foster 
closer bilateral r e l a t i o n s . I n November a Chinese justice delegation headed by 
Minister of Justice Zou Yu visited Oman.^' In December a Chinese military delegation 
headed by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA, General He Zhengwen, visited 
Oman.^^ He met with several high-ranking Omani military officials including the 
Omani Assistant of the Chief of Staff, Major General Hassan bin Ihsan bin Nasib, 
Commander of the Sultan's Ground Forces, Major General Nasib bin Hamad al-
Rawahi, Director of Operation at the Sultan's Ai r Force Staff, Colonel Muhammad bin 
Mubarak al-Amiri , Commander of the Training Battalion of the Sultan's Armed Forces, 
Colonel Jum'ah bin Salim Al-Khatir i , and Major Muhammad bin 'Umar al-Zubaydi 
f rom the Sultan's Navy. This was the first meeting of its kind between military 
officials of both countries. Joseph Kechichian (1995) argues that these meetings did not 
lead to a shift in Oman's sourcing of weapons supplies f rom the West to China. 
However, according to Kechichian, the meetings allowed Omani officers to formalise 
themselves with what was available in China and to broaden their knowledge. 
However, it allowed Muscat to better assess China's position in the Iran-Iraq war, given 
79 Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, p. 192. 
FBIS-CHI-84-I35, 12 July 1984, p. I 1. 
^' FBIS-CHI-84-232, 30 November 1984, p. 14. 
^2 FBIS-CHI-84-25I, 28 December 1984, p. I 1. 
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that China provided large quantities of its weapons to both countr ies .Chinese Vice 
Premier Yao Yi l in visited Oman in November 1985 and attended the 15 '^' National Day 
celebration of the Sultanate.^"^ In July 1986 Yusuf al- 'Alawi 'Abdallah, Omani Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, visited and headed a delegation to Beijing. Omani Minister of 
Social Affairs and Labour, Mustahil bin Ahmad al-Maashini visited China in March-
Apr i l 1987. Haitham ibn-Tariq al-Sa'id, Omani Foreign Minister Under Secretary for 
Political Affairs , visited China in September 1988.^^ Haitham's visit to Beijing was to 
express Oman's formal appreciation for Beijing's positive role in bringing the Iran-Iraq 
war to an end.^^ President Yang Shangkun visited Oman in December 1989. He was 
received with a highly visible public welcome with thousands of Omanis lining city 
streets waving Chinese and Omani flages. Yang was received by Qaboos who thanked 
China for its support of Security Council Resolution 598.^^ 
Throughout all these meetings the Chinese praised Oman's foreign policy and 
emphasised that China and Oman shared identical views on a wide range of 
international issues. Although China had officially invited Sultan Qaboos to visit China 
several times, the Sultan, who did not reject the invitations, did not visit China in the 
1980s. 
Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, p. 194. 
^'^ FBIS-CHI-85-226, 22 November 1985, p. I 1. 
^-^ FBIS-CHI-86-136, 16 July 1986, p. I 1. 
FBIS-CHI-87-064, 3 April 1987, p. I . 
FBIS-CHI-88-183, 21 September 1988, p. 18. 
Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World, p. 195. 
Beijing Review, number 52, 25 December 1989, pp. 4-5. 
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Culturally, the two countries signed an agreement in 1981 on co-operation in such 
cultural fields as the exchange of visit by artists and folklore troupes.^ *^ The Omani 
traditional vessel 'Sohar' arrived in Guangzhou in the same year.^' In May 1980 a 
delegation of the Oman Ministry of Religious Trusts and Islamic Affairs, led by 
Minister Walid ibn Zahir al-Hinnawi, visited China. A few months later, a Chinese 
Islamic delegation led by Shen Xiaai, Vice-President of the Chinese Islamic 
Association, reciprocated the visit. Prior to these visits Haj Mohamed A l i Zhang Jie, 
Vice-President of the Chinese Islamic Association, led a delegation of Chinese Muslims 
to Oman in November 1979 to participate in the celebration of Oman's National Day. 
In June 1980 an Omani information delegation including representatives f rom the Oman 
Publishing House an-Nahda magazine, al-Watan newspaper, and the Times of Oman 
paid a visit to China. An Omani youth delegation visited China in June 1982 and the 
two countries signed an accord on youth visits, exchanges and co-operation.^"^ A civi l 
aviation agreement was signed by the two governments in Muscat in May 1983.^^ A 
sport exchange agreement was signed in January 1985.^^ 
Economically, Chinese exports to Oman dominated trade relations between the two 
countries in the 1980s. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in May 1978, 
China's exports to Oman jumped f rom $5.85 million in 1976 to $9.06 mill ion in 1983 
and to $10 mill ion in 1986 (see Table 7 in the appendix). However, China's trade 
FBIS-CHI-91-197, 10 October 1991, p. I 1. 
^' FBIS-CHI-91-135, 15 July 1991, pp. 20-21. 
Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf pp. 290-291 
'^ ^ Ibid., 285. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-82-108, 4 June 1982, p. I 1. 
FBIS-CHI-83-087, 4 May 1983, p. I 2. 
FBIS-CHI-85-017, 25 January 1985, p. I I . 
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relations with Oman, despite the increase in trade volume in the 1980s to approximately 
six times that of the 1970s, represented only 3 percent of China's total trade relations 
with the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region countries. This does not imply that China 
was not interested economically in Oman. Instead, one could argue that Oman had very 
little economic benefits to offer China in the 1980s. China had sufficient energy to 
pursue its economic modernisation programme and was not in need of Omani oi l . On 
the other hand, Oman's long trade relations with Japan and the West made the Omani 
market less dependent on Chinese products. 
6.2.4. China and Oman in the 1990s 
In addition to its strategic importance, Oman assumed a new significance to China in 
the 1990s. China, particularly since 1993, began to turn to Oman and other Gulf states 
to secure long-term energy suppliers in order to face the sharp increases in its energy 
consumption resulting f rom its rapid economic growth. China, therefore, started to pay 
more attention to developing its economic relations with Oman. In June 1993, Qiu 
Zhongjiang, Vice-President of China's National Petroleum (CNP), visited Muscat to 
seek Omani investments for the Tamrin basin oil fields.^^ The CNP's President visited 
Muscat in 1993 and expressed his company's willingness to have CNP employees 
98 
trained by Omani workers. 
Thus, oi l was high on the agenda. As China became a net importer of oi l in 1993, it 
began to import large amounts of Omani crude oil (see Table 6.1). Since then China 
became one of the major recipients of Oman's crude oi l . After China first started to 
Middle East Economic Digest, Volume 37, Number 23, 11 June 1993, p. 29. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Oman and Yemen, Number 2, (London; EIU, 1993), 
p. 20. 
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import Oman's crude oil in large quantities in 1993, it immediately assumed a leading 
position. China was in third place behind Japan and South Korea. Its imports of 
Oman's crude oil continued to increase every year after 1995, which allowed China to 
become the third leading recipient of crude oil f rom Oman in 1997. China ranked only 
behind Japan who remained Oman's top crude oil customer by 1997 and Thailand who 
assumed second place. In 1995 China signed a contract with the Omani government to 
increase its purchases of Oman's crude oil f rom less than 20,000 b/d in 1995 to 100,000 
b/d in 1996.^^ In the first four months of 1998 China imported 40.5 mill ion barrels of 
oil f rom Oman and dropped to fourth place behind Japan, Thailand and South Korea 
respectively. 
The suitability of Oman's crude oil to China's existing refining technology and ability 
means Oman has become a very successful trading partner with China. This is 
significant because i f China wants to be a major importer of crude oil f rom the other 
major exporters of oil in the Gulf and Peninsula region, it has to spend billions of 
dollars to upgrade its refining technology to suit the type of crude oil f rom the other 
producers in the Gulf region. Therefore, as China's economic growth continues to 
mount in the next century, China's imports of Oman's crude oil are expected to increase 
as long as Oman continues its production of oil . 
In 1997 the Chinese government began to import Oman's liquefied natural gas (LNG). 
It was also in the process of selecting three coastal locations for the construction of 
L N G receiving terminals. At least one of these was reportedly to be in Guandong 
province, whose municipal government signed a letter of intent with Oman L N G in 
http://www.uae.internetact.com/newsreport/19970612.htm, p. 2. 
'"'^  The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Oman 1999-2000, (London: E.I.U: 1999), p. 33. 
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1994 101 In May 1999 the Chinese government also offered its willingness to conduct a 
joint study with Oman in the protection, exploration and use of water resources. 102 
China's trade volume with Oman also increased f rom being only 3 percent of China's 
total trade volume with the Gulf and Peninsula region countries in the 1980s, to 15 
percent in the first six years of the 1990s. Chinese imports constituted over 95 percent 
of total trade volume with Oman in the first six years of the 1990s (see Table 7 in 
Appendix 1). Oman became the principal exporter to China f rom the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region (see table 6.2). The Chinese market's total value with Oman was 
$3,256 mil l ion, approximately $1000 million ahead of Saudi Arabia, which was in 
second place. This sharp increase in China's imports f rom Oman is due to its increasing 
Chinese crude oil imports f rom Oman. 
Realising the importance of Oman, Chinese President Jiang Zemin met Thuwayni Bin 
Shihab al Sa'id, a special representative of Sultan Qaboos, and emphasised China's 
willingness to forge a long-term, stable and comprehensive co-operative relationship 
with Oman for the next century, on the existing basis of the bilateral links. The Chinese 
President praised Oman's efforts in promoting the unity among Arab states and working 
towards peace and stability in the Gulf region. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 41, number 13, 30 March 1998, p. A8. 
BBC, SWB, FEZ3540, 21 May 1999, p. G/5. 
"^ -^  BBC, SWB, FEZ2943, 12 June 1997, p. G/4. 
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Table 6.1: Oman's exports of crude oil by country 
1992 
% MB 
1993 
% MB 
1994 
% MB 
1995 
% MB 
1996 
% MB 
1997 
% MB 
Japan 40.4 102.0 33.6 89.9 42.1 113.9 34.7 99.4 30.4 90.5 28.2 85.9 
US 0.6 1.5 4.1 10.9 5.9 16.0 2.5 7.2 4.6 13.6 0.5 1.5 
France 0.4 0.9 0.3 0.7 - - 0.6 1.8 -
S. Korea 28.0 70.8 25.7 68.7 17.1 46.3 18.8 53.8 19.2 57.0 16.5 50.3 
Singapore 4.6 11.6 6.2 • 16.5 2.3 6.1 3.0 8.7 2.6 7.8 0.2 0.5 
Thailand 5.3 13.5 6.5 17.5 9.9 26.8 13.5 38.8 18.3 54.4 23.5 71.6 
Philippines - - 1.0 2.6 2.2 6.3 3.7 11.1 4.8 14.5 
Taiwan 7.9 20.0 7.9 21.0 7.1 19.2 5.8 16.7 3.0 9.0 2.0 6.2 
India - 0.2 0.5 - - - -
Australia - 0.2 0.6 1.4 3.9 1.0 2.9 1.3 3.9 0.9 2.7 
China - 10.4 27.9 9.8 26.5 11.4 32.8 14.2 42.4 22.7 69.2 
Other 12.8 32.2 4.9 13.2 3.4 9.1 7.0 20.0 2.0 6.1 0.8 2.3 
Total 100.0 252.5 100.0 267.4 100.0 270.4 100.0 286.6 100.0 297.6 100.0 304.7 
MB = Million Barrels 
Source: Oman Ministry of Development, Statistical Yearbook 1994, (Oman: Information and 
Documentation Centre, 1995), p. 189; Statistical Yearbook 1995, p. 193; and Statistical Yearbook 1997, 
p. 173. 
Table 6.2: Oman's main trading partners (US$ million) 
Export to: 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Japan 1,416 1,689 1,694 1,774 1,665 
China 510 376 438 753 1,223 
Thailand 273 361 621 957 1,212 
S. Korea 1,016 716 844 1,103 921 
U.S. 277 452 292 407 237 
Total 
(including 
others) 
5,370 5,545 5,962 7,339 7,630 
Import 
From: 
U A E 1,156 1,139 1,012 1,053 1,116 
Japan 860 779 670 721 813 
U K 343 346 445 711 668 
U.S. 332 264 276 237 376 
Germany 182 192 216 249 262 
Total 
including 
others 
4,114 3,915 4,248 4,578 5,026 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: Oman 1999-2000, (London: E.I.U, 
1999), p. 33. 
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6.3. China and Saudi Arabia 
6.3.1. China and Saudi relations in the 1950s and 1960s 
China's communist ideology had created an unfavourable opinion of China in Saudi 
Arabia. King Faisal bin Sa'ud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was outspoken in his 
strong opposition to communist ideology as an alien ideology that encourages instability 
and revolutionary change and is in fundamental conflict with Islam.^ ^"^ China's close 
alignment with the Soviet Union, its revolutionary policy, as well as its policy towards 
its Musl im minority, contributed towards Saudi's negative view of China in the PRC's 
first two decades as an independent state. 
Saudi Arabia was greatly concerned about the possible indirect Soviet-Chinese threat to 
the region through radical ideologies like Nasserism, Ba'athism, socialism, and 
communism. From the Saudi point of view, Chinese and Soviet support for the Marxist 
regime in Aden and the Dhofari insurgents in Oman, and China's continued 
revolutionary propaganda throughout the world generated a further threatening situation 
to the security of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. In addition to that, China's 
harsh treatment of its own Muslim population in the early 1950s and during the Cultural 
Revolution had added to unfavourable Saudi sentiments towards China. 
Although China perceived Saudi Arabia as a reactionary state, hostile to communism 
and closely aligned with the capitalist camp, Beijing's leaders still hoped to win its 
goodwill for a number of reasons: 
1. Saudi Arabia abstained consistently on U N votes concerning the PRC. 
See William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security, and Oil, (Washington 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 64. 
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2. Saudi Arabia, unlike some other Arab states, did not condemn China as an aggressor 
in Korea. 
3. Saudi Arabia did not support the U.S. sponsored resolution to postpone 
consideration of any proposal to exclude Taiwan f rom the UN. 
4. Saudi Arabia refused to jo in regional alliances with the West (Baghdad Pact 
November 1955) and disputed the British over the Buraymi Oasis. 
5. Saudi Arabia concluded a mutual defence treaty with Egypt in October 1955 and co-
operated with Nasser in efforts to contain Iraq and prevent others, including Syria 
and Jordan, f rom joining the Pact.^ ^^ 
6. Saudi Arabia supported Nasser's move in September 1955 to conclude an arms deal 
with the Soviet Union, in which the Chinese played a large role.^^^ 
7. Saudi Arabia supported Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, broke o f f its 
diplomatic relations with Britain and France and declared an embargo on oil 
shipments to the two European powers when they invaded Egypt in 1956. 
8. Saudi Arabia supported the Imam of Yemen's claim to the British colony of Aden 
and assisted, for a while, the Omani rebels against the British-backed sultan. 
A l l of the above developments made the Chinese government perceive Saudi Arabia as 
pursuing a foreign policy independently f rom the West.^^^ China appreciated such 
developments, particularly after Beijing's efforts since the mid-1950s to enhance its 
image in the Third World as a reliable Third World country. 
'^ •^  Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security,{London: Cornell University Press, 
1988), p.78. 
"^^^  Ibid., p. 79. 
Ibid. 
108 Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, pp. 29-31. 
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As its relations with the Islamic World became more and more important in its foreign 
policy, Islam in China acquired a new significance. In addition to its belief that 
Muslims all over the world, who were oppressed by imperialism, shared the same 
common interests with China and, therefore, should unite to fight against 
imperialism,'^^ China had used Islam and Muslim figures to lay the groundwork for 
formal relations with the Islamic World including Saudi Arabia. 
The Chinese use of the Islam card with Saudi Arabia was first orchestrated by China's 
Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung conference. Zhou brought with him two prominent 
Chinese Musl im figures to the conference, Ta P'u-sheng and Yusuf Ma Yuhuai. This 
was a strong indication that the Chinese government was wil l ing to use China's 
Muslims as steppingstones to reach the Muslim World. Zhou and his Muslim 
delegation met with Prince Faysal ibn Sa'ud, the Saudi Foreign Minister. For the first 
time they raised the issue of permitting Chinese Muslims to enter the Kingdom to 
perform the hajj (pilgrimage)."^ Up to that time Chinese Muslims were not allowed by 
the Saudi government to enter the Kingdom for pilgrimage. The Saudi government 
agreed thereafter to allow twenty Chinese Muslims to visit Mecca every year.'" 
The use of Islam in China's foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia was also evident in 
meetings between Burhan Shahidi, Chairman of the CCP-established China Islamic 
Association and head of the Chinese pilgrimage mission to Mecca in 1956, and King 
"^ ^ Yitzhak Shichor, 'The Role of Islam in China's Middle-Eastern Policy', in Raphael Israel and 
Anthony H. Johns [eds.], Islam in Asia: Southeast and East Asia, (Jerusalem, the Hebrew University: the 
Magnes Press, 1984), p. 310. 
' Yitzhak Shichor, East Wind Over Arabia: Origins and Implications of the Sino-Saudi Missile Deal, 
(University of California, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1989), p. 3. 
' " I b i d . 
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Sa'ud, the Saudi Prime Minister and the Saudi Finance Minister.^'^ Yitzhak Shichor 
(1979) argued that Burhan's meetings with such significant top Saudi leaders were an 
indication that Burhan was not merely a religious figure but also an important figure in 
China's Foreign Ministry.'''^ 
As Islam in China became a valuable instrument for the Chinese government not only to 
foster its relations with the countries of the Muslim World, but also to spread Mao's 
thought to the millions of Muslims in Asia and Africa/'"^ Chinese Muslims gained 
considerable religious freedom. Mosques were reopened, lands were retained by 
Muslims, and Muslims leaders assumed high ranking positions in the government."^ 
Muslims in China played a major role in fostering China's political relations with 
countries like Indonesia, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Yemen, and Afghanistan. 
Since 1955 the China Islamic Association sent a pilgrimage mission to Mecca every 
year until the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1964 when the missions were 
terminated. The Cultural Revolution was a bitter struggle for supremacy within the 
CCP, between the radical faction of Mao and the more pragmatic group led by Liu 
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping. The premise of the Cultural Revolution was to attack the 
'four olds'- old thinking, old culture, old morality and old custom. As a result, the CCP 
carried out harsh practices against Mushm minorities, as well as against other religious 
minorities such as the Tibetans and Mongols, in order to solve the 'nationality problem' 
' Burhan also met, when he led the Chinese pilgrims to Mecca in 1956, with King Husayn of Jordan, 
Prime Minister of Lebanon, Prime Minister of Syria, Prime Minister of Egypt, and Prince al-Badr of 
Yemen. 
' '•^  Yitzhak Shichor, The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, p. 44. 
W. A. C. Adie, 'China's Middle East Strategy', in The World Today, August 1967, p. 222. 
' Clyde-Ahmad Winters, Mao or Muhammad: Islam in the People's Republic of China, (Hong Kong: 
Asian Research Service, 1979), p. 47. 
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and achieve ethnic uniformity in China. Most mosques and MusHms schools were 
forced to close down and many were destroyed; the use of minority language scripts 
was restricted; copies of the Koran and other religious texts were burned; Muslims were 
killed or arrested for their resistance; and Muslims lost their high position in the 
government."^ 
Meanwhile, the Saudi government's perception of the threat to its own security had 
changed in the late 1960s."^ The Saudis saw the following two major developments in 
the region as the two most threatening developments to the security of the kingdom: 
1. The establishment of the PRSY (PDRY) under the control of the Marxist National 
Liberation Front and the proclamation of its dedication to the overthrow of all the 
traditional regimes in the region; and 
2. The revolutionary movement in Oman, which was originally supported by the 
Saudis, adopted a Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong thought ideological orientation in 
1968 and proclaimed its duty as the liberator of the entire occupied Arab Gulf 
region. 
However, China escalated support for the above movements and so its valuable 
political, ideological, and material support to both in the late 1960s and most of the 
1970s intensified Saudi Arabia's unfavourable attitude towards China. 
Against this background, China's only direct contact with Saudi Arabia was interrupted 
by the Cultural Revolution and China's support for liberation movements in the region. 
' See Michael Dillon, China's Muslim Hui Community: Migration, Settlement and Sects, (Surrey: 
Curzon Press, 1999), pp. 164-166. 
See Nadav Safran, Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, p. 123. 
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Thus, the Saudi government, once again, came to view China as a hostile force against 
Islam and a source of instability and revolutionary change in the region."^ Therefore, 
the Chinese use of the Islam card to foster political relations with the Saudi government 
was unsuccessful. Had the Chinese government continued its tolerance of its Muslim 
population and discharged itself from supporting the revolutionary movements in the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, the Saudi government might have felt more 
comfortable dealing with the Chinese in more formal political relations. But China's 
continued negative treatment of its Muslims and, more importantly, its continued 
support for the Marxist revolutionary movement in South Yemen and Oman prevented 
Saudi government from pursuing better relations with the Chinese government. 
6.3.2. China's changing poUcy 
As discussed above, China's treatment of its Muslims and its involvement with the 
revolutionary movements in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region prevented China 
from achieving direct relations with the Kingdom. This was about to change. In the 
1970s China began to pursue a much more favourable foreign policy towards the 
countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. It started to lean towards the 
United States and began to court the governments of the Gulf and Peninsula region. 
This shift was due to China's fear of Soviet expansionism. Recognising the 
significance of Saudi Arabia's dominant position and political weight in the region and 
its ability to play a major role in the efforts to contain Soviet penetration, China stepped 
up its efforts to establish contacts with the Kingdom. Since the late 1970s it has 
followed the following strategies to foster contacts with the Kingdom: 
William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, pp. 64-65. 
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6.3.2.1. Abandoning its revolutionary stance 
China terminated its support for the revolutionary movement in Oman and established 
diplomatic relations with the government of Oman. It also limited its support to the 
government of South Yemen and accelerated its political and economic relations with 
North Yemen. 
6.3.2.2. Adopting similar policies 
China paid considerable attention to the opinions of Saudi leaders, endorsing many 
Saudi policies, particularly with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the security of 
the Gulf and Peninsula region. The Chinese media carried several articles informing the 
public of Saudi attitudes. For example, Peking Review republished Prince Fahd ibn 
'Abd al-Aziz's, Second Deputy Prime Minister of the Kingdom's, interview with the 
Lebanon daily A l Anwar, where he commented on the policy of the oil embargo.'*^ The 
Chinese government hailed Saudi government efforts to build up unity among the Gulf 
count r ies , to bring about ceasefire in Lebanon,^ ^^ to foster peaceful settlement of the 
Middle East problem by forwarding an eight-point proposal (Fahd Plan), to achieve 
peace between Iran and Iraq, and to solve Soviet presence in Afghanis tan .China 
supported the Saudi desire to buy the airborne warning and control system aeroplanes 
119 Peking Review, number 2, 10 January 1975, p. 20. 
See 'Why does the West rely so heavily on Saudi Arabia', in FBIS-CHI-81-96, 19 May 1981, p. I I ; 
and BBC, SWB, FE/6853,1 October 1981. 
121 FBIS-CHI-83-004, 6 January 1983, p. 18. 
'-- Beijing Review, number 34, 24 August 1981, pp. 10-11; JPRS 79457-China Report, number 238, 17 
November 1981, pp. 6-13; the Chinese said that the Plan 'provided a comprehensive and fair solution to 
the conflict between Israel and Arab nations', in FBIS-CHI-81-219, 13 November 1981, p. I I . 
'^"^ Beijing Review, number 4,12 October 1981, p. 12; and Beijing Review, number 16, 21 April 1980, p. 
12. 
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(AWACS) from the U.S. and criticised the U.S. delayed decision to sell the aeroplanes 
to the Kingdom.'^"^ The Chinese believed that the Soviet threat to the region, through 
South Yemen, East Africa and Afghanistan, was on the rise and that the U.S. should 
support the Kingdom in order to defend the region from Soviet penetration. 
6.3.2.3. AppeaUng for good offices 
China tried to use certain Gulf countries, which had already established diplomatic 
relations with the PRC, to use their good offices to mediate between China and Saudi 
Arabia. Hashim Behbehani (1981) argued that China tried unsuccessfully to use Kuwait 
as a 'stepping stone' in its effort to win Saudi recognition. China, according to 
Behbehani, continued pressing the Kuwaiti government to use its good offices to bring 
about Saudi recognition.'^^ China's Ambassador in Kuwait, Ting Hao, told the Kuwaiti 
daily As-Siyassah on May 2, 1979 that his country would like to establish formal 
relations with Saudi Arabia. He added that China and Saudi Arabia maintain identical 
viewpoints on different international issues. The vice-director of China's National 
Sports Commission, Xu Yunsheng, met the Saudi Minister of Social Affairs and Vice-
President of the Saudi Arabian Football Federation in Malaysia on 15 November 1981. 
Both expressed their hopes for improving the two countries' relations with each 
other.'^^ 
Beijing Review, number 41, 12 October 1981, pp. 11-12. 
Hashim Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, p. 224. 
'^ ^ A. H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, pp. 231-232. 
'^^ The China Quarterly, number 89, March 1982, p. 146. 
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6.3.2.4. Setting the pattern 
China also used its improving relations with the countries of the Gulf and Peninsula 
region to demonstrate to the Saudis that countries of different social and ideological 
beliefs can coexist with China. It was reported by Chinese sources in June 1978 that 
following the establishment of diplomatic relations with Oman, China had started talks 
with Saudi Arabia on the opening of formal relations between the two countr ies .The 
daily South China Morning Post reported on 31 October 1978 that negotiations were 
quietly underway for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two 
countries. The paper observed that in the past six months there had been numerous 
indications that the two countries were preparing to normalise their relations. It 
indicated that Saudi nationals had been visiting China, as private individuals 'but 
obviously with the tacit approval of the Saudi government'. The paper went on to say 
that the establishment of diplomatic relations with Oman was a definite sign because the 
Sultan of Oman, according to the paper, could not have acted without consulting the 
Saudi government.'^^ Despite these reports, Saudi Arabia remained strongly against 
establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, although Riyadh allowed small indirect 
amounts of trade with China (see Table 8 in Appendix 1).'^° 
On November 17, 1981 Premier Zhao shook hands with Crown Prince Fahd at the 
Cancun North-South summit.'^' Although it was not an official meeting, this was the 
first highest meeting between officials from both countries. There was very little 
FBIS-CHI-78-123, 26 June 1978, p. A26. 
FBIS-CHI-78-211, 31 October 1978, p. A26. 
See Martin Harrison, 'Saudi Arabia Foreign Policy: Relations with the Superpowers' in CMEIS 
Occasional Papers, number 46, (University of Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 
1995), p. 35. 
Andrew Tanzer, 'The Saudi Connection', in Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 July 1982, pp. 28-29. 
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publicity from both countries about this meeting, but it did concern Taiwan, who 
already had diplomatic relations with the Kingdom. Shortly after, the Kingdom 
reassured Taiwan that Riyadh had no intention whatsoever to change its policy towards 
Beijing. During his visit to the UAE in 1985, Chinese Vice-Premier Yao Yilin 
mentioned, while speaking at the airport, that it is China's consistent policy to develop 
friendly relations with the Gulf countries, and said: 'we are also willing to develop 
relations with Saudi Arabia'.'''^ While visiting Oman in November 1985 to attend the 
Sultanate 15^ ^ National Day celebrations, Yao Yilin met with Saudi Arabia's Crown 
Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister 'Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud at the A l -
Bustan Palace. The Chinese official used the Palestinian issue to initiate dialogue with 
Saudi Arabia. At the meeting, Yao reiterated China's support of the Palestinian cause 
and the unity of the Arab world. He expressed his country's appreciation of what the 
Kingdom had done to support the Palestinian cause and in the affairs of the region.'^^ 
This meeting marked the second meeting between a Chinese leader and a Saudi Arabian 
leader. Beijing Radio described the meeting as a 'new page in the annals of a 
relationship between China and Saudi Arabia'.'"^"^ 
While visiting the UAE, Chinese Councillor and Foreign Minister, Wu Xueqian said in 
an interview with the UAE daily Al Khaleej on December 23, 1985 that his country was 
interested in establishing diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain. 
However as there were no diplomatic relations with these countries and China, he said 
China could wait. He added that although China had no diplomatic relations with the 
Kingdom, the two countries had contacts in many fields. He also said that China had no 
FBIS-CHI-85-219, 13 November 1985, p. I I . 
FBIS-CHI-85-223, 19 November 1985, p. I I . 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-85-229, 27 November 1985, p. I I . 
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conflict of interests with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain but had identical viewpoints 
with them on the issues of the Middle East, the Iran-Iraq war, and Afghanistan. He 
stressed that with the strengthening of mutual understanding, the day would come for 
China to establish diplomatic relations with these countries. 
6.3.2.5. Using Islam 
China, once again, turned to the use of Islam as an important instrument to achieve its 
foreign policy objective regarding Saudi Arabia. The use of Islam to develop relations 
with other countries had been one of the major tasks of the China Islamic Association. 
During the second session of the fourth committee of the CIA from 13^*^  to 20^ *^  August 
1982, which was attended by several CCP leaders, China pledged to continue to develop 
friendly relations and to conduct academic and cultural exchanges with other Muslim 
countries in order to promote mutual understanding and friendship. 
The year 1979 was the turning point in China's policy towards its own Muslim 
population. Since that year, the Chinese government started to redeem its old practices 
resulting from the Cultural Revolution policies against Muslims in China. Mosques and 
Muslim schools were reopened; copies of the Koran and other Islamic classics were 
printed and distributed to Muslims in China; and by 1990 the number of Muslims 
making the pilgrimage to Mecca increased to over 2,000 annually. China 
consistently sent its Muslim delegations to participate in international Islamic academic 
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symposiums, commemorative meetings and celebration activities. China also 
FBIS-CHI-85-247, 24 December 1985, pp. 11-12. 
'^•^ FBIS-CHI-82-164, 24 August 1982, p. K 23. 
'^ ^ See Beijing Review, number 28, 9-15 July 1990, p. 25. 
Ibid. 
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received Muslim delegations, including a delegation from the Saudi-based World 
Islamic Organisation (Rabetat al 'Alam al Islami) which visited China in May-June 
1981. The delegation visited China's Mushm communities and met with Yang 
Jingren, a high ranking Muslim official in the Chinese government. A donation of 
$500,000 was made by the visiting delegation to the China Islamic Association.'"^ 
Although Chinese organisations, including the China Islamic Association, were 
prohibited by law from accepting foreign contributions, the Chinese government gave 
an exception to the China Islamic Association to accept the Saudi gift.^"^' By allowing 
the Saudi contribution the Chinese government wanted to represent itself favourably to 
the visiting delegation and to show that the Chinese communist regime was not against 
China's Muslim minority. 
Several reasons could have contributed to the changing in China's policies towards its 
Muslim population in 1979. Primarily, China had started to take a more pragmatic and 
open policy with the outside world, with the arrival of the Deng Xiaoping leadership, 
and began introducing integral changes in its internal policies, including the treatment 
of its minorities. Second, Iran, China's main partner in the Gulf region, had achieved a 
revolutionary change by introducing an Islamic government in 1979. China, therefore, 
found it necessary to treat its own Muslims in a means that would not harm its relations 
with Iran. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Mujahedeen military 
operation against the Russian troops demonstrated the significance of Muslims to 
'"^ ^ See Philip Bowring, 'The Tithes that Bind', in Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 January 1982, pp. 
10-11. 
'"^ ^ T.Y.Wang, 'Competing for Friendship: The Two Chinas and Saudi Arabia', in Arab Studies Quarterly, 
volume 15, number 3, Summer 1993, p. 68. 
Yitzhak Shichor, 'East Wind over Arabia', p. 8. 
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China's policy to undermine Soviet influence in Afghanistan in particular and the 
surrounding region in general. 
China encouraged the practice of combining pilgrimage with politics. Chinese Muslim 
pilgrims to Mecca served as ambassadors helping to foster relations with Saudi Arabia. 
The Chinese Muslim pilgrimage delegation to Mecca, led by Ilyas Shen Xiaxi, Vice-
President of the China Islamic Association, attended a state banquet in September 1984 
given by Saudi Arabia's King, Fahd ibn 'Abd al-Aziz. The delegation reportedly 
extended congratulations on the occasion of the Qorban Muslim Festival to the King, 
Crown Prince and First Deputy Minister 'Abdallah, Second Deputy Prime Minister 
Sultan ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, the royal family and principal government officials. It was 
said that the King welcomed Chinese pilgrims to Mecca and wished happiness for all 
Muslims in China.'"^^ A Chinese Muslim delegation headed by Ismail Amat, Chairman 
of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, visited Riyadh in December 1985 and met 
with the Saudi Grand Mufti 'Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Baz.'"^^ The delegation also met with 
the Saudi Vice-Minister of Defence and Aviation, Prince 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abd al-
Aziz.'"^"^ Upon its return to China, Ismail said that during their meetings both sides 
expressed their desire to further economic, cultural, and religious co-operation and 
exchange. The Saudi official, according to Ismail, expressed admiration for the Chinese 
policy of freedom of rehgious belief and the open policy, and hoped that more Chinese 
Muslims would visit the Kingdom.'" '^^  Marouf al-Dawalibi, Chairman of the Muslim 
World Congress and advisor of foreign affairs and religious affairs to the King visited 
FBIS-CHI-84-182, 18 September 1984, p. 14. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-85-231, 2 December 1985, p. I I . 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-85-235, 6 December 1985, p. I I . 
'^-^ FBIS-CHI-85-245, 20 December 1985, p. 12. 
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China and met with Muslim leaders including Mohammed Ali Zhang Jie and Hyas Shen 
Xiaxi. The Chinese Muslim leaders briefed the guest on the position and the role of 
Chinese Muslims in the country's political and economic life and the role of the China 
Islamic Association in promoting Islam in China. Al-Dawalibi reportedly left with a 
very positive image of Islam in China.'"^^ Jamil 'Abd al-Rahman, deputy director of the 
China Hajj Affairs Office of the Saudi Pilgrimage Company visited China in March 
1987. His visit came at the invitation of the China Islamic Association to discuss 
matters related to a Chinese Hajj mission to Mecca proposed for 1987.^ "^ ^ Throughout 
the 1980s the Muslim World Organisation financed many Chinese Muslim students 
Studying in A l Azhar University in Cairo. 
Al l these Chinese and Saudi religious visits were seen as important developments in 
fostering China's relations with Saudi Arabia. China's use of Islam as a foreign policy 
instrument succeeded this time in creating a direct contact between the two peoples. 
'People to people' contact was seen as the first step towards establishing mutual 
understanding of each other. Such contacts created, for the first time, a favourable 
opinion of China among both religious and political leaders in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, 
in a country where the religious leaders have an influential status, Islam cannot be ruled 
out as to have had a powerful influence in Saudi Arabia's decision to foster political 
relations with China in the early 1990s. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-86-201, 17 October 1986, p. 12. 
FBJS-CHI-87-055, 23 March 1987, p. I I . 
""^  Dru C. Gladney, 'Trans-national Islam and Uighar National Identity: Salman Rushdi, Sino-Muslim 
Missile Deals, and the Trans-Eurasian Railway', in Central Asian Survey, volume 11, number 3, 
September 1993, p. 12. 
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6.3.2.6. Conducting business 
China had also used businessmen to develop China's economic links and to promote 
friendship with Saudi Arabia.'"^^ Saudi businessmen visited China and attended the 
Canton trade fair in the early 1980s.'^° In April-May 1985 Haji Husayn Hei Boli, 
Chairman of the Ningxia regional government visited Saudi Arabia; and later a Saudi 
trade delegation visited Yinchuan in November to 'explore ways of promoting 
economic and technological co-operation' with Ningxia Autonomous Region. The 
delegation held talks on co-operation projects in various fields including agriculture and 
the chemical industry.*^' Another delegation of Saudi businessmen-bankers visited 
Ningxia in December 1985 - January 1986 and expressed interests in establishing a 
financial institute in Ningxia.'^^ 
In November 1986 a group of Saudi entrepreneurs, led by former governor of the Saudi 
Monetary Agency (the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia) 'Abd al-Aziz al-Qurayshi, visited 
China and met with Chinese Premier Zhao. Zhao expressed his belief that the visit of 
the Saudi entrepreneurs, whom he called 'envoys', would lead to 'promoting the Sino-
Saudi friendship and economic co-operation'. He said that he would welcome more 
Saudis to visit China in order to pave the way for creating a better understanding, 
establishing friendship, and promoting economic and trade relations between the two 
countries. He hailed Saudi's 'neutral and non-alignment foreign policy', its role in 
safeguarding Arab unity and its support for the cause of the Palestinian people and the 
In regard to China official line on using economic co-operation to further friendly relations see, for 
example, FBIS-CHJ-82-145, 28 July 1982, p. K l l . 
Andrew Tanzer, The Saudi Connection', p. 28. 
FBIS-CHI-85-219, 13 November 1985, p. I I ; and FBIS-CHI-85-223, 19 November 1985, p. 12. 
'"^2 FBIS-CHI-86-002, 3 January 1986, p. I I . 
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struggle of the Afghan and Kampuchean peoples. Zhao reiterated that China and the 
Kingdom hold the same policies on many of the world's issues. Al-Qurayshi conveyed 
thanks from the Saudi government to the Chinese government for its stand on the 
Middle East issue. He also said that the Saudi leaders were grateful to China for its 
efforts in promoting peace and stability in the Gulf and Peninsula region and an early 
end to the Iran-Iraq war.' '"^  
A year later a Chinese delegation of entrepreneurs visited Saudi Arabia for a goodwill 
visit at the invitation of al-Qurayshi. The delegation was headed by the president of the 
China Council for Promotion of International Trade Jia Shi. This was the first Chinese 
delegation, that consisted solely of entrepreneurs, ever to visit the Kingdom.'^"^ The 
delegation was received by Saudi Second Deputy Prince Minister and Defence and 
Aviation Minister, Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-Aziz a l -Sa 'ud .Dur ing its meeting with 
Saudi officials, the delegation expressed China's interest in strengthening co-operation 
with Saudi Arabia in the fields of trade, joint ventures, fairs, investment and labour 
exports. He also hoped that Chinese companies could qualify for project loans and 
assistance from the Saudi Development Fund.'^^ 
In November 1988 China and Saudi Arabia decided to establish commercial 
representative's offices in their capital cities to 'further develop the friendly relations 
and co-operation' between the two countries 'in economic and commercial fields'. The 
decision was signed in Washington by Han Xu, Chinese Ambassador to the U.S., and 
FBIS-CHI-86-221, 17 November 1986, p. I I . 
'-'^ FBIS-CHI-87-223, 19 November 1987, p. 5. 
FBIS-CHI-87-229, 30 November 1987, p. 9. 
FBIS-CHI-87-223, p. 5. 
Chapter six: China's relations with the GCC countries 329 
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. The decision was the result of 
Prince Bandar's mid-October visit to C h i n a . T h e Chinese press reported the Prince 
as stating that the commercial representative's offices were only the first step, and the 
following year relations would develop to the establishment of diplomatic relations.'^^ 
However this was not mentioned during the signing of the memorandum. In an 
interview with Saudi newspaper A/-/?/3^aJ/z Han Xu said: 
The establishment of commercial representative offices in each other's territory 
by China and Saudi Arabia is an important indicator of the positive and steady 
development of friendship and co-operation between the two countries. The 
purpose of all of this is to achieve the normalisation of their relations. 
He added that: 
The Chinese Government is happy with the steady development of the friendship 
and co-operation between China and Saudi Arabia in the trade, political and other 
fields over the past few years. It thinks that there is a sohd foundation for the 
development of friendship and co-operation between the two countries and that 
this is in the fundamental interest of their peoples and beneficial to world peace 
and stability. It hopes that by making joint efforts, the two countries can make 
the relations between China and Saudi Arabia a model of friendship and co-
operation between countries with different social systems and beliefs.*^ 
The Japanese press reported a disagreement between China and the Kingdom over the 
location of the Chinese trade office in Riyadh. According to the report, China 
demanded that its trade office be located in the same Western outskirts of Riyadh where 
other diplomatic missions are located and for its representatives to enjoy diplomatic 
privileges instead of the Saudi proposal to locate the office inside the local industry and 
commerce chamber in R i y a d h . B y insisting on its demands Beijing wanted its trade 
office to look like other diplomatic missions. After accepting China's demand, the 
FBIS-CHI-88-2I9, 14 November 1988, p. 19. 
Ibid. 
'-'^ FBIS-CHI-88-248, 27 December 1988, pp. 13-14. 
FBIS-CHI-89-042, 6 March 1989, p. 11. 
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Chinese trade office in Riyadh became operational in April 1989.'^' It was headed by 
Deng Shaoqin, known among Saudi businessmen as 'Najib', who had a good command 
of Arabic language both spoken and written. In an interview with the Saudi daily Al-
Riyadh on April 5, 1989 Deng Shaoqin said: 
We will work and make efforts to increase mutual understanding, strengthen co-
operation, and develop Saudi-Chinese relations in all fields, so that our relations 
can reach a higher level in the interest of both countries and both peoples. 
The Saudi trade office was subsequently opened in Beijing and Tawfiq Khalid al-
Madar, the Saudi first commercial representative to China, presented his certificate of 
appointment to the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen on 28 August 1989.^ ^^  
Meanwhile, the Ningxia Islamic International Trust and Investment Corporation of 
China signed a contract on April 13, 1989 with the Al-Barakah group of Saudi Arabia to 
jointly set up an international trust and investment company- the Al-Barakah-Ningxia 
Islamic International Trust and Investment Company. The Company is based in 
Yinchuan, capital of the Ningxia (Hui) Muslim Autonomous Region with a registered 
capital of $80 million. Its aim was reported to be the promotion of financial and 
economic co-operation among Muslim regions.^ "^^  
In December 1989 the International Chamber of Commerce of China opened a Chinese 
export exhibition in Riyadh, which was the first of its kind ever held in the Kingdom. 
56 Chinese companies participated in the exhibition from fields such as light industry. 
FBIS-CHI-89-065, 6 April 1989, p. 15. 
FBIS-CHI-89-068, 11 April 1989, p. 12. 
"^^ FBIS-CHI-89-165, 28 August 1989, p. 12. 
'^^ FBIS-CHI-89-065, 6 April 1989, pp. 15-16. 
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textiles, machinery, modern building materials, handicrafts and others. It was reported 
that the Chinese companies had concluded deals worth more than $30 million.'^^ 
As a result of all these business contacts between China and the Kingdom, trade 
relations between the two countries increased substantially in the 1980s. Prior to the 
1981 lifting of the ban on direct imports to the Kingdom from China, trade relations 
were limited to indirect trade through other countries, mainly Hong Kong, Kuwait, 
Oman, and the UAE. However, following the lifting of the ban the Kingdom 
established a direct maritime line between China and Saudi Arab ia .China ' s indirect 
trade relations with the Kingdom in the 1970s were valued at $149 million or about 4 
percent of China's total trade relations with the countries of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region. This value, however, jumped to $2,212 million or just over 22.5 
percent of China's total trade with the countries of the region in the 1980s (see Table 8 
in Appendix 1). China's exports to the Kingdom were dominated by textile yarn, 
fabrics, articles of apparel and clothing accessories, manufacturers of metals, vegetables 
and fruit and food products. China's imports from the Kingdom consisted primarily of 
chemicals, fertilisers, and food products. The Saudi Arabian Basic Industries 
Corporation (SABIC) exported in 1987, 320,000 tons of urea and other petrochemicals 
worth $43 million to a Hong Kong company for re-sale it to C h i n a . I t was reported 
that SABIC was to sell China a total of 340,000 tons of plastic, fertilisers, and other 
chemicals worth $60 million following a visit to the Kingdom by a Chinese trade 
FBIS-CHI-89-243, 20 December 1989, p. 15. 
Yitzhak Shichor, 'East Wind over Arabia', p. 15. 
Ibid., p. 17. 
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delegation headed by Jia Shi. In December 1987 the Kingdom exported 
approximately 300,000 tons of Saudi wheat to China.'^^ 
6.3.2.7. Selling missiles 
China and Saudi Arabia concluded a secret missile deal in March 1988 in which the 
Saudis received an unspecified number of Chinese made DF-3 (known to the West as 
CSS-2) intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), capable of reaching any location in 
the Middle East.'^° The missile is able to carry nuclear and chemical warheads, as well 
as conventional ones. The real cost was not revealed but it was suggested that the 
Kingdom probably paid $3 billion to $3.5 biUion for the missile package.'^' 
The Chinese Foreign Minster Wu Xueqian confirmed on April 6, 1988 that China had 
sold a number of ground-to-ground missiles to Saudi Arabia. He added that the Saudi 
government had promised that it would not transfer, or be first to use, the missile and it 
would use them only for defence purposes. He argued that the sale of Chinese missiles 
to the Kingdom would help stabilise the situation in the region.'^^ Later on it was 
reported in The Sunday Telegraph on March 29, 1992 that the U.S. defence department 
had become convinced that the Kingdom had transferred secrets of the U.S. Patriot anti-
'^'^ Middle East Economic Survey, volume 31, number 8, 30 November 1987, p. A8. 
'® FBIS-CHI-87-250, 30 December 1987, p. 8. 
™ 'Beijing Surprise: Missiles for the Saudis', in Time, 11 April 1988, p. 40. 
Gerald F. Seib, 'Saudi Purchase of Long-Range Missiles Rekindles Debate on U.S. Arms to Arabs', 
The Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition, 4 April 1988, p. 1. 
172 FBIS-CHI-88-066, 6 April 1988, p. 8. 
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missile system to China as part of the East-Wind missile deal/^ "^ The Saudis, however, 
denied the allegation.'^ "^ 
The discussions that led to the acquisition of the Chinese CSS-2 missiles stem from July 
1985 when Prince Bandar visited China after the Saudi government's decision to obtain 
arms from sources other than the U.S.'^^ Since then several meetings had taken place 
between officials from both governments, but nothing was reported to suggest that they 
had discussed the missile deal. When Vice-Premier Yao Yilin met with the Crown 
Prince 'Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-Aziz in Oman, the meeting was described as 'a new page' 
in China-Saudi Arabia relations. When the Chinese entrepreneur delegation visited the 
Kingdom, it met with the Saudi Defence and Aviation Minister. Saudi Minister of 
Agriculture, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shaykh, visited Beijing in January 1988 and it was 
reported that the two sides discussed the situation in the Gulf r e g i o n . Q i Huaiyuan, 
special envoy of the Chinese President Li Xiannian and Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, visited Riyadh in April 1988 as the first senior official of the PRC to visit the 
Kingdom.'^^ There were no public statements or even indications that the two sides 
were negotiating missile deal in all these meetings. Both Beijing and Riyadh wanted to 
keep the missiles deal secret. The two sides arranged for the deal through several secret 
visits by officials from two sides. In 1986 China sent Lieutenant General Gao 
Gangchuan, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the PLA, to Saudi Arabia to discuss 
the deal in detail. His visit was kept secret from the eyes of the West and Taiwan. 
'^ "^  Adrian Porter, 'Patriot Missile Secrets Leaked to China', in The Sunday Telegraph, 29 March 1992, p. 
2. 
'^^ FBIS-NES-92-064, 8 April 1992, p. 11. 
Gerald Seib, 'Saudi Purchase of Long-Range Missiles Rekindles Debate on U.S. Arms to Arabs', p. 1. 
'^"^ FBIS-CHI-88-015, 25 January 1988, p. 7. 
FBIS-CHI-88-064, 4 April 1988, p. 10. 
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Later General Khaled Bin Sultan, Commander of the Saudi Air Defence, was assigned 
to take charge of the missile deal project with China. He visited China secretly four 
times to discuss with Chinese officials the details of their deal. In his book Desert 
Warrior (1995), he outlined his visits to China and his discussion with the Chinese 
officials on the purchase of the East Wind. His visits were conducted by travelling 
trough other Asian countries like Malaysia and Hong Kong. Khaled was the first 
foreigner to visit the site of the East Wind. Saudis were trained in China and the 
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Kingdom to maintain and operate the missiles. 
It was even reported in The Sunday Times, 1 August 1994 that Saudi Arabia tried to buy 
experimental nuclear reactors from China as part of a secret 20-year programme to 
become a nuclear power. According to the paper Prince 'Abd al-Rahman Bin 
Muhammad, the nephew of King Fahd, travelled secretly to China, toured facilities and 
opened negotiations on the purchases of a miniature neutron source reactor in 1989. 
Muhammad Khilaywi, a Saudi diplomat-seeking asylum in the U.S. claimed that the 
Kingdom bought at least two mini-reactors.'^^ 
Why China sold such weapons to a country like Saudi Arabia, which was known as an 
anticommunist state, can be explained in terms of the following points: 
1. Saudi Arabia was one of just three major countries that had full diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan and the only major Arab state that had no diplomatic relations with the 
PRC. Therefore, the deal was intended as a sweetener for Riyadh to recognise 
Beijing. Wu Xueqian said when he confirmed the deal: 
'^ ^ Khaled Bin Sultan and Patrick Scale, Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint 
Forces Commander, pp. 137-152. 
'^ ^ Marie Colvin and Peter Sawyer, 'Riyadh Bargained with Chinese for Nuclear Reactors', in The 
Sunday Times, 7 August 1994, p. 7. 
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We want to see the earliest possible establishment of diplomatic relations with Saudi 
Arabia.'^^ 
2. The timing was most favourable to achieving the above objective and for the 
Chinese government to create a favourable opinion of China among Saudi leaders. 
The Saudi government was in need of a more sophisticated missiles system, taking 
in mind that both Israel and Iran had already possess such system, to deter any 
possible Iranian attack on the Kingdom as the missile war between Iran and Iraq 
reached its highest po in t .However , the Saudi request for the purchase of 48 U.S. 
F-15 fighters and related ground-strike equipment were turned down by its close 
ally, the U.S.'^^ Therefore, the deal was well timed by the Chinese government both 
to demonstrate its willingness to work with the Kingdom, and to present itself as a 
valuable alternative for the Kingdom should the West, mainly the U.S., be unwilling 
to accommodate Saudi military's needs. 
3. The deal would generate much needed foreign exchange income for China's 
military modernisation programme. 
Thus, China's adoption of all of the above foreign policy strategies throughout the 
1980s stemmed from: 
1. Fear of the Soviet's penetration in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region and 
support for the Saudi government's strong opposition to the Soviet's presence in 
Afghanistan and South Yemen; and 
'^ '^  Tai Ming Cheung, 'Proliferation is Good and there's Money in it too', in Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 2 June 1988, p. 26-27. 
Editorial, 'Review & Outlook: East Winds in the Mideast', in The Wall Street Journal, Eastern 
Edition, 22 March 1988, p. 1. 
'^ ^ See John E. Yang and Robert S. Greenberger, 'U.S. Military Sale to Saudis Opposed by 58 Senators', 
in The Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition, 15 April 1988 
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2. The need to eliminate the established political relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Taiwan. 
Therefore, the Chinese paid much more attention to its Saudi policies. They adjusted 
their own policies in regard to its Muslim populations. They also worked to develop 
their relations within the Gulf and Peninsula region in order to set examples to the Saudi 
leaders and to create a new pattern within which two different social systems and 
ideologies can coexist. They also worked hard to develop their economic relations with 
businessmen from the Kingdom. China was also even willing to provide advanced 
military technology to Saudi Arabia. Despite all of the above efforts by the Chinese, 
diplomatic relations between the two countries remained absent. However, the effort 
did create mutual understanding between the two governments, which the Chinese 
perceived as a necessary step that could lead to the establishment of formal relations in 
the near future. 
6.3.3. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
The delayed establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and the Kingdom 
was caused by the issue of Taiwan. The Kingdom wanted to use its diplomacy to foster 
diplomatic relations with both China and Taiwan. But the Chinese government's 
insistence that the Saudis abolish their diplomatic relations with the Taiwanese regime 
as the first step towards fostering political relations with China delayed the process. 
Eventually, the Saudi government realised that the political and military significance of 
the PRC was much more important than the economic significance of Taiwan. Prince 
Bandar, who indicated Saudi's willingness to purchase Chinese missiles, flew to Beijing 
on 9^ '^  July 1990 to discuss the possibility of establishing formal relations with 
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Beijing.^^'^ The Chinese press did not reveal much about the visit and covered it briefly. 
It was reported that meetings between the Prince and Chinese officials covered 'matters 
of mutual concern to the two countries'.'^ "^ 
However, it was the Taiwanese press, the Taipei Central News Agency in particular, 
that revealed that the Prince's visit to Beijing was to negotiate the establishment of 
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official ties."^' The ROC was very concerned about the development and tried to 
maintain diplomatic relations with the Kingdom. Premier Hao Po-tsun instructed his 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to do 'everything possible' to maintain Taiwan's diplomatic 
relations with the K i n g d o m . B u t all the efforts failed to deter the Saudi government 
from its decision to establish formal relations with China. 
Following Prince Bandar's visit to Beijing, Riyadh sent 'Abd al-Aziz bin 'Abdullah al-
Zamil, Minister of Industry and Electricity, to Taipei as a special envoy of the Saudi 
government. Al-Zamil delivered to President Lee Teng-hui a written message from the 
King in which he said that his government had decided to set up official ties with China, 
and asked that the two countries' embassies change into 'representative offices'.'^^ 
Following the Kingdom's move to eliminate official ties with Taiwan, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Qian Qichen visited Saudi Arabia on 20'*^  July on an official 3-day visit at the 
invitation of his Saudi counterpart. This was the first visit to Saudi Arabia by a Chinese 
Gerald F. Seib, 'Gulf Crisis Casts Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar In a High-Visibility Role on the 
Global Stage', in The Wall Street Journal, Eastern Edition, 26 November 1990, p. 12. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/0815, 13 July 1990, p. A4/2. 
'^•'Ibid.,p. A4/1. 
BBC, SWB, FE/0819, 18 July 1990, p. A4/1. 
BBC, SWB, FE/0822, 21 July 1990, p. A4/1. 
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foreign minister. Qian's visit was intended to put the finishing touches to an agreement 
to establish diplomatic relations between the two count r i es .On the second day of his 
visit the two countries signed a communique in Riyadh on the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the People's Republic 
of China. It said: 
The Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia have decided to establish diplomatic relations between the two countries 
at the ambassadorial level as of 29"^  Dhu al-Hujjah 1410 A.H., corresponding to 
2r^ July 1990 AD. The Government of the People's Republic of China supports 
the policy of the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in pursuing of 
achieving its security, stability and national interests. The Government of the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises that the government of the People's 
Republic of China is the sole legitimate government that represents the entire 
Chinese people. The two governments have agreed to develop co-operation and 
friendly relations between the two countries on the basis of the principles of 
mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equity and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence. 
Qichen met on July 22"^ ^ with King Fahd and delivered to him a letter from President 
Yang Shangkun. Yang's letter expressed the Chinese government's happiness over the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries and stressed that this 
development 'does not only respond to the fundamental interests of the two peoples but 
also serves peace and stability in Asia, and in fact the world over'.^^° 
Press in the two countries hailed the establishment of diplomatic relations. An editorial 
in Renmin Ribao, 23^^ July, said: 
China and Saudi Arabia differ in [their] social system and ideology. But both are 
willing to forge and push forward friendly and co-operative ties on the basis of 
the five principles of peaceful co-existence. 
BBC, SWB, ME/0822, 21 July 1990, p. I . 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/0823, 23 July 1990, p. A4/1. 
BBC, SWB, ME/0824, 24 July 1990, p. A/2. 
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The editorial praised Saudi foreign policy stating: 
In foreign affairs, Saudi Arabia pursues a policy of neutrality, non-alignment and 
peace. It upholds that countries should act on mutual respect, good 
neighbourliness and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and should 
co-operate to bring about stability and prosperity.'^' 
The editorial in the government-controlled Al-Riyad, 23^^ July, not only applauded the 
new development but also explained why the Kingdom should pursue diplomatic 
relations with China. It said: 
We do not believe that there is anything exciting or glamorous about the mutual 
recognition between the Kingdom and the PRC or about raising representation 
between them to ambassador level. Especially when we consider that China has 
a notable international status and is moving towards becoming as influential and 
strong as the superpowers, which influence international decisions. China has 
moved towards Muslims and allowed them to perform their rites without any 
pressure or ideological rigidity; and it maintains distinctive stances towards the 
Arabs and their causes...the Kingdom was prompted to regard these practices as 
a realistic factor for establishing these relations between the two countries with a 
view of placing them in their sound and positive context. The two countries' 
need for one another will be beneficial in terms of industrial and agricultural 
products as well as the other joint business over which government and private 
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sectors co-operate. 
The first Saudi ambassador to Beijing, Tawfiq al-Alamdar, who was in charge of the 
Saudi trade representative office in Beijing, presented on August 7^ ^ his letter of 
credence to the Chinese president. The appointment of al-Almadar, a soldier turned 
diplomat, as the Kingdom's Ambassador to Beijing revealed Riyadh's ambitions to 
increase arms trade with Beijing in the future.'^ "^ The first Chinese ambassador to the 
Kingdom Sun Bigan was appointed in September 1990.'^ ^ 
BBC, SWB, FE/0824, 24 July 1990, p. A4/1. 
FBIS-Near East & South Asa (NES)-90-I45, 27 July 1990, pp. 25-26. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/0837, 8 august 1990, p. A4/2. 
See Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior, p. 152. 
BBC, SWB, FE/0871, 17 September 1990, p. A4/1. 
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6.3.4. China and the Kingdom after the establishment of formal relations 
Less than a month after the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the 
Kingdom, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The invasion and the subsequent developments 
presented the first real test for the Chinese government to show how far the Chinese 
government were willing to accommodate its relations with Saudi Arabia and the GCC 
countries. 
Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud bin Faysal travelled to Beijing on 19'^  September. 
He met with Premier L i Peng and President Yang Shangkun respectively. Prince Sa'ud 
reportedly briefed both leaders on the Saudi position towards the crisis and said that the 
Saudi leadership appreciated China's stand of, so far, supporting and favouring the 
relevant UN resolutions and called upon China to 'play a larger role in the future 
resolutions' of the crisis. The Chinese leaders stressed China's stand on the crisis and 
expressed their country's understanding of the measures adopted by the Kingdom and 
other Gulf countries to safeguard their own security. The visit was said to have 
achieved satisfactory results.'^^ Later, in October, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian 
Qichen met with his Saudi counterpart in New York.'^^ The Gulf crisis dominated the 
Chinese-Saudi discussion. In December King Fahd sent a letter to the Chinese 
president through his special envoy 'Abd al-Aziz al-Thunayyan. The letter reportedly 
expressed the King's appreciation to the Chinese government for its position on the 
c r i s i s . N o t h i n g else was reported concerning these contacts. But one could argue 
that the main themes of these contacts were: 
'^ '^  BBC, SWB, FE/0876, 22 September 1990, p. A4/1. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/0888, 6 October 1990, p. A4/1. 
'^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/0950, 18 December 1990, p. A4/1. 
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1. To present the Saudi position in regard to the Iraqi invasion and to its own defence 
measures; 
2. To ensure the support of the Chinese government to the UN resolution relevant to 
the crisis; and 
3. To ensure that the Chinese did not provide military supports to the Iraqi regime. 
Chinese Premier L i Peng visited Saudi Arabia from 9 to 11 July 1991. His visit marked 
the first visit to the Kingdom by a Chinese leader since China and the Kingdom 
established relations. His visit was intended to 'boost the further advancement of the 
friendly and co-operative relations between the two countries'. He called Saudi Arabia 
'an important country in the Middle East and the Gulf region, and an important factor 
for regional peace and stability'.'^^ The Chinese leader discussed with King Fahd and 
his government officials the Gulf crisis, the Palestinian issue, and other international 
issues, as well as ways to expand bilateral political and economic relations.^°° Li 
described his visit as 'successful' and 'fruitful ' . 
China donated, in mid-August 1991, equipment to the Kingdom to help the oil spill 
cleanup efforts in the Gulf. The equipment included a 3,000m railing that could entrap 
oil.^°^ A Muslim delegation visited the Kingdom in December for a friendly visit. It 
was the first of its kind since the establishment of diplomatic relations. The delegation 
was headed by Mohamad Hanafy Wan Yaobin, deputy director of the Bureau of 
'^^ FBIS-NES-91-I33, 11 July 1991, pp. 12-18. 
See the joint communique in FBIS-NES-91-134, 12 July 1991, p. 14. 
Beijing Review, number 29, 22-28 July 1991, pp. 10-11. 
-°- FBIS-CHI-91-139, 19 July 1991, p. 17. 
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Religious Affairs under the State Council.^^^ The Saudi Arabian retired general Prince 
Khalid Bin Sultan Bin Abd al-Aziz visited China in March 1995. He met with 
President Zemin and the Vice-Chairman of China's Central Military Commission and 
Minister of Defence General Chi Haotian. Khalid said: 'a strong China would 
contribute to the peace and development of Asia and the world'.^^"^ However, what he 
meant by 'a strong China' is not clear. But one could assume that as a military man 
himself, his judgement of a state's strength could only mean strength in military terms. 
This assumption is supported by the fact that his visit did not yield any economic or 
social agreements and his meetings were limited to high military officials. He visited 
China again in May of the following year and again met with General Chi Haotian. 
A few days later Chi arrived in the Kingdom and on June 1st visited Saudi Western 
Fleet.^°^ No further details were reported about this visit. A delegation from the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference visited the Kingdom in November 
1996 and met with the Saudi Crown Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister and 
National Guard Commander 'Abdullah. 
Prince 'Abdullah visited China between 14 and 21 October 1998. He was the highest 
ranked Saudi official to ever visit the PRC. His talks with Jiang Zemin embraced 
various bilateral, regional and international issues and revealed a consensus on bilateral 
relations. In a joint communique the two sides expressed satisfaction with the 
development of bilateral ties, and stressed their concern that little progress had been 
made towards a political settlement on the Middle East question. They emphasised the 
'-^^ FBIS-CHI-91-247, 24 December 1991, p. 11. 
-^ ^ BBC, SWB, FE/2267, 1 April 1995, p. G/2. 
BBC, SWB, FE/2617, 21 May 1996, p. G/4. 
^^ '^  BBC, SWB, FE/2628, 3 June 1996, p. G/2; and FE/2630, 5 June 1996, G/1. 
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importance of the Jerusalem issue and the necessity of not undertaking any unilateral 
measures that could prejudice the final status negotiations over the city. They called on 
Syria and Israel to resume negotiations and they also urged the implementation of UN 
resolution 4216 on L e b a n o n . I n April 1999 Prince Salman ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, the 
governor of Riyadh Province, visited China. He was received by the Beijing Mayor and 
discussed bilateral co-operation in such fields as urban infrastructure, real estate, 
transportation and entertainment facilities. He was also received by the Chinese 
Defence Minister, Chi Haotian, and President Jiang Zemin. President Jiang paid a 4-
day visit to the Kingdom on 31^' October 1999. His visit marked the first visit ever by a 
Chinese president and the first visit ever by Jiang to any country in the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region. He met with King Fahd, stating that China, as a permanent 
member of the UN Security Council, would continue with its efforts to promote peace 
and stability in the Gulf region and the entire Middle East.^ ^^  It was said that the two 
sides had decided to form 'a political and economic partnership'. 
Despite no elaboration on the so-called 'partnership', one can argue that both countries 
recognised the political and economic weights of one another. China's political 
importance as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and its relatively 
advanced military arsenal, elevated China's significance to the Saudi leaders. On the 
other side, Saudi economic power and its political status in the region strengthened 
China's interest in the Kingdom. 
Saudi Economic Survey, volume 32, number 1589, 21 October 1998, p. 2; and China Quarterly, 
volume 157, March 1999, p. 272. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3514, 21 April 1999, p. G/5. 
^'^'^ China Daily, Hong Kong Edition, volume 3, number 22, 2 November 1999, p. 1. 
Beijing Review, number 46, 15 November 1999, p. 6. 
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The groundwork for this 'partnership' had already been laid down by the two 
governments. Economically, which will be discussed in more details later, the two 
countries had achieved a substantial improvement in relations. Politically, the Chinese 
have worked to fulf i l their commitments to the UN Security Council towards issues 
related to the Gulf and Peninsula region and the Middle East. They continued to 
support or at least not oppose the UN resolutions related to Iraq, and continued their 
support for the Palestinian, as well as other Arab causes. Most importantly, China has 
become a very valuable source of advanced weapons to the Kingdom. In addition to the 
missile deal of 1988 and the alleged nuclear reactors deal of 1989, Western reports 
alleged that China-Saudi military co-operation had not been halted in the 1990s. It was 
reported in January 1991 that China had shipped 12 nuclear warheads to Saudi 
Arabia.^'' Both sides denied the allegation and called it 'groundless'. The New York 
Times Current Events Edition in its March 5* 1992 issue called for investigation into 
why Chinese missile technologists keep visiting a plant in Hama. The paper claimed 
there was enough evidence to suggest the Chinese were attempting to circumvent 
agreements made in a missile non-proliferation pact.^ ^^ 
6.3.5. China-Saudi economic relations 
Economic relations between China and the Kingdom have continued to increase since 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. In August 1993 a 
high-level delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade 
visited the Kingdom. Later, the two sides signed a trade and economic co-operation 
^" BBC, SWB, FE/0970, 15 January 1991, p. I . 
William Satire, 'China's Hama Rules', The New York Times Current Events Edition, 5 March 1992, p. 
A27. 
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agreement in Beij ing.^Another trade delegation visited the kingdom in August from 
the Muslim city of Jinan in Shandong Province to explore co-operation between the city 
and the Kingdom in the export of labours, joint exploitation of Jinan's mineral 
resources, joint ventures in the building materials, contracting, foodstuffs, consultancy 
and livestock sectors.^ '"^  In May, Saudi Arabia's Al-Zamil Steel Building Company 
won its first order from China for a $2 miUion steel structure for an air-conditioning 
plant in Shenzhen. 
In November 1993 the Kingdom approved China's status as the preferential state in 
terms of trade. A Chinese-Saudi Arabian economic conference was held in Beijing 
on 21^* March 1994. It was attended by some 100 Chinese and Saudi Arabia 
businessmen and government o f f i c i a l s . I n February 1996 the first meeting of the 
Si no-Saudi Arabian Mixed Trade and Economic Committee was held in Beijing. The 
meeting was co-chaired by Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Co-
operation, Wu Yli and Saudi Minister of Finance, Ibrahim al-Assaf.^ ^^ 
The value of China's trade relations with the Kingdom jumped from $71 million in 
1989 to $525 million in 1991, $1,027 million in 1994, and $1,588 in 1996. This 
substantial increase led the Kingdom to become China's the leading trade partner in the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region by 1996, accounting for more than 30.5 percent of 
^'^ Mushtak Parker, 'Saudi-China: Chinese Trade Takes o f f , in The Middle East, October 1993, p. 29. 
'-'^Ibid. 
'^•^  Ibid. 
^'^ FBlS-NES-93-211, 3 November 1993, p. 33. 
FBIS-CHI-94-056, 23 March 1994, p. 7. 
^'^ BBC, SWB, FE/2548, 29 February 1996, p. G l . 
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China's exports and 23.2 percent of China's imports from the region from 1990 to 1996. 
China's exports to the Kingdom consisted mainly of refined sugar crystal, textiles, 
cassette-type magnetic tapes, furniture, silk carpets, machinery, foodstuffs. While the 
Kingdom's main exports to China were petrochemicals, fertilisers, and wheat.^ ^^ The 
National Shipping Co. of Saudi Arabia (NSCSA) started in May 1995 services for 
China's Tianjin port, after launching operations at Shanghai port the previous year. 
NSCSA was the first Arab shipping firm to do business with China.^ ^^ 
In the oil field, China is not yet a major recipient of Saudi oil mainly because the quality 
of the Saudi crude oil is not accessible for the existing Chinese refineries. However, the 
Chinese officials have always stressed their country's willingness to conduct oil 
agreements and ventures with the Kingdom in order to meet China's short and long 
term needs of oil.^^' When vice-premier for foreign economic relations and trade Li 
Lanqing visited the Kingdom in July 1993, he signed on behalf of the China National 
Oil Company (CNOC) an oil deal with Saudi Aramco to import 3 million tons of crude 
oil from the Kingdom.^^^ Although it was not stated when the imports would start. Wu 
Yi China's minister of foreign trade and economic co-operation expressed in March 
1996 her country's desire to increase its import of Saudi crude oil, petrochemicals, and 
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fertilisers-China was already the biggest market for fertilisers from Saudi Arabia. 
She added that despite the fact that China lacks the ability to process certain Saudi 
Arabian crude oil, China imported 300,000 tons of crude oil from the Kingdom in 1995 
^'^ Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Foreign Trade Statistics, (Central Department of 
Statistics, 1997). 
FBIS-CHI-95-068, 10 April 1995, p. 16. 
BBC, SWB, MEW/0416 WME, 2 January 1996, p. 10. 
Mushtak Parker, 'Saudi-China: Chinese Trade Takes o f f , p. 29. 
^-^ China Economic Review, May 1995, pp. 22-30. 
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(or 3 percent of its total oil import in that year), in addition to 440,000 tons of urea in 
1994. She pointed that China was building a refinery to process this type of crude 
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oil. The completion of which would result in increased crude oil imports from Saudi 
Arabia. 
The Chinese also continued to urge Saudi Arabia to invest in the development of 
Chinese refineries. Several meetings between officials from the two countries met in 
each other's capital and discussed plans for a joint venture for refining in China. There 
were in fact two joint venture refining projects in China in which Saudi Aramco had 
negotiated with Chinese officials. One was a project for which Saudi Aramco and its 
South Korean partner Ssangyong would join China's Sinochem to build in 1997 a new 
refinery designed to run mainly Saudi crude at the northeastern port city of Qingdao, in 
Shandong province. Its capacity was said to be in the range of 200,000-300,000 b/d and 
a total cost of $1.5 billion. Aramco would hold a 45 percent stake in the project. The 
refinery once completed would allow China to import 3.5 million tons of Saudi oil 
annually.^^^ The other project, which the Saudis negotiated with the Chinese, was the 
expansion of an existing 170,000 b/d refinery at Maoming in Guandong province in 
south China to reach 270,000 b/d. The project was estimated to cost $1 b i l l i o n . O n 
October 13,1997 Aramco, American Exxon and Chinese companies based in Wuhan 
signed an agreement for a joint petrochemical project in Wuhan province, in Southeast 
China. The project included increasing the capacity of a refinery in the region from 
80,000 b/d to 240,000 b/d. The project also included the setting up of new distillation 
BBC, SWB, FE/2549, 1 March 1996, G/3. 
^^ "^  'World Wire: Refinery Venture set in China', The Wall Street Journal, 6 August 1996, p. 4; and 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 39, number 12, 18 December 1995, p. A3. 
226 Ibid. 
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and breaking units, which could produce some Ught oil and petrochemical products. It 
also included marketing and distribution operations in the province?^^ 
A delegation from China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) signed in June 1997 a 
crude oil export deal with Saudi Aramco to increase Saudi Arabia crude supplies to 
China from its 1997 level of 30,000 b/d to 60,000 b/d.^ ^^ During President Jiang 
Zemin's October-November 1999 visit to the Kingdom the two sides signed several co-
operation agreements including one covering oil. No further details have been given 
about the oil agreement. Jiang was said to have discussed the construction of a $1 
billion refinery and petrochemicals complex in China's southern province of Guandong 
with Saudi assistance that would use Saudi oil.^^^ 
BBC, SWB, MEW/0509 WME, 21 October 1997, p. 14. 
See OPEC Bulletin, volume 28, number 7, July 1997, p. 20; and Middle East Economic Digest, 
volume 41, number 44, 31 October 1997, p. 3. 
www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin.../s/w-me/1999/nov/03/110300614.htm^, p. 1. 
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6.4. China and the UAE 
6.4.1. China and the UAE prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
Due to their dependence on Britain, China's view of the Sheikhdoms prior to the 
establishment of the UAE was highly critical. This was evident in China's increasing 
political, ideological, and material support for the South Yemenis and the PFLOAG's 
efforts to carry on its policy of liberating the whole region from Britain and its so-called 
'lackeys', namely the governments of the Gulf countries. However, as China's foreign 
policy began to shift towards pragmatism in the region, it began by 1971 to hail the 
Sheikhdoms' efforts to pursue unity among them and to manage their own affairs 
following the British withdrawal from the region. 
Sheikh Zaid Bin Sultan al-Nahayyan, President of the newly proclaimed UAE, sent a 
message to the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai on 3*^^ December 1971 on the founding of 
the UAE. The message said: 
It gives me great pleasure to bring to Your Excellency's notice that the Emirates 
of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Qawain and Fujairah, fol lowing 
the termination of the treaties previously held between them and the United 
Kingdom, have decided, on this day, 2"^ * December 1971, to unite and fo rm 
among themselves the State of the United Arab Emirates and to declare it as an 
independent State with complete sovereignty. The State declares its adherence to 
the Charter of the United Nations and that of the Arab League. It also expresses 
its belief in the necessity of peaceful coexistence between all nations and 
international co-operation in all fields and confirms its intention to preserve the 
international peace. While expressing the willingness of my people and 
Government to strengthen all relations with your Excellency's people and 
Government, I send Your Excellency's health, happiness and for your people's 
• ^  230 
prosperity. 
Premier Zhou responded on the S"^  December with a message to Sheikh Zaid informing 
him of the Chinese government's decision to recognise the UAE. The message said: 
BBQ SWB, FE/3861, 10 December 1971, p. A4/1. 
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I thank your Highness for your friendly message addressed to me on the occasion 
of the independence of your country. I wish to take this opportunity to inform 
your Highness that the Chinese Government has decided to recognise your 
country. May the United Arab Emirates enjoy prosperity and its people 
happiness. May the friendship between the people of China and the United Arab 
Emirates develop continuously. 
In both letters the two sides expressed willingness to further political and economic 
relations between the two countries. However, the furthering of mainly political 
relations did not take place immediately. From the Chinese view, China preferred to 
wait for several days before it extended its recognition to the UAE. This was mainly 
due to China's newly established diplomatic relations with Iran. China wanted to wait 
and see the Iranian reaction first before it publicised its own decision. Iran and the UAE 
emirate of Sharjah and the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, who later joined the union, had 
territorial disputes over the Iranian occupation on 30^ ^ November 1971 of Sharjah's 
island of Abu Musa and Ras al-Khaimah's islands of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs.^ ^^ 
China avoided, at least publicly, taking sides on the islands issue. When Iran 
recognised the UAE on 4'*^  December, China felt at ease to extend its recognition to the 
new federation. It could be argued that in regard to the Iranian occupation of the 
islands, China, for several reasons, was not in a position to criticise the Iranian action. 
The Chinese government did not want to severe its newly established diplomatic 
relations with Iran, which started just over three months earlier. It could also be said 
that the Chinese government felt that Iran was exercising its right to f i l l the power 
vacuum in the region in order to prevent the Soviet Union from taking the initiative 
there. A policy the Chinese perceived as essential to the security of the region from the 
domination of the Soviet Union. It could also be argued that the Chinese was following 
the American line, which did not condemn the Iranian action. 
231 Ibid. 
•^'^  For a discussion about this issue see Hassan Hamdan al-Alkim, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab 
Emirates, (London: Saqi Books, 1989), pp. 140-145. 
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In his message to Premier Zhou, Sheikh Zayid avoided mentioning the issue of UAE's 
recognition of the PRC. Thus, the UAE did not reciprocate China's recognition. So, 
why then did the UAE send a message to the Chinese government expressing its 
willingness for strengthening 'all relations' with China? A. Abidi argues that Sheikh 
Zayid's message might have been aimed at strengthening his state position vis-a-vis 
Saudi Arabia in the context of the border dispute over the Buraimi oasis and against Iran 
in the wake of the latter's occupation of the islands.^ ^^ But if that is the case then why 
did the UAE still refuses to establish diplomatic relations with China? This was said to 
be partly due to the overbearing influence of Saudi Arabia and partly because of the 
Chinese support to the revolutionary movements in South Yemen and Oman.^ "^^  While 
there is no true evidence to suggest that the Kingdom prevented the UAE from 
recognising China, one could argue that the newly established state of the UAE did not 
want to conflict with the Kingdom's policy towards China. The UAE's government 
recognised the Kingdom's poHtical weight in the region, particularly when it submitted 
to the Saudi territorial claims of its territory in the early 1970s in order to receive its 
political recognition. It also followed the Saudi policy lines in Yemen and Oman. This 
indicates that the UAE was interested, in its early days, in avoiding contrasting the 
Kingdom's foreign policies, which in turn might have prevented the UAE from 
establishing diplomatic relations with China. 
Until the establishment of diplomatic ties between the two countries in November 1984, 
relations remained limited to economic spheres. A delegation from the Abu Dhabi 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry visited China in October 1978, at the invitation of 
"^^"^  A. H.H. Abidi, China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf, p. 226. 
^^ '^  See ibid., p. 226; and Hassan al-Alkim, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, p. 13, and 79. 
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the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade. The delegation was led by 
Sa'id Ahmad al-'Utayba. The delegation visited the Canton Fair and held business talks 
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with Chinese companies. At the beginning of 1980, the Civil Aviation 
Administration of China signed an agreement on air service with the Sharjah Civil 
Aviation Administration. Since then most of China's civil airlines flying to Europe 
stopped at Sharjah. ' The Ruwais Fertiliser Industries Company (FERTIL), which is 
owned by the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and Compagnie Francaise 
des Petroles (CFP), reached in 1984, long-term contracts for the export of up to 100,000 
tons/year of ammonia and urea fertilisers to Japan's Mitsubishi company for re-export 
to China.^ ^^ Trade relations, mainly Chinese exports, had increased between the two 
countries despite the absence of political relations. The value of Chinese exports to the 
UAE rose from $3.81 milhon in 1969 to $34.86 million in 1974, then to $80.71 million 
in 1979, and to $100.67 miUion in 1981 (see Table 9 in appendix 1). China's exports to 
the UAE were dominated by textiles, light industrial goods, and meat and vegetables. 
The increase in trade relations between the two countries could be related to the 
following two main points: 
1. The increasing role of Dubai as a trade-point in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
region; and 
2. The lack of any foreign political pressure on the UAE, due to the absence of 
political relations with Taiwan. 
FBlS-CHI-208, 26 October 1978, p. A28. 
Beijing Review, number 52, 21-31 December 1989, p. 5. 
^•^^ Middle East Economic Survey, volume 27, number 22, 12 March 1984, p. A6. 
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6.4.2. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
China and the UAE established diplomatic relations on November 1^ ^ 1984. A joint 
communique said: 
Out of a common desire to strengthen and develop the friendly relations and co-
operation between the two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of 
China and the Government of the United Arab Emirates have decided to establish 
diplomatic relations between the two countries at ambassadorial level. 
On the establishment of diplomatic relations with the UAE, the Renmin Ribao wrote: 
The establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the UAE entirely 
conforms with the common interest and aspiration of the peoples of the two 
countries. This indicates that the friendship between the Chinese people and the 
peoples in the Persian Gulf area has been developing profoundly. The Chinese 
people express their warm congratulations on this. 
The paper went on to hail the UAE's foreign policy and said: 
In intemational affairs the UAE government has pursued a neutral and non-
aligned policy. It has supported the just stmggle of the Palestinian people and 
opposed the aggressive and expansionist acts of Israel. It has advocated that the 
Persian Gulf countries strengthen their unity, iron out their differences, and solve 
their disputes through peaceful means and consultations. It has opposed 
interference in the internal affairs of the Persian Gulf area by foreign forces. The 
just stand of the UAE has been highly praised by the Third World countries and 
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their peoples. 
The UAE newspaper Al Kahleej said that the decision made by the government of the 
UAE to establish diplomatic ties with China was in line with the UAE's policy on non-
alignment and its rejection of international polarisation in the Gulf region. The paper 
stressed that the UAE's foreign policy was based on keeping balanced relations with the 
big powers so as to help avoid polarisation in the region.^ '^ ^ The UAE Al Wahdah 
Beijing Review, number 46, 12 November 1985, pp. 10-11. 
FBIS-CHI-84-216, 6 November 1984, p. I I . 
'^^ ^ Ibid., p. 12. 
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newspaper in its Monday 26 issue of December 1985 said that the UAE wants to 
develop its relations with China because China has long advocated Arab causes and 
taken a positive stand over the Arab-Israeli dispute and the issue of international 
security and peace. The paper added that: 
China's attitude deserves respect as its foreign policy is based on mutual respect 
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries, quahty and 
peaceful coexistence.^ "^ ^ 
China's success in establishing relations with the UAE was significant, politically and 
economically. Politically, the UAE was among four countries in the region that did not 
recognise Beijing and maintain ties with Taipei. Economically, the UAE could present 
a potential market for Chinese goods and a long-term suppher of oil to meet China's 
growing demand for oil in the twenty first century. The two UAE newspapers 
summarise the reasons behind the UAE's decision to establish diplomatic relations with 
China. It could be argued, therefore, that the political and strategic importance of China 
contributed to the UAE's decision. The UAE saw China as a valuable power to enable 
the UAE government to balance its relations with Iran, while exerting some influence 
on Beijing's military co-operation with Tehran. Thus the UAE government came to 
realise the significance of engaging China rather than isolating it in order to achieve its 
foreign policy's objectives. Here, however, we should mention that the Kingdom 
remained an important factor in allowing the UAE to step towards establishing 
diplomatic relations with China. As mentioned earlier, the absence of political and any 
other forms of contacts between the Kingdom and China prevented the UAE from 
establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC in the early 1970s. However, this had 
changed. The Kingdom itself had started to pursue some cultural and economic 
contacts with China since the late 1970s. Such a development could have signalled the 
FBIS-CHI-85-249, 27 December 1985, pp. 11-12. 
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'go light' to countries like the UAE and Oman to forge cultural, economic, and even 
political contacts with China. 
6.4.3. China and the UAE after the establishment of diplomatic relations 
Relations between China and the UAE were strengthened through inter-governmental 
contacts. The first official visit between the two countries after the establishment of 
diplomatic relations came from China's Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the NPC and Chairman of the China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
(CITIC), Ron Yiren, in December 1984.^ "^ ^ Ron's visit was said to formally establish 
and further improve the economic relations between the two countries.^ "^ ^ 
On February 26, 1985 China's Minister of Urban and Rural Construction and 
Environmental Protection, Rui Xingwen, headed a delegation to Abu Dhabi for an 
official visit to the UAE. Rui was the highest Chinese official to visit the UAE since 
the two countries established diplomatic relations. It was reported that the Chinese 
official discussed the Iran-Iraq war with UAE officials. He reiterated his country's 
belief that a peaceful solution was the only way to end the war. It was said that Rui 
ensured the UAE government that his country would not establish diplomatic relations 
with Israel unless 'the Palestinian people's inalienable rights are restored and Israel 
stops its expansion in the Middle East'.^ "^ "^  President Sheikh Zayid received a letter from 
the Chinese President inviting him to visit China. The UAE president reportedly 
accepted the invitation.^"^^ 
FBIS-CHI-84-236, 6 December 1984, p. 12. 
FBIS-CHI-84-242, 14 December 1984, p. 14. 
FBIS-CHI-85-039, 27 February 1985, p. I I . 
2^ *-' FBIS-CHI-85-143, 25 July 1985, p. I I . 
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In November Chinese Vice-Premier Yao Yilin visited the UAE and met with President 
Sheikh Zayid. Yao's visit was the first by a high ranked Chinese government official 
ever to visit the UAE. At a meeting with the UAE President Yao told Sheikh Zayid that 
China appreciated the non-aligned foreign policy of the UAE. He spoke highly of the 
role played by the UAE in promoting Arab unity and peace in the region and its support 
for the Palestinian struggle. Sheikh Zayid praised China's policy of not interfering in 
the internal affairs of other countries. In reference to China's position on the 
superpowers, he pointed out that other big powers interfered in the internal affairs of 
other countries and said 'we must keep vigilance against these powers'. He also 
appreciated China's policy towards its own Muslim population.^ "^^ During his visit the 
two countries signed an agreement on economic, trade, and technological co-
operation.^ '^ '^  The agreement covered the establishment of a committee of deputy trade 
ministers, which would meet regularly to expand economic ties and explore joint 
ventures in such fields as oil and tourism. Commenting on the agreement, the Chinese 
official said: 
We welcome investment not only f rom the govemment but also f rom the private 
sector, and our country has the capacity to provide manpower and technology and 
you could contribute by financing these projects. 
He also said that Beijing would increase its imports from the UAE and was considering 
oil, aluminium and petrochemicals.^ "^^ China in 1985 was the third top buyer of 
FBIS-CHI-85-220, 14 November 1985, p. I I . 
'-^'^ FBIS-CHI-85-222, 18 November 1985, p. I I . 
248 Middle East Economic Survey, volume 29, number 6, 18 November 1985, pp. A5-A6. 
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aluminium from the Dubai Aluminium Company (Dubai) with 19,280 tons following 
the U.S. with 34,314 tons in second place and Japan with 42,456 tons in first place.""*^  
A month later, Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian visited Abu 
Dhabi for a two-day visit to the UAE. He was the first Chinese foreign minister and the 
second high ranked Chinese official to pay an official visit to the UAE since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations. As other Chinese officials who visited the UAE, 
Wu praised in a meeting with the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs Rashid 
'Abdullah al-Nu'aymi the UAE foreign policy in trying to bring a peaceful end to the 
Iran-Iraq war. He noted that China highly appreciated the 'good-neighbour policy' of 
the UAE and its position for settling disputes in the region through peaceful means and 
dialogue.^^^ Most importantly, Wu's visit came twenty days after the announcement of 
the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and the Soviet Union on 28 
November 1985. During their meetings the UAE official echoed Chinese foreign policy 
interests. He assured him that the rapprochement with the Soviet Union would not be at 
the expense of relations with China, who was up to that time refusing to normalise its 
relations with Moscow, and would not change the UAE's position in regard to the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan. ' 
In January 1986 a protocol on trade and co-operation was signed in Abu Dhabi under 
which China's first centre for promoting China's international trade was opened in Abu 
D h a b i . C h i n a ' s National Metal and Minerals Export and Import and China's Ever-
^"^^ Middle East Economic Survey, volume 29, number 17, 3 February 1986, p. A l 1. 
FBIS-CHI-85-249, 27 December 1985, p. I I . 
Al Ittihad, 24 November 1985, p. 1 and p. 8. 
FBIS-CHI-86-005, 8 January 1986, p. I I . 
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bright contracted Um al-Quwain Aluminium Company (UMALCO) to purchase 65 
percent or 120,000 ton/year of its output for a period of 12 years starting from 1986.^ "^^  
A delegation from China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Regional People's 
Government, headed by Tomur Dawamat, visited the UAE and met with the ruler of 
Sharjah Emirate, Sheikh Sultan Bin Muhammad al-Qasimi in December 1986. The 
delegation held talks with Sharjah Chamber of Commerce and Industry to improve 
economic and trade links between the two regions.^ "^^  
Rashid 'Abdullah al-Nu'aymi visited China in April 1987. His visit marked the first by 
a UAE minister to China. He discussed the Iran-Iraq war, the situation in the Gulf, the 
Strait of Hormuz and the Palestinian question with his counterpart. Al-Nu'aymi 
explained his country's concern over the escalation of the war in the Gulf. The Chinese 
side, reportedly, shared UAE's concerns over these issues. Premier Zhao, in a separate 
meeting with the visiting minister, said that China was concerned with the Hormuz 
Strait where navigation was under threat and: 
We disapprove jeopardising navigation of this international channel by any 
country under whatever name or using whatever methods. 
He reaffirmed China's position of 'strict neutrality' towards Iran and Iraq. Nothing else 
was reported about this visit. The delegation expressed its government's desire to see 
China use its good relations with Iran to foster peaceful settlement of the war, which 
'^^'^ Middle East Economic Survey, volume 29, number 39, 7 July 1986, pp. A6-A7. 
FBIS-CHI-86-237, 10 December 1986, p. 12. 
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proclaimed Abu Dhabi's Abu-Bakush offshore oil platform as its latest victim in 
November 1986.^ ^^ 
The first economic delegation from the UAE to visit China after the establishment of 
diplomatic relations was a delegation from the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry in June 1987. It was led by President of the Chamber, Sa'id Juma al-Nabudah 
and was received by Yao Yilin. The al-Aotaba Group of the UAE started in 1987 to 
discuss with the Chinese government the possibility of investment in the building an oil 
refinery with an annual handling capacity of 3 million tons of oil in the Shenzhen 
special economic zone in Guandong Province. The Investment involved some $324-
360 million.^''^ The UAE firm would undertake to provide the crude feedstock from the 
UAE for the refinery and to market the products overseas .The final agreement on 
the project was reached in June 1988. The refinery was said to be the largest foreign 
investment project approved by China in 1988. It was also the Chinese first project the 
UAE invested in.^''^ A UAE economic and trade delegation headed by Economic and 
Commerce Minister, Sayf Bin ' A l i al-Jarwan visited China in November 1988. The two 
sides signed accord minutes of the first session of the joint commission for trade and 
economic and technical co-operation. The accord minutes focused on bilateral co-
FBIS-CHI-87-080, 27 April 1987, p. I ; and for the bombing of the oil platform see Trevor Mostyn, 
Major Political Events in Iran, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula, (New York: Facts on File Limited, 
1991), p. 227. 
FBlS-CHI-87-121, 24 June 1987, p. F4. 
2-'^ FBIS-CHI-87-133, 13 July 1987, p. F2. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 39, number 52, 5 October 1987, p. A6. 
259 FBIS-CHI-88-168, 30 August 1988, p. 17. 
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Operation in the fields of trade, labour contract, and technique.^ ^^ In 1988 China 
imported 24,000 metric tons of natural gas liquefication from the UAE.^^^ 
Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun visited the UAE in March 1989 and met with Sheikh Zayid 
and delivering a letter from the Chinese President. It was said that the letter contained 
an official invitation for Sheikh Zayid to visit China. Tian was the first Chinese leader 
to visit the UAE since November 1985 when Vice-Premier Yao Yilin paid a visit. He 
held talks with Defence Minister Sheikh Muhammad Bin Rashid al-Maktum, who was 
also in charge of the free zone affairs, on the possibility of utilising UAE natural gas. 
He also met with Sheikh Sultan ruler of Sharjah. Seven months later the Chinese 
President Yang Shangkun paid a one-day official goodwill visit to the UAE at the 
invitation of the UAE government. He arrived on December 23, 1989 after visiting 
Cairo. President Yang was the first Chinese president to visit the UAE. During his 
meeting with Sheikh Zayid, he reaffirmed his country's position on the Gulf conflict 
and said: 
As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China will play its due role 
in helping push forward the Iran-Iraq peace talks together with the international 
community. 
On China's relations with the UAE Yang said: 
The Sino-UAE relations are based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
and completely comply with the mutual interests of the two countries. 
2'''° FBIS-CHI-88-222, 17 November 1988, p. 17. 
UAE Statistical Yearbook 1992, (Abu Dhabi: Department of Planning, 1993), p. 145. 
-^^ FBlS-CHl-89-052, 20 March 1989, pp. 11-12. 
FBIS-CHI-89-246, 26 December 1989, p. 8; see also 'Sino-UAE Ties Solid and Friendly', in Beijing 
Review, number 21,21 May 1990, p. 9. 
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Ahmed al-Hosani, Charge d'affairs and interim of the UAE Embassy in Beijing, 
described the Chinese President's visit to the UAE as 'an historical event in the 
relationship between the two countries'.^ ^"^ 
It is important to mention that President Yang's visit came as part of his tour to the Gulf 
countries and Egypt. He visited Egypt, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman. His visit came 
after the Chinese government's military crackdown on the student demonstrations in 
Tiananmen Square and the subsequent Western and Japanese economic sanctions 
against China. Therefore, Yang's visits might have been directed towards ensuring to 
the Gulf governments that China's policies towards them had not changed and that 
China would continue working to implement a peaceful settlement to the Iran-Iraq 
dispute. He might have also came to ensure the Gulf governments that China's opening 
economic policy would continue. It is also important to note that unlike the West and 
South East Asian countries, Egypt and the Gulf countries did not criticise China's harsh 
treatment of the demonstrators and considered them as the internal affairs of China. 
Therefore, his visit might have also been directed towards thanking the governments of 
these countries for their refusal to comply with sanctions imposed by the West or 
criticise the Chinese government's action. 
In May 1990 Sheikh Zayid visited China for a five-day official goodwill visit. His visit 
was the first by the UAE President and a GCC leader to China. He was received by 
President Yang on May 8"\ The Chinese President pointed out in his banquet speech: 
Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, the friendly, co-operative relations 
between the two countries have developed in a satisfactory manner, because the 
two countries hold identical or similar stands on major intemational issues and 
because the people of the two countries are peace-loving and dedicated to 
constmction, upholding justice, and respecting each other. 
FBIS-CHI-89-241, 18 December 1989, p. 10. 
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He added: 
We value the great importance attached by Your Excellency the President and the 
govemment of the UAE to developing friendly ties with China. The development 
of friendly, co-operative relations with the UAE and other Gulf nations also 
occupies a very important position in China's foreign policy. 
Such rhetoric has always appeared in the Chinese officials' statements to officials from 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. They have always emphasised having common 
views with the countries of the region in regards to many issues in and around the 
region. The fact remains that China and the UAE have adopted different practices with 
regard to many issues in the region. For example, despite China's neutrality in the Iran-
Iraq war, China was the largest arms supplier to Iran and allegedly provided Iran with 
some advanced military capabilities. On the other hand, the UAE supported Iraq in the 
war and provided a substantial assistance to the Iraqi regime. This difference, therefore, 
could have played a significant role in planning for Sheikh Zayid's visit to China. The 
purpose of his visit, in addition to what had been reported as to promote political, 
economic, and cultural ties with China, could be looked at also from a security 
perspective. The UAE might have felt for the need for a high level direct talk with the 
Chinese officials about their military co-operation with Iran, and perhaps for joint co-
operation between the two countries in the military field, similar to that of China and 
Saudi Arabia. It is worth noting that among the high ranked UAE officials who 
accompanied him to China were his Minister of Defence Sheikh Muhammad Bin 
Rashid al-Maktum, and his Commander of the Air Force and Air-Defence Corps Sheikh 
Muhammad Bin Zayid al-Nahayyan. 
Sheikh Zayid's speech covered the UAE's praise of China's foreign policy stance 
towards Palestine, the Gulf region, and the Pakistan-India dispute. He also hailed the 
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Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that governed China's relations with the 
UAE. Sheikh Zayid met separately with Chinese Premier L i Peng and the CCP 
General Secretary Jiang Zemin. He also visited Shanghai and met with its mayor Zhu 
Rongji. It was reported that Sheikh Zayid regarded the results of his visit as 'much 
better than expected'. Several economic, trade and technical agreements were signed 
by the two sides. But most importantly the visit was said to have achieved its 
intended aim, which was to strengthen the already established relations between the two 
countries and to establish a common view towards international and regional issues. 
6.4.4. China and the UAE in the 1990s 
China-UAE relations had improved substantially after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. Within only five years of their formal relations 
both the Chinese President and the UAE President had visited each other's countries. 
Political and economic relations continued to grow between them throughout the 1990s. 
Sheikh Sultan of Sharjah visited China in May 1991 and met with the Chinese 
President. Sheikh Sultan was the first high ranked UAE official to visit China since 
Sheikh Zayid's visit. President Yang welcomed the visiting ruler and reportedly said 
'Sultan is an old friend of the Chinese people and one of the founders of the Sino-UAE 
friendly ties'. Sheikh Sultan reaffirmed that he would continue his efforts to further 
consolidate and promote the friendly relations and co-operation between the two 
countr ies .Later in October 1991 Sheikh Sultan emphasised, while meeting with the 
'^^^ FBIS-CHI-90-090, 9 May 1990, p. 10-11. 
'-^'^ FBIS-CHI-90-091, 10 May 1990, p. 12. 
^'^^Ibid. 
'-^^ FBIS-NES-93-128, 7 July 1993, p. 26. 
2^ ^^  FBIS-CHI-91-100, 23 May 1991, p. 17. 
Chapter six: China's relations with the GCC countries 364 
visiting deputy director of the Chinese Civil Aviation Administration, that his emirate 
was ready to conduct long-term co-operation with China in the fields of air 
transportation, tourism, and trade, in order to further consolidate and develop friendly 
relations. Sheikh Sultan's visit and his continued efforts to strengthen ties with China 
is something that must not be disregarded without some analysis. In the UAE Federal 
system, it is the responsibility of the central government to establish most of the foreign 
contacts and ties on behalf of the other emirates. Therefore, it is unusual for rulers to 
take official visits to other countries; but if they do so, it must then have some political 
implications. So, what can be the political implications for Sheikh Sultan's visit and 
expanding co-operation between his emirate and China? It could be said that the most 
important implication is the Iranian occupation of Abu Musa. The emirate of Sharjah 
has a long dispute with Iran over the island of Abu Musa, which was occupied by the 
Iranians in 1970. Such a dispute was intensified with the Iranian authority taking 
complete charge of the island in September 1992. Therefore, his visit could be 
understood in terms of his willingness to explain his emirate position on the island issue 
to the Chinese side and to create an understanding about the issue. Taking in mind that 
China is a key international player, with permanent membership of the Security 
Council, and it has also enjoyed a history of good relations with Iran. 
Chinese Vice-Premier Li Lanqing headed an economic delegation to the UAE in July 
1993. His visit was said to bolster and promote bilateral economic and trade relations 
between the two countries and the possibility of opening new areas for this co-operation 
in the future.^^' At the end of his visit, Li described his visit as successful and had 
FBIS-CHI-91-202, 18 October 1991, pp. 12-13. 
FBIS-NES-93-126, p. 2 July 1993, p. 21. 
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realised positive results that would strengthen the economic r e l a t i o n s . I n June 1994 
Sheikh Zayid offered printing equipment worth $350,000 as a gift to the China Islamic 
Association. A delegation from the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC) 
visited the UAE in November 1994 and was headed by Vice-Chairman Li Peiyao. The 
delegation held talks with the UAE Federal National Council's chairman al-Hajj Bin 
'Abdallah al-Muhayribi.^^"^ Al-Muhayribi said that the UAE admired China's 
achievements and the 'correct' economic road it had chosen, namely the opening policy. 
He added that the UAE appreciated China's stand on international issues and its 
handling of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.^^^ 
Political relations did not deteriorate in 1995 when in April ROC's President Lee Teng-
hui visited the UAE at the invitation of the UAE's Foreign Ministry. Lee visited 
Jordan and the UAE and was going to stopover in Israel but the Israeli government 
refused him entry. His 24-hour visit to the UAE led to a Chinese protest issued to the 
government of the UAE. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that Lee's visit to 
Jordan and the UAE was planned to carry out 'political activities there' in order to 
promote the 'two Chinas' or 'one China, one Taiwan' strategy. But he added that those 
attempts were 'bound to end up in failure'. He said also 'we stressed China's solemn 
and just position and lodged a protest with the governments of the countries 
Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates Radio Network, 'PRC Vice-Premier Praises Bilateral Co-operation' 
9 July 1993, in FBIS-NES-93-131, 12 July 1993, p. 17. 
FBIS-CHI-94-126, 30 June 1994. 
^^ '^  Abu Dhabi United Arab Emirates Radio Network, 'National Council Meet PRC Delegates', in FBIS-
NES-94-215,1 November 1994, p. 25. 
^^-^ FBIS-CHI-940218, 10 November 1994, p. 15. 
Free China Review, volume 45, number 7, July 1995, pp. 48-51. 
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involved'. The UAE's government, which did not want to sever its good relations 
with Beijing, ensured the Chinese government that Lee's visit was private in nature and 
would not have any impact on the UAH-China relations. In order to ensure the above 
position President Lee was received in the airport by officials from the UAE's Foreign 
Ministry instead of high ranked governmental officials. He landed in the UAE using a 
special China Airline plane that does not bear the ROC flag. In addition the entrance 
visa issued by the UAE to the Taiwanese officials read 'Taiwan Province of China' in 
the nationality column. Further, he was not received by the UAE's President Sheikh 
Zayid, who was in the country at the time, and was received only by Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince Sheikh Khalifah Bin Zayid and the UAE's Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamdan Bin 
Zayid.^ '^* 
This incident demonstrated China's disapproval of the UAE, or any other country, 
trying to establish political contacts with the regime in Taiwan, an issue both countries 
have agreed upon as China's internal affairs. The manner in which the UAE's 
government managed Lee's visit, demonstrated the UAE attached great significance to 
China. Taiwan could be a significant supplier of technology to the UAE, but this 
economic importance was surpassed by China's political significance. China's 
permanent membership of the Security Council, coupled with its influence in world 
politics, ensured its status as a political asset for a country like the UAE, who was 
seeking to settle its territorial disputes with Iran peacefully. The latest developments 
facing the UAE in its relations with Iran, in regard to the 1992 Iranian 'occupation' of 
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, 'Foreign Ministry on Lee's Visit', 5 April 1995, in BBC, SWB, 
FE/2272, 7 April 1995, p. G/2. 
Zhongguo Tongxue She, Hong Kong, 'Lee's Visit to the Middle East', 1 April 1995, in BBC, SWB, 
FE/2271, 6 April 1995, p. F/2. 
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the UAE's island of Abu Musa,^ ^^ demonstrates the UAE's need to create an 
international understanding to pressure Iran to submit to the international court of 
justice. This could be sensed in the speaker of the UAE Federal National Council, 
Muhammad Khalifah Bin Habtur's, remark while meeting the visiting Chinese 
delegation of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference headed by China's top advisor Li Ruihuan in May 1999 that: 
The UAE paid much attention to its relationship with China since the Asian giant 
plays an important role in the international arena. As a permanent member of the 
UN Security Council, China could push forward the unsettled territorial dispute 
between the UAE and Iran.^^° 
The important question that remains to be answered is: Why the UAE government 
invited the Taiwanese president to the UAE. The two sides seem to cover the answer 
with a great deal of secrecy. Initially the researcher was unsuccessful in finding an 
answer to this question in either Abu Dhabi or Taipei, provoking the researcher's 
interest further. Eventually an answer was found but due to its sensibility, permission 
not granted for its publication. However, the researcher is able to confirm that President 
Lee's visit to the UAE was pushed forward by a third party who had an interest in 
convincing the UAE's government to invite President Lee. However, there is yet 
another twist to the story. One of the highest ranked military commanders of the UAE 
was very interested, even before the third party involvement, in establishing a high level 
contact with Taiwan. This suggests that the UAE was interested in Taiwan either as a 
supplier of advanced technology in some military fields or as a political card against 
China to halt its military co-operation with Iran. 
"''^  For discussions about the 1992 Iranian move in Abu Musa see Shimlan el-Issa, 'The Dispute Between 
the United Arab Emirates and Iran over Three Island', and Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, 'Arab-Iran Territorial 
Disputes: Co-operation in the Region, not Confrontation', in Khair el-Din Haseeb [ed.], Arab-Iranian 
Relations, (Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1998), pp. 237-248; and pp. 287-307. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3537, 18 May 1999, p. G/5. 
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6.4.5. China-UAE economic relations 
It was not only the political relations that had flourished between the two countries in 
the 1990s. Economic relations were developing even faster. This was mainly due to 
China's willingness to further economic and trade relations with the UAE, which was 
considered by the Chinese to be the centre of trade in the Gulf region. Furthermore, the 
UAE's large oil reserves had convinced the Chinese government of the need to further 
economic relations with the UAE in order to ensure a long-term supply of oil to satisfy 
China's own short and long-term oil needs. 
Economic relations between the two countries expanded in the 1990s. China 
participated in the construction of a dry dock in the Fujairah emirate as well as 
agriculture and fishery p r o j e c t s . I t s trade co-operation with the Dubai emirate was 
underscored by China's enhanced role as the second largest trading partner of Dubai, 
behind Japan with $1.4 billion in 1994 compared with $560 million in 1990, registering 
an average growth of 37 percent.^ ^^ If cars and electronics were excluded, China would 
top the list of countries trading with Dubai. China's imports from Dubai were mainly 
aluminium.^^'' In 1995 China assumed the top exporter position to Dubai. On the other 
hand it was ranked 25^ ^ among the leading importing countries from Dubai in 1995.^ "^^  
Trade relations with Fujairah also increased. The Fujairah imports from China were 
FBIS-CHI-91-084, 1 May 1991, p. 22. 
Xinhua News Agency, 'UAE Trade Delegation In China', 12 April 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-070, 12 
April 1995, p. 8. 
Dubai CI 
1995, p. 44. 
-^ ^ Statistics 
SODPC, 1997), pp. 232 and 238. 
hamber of Commerce and Industry, Trade and Industry, volume 20, number 238, October 
Office of Department of Ports and Customs, Dubai External Trade Statistics, (Dubai: 
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figured at 67.5 percent and the exports to China were figured at 31 percent from the 
total Fujairah trade volume in 1998. This marked China as one of the ten leading 
trading countries of Fujairah in 1998.^ ^^  Value of China's trade relations with the UAE 
from 1990 to 1996 increased 4.5 times over that of the 1980s, reaching $5456 million 
and marking the UAE as the second leading trade partner of China in the Gulf and 
Peninsula region (see Table 9 in Appendix 1). China also assumed a top ten position in 
terms of UAE's world wide import partners. In 1994 China was in sixth place; later it 
jumped to third place in 1996. China exports to the UAE in 1997 amounted to $1.3 
billion consisting of textiles, electronics, machines, and tyres. Its imports were $85 
million, mostly chemical fertiliser, aluminium and crude oil.^^^ 
Chinese officials expressed repeatedly in meetings with the UAE's officials, their 
country's desire to further oil co-operation between the two countries. It is important to 
note that the UAE was the second country in the Gulf, after Kuwait, to invest in China's 
refinery projects in the late 1980s. President of the Chinese Sinopec (China 
Petrochemical Corporation) company visited the UAE in May 1997 and expressed in a 
meedng with the UAE's Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources a desire to 
establish joint co-operation with the UAE in the field of petroleum industries. He 
stressed China's interest in promoting ties with the UAE within the framework of 
diversifying its petroleum imports, and presented China's plan to build new projects in 
the petroleum sector.^ ^^ The UAE may have not yet have been as large as exporter of 
crude oil to China as Oman, but the Chinese wanted to ensure a long-term supplier to 
'^ ^^  Fujairah Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, Al-Ghorfa, number 64, June 1999, p. 31. 
The Economic Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: UAE 1999-2000, (London: EIU, 2000), p. 58. 
Ak-har al-bitrul Walsina'a, number 330, August 1998, pp. 1-4. 
BBC, SWB, MEW/0489 WME, 3 June 1997, p. 16. 
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meet their future energy thirst. In August 1997, the Chinese began to hold talks with 
the UAE's officials to start buying a larger quantity of UAE oil to meet its rising 
consumption due to economic g rowth .La t e r , China and the Abu Dhabi Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry agreed to establish a joint venture for building an oil refinery in 
China. This was Abu Dhabi's second refinery joint venture overseas and China's 
second refinery joint venture with a UAE company. 
^^'^ AlKhaleej, 18 August 1997, p. 1. 
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6.5. China and Qatar 
6.5.1. China's relations with Qatar prior to the estabUshment of diplomatic 
relations 
Like all other countries in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region China's relations with 
Qatar was determined by China's relations with the superpowers and its perception of 
the international system. China was politically isolated from Qatar during the 1950s 
and 1960s. China criticised the regime in Qatar as being dominated by the British 
presence in the Gulf. It classified Qatar with the capitalist camp. Qatar's lack of any 
nationalist movement such as the ones in Oman and South Yemen, convinced the 
Chinese that their chances to spread a people's war against imperialist powers were 
more likely to succeed in Oman and South Yemen than elsewhere in the region. The 
Chinese also had no chance to foster political relations with the Qatari regime because 
of the strong British influence on the small emirate. Therefore, China's only contacts 
with the emirate were limited to indirect trade. The emirate had received Chinese goods 
through different destinations in the Gulf and Asia since late 1950s. From 1958 to 1970 
Qatar received some $4.7 million worth of Chinese goods (see Table 10 in Appendix 1). 
The first direct political contact came when Qatar proclaimed its independence from 
Britain on 1 September 1971. Premier Zhou sent on the lO"^  September 1971 the 
following message to the Amir of Qatar Sheikh Ahmad Bin Al i al-Thani: 
On the Occasion of the proclamation of the independence of Qatar, I wish, on 
behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Chinese 
people, to express congratulations to your Highness and the people of Qatar. The 
Chinese Government has decided to give recognition to your country. May your 
country enjoy prosperity and its people happiness. May the friendship between 
290 
the peoples of China and Qatar develop continuously. 
290 BBC, SWB, FE/3786, 14 September 1971, p. A 4/1. 
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A day later Sheikh Ahmad al-Thani sent a message to Zhou thanking him for China's 
recognition of the State of Qatar. Despite China's recognition of Qatar's 
independence, the Qatari Amir's message did not contain anything about Qatar's 
recognition of the PRC. The Qatari leadership was most likely not in a position to 
recognise China particularly when Saudi Arabia, Oman and Bahrain had not done so. 
In addition to that, the Qatari leadership's main goal at that time was to maintain the 
survival of the new political entity from any internal and external threats. China's 
relations with the South Yemeni Marxist regime and support for the PFLOAG posed a 
great obstacle in China's efforts to gain political recognition from Qatar. It is also 
worth mentioning that South Yemen was the only state to voice opposition to Qatar's 
admittance to the Arab League, maintaining that both Qatar and Bahrain were still 
dominated by 'political and military colonialism'. The PFLOAG called the League's 
decision a means of consolidating 'the frail entities set up by Britain in the territory of 
the Gulf'.^^^ 
Therefore, China's political relations with Qatar throughout the 1970s remained absent 
despite the changes in China's foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in general and 
the Gulf and Peninsula region in particular. China welcomed the nationalisation of the 
oil industry in Qatar in February 1977 when Qatar gained full sovereignty over its oil 
resources. An article in Peking Review hailed the development and said: 
Qatar is rich in oil resources, but prospecting and exploitation in the past had 
been controlled by the foreign-run Qatar Petroleum Company and the Shell 
Company of Qatar...the struggle to nationalise oil resources in the third world as 
a whole is surging forward vigorously. Up till now, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and 
Venezuela in addition to Qatar have nationalised all their oil resources. This 
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proves that the 'concession system' imposed on the oi l producing countries by 
the imperialists over the past century is heading for collapse.^^^ 
Despite the absence of political relations, trade relations had increased in the 1970s. 
The trade value between the two countries jumped from $3.6 million by 1969 to $73 
million from 1970 to 1979 (see Table 10 in Appendix 1). It may sound positive but the 
Chinese trade volume with Qatar in the 1970s was second from the bottom in China's 
trade with the Gulf and Peninsula region and just ahead of the trade volume with 
Bahrain. Such volume cannot be compared with China's trade, for example, with Iraq, 
Iran or even the UAE. 
The political contact between China and Qatar remained very limited throughout the 
period prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations in July 1988. Among the very 
few political contacts between officials of the two countries was a meeting between 
China's Vice Premier Yao Yilin in Oman with the head of the Qatari delegation to 
Oman's 15"^  national day celebrations in November 1985.^ "^^  Nothing resulted from 
these meetings to indicate any furthering in political relations. The Chinese 
government's observing delegation visited Doha in May 1987 to participate in the 18* 
Arab Red Crescent and Red Cross societies.^ ^^ Economic relations positively 
developed in the 1980s. The Chinese council for the promotion of international trade 
sponsored, for the first time, an exhibition of Chinese export commodities in Doha in 
December 1987. The exhibition included light industrial products, textiles, foodstuffs, 
silk fabrics, handicrafts, carpets, electronics and jewellery. Chinese officials stressed 
Peking Review, number 9, 25 February 1977, p 28. 
^•^^ FBIS-CHI-85-229, 27 November 1985, p. 1 1. 
^'^^ FBIS-CHI-87-049, 13 March 1987, p. I 2. 
FBIS-CHI-87-231, 2 December 1987, p. 11. 
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that the exhibition was conducted to further the mutual understanding and friendship 
between the two countries.^^^ China's trade with Qatar from 1980 to 1987, $380 
million, was over five times the amount of trade in the 1970s. Thus, their relations prior 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations were limited only to some economic 
contacts and trade relations; political contacts were virtually non-existent. 
6.5.2. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
China and Qatar established full diplomatic relations on July 9, 1988. A joint 
communique was signed in Paris by Qatari Ambassador to France 'Abd al-Rahman al-
'Attiyah and his Chinese counterpart Zhou Jue on the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. The communique stated that the two governments' 
decision was the result of their common desire to strengthen and develop relations of 
friendship and co-operation between them. Renmin Ribao applauded on its 10 July 
issue, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Qatar and said: 
Starting from the common will of strengthening and developing Sino-Qatari 
friendly co-operation, the PRC Government and Qatari Government have 
decided, through negotiations, to establish diplomatic relations at the 
ambassadorial level, effective 9*^  July 1988. Let us extend our warm 
congratulations to this great event of historical significance in the relations 
between the two nations. 
The friendship between the Chinese and the Qatari people has a long standing. 
On 10* September 1971, the late Premier Zhou Enlai sent a telegraph to Qatar 
addressed to Amir Khalifah ibn Hamad al-Thani to extend his congratulations on 
Qatar's independence, and to announce China's acknowledgement of the state of 
Qatar. Since then, trade, friendly visits and ties between the personalities of the 
two countries have continued to grow. The Qatari government has persisted in its 
one China position, and acknowledged that the PRC is the sole legitimate 
government representing China. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
between China and Qatar signals that the relations between the two nations have 
entered upon a new historical phase, and opened up new prospects for the 
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Qatari daily Al Rayan welcomed the new development in Qatar-China relations and said 
that the establishment of diplomatic relations served the common interest and 
contributed to boosting Chinese-Arab relations and reinforcing Chinese support of Arab 
causes. Another Qatari daily, Al Arab said that China constituted at present, a balancing 
force in international relations, and Qatari ties with China represented a gain for the 
Arab World and its struggle against Israel."^ "^^  
It is important to mention here that Qatar's decision to establish diplomatic relations 
with China did not merely originate from the Qatari government's desire to balance its 
foreign relations, but also from the changing attitudes of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula 
countries towards China. Prior to July 1988, China had established full diplomatic 
relations with all the countries of the region except Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. 
Even China's relations with Saudi Arabia were moving towards political 
rapprochement, particularly after the missile deal between the two countries in early 
1988. Therefore, Qatar could not remain isolated from the general regional attitude 
towards China. 
6.5.3. China and Qatar after the establishment of diplomatic relations 
Qatari Vice Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad ibn Suhaym al-Thani visited China from 
August 23"^  to 26 '^\ 1988. This visit marked the first visit by a high-ranking Qatari 
official to Beijing after the establishment of formal relations. The two countries 
reportedly agreed to further their co-operation and relations in the fields of economy, 
culture and sports. They also discussed the situation in the Gulf and the Middle East; 
FBIS-CHI-88-133, 12 July 1988, pp. 15-16. 
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and it was said that both shared the same views on regional and international issues. 
The first Qatari Ambassador to China, Mohamed Sa'ad al-Fahid arrived in Beijing for 
his post on July 31, 1989, and presented his credentials to the Chinese President on 
August 23, 1989.^°^ 
Trade relations increased substantially after the establishment of diplomatic relations. 
The trade value jumped from $30 million in 1987 to $49 million in 1989, then to $86 
million in 1991 (see Table 10 in Appendix 1). Chinese imports constituted the larger 
proportion of the trade volume. China imported Qatari mineral fuel, lubricants, natural 
and processed gas, chemical products, urea fertilisers and polyethylene. While China 
exported mainly food, vegetables and live animals, textile fibres, rubbers, chemical 
products, papers and iron and steel."^ "^^  
The highest Chinese official to visit Qatar after the establishment of formal relations 
was the Chinese Vice Premier Li Lanqing in June 1993. Li met with the Qatari 
President, Sheikh Khalifah Bin Hamad al-Thani, on June 30 and discussed the Chinese 
desire to bolster bilateral ties and co-operation in all fields, particularly trade and 
economy, and exchanged views on regional and international issues.^ "^^  In January 1995 
the two countries signed an accord in which China would import 2.5 million tons/year 
of liquefied natural gas.^ ^^  The agreement was finalised during the Qatari Minister of 
Energy and Industry, 'Abdullah Bin Hamad al-'Atiyah's, visit to Beijing in March 
FBIS-CHI-88-166, 26 August 1988, p. 15. 
FBIS-CHI-89-163, 24 August 1989, p. 5. 
State of Qatar Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Trade Exchange 1993, (Qatar: Central 
Statistical Organisation, 1994), p. 837, and p. 985. 
FBIS-NES-93-126, 2 July 1993, p. 20. 
Middle East Economic Survey, volume 38, number 18, 30 January 1995, p. A 15. 
Chapter six: China's relations with the GCC countries 377 
1995.^ ^^ A delegation of the Chinese PLA, led by Deputy Chief of the PLA General 
Staff Wu Quanxu, visited Qatar in April 1998 at the invitation of the Qatari armed 
forces. It was said that Qatar was seeking Chinese assistance in training its armed 
forces.'^ ^^ No further details were circulated on this matter. 
Qatar's Amir Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifah al-Thani visited China on April 8, 1999 at the 
invitation of Chinese President Jiang Zemin. His two-day visit marked the first visit 
ever to the PRC by a Qatari head of state. He held talks with Chinese officials such as 
President Jiang Zemin, Vice President Hu Jintao, and Vice Premier Qian Qichen. His 
talks with the Chinese officials resulted in agreement that the two sides should establish 
a 'solid and stable relationship' and long-term co-operation. Agreements were signed, 
related to protecting and encouraging mutual investments, air transportation, 
educational and cultural co-operation, as well as a memorandum between foreign 
ministries of the two countries. They even agreed on respecting the universitality of 
human rights, but stressed that protecting and safeguarding human rights should be 
combined with the actual conditions in the country concerned. They opposed the 
politicisation of the human rights issue and the practice of using related issues as a 
pretext for interfering in another country's internal affairs. The Chinese Vice 
President appreciated Qatar's pursuit of the 'one China' policy on the issue of Taiwan; 
and praised Qatar's domestic and foreign policy; he also spoke highly of Qatar's 
'independent foreign policy of peace, neutrality, and non-alliance, and its active role in 
safeguarding regional peace and stability'. The Amir stated his government's full 
^'^^ FBIS-CHI-95-063, 3 April 1995, p. 9. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3187, 28 March 1998, p. G/3. 
BBC, SWB, FE/3507, 13 April 1999, G/3. 
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awareness of China's role in world affairs, and his appreciation of China's view that all 
countries, large or small, are equal.''^ ^ 
Against this background, we can argue that the importance of the establishment of 
formal relations with Qatar in China's foreign policy had achieved two goals: political 
goal and economic goal. Politically, China achieved another diplomatic partner for 
itself in the Gulf and Peninsula region and succeeded in eliminating Taiwan's position 
there. Economically, China succeeded in fostering its economic and trade relations with 
Qatar as well as co-operation in the gas field. 
-'"•^  Ibid., p. G/4. 
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6.6. China and Bahrain 
6.6.1. China-Bahrain relations prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations 
As with other sheikhdoms, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran, China could not 
forge relations with the regime in Bahrain. This was due, as already mentioned, to the 
strong presence of Britain in the region and to China's close alignment with the Soviet 
Union, as well as its strong revolutionary stance. China criticised the stationing of 
British's troops in Bahrain particularly after they had moved out from Kuwait in early 
1960s. The first official contact between the two governments came upon Bahrain's 
declaration of its independence on 14 August 1971. Premier Zhou Enlai sent on 23 
August a message to the Amir of the State of Bahrain Sheikh Isa Bin Salman al-
Khalifah congratulating him on behalf of the Chinese government and people. On 24 
August Amir Isa Bin Salman replied to Zhou's message, thanking him for his 
congratulations and recognition."^^^ The Amir's message did not reciprocate Chinese 
recognition. Instead he preferred to remain aligned to the West and Saudi Arabia's 
position. 
Therefore, Bahrain and China remained politically isolated from each other throughout 
the first three decades of the PRC's existence. The only contacts were Chinese 
statements supporting some of Bahrain's initiatives, like, for instance, the Bahraini 
government's decision in April 1978 to take over the controUing interest of all foreign 
oil companies in the country; as well as in the director of the Asian-African 
Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Yang Fuchang's visit to Bahrain in April 
1988 at the invitation of the Bahraini Foreign Ministry.^Yang met with the Bahraini 
BBC, SWB, FE/3773, 28 August 1971, p. A 4/1. 
FBIS-CHI-78-86, 3 May 1978, p. A 21. 
^'^ FBlS-CHI-88-067, 7 April 1988, p. 11. 
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Amir 'Isa ibn Salman and both, reportedly, expressed the desire for better relations 
between the two countries. The Bahraini side stressed its appreciation for China's 
persistent support for Arab causes. Yang also met separately with Bahrain's Prime 
Minister Khalifah ibn Salman and the Foreign Minister Muhammad ibn Mubarak.^ 
China's contact with Bahrain came also in the social and economic fields. The Vice-
President of the China Islamic Association, Hajj Mohammad Al i Zhang lie, led a 
delegation of Chinese Muslims to participate in the Hijiri era celebration in Bahrain in 
November 1979. The delegation visited Saudi Arabia to make the pilgrimage and went 
onto Oman to participate in its National Day celebrations.^ '"^ Bahraini businessmen 
from the Bahrain Chamber of Commerce visited China in October 1984 and met with 
Rong Yiren, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and Chairman of 
China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC). The visit was described 
as an attempt to increase mutual understanding and promote co-operation. 'Abd al-
Rasul al-Jishi, head of the delegation, said: 
We are eager to develop economic, trade and cultural co-operation with 
China...we expect to open new ways for co-operation through exchange 
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monetary businesses between the two countries. 
China held from 23-25 November 1988 a Chinese export commodity exhibition in 
Manama, its first in Bahrain. Tariq 'Abd al-Mu'ayyad, Bahrain's Information Minister, 
told Xinhua news agency that the Chinese exhibition 'is an indication of our respect for 
China as well as our willingness to co-operate through trade to the benefit of both 
countries'; he added that his country expected more cultural contacts with China: 
Ibid. 
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'through cultural contacts we can develop more friendship on a personal level between 
institutions and government officials'. 
Trade contacts between the two sides date back to the late 1950s. Until 1974 China's 
trade relations with Bahrain was dominated by exports to Bahrain. Textiles, food and 
chemical products being the dominant Chinese exports. From 1956 to 1969 China 
exported goods worth $15.73 million to Bahrain. Then the value of trade between the 
two countries jumped to $292 million in the 1970s, from which 86 percent were 
Chinese exports to Bahrain. Prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1988, 
the value of trade from 1980 to 1988 was $198 million. Chinese exports still dominated 
the balance of trade between the two countries (see Table 11 in Appendix 1). But, it is 
important to note that the value of China's trade with Bahrain in the 1980s was much 
less than that of the 1970s. One reason was the fall in world oil prices in the early 
1980s, which greatly curtailed Bahrain's ability to import foreign goods and was the 
main cause of the slow down in the development of trade relations with China. 
Thus, relations between China and Bahrain prior to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations in 1988 were very limited to some economic and social contacts. Official 
political contacts between the two countries were almost non-existent. This could be 
related, from China's point of view, to the absence of a Taiwanese challenge in Bahrain, 
whom Taiwan did not have diplomatic relations with; also arguably because Bahrain 
was following the Saudi bandwagon and the Chinese felt that once the Kingdom had 
established relations with Beijing, Bahrain would have no choice but to follow suit. 
^'^ FBIS-CHI-88-227, 25 November 1988, p. 19. 
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6.6.2. The establishment of diplomatic relations 
Bahrain decided in April 1989 to establish diplomatic relations with China. The 
Bahraini decision could be explained in the following terms: 
1. The Bahraini government might have felt that it was the only GCC country besides 
the Kingdom that had no diplomatic relations with China, an important member in 
the UN Security Council. Plus, its relations with Taiwan did not extend beyond the 
economic field. Therefore, there was no real reason to prevent Bahrain from 
establishing diplomatic relations with China. 
2. A factor that may have hindered the establishment of Bahraini-Chinese diplomatic 
relations would be the absence of diplomatic relations between the Kingdom and 
China. But since the Kingdom itself started since the mid-1980s to lean towards 
establishing political contacts with China, and 
3. Since Bahrain was aware of this rapprochement,''^ ^ the Bahraini government felt 
more comfortable establishing diplomatic relations with China. 
Thus, the two governments decided to establish diplomatic relations at the 
ambassadorial level on 18 April 1989. The joint communique emphasised that the 
diplomatic relations were established on the principles of peaceful co-existence, 
equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Both sides hoped that the 
establishment of formal relations would strengthen and develop friendly co-operation, 
and maintain the benefits based on mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity for peoples in both countries. In a message to Bahrain's Foreign Minister 
Muhammad ibn Mubarak al-Khalifah, the Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said 
that the establishment of diplomatic relations 'entirely accords with the fundamental 
Khaled Bin Sultan and Patrick Scale, Desert Warrior, p. 140. 
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interests and aspirations of our two peoples and marks a new stage in the history of the 
friendly relations and co-operation between our two countries'. 
An editorial in Renmin Ribao applauded the new development in China-Bahrain 
relations, and also hailed Bahrain's foreign policy saying: 
In developing its external relations, the State of Bahrain has all along followed a 
neutral and non-aligned foreign policy, made consistent efforts to safeguard the 
unity of the Arab world and the good-neighbour relations among various Gulf 
countries, and adhered to the principle of respecting other countries' state 
sovereignty, not interfering in other countries' intemal affairs, not restoring to 
force, and settling disputes with other countries through peaceful means. 
Therefore, the foreign policy and stand adhered to by the State of Bahrain has 
been widely praised by the international community.^  
The first Bahraini Ambassador, Husayn Rashid al-Sabbagh, presented his credentials to 
the Chinese President on 29 September 1989.^^° The first Chinese Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the PRC to Kuwait and concurrently Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the PRC to Bahrain, Guan Zihuai, presented his 
credentials to Bahrain's Amir on 11 December 1989."*^ ' 
6.6.3. China and Bahrain after the establishment of formal relations 
Political relations between the two countries developed steadily after the establishment 
of diplomatic relations. The Foreign Minister of Bahrain, Muhammad ibn Mubarak, 
visited China on 15 July 1989 for a week-long visit. He was the first senior Bahraini 
official to visit China, since the two forged diplomatic relations a year earlier. He held 
talks with China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. It was reported that the two sides 
^'^ FBIS-CHI-89-074, 19 April 1989, p. 7. 
^'^ FBIS-CHI-89-075, 20 April 1989, pp. 10-11. 
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discussed means of expanding their political and economic ties, and exchanged views 
on regional and international issues. They signed an agreement on economic, trade and 
technical co-operation.''^^ Later in September the Chinese Foreign Minister met with 
his Bahraini counterpart at the United Nations. Their talks were dominated by the Iraqi 
military invasion of Kuwait and the UN efforts to force Iraq to withdraw 
unconditionally from Kuwait." Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Fuchang visited 
Manama in May 1993. During his visit, he met with the Bahraini Foreign Minister and 
discussed with him the promotion of the bilateral ties of friendship and co-operation in 
trade, technical and cultural fields. They examined means of facilitating air links as 
well as the exchange of visits as ways of enhancing bilateral ties.^ "^^  He was received 
also by the Bahraini Amir on 22 May and the Bahraini Prime Minister. Chinese Vice 
Premier L i Lanqing visited Bahrain in June 1993. He was the highest ranked Chinese 
official to visit Bahrain ever. His visit was said to 'exchange views with Bahraini 
officials in order to promote bilateral co-operation and review issues of mutual 
concern'. He first held talks with Bahraini Minister of Commerce and Agriculture 
Habib Ahmad al-Qasim. He was then received by the Amir and his Prime Minister. 
A delegation from Bahrain's Consultative Council headed by its Chairman Ibrahim 
Humaydan visited Beijing in September 1994. The delegation met with Li Ruihuan, 
Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference. L i said to the delegation: 
'-^ BBC, SWB, FE/0813, 17 July 1990, p. A 4/1. 
FBIS-NES-90-193, 4 October 1990, p. 14. 
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During the course of establishing a socialist economic system, China needs to use 
the experience of certain foreign countries in relevant fields...Bahrain enjoys 
advantages in financial and economic management and the prospects for 
exchanges and co-operation between China and Bahrain in this field would be 
very broad. 
Humaydan said his trip to China was aimed at promoting co-operation in political, 
economic, financial and other fields, at all levels between the two countries."^ ^^ In April 
1998 a delegation from the Chinese PLA, led by its Deputy Chief, visited Bahrain at the 
invitation of the Bahraini armed forces. 
In the economic field, China and Bahrain signed an agreement on economic, trade, and 
technical co-operation during the Bahraini Foreign Minister's visit to China in July 
1990. The agreement called for the two countries to co-operate in construction, 
chemical industry, petroleum, light industry, public health, agriculture and fishery. 
Forms of co-operation would include contract projects, labour services, exchange of 
technology, joint ventures, personnel training and trade exhibitions. The Sino-Bahraini 
committee for economic, trade and technological co-operation was also established.^ ^^ 
Despite the two countries continuing emphasis on the need to increase the level of the 
trade volume, the volume of trade between them from 1990 to 1996 remained less than 
that of the 1970s. Chinese exports dominated the balance of trade between them. 
Chinese exports were mainly dominated by textiles, chemical products, food and 
vegetables. While China imported mainly aluminium from Bahrain. 
327 FBIS-CHI-94-180, 16 September 1994, p. 15. 
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6.7. Conclusion 
China's foreign policy towards the six GCC countries was a reflection of China's 
perception of both Washington and Moscow and its need to ensure the supply of oil and 
access to markets in order to modernise its economy and sustain a high level of growth. 
China's foreign policy towards these countries in the 1950s mirrored that of the Soviet 
Union. China's close alignment with Moscow combined with the Golf countries' close 
ties with Washington and the West, prevented Beijing from establishing relations with 
these countries despite its continued efforts to pursue ties with certain Gulf states 
following the Bandung meetings. As China's began to devote much of its attention to 
the revolutionary states in the world, the Dhofari rebels of Oman captured China's 
interest in the region in the 1960s. The result was a continued political, financial, and 
arms supports by China to the rebels. But as China started to shift its perceptions of 
both Washington and Moscow towards favouring strategic alignment with Washington, 
Beijing began to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy towards the countries of the 
Gulf region. It abolished its support for the revolutionary groups in the region and 
established diplomatic relations with Kuwait and Oman. The perceived Soviet 
penetration in and around the region exerted the change in China's foreign policy 
towards these countries. To undermine the Soviet influence on the region, China 
upgraded its efforts to establish political, economic, and military co-operation with the 
GCC countries in the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, things started to change. 
China's policy towards the GCC countries was not conducted in the manner of the 
rivalry relations with both Moscow and Washington. Instead, it was China's own need 
of oil that directed China's foreign policy towards the countries of the GCC in the 
1990s. Thus, China worked throughout this period to secure a long-term supplier of 
energy from the region for China's thirsty economy and increase its economic ties with 
the countries of the GCC in order to gain access to their markets. 
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The discussion suggests that the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China 
towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region during the past half a century had 
exhibited certain dynamism and an evolving trend. The researcher has argued that 
China's foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region had changed 
according to the changes in China's relations with Washington and Moscow and the 
changes in China's own domestic economic needs - namely increasing its local demand 
for oil. Many changes in China's foreign policy towards the region have been 
introduced to accommodate the changes in China's relations with the United States and 
the Soviet Union and the change in China's economic requirements. In the first forty 
years of China's interactions with the region - namely from late 1949 to the end of the 
1989- China's foreign policy was attached to its relations with both the superpowers, 
and to its policy to exclude Taiwan politically from the region. Since 1990, China's 
relations with the countries of the region has been guided by China's interest in securing 
a long-term independent oil supplier in order to be able to continue to modernise its 
economy and sustain a high level of economic growth. 
In the first thirty-two years, China lived in a dangerous, but somehow stable, triangle 
relationship with both the two superpowers. During the first half of the fifties, China's 
national interest was seen to be compatible with that of the Soviet Union and the 
socialist camp. China saw the U.S. as the primary enemy that contradicted the newly 
established Communist state in the mainland by first invading the neighbouring 
Communist regime in North Korea, and second by protecting the island of Taiwan from 
Communist China's ambition to seize control of the island. This perception encouraged 
the Chinese to lean further towards the Soviet Union and form an alliance in the 
struggle against the United States and the capitalist camp. Thus, China signed a treaty 
of friendship and an alliance with the Soviet Union that was directed mainly against the 
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United States and its allies in Asia. China also sought to receive all kinds of assistance 
from the Soviet Union in order to fu l f i l its own military, economic and technical needs. 
Throughout this period, China's foreign policy was directed towards creating a massive 
negative propaganda, mainly among the socialist states, against the United States, the 
West, and Japan's policies in Asia and around the world. However, the strong Western 
presence and influence in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region made it impossible for 
China to carry out its political and ideological ambitions into the region. The Chinese 
therefore associated the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region with the capitalist camp 
headed by the United States. Conceived in this way, China did not pay attention to 
further ties and connections with the countries of the region. Not surprisingly, its 
foreign policy outlook towards the region during this period reflected that of the Soviet 
Union towards the region. 
However, things started to change after the Bandung Conference. Starting from the 
mid-fifties China's relations with both superpowers started to take a new direction. It 
was the change in the Soviet Union's foreign policy that triggered the change in China's 
foreign policy towards the United States and the Soviet Union, which in turn resulted in 
a change in China's foreign policy towards the rest of the world. Khrushchev's new 
foreign policy of peaceful coexistence with Washington was seen by Beijing as counter 
to Mao's thought of advocating struggle against the United States and the capitalist 
camp. The failure of the Chinese leadership to convince the Soviet leadership to pull 
itself away from the new policy marked the beginning of a long confrontational 
relationship between China and the Soviet Union. During this period, China-Soviet 
relations stumbled upon many other disagreements over many foreign, domestic, and 
ideological issues. Their disputes encouraged a major change in China's perception of 
the threat to its own security in particular and the stability of the world in general. For 
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the first time, the Soviet Union was perceived by the Chinese leadership to have joined 
the imperialist camp. China's foreign policy in this period took on itself the duty of 
contradicting both the 'imperialist power' of the United States and the 'revisionist 
government' of the Soviet Union. The countries of the Third World were seen as 
valuable partners in China's foreign policy strategy of contradicting both superpowers' 
efforts to 'dominate' the world. Thus, China from this period onward began to increase 
its efforts to woo the countries of the Third World and create a general understanding of 
the two superpowers' exploitative relation with them. As a result, China's relations 
with the superpowers remained low throughout this period. Meanwhile its relations 
with the countries of the Third World entered a new phase, with China establishing new 
diplomatic contacts with many of the Third World countries soon after its participation 
in the Bandung Conference of 1955. Bandung was the turning point not only in China's 
relations with the Third World countries in general but also in China's relations with the 
countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region in particular. Bandung was the first 
real chance for the Chinese government to interact directly with officials from countries 
of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. The region was presented in the conference 
with delegations from Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen. In the hope of containing 
Washington's efforts to draw more of the countries of the region into the Baghdad Pact 
and challenging Moscow's authority in the Third World, China accelerated its efforts to 
pave the way for establishing political, economic, and social contacts with the 
participating countries of the region. It succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations 
with the YAR (August 1956) and Iraq (August 1958). It achieved higher economic 
relations with the countries of the region than the previous years. It also attained some 
desirable results by dispatching social, cultural, and religious delegations to Saudi 
Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen. Thus, it was the changes in China's relations with the 
superpowers in the second half of the fifties that marked the beginning of China's 
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interest in the countries of the region. Bandung, therefore, presented the Chinese 
government with a great opportunity to introduce itself and interact with the countries of 
the region. 
After its failure to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing closer ties with the Iraqi 
regime and after its unsuccessful attempts to exclude Moscow from participating in the 
second Bandung Conference, China's foreign policy shifted its attention to those 
countries that appeared to have revolutionary potential in the region. Thus, South 
Yemen and the Dhofari rebels captured most of China's interest in the region in the 
1960s. China offered political, financial, and even military support to the 
revolutionaries in South Yemen in their struggle to gain independence from Britain. It 
also provided the same to the Dhofari rebels in their fight against the British-backed 
Sultan of Oman. 
From 1970 China's foreign policy witnessed yet another change as its relations with the 
United States and the Soviet Union entered a new phase. This time the increasing 
Soviet penetration around the world and on their frontiers reinforced the shift in China's 
foreign policy from challenging both powers towards leaning towards one against the 
other. From 1970 to the early 1980s, Beijing's fear of Moscow's efforts to contain it 
encouraged China's policy to lean towards a strategic alignment with Washington. As 
the Chinese grew more and more suspicious of the Soviet's penetration in the Third 
World, their relations with the United States assumed more significance. Both Beijing 
and Washington were very much concerned about the increasing Soviet influence 
around the world in the seventies. The Soviets had already invaded Czechoslovakia, 
announced the Brezhnev's Doctrine, escalated their border arms clashes with China, and 
later invaded Afghanistan- a neighbour of China. As a result, this led to two major 
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changes in China's foreign policy in general. First, China reached some important 
agreements with the United States on furthering bilateral relations, which led to the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between the two sides in the late seventies. 
Second, China's perception of the threat to world stability changed from perceiving 
both superpowers as the principle threats to perceiving only the Soviet Union as the 
principle threat to world stability and the primary enemy of world security. During this 
period, China supported much of Washington's policies in Asia and around the world. 
It also encouraged and hailed U.S.'s efforts to contain the Soviet Union and challenge 
its growing presence and influence around the world. Economic, political, social, and 
technological co-operation between Beijing and Washington began to flourish. China's 
foreign policy outlook during this period, therefore, was a reflection of its relations with 
the United States and the Soviet Union. 
This new shift in China's foreign policy left its mark on China's foreign policy towards 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. First, Beijing began accepting U.S. policy in 
the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region in order to offset Moscow's penetration in the 
region particularly in Iraq and Yemen. Second, Beijing moved towards cultivating 
amicable relations with the governments of the region. These two changes in China's 
foreign policy towards the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region produced some 
remarkable achievements in China's relations with the countries of the region. It 
succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations with Kuwait (March 1971), Iran (August 
1971), and Oman (May 1978). It also achieved some economic gains including an 
increase in trade volume to around $3.8 billion in the seventies, of which 77 percent was 
with those countries with which China had already established diplomatic relations -
namely Iraq, YAR, PDRY, Kuwait, Iran, and Oman. China also enjoyed a large 
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favourable trade surplus in its trade relations with the countries of the region throughout 
the seventies. 
But the most significant change in China's foreign policy towards the region.in the 
seventies was the termination of its support for revolutionary groups in the region. 
Most notable of them all was the termination of its support for the Dhofari rebels' 
ambition to export their revolutionary ideas throughout the region and challenge the 
legitimacy of the ruling families of the states of the region. The Chinese government 
feared that the Soviet Union was attempting to f i l l the power vacuum left by the British 
withdrawal from the region. Therefore, it felt the need to halt its revolutionary rhetoric 
in the region in favour of accumulating better political, economic, and social relations 
with the ruling regimes of the region. Such change was directed mainly towards 
preventing the Soviet Union from succeeding in filling the power vacuum. 
Another change in China's foreign policy took place in 1982. That year witnessed the 
introduction and the implementation of China's 'independent foreign policy'. The new 
Chinese policy came as a result of changes in China's perception of its relations with 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The continuing American arms supply to 
Taiwan and China's own drive for economic and military modernisation in the context 
of the implementation of the Four Modernisation programmes encouraged the adoption 
of an independent foreign policy in China's relations with both powers. The new policy 
was aimed at allowing China to achieve a greater degree of manoeuvrability within the 
Chinese-American-Soviet triangle and to avoid China from being drawn into conflicts 
between the two superpowers. As a result of the adoption of the new foreign policy, 
China's relations with both powers improved significantly. China-Soviet trade relations 
improved and many social and educational contacts took place between them. 
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However, China's insistence on the removal of, what they perceived as, the three main 
obstacles (the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the 
increasing Soviet military presence along their border) to better relations prevented the 
normalisation of relationship between the two countries until May 1989. Despite the 
cooling off of Beijing-Washington relations in the early 1980s, the second half of the 
decade saw the most productive era of co-operation in their bilateral relations. Political 
contacts, economic relations, military co-operation, and social and educational 
exchanges increased significantly. But the real souring of the relations came at the end 
of the decade. China's harsh treatment of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 
June 1989 triggered sanctions against the Chinese government by the countries of the 
West, Japan, and ASEAN countries. 
Despite the improvements in its relations with the Soviet Union, China's fear of 
Moscow remained high throughout the eighties. Moscow's presence in Afghanistan 
and South Yemen and the eruption of the Iran-Iraq war elevated China's fear of the 
Soviet Union in this period. The Chinese government worried that the Soviet Union 
could use the prolonged war in the region to its own advantage by exploiting one side 
against the other. Therefore, China's foreign policy accelerated all its efforts to prevent 
Moscow from achieving that goal. It offered military and economic assistance to Iran, 
whom the Chinese saw as the more vulnerable of the two belligerents to Soviet 
penetration particularly since Iraq already received a substantial amount of assistance 
from the Soviet union and the United States. 
Taiwan's established political and economic relations with the countries of the region 
had also determined China's foreign policy towards the region in the eighties. China 
worked to further its political ties with those countries that had remained politically 
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isolated from China - Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, and Bahrain. EstabHshing 
diplomatic relations with these countries was one of China's most prominent goals in its 
foreign policy towards the region in the eighties. China hoped to not only extend its 
political relations with all of the countries of the region but also to isolate Taiwan. 
Saudi Arabia was one of the only two major countries in the world -the other was South 
Africa- to hold diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognise Taipei's regime instead 
of Beijing's as the sole representative of all of China. In China's strategy, establishing 
diplomatic relations with the Kingdom would mean a huge blow to Taiwan's efforts to 
gain further international recognition. Thus, China wasted no time. It allocated 
massive political, economic, social, and military strategies to achieve this goal. This 
strategy bore fruit with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the UAE (1984), 
Qatar (1986), and Bahrain (1988). Economically, China increased its economic relations 
with the countries of the region. Its trade relations with the countries of the region 
jumped to around $9.7 billion, from which Chinese exports amounted to $7.3 billion 
and its imports from the region accounted for $2.4 billion. This increase was about $6 
billion higher than the volume of China's trade relations with the region in the 
seventies. In addition to its arms sales to Iran and Iraq, China sold the Kingdom 
advanced ballistic missiles in the second half of the eighties. Al l the commercial and 
military co-operation were aimed at scoring some political points in favour of China's 
own interests. In the case of its relations with Iran and Iraq, China's interest was to 
undermine Soviet influence in the Gulf. In the case of China's relations with the GCC 
countries China's interest was to exclude Taiwan from the region. 
The nineties introduced some other important changes in China's foreign policy. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union and also communism in eastern Europe in general, the end 
of the Cold War, and the United States taking the leading role as the policeman of the 
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world contributed to another shift in China's relations with both powers and, 
subsequently, in China's foreign policy towards the rest of the world. This time, China 
began strengthening its relations with Russia. The Chinese felt that they and the 
Russian leadership held a mutual interest in keeping their relations with the United 
States in balance. Both sides shared the same concerns over the U.S. policy in using 
military means to force states to abandon some of their foreign and domestic policies. 
They also shared the same concerns over the United States' efforts to expand NATO 
towards some of the neighbouring countries of Russia. Therefore, the Chinese felt the 
urge to reach a strategic understanding with Russia in order to combat the United 
States' efforts to dominate the world in general and contain China and Russia in 
particular. Thus, Beijing's relations with Moscow continued to develop at all levels 
during the post-Cold War era. However, this development of relations was not bound 
by an alliance in any strict sense of the term. 
At the same time, China's relations with the United States faced many obstacles that led 
to the slow development of relations. Issues like the abuse of human rights in China, 
allegations of spying and buying influence in the United States, the bombing of the 
Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and the continuing debate and efforts in both Washington 
and Tokyo over the deployment of the national theatre missile defence system in both 
countries had contributed to the deterioration in Beijing-Washington relations in the 
1990s. But the main issue in China-U.S. relations that impacted China's foreign policy 
towards the region in this period was the issue of China's arms sales and military 
technology transfer to the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. The United States kept 
pushing China to halt its military transfer to the region. It imposed sanctions against 
military and technological co-operation with China twice in the early and mid 1990s 
respectively. China promised to halt its military transfer of advanced technological 
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weaponry to the region in an effort to re-establish its co-operation with the United 
States, which at the end resulted in the removal of the sanctions. This could well 
explain the decline in China's arms sales to the region in the second half of the 1990s. 
Though not completely abolished, China's military co-operation with the countries of 
the region was very limited in the second half of the 1990s. Even Western sources 
reported very little information about the Chinese military transfer to the region 
compared to that of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
It was mainly China's present and future requirements for oil that directed most of 
China's foreign policy strategy towards the region in the 1990s. In the early nineties the 
PRC became a net importer of oil for the first time in its forty year history. With its 
increasing pace of economic development, China's net external oil requirements are 
expected to reach seven million barrels per day by 2015. Much of this oil will have to 
come from the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, which hold the world's largest 
proven oil reserves.' It is anticipated that 77 percent of China's oil imports in 2000 
came from the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. The figure is expected to reach as 
high as 92 percent in the year 2005. For its proven oil reserves and for the fact that oil 
in the Caspian Basin might not be sufficient to make up for any possible loss of the oil 
from the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region,^ stability of the Gulf and Arabian 
Peninsula region had become the main concern of China in the nineties. The Chinese 
believed that if the oil supply from the region was disrupted, the economies of most of 
the leading economic countries including China would be disrupted. Thus, China began 
' See Geoffrey Kemp, 'The Persian Gulf Remains the Strategic Prize', in Survival, vol. 40, no. 4, winter 
1998-1999, pp. 135-136. 
" For more discussion about the Caspian Basin oil potential see Amy Myer Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, 
'The Myth of the Caspian 'Great Game': The Real Geopolitics of Energy', in Survival, vol. 40, no. 4, 
winter 1998-1999, pp. 112-131. 
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to acquire a fundamental interest in the stability of the region. This interest was evident 
in China's continued emphasis on the need to settle disputes among the countries of the 
region peacefully and without foreign intervention. China supported the UN policies on 
Iraq and condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. No criticism was made of the security 
arrangements adopted by most of the countries of the region with the United States and 
the West, which gave foreign forces access to their military facilities. The Chinese 
government was, also, careful not to attack the foreign policy of the countries of the 
region. For instance, the government of the UAE was not criticised when it invited 
President Lee of Taiwan to visit in 1995. Any criticism was mainly limited to attacks 
on Taiwan's efforts to gather international recognition for the independence of Taiwan. 
Nor was there criticism of the Kingdom's policy in promoting the 're-islamisation' of 
Central Asia. In addition, China continued to push for better economic ties with the 
countries of the region. Trade relations with the countries of the region totalled $22 
billion for the first six years of the nineties, which was twice the value of its trade 
relations with the region in the whole of the eighties. Most importantly, China's 
imports from the region, which were constituted mainly of oil, amounted to $9.5 billion 
(43 percent of the total trade), or four times that of China's imports from the region in 
the eighties. Such an increase in China's imports from the region in only a few years 
demonstrates the importance of the region as a supplier of oil to China. Although 
China's oil imports from the region in the 1990s came mainly from Iran, Oman, and 
Yemen, China had sought to develop an economic partnership with Saudi Arabia. 
Saudi's large oil reserves encouraged Beijing to start building economic ties with the 
Kingdom. This was marked by President Jiang Zemin's first ever visit to the Kingdom 
in October/November 1999. His visit was not only his first to the Kingdom but also to 
any Gulf and Arabian Peninsula country. His choice of the Kingdom demonstrated the 
value Beijing placed on the Kingdom as China's main future oil supplier. While oil 
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production in Oman, Yemen and even Iran are believed to decrease in the early twenty 
first century, the Kingdom's oil production is expected to continue throughout the 
century. China, therefore, has been investing in building and upgrading its refineries to 
suit the type of crude oil that the Kingdom produces and has been encouraging Saudi 
co-operation in the field. Jiang's visit, therefore, was aimed at achieving greater 
economic relations in the oil field between China and the Kingdom for the twenty first 
century. 
But one could ask why did China continue to sell high-tech weaponry to countries such 
as Iran in the nineties i f it really sought stability in the region? Arguably the Chinese 
had hoped to achieve some strategic, political, and economic gains through increasing 
their military co-operation with the countries of the region. Strategically, China may 
have wanted to keep Iran, with whom it enjoyed a fruitful relationship in the 1980s and 
the 1990s, militarily strong to deter any possible hostile country, such as Iraq, from 
dominating the region. Like the West, China played the balance of power game in its 
relations with the countries of the region. Politically, the Chinese may have felt that 
furthering military co-operation with the countries of the region could upgrade the 
importance of the PRC to the same level as that of Russia and the United States. Selling 
advanced military technology to Iran could also largely have been determined by the 
Chinese view of Iran's geopolitical importance. This view, which was predicated on the 
need to secure a long-term independent supply of oil, saw Iran as a vital gateway 
between China and both Gulf oil and Caspian oil. Therefore China's military co-
operation with Iran was one of China's foreign policy priorities, in order to obtain long 
term economic gain, particularly the supply of Iranian oil and gas to China. China's 
military co-operation could also be traced to China's hopes for generating hard currency 
to modernise its military establishment. On the other hand, China's arms sales to Iran 
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could also be explained as a demonstration of Chinese dissatisfaction with the United 
States' military co-operation with Taiwan. The Chinese may have wanted to use their 
supply of arms technology to Iran and others in the region as a political card to halt 
United States' arms transfer to the island. 
Throughout the study the researcher has sought to show that China's foreign policy 
towards the region has changed simultaneously as the international system has changed. 
Neo-realism as a theoretical framework, which attributes states' foreign policy to 
external rather than internal factors, worked nicely in explaining China's foreign policy 
towards the region during the PRC's fifty years of interactions with the region. As 
shown throughout the research, China's foreign policy towards the region in the Cold 
War era had been mainly determined by external factors namely China's relations with 
both the United States and the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War era however, 
China's efforts to upgrade its economic capability was the most determinant factor that 
has shaped China's foreign policy towards the region. As mentioned earlier, neo-
realists assume that states' foreign policy would be shaped by their drive to increase or 
at least sustain their economic, political, and military capabilities relative to other 
regional and international powers. China followed exactly such a pattern. Its current 
and future requirements of oil forced China to further develop its relations with the 
countries of the region and be more concerned with the stability and security of the 
region. The Chinese leadership believes that its legitimacy depended on how it 
develops the country's economy and, therefore, sustain the well being of its massive 
population. Thus, a strong economy requires a sufficient supply of raw materials 
including oil, which its production started to decline in China in 1993. A Chinese 
official summed up in 1994 the importance of the region to China's future need for oil 
by saying: 
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While China's production of oil is expected to continue its decline, China has to 
concentrate its efforts to further ties with the Gulf region, which possess the 
world's largest proven oil reserves. This should be our foreign policy main 
concern and should be treated as a vital interest of China's future.^ 
As China continues to develop economically, modernisation will remain the most 
dominant factor in determining China's foreign policy towards the countries of the Gulf 
and Arabian Peninsula region for the next decade and beyond. With China becoming 
more and more dependent on Gulf and Arabian Peninsula oil, its policies towards the 
region will continue to focus on stability and solving disputes peacefully without 
foreign intervention. Internationally, China will continue to adopt more favourable 
policies to the countries of the region including supporting Arab initiatives over many 
issues like the Palestine-Israeli negotiations; and it will avoid criticising their domestic 
or foreign policies. Iraq's potential as a supplier of oil and a source of investment for 
Chinese companies will push China's foreign policy to support any proposal for the 
removal of the economic sanctions against Iraq. China will also continue to sell 
weapons to the countries of the region and co-operate with them in the military field as 
long as it serves China's interests in the region. Clearly, much of it, will remain secret, 
allowing Beijing to avoid any deterioration in its economic relations with the West. It 
will continue to stress its objections to any foreign or regional powers to dominate the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region. However, in the short term, China will not 
challenge the presence of the United States in the region. The Chinese see the 
American presence as the last resort protector of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region 
against any possible threats. Ensuring, therefore, the flow of oil from the region to the 
Chinese thirsty economy. 
This statement was made by an assistant to the deputy foreign minister of China in an interview with the 
UAE-based Al Wahdah newspaper, 13 March 1994, p. 4. 
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After the collapse of the communist party and the economy in the USSR, the Chinese 
government became more and more aware of the fact that any threat to the flow of the 
Gulf and Arabian Peninsula oil to China could have widespread political and security 
consequences. For this reason, China's foreign policy will continue to call for stability 
in the region. It will also continue to make sure that the oil routes from the region to the 
coastal areas of China are secured from the domination of any hostile country. 
Therefore, China will pay more attention to its relations with Iran and Oman who share 
control over the Strait of Hormuz. It will also work to strengthen its naval presence in 
the South China Sea where the Gulf oil passes through to China. Consequently, China's 
relations with such large and growing military powers in the area such as India, Japan, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines will also be affected, as 
China will work to prevent any power from dominating the route. In short, the Gulf and 
Arabian Peninsula region in the next decade and beyond will remain a very important 
region in China's foreign policy calculations. 
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Table 1: Value of China's trade with Iraq, 1950-1996 (in US$ million) 
Year Exports Imports Total 
1950 N/A N/A N/A 
1951 N/A N/A N/A 
1952 N/A N/A N/A 
1953 N/A N/A N/A 
1954 N/A N/A N/A 
1955 0.01 N/A 0.01 
1956 0.03 N/A 0.03 
1957 0.25 N/A 0.25 
1958 1.16 N/A 1.16 
1959 4.44 3.93 8.37 
1960 5.64 • 1.21 6.85 
1961 5.05 3.52 8.57 
1962 10.16 4.62 14.78 
1963 10.42 7.19 17.61 
1964 13.06 3.98 17.04 
1965 13.98 7.25 21.23 
1966 18.09 5.55 23.64 
1967 14.75 6.64 21.39 
1968 16.61 4.22 20.83 
1969 18.86 4.53 23.39 
1970 17.52 4.54 22.06 
1971 20.22 4.13 24.35 
1972 18.74 7.27 26.01 
1973 16.85 4.74 21.59 
1974 54.60 69.24 123.84 
1975 65.48 117.84 183.32 
1976 55.44 83.49 138.93 
1977 83.67 23.02 106.69 
1978 69.12 56.75 125.87 
1979 134.69 48.57 183.26 
1980 124.35 127.96 252.31 
1981 199.95 3.81 203.76 
1982 130.57 11.26 141.83 
1983 35.00 11.00 45.00 
1984 55.00 8.00 63.00 
1985 128.00 7.00 135.00 
1986 151.00 5.00 156.00 
1987 74.00 1.00 75.00 
1988 75.00 14.00 89.00 
1989 66.00 73.00 139.00 
1990 33.00 71.00 104.00 
1991 N/A N/A N/A 
1992 1.00 1.00 2.00 
1993 5.00 1.00 6.00 
1994 2.00 1.00 3.00 
1995 N/A 1.00 1.00 
1996 1.00 N/A 1.00 
Sources: Editorial Board, Almanac of China 
China Resources Trade Consultancy, 1984), 
Statistics 1990 Yearbook, (Washington D.C. 
Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 Yearbook 
's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, (Hong Kong: 
p. 840; International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
: IMF, 1990), p. 134; and International Monetary Found, 
, (Washington D.C.: IMF, 1997), p. 158. 
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Table 2: Value of China's trade with Iran, 1950-1996 (US$ million) 
Year Exports Imports Total 
1950 N/A 0.56 0.56 
1951 N/A 0.56 0.56 
1952 N/A N/A N/A 
1953 - - -
1954 N/A N/A N/A 
1955 N/A N/A N/A 
1956 0.01 - 0.01 
1957 0.07 - 0.07 
1958 0.44 - 0.44 
1959 0.80 - 0.80 
1960 0.92 - 0.92 
1961 0.40 - 0.40 
1962 1.58 - 1.58 
1963 3.05 - 3.05 
1964 5.44 - 5.44 
1965 7.71 2.16 9.87 
1966 10.45 1.44 11.89 
1967 4.07 3.33 7.40 
1968 1.62 1.03 2.65 
1969 2.15 0.89 3.04 
1970 1.69 4.95 6.64 
1971 3.41 2.57 5.98 
1972 14.06 21.28 35.34 
1973 22.46 39.58 62.04 
1974 47.52 3.84 51.36 
1975 53.09 32.71 85.80 
1976 53.73 39.60 93.33 
1977 52.54 48.04 100.58 
1978 64.97 53.45 118.42 
1979 36.50 31.39 67.89 
1980 120.56 58.55 179.11 
1981 149.39 19.16 168.55 
1982 44.56 155.51 200.07 
1983 205.56 77.81 283.37 
1984 167.00 50.00 217.00 
1985 98.00 6.00 104.00 
1986 130.00 - 130.00 
1987 125.00 10.00 135.00 
1988 166.00 9.00 74.00 
1989 68.00 6.00 74.00 
1990 292.00 43.00 335.00 
1991 293.00 21.00 314.00 
1992 336.00 101.00 437.00 
1993 403.00 310.00 713.00 
1994 266.00 182.00 448.00 
1995 278.00 227.00 505.00 
1996 399.00 386.00 785.00 
- Not a significant amount 
Sources: Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade(l9S4), p. 839; 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p.l35; and IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 
Yearbook, p. 158. 
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Table 3: Value of China's trade with the Y A R 1955-1989, (US$ million) 
Year Exports Imports Total 
1955 N/A N/A N/A 
1956 0.01 N/A 0.01 
1957 - N/A -
1958 0.09 N/A 0.09 
1959 3.62 N/A 3.62 
1960 1.20 N/A 1.20 
1961 1.30 N/A 1.30 
1962 0.46 N/A 0.46 
1963 0.21 N/A 0.21 
1964 1.14 0.02 1.16 
1965 4.25 0.71 4.96 
1966 2.02 0.36 2.38 
1967 0.97 0.49 1.46 
1968 1.19 0.47 1.66 
1969 1.92 - 1.92 
1970 1.25 - 1.25 
1971 3.94 0.92 4.86 
1972 5.03 1.62 6.65 
1973 12.79 2.74 15.53 
1974 26.64 4.10 30.74 
1975 18.21 3.99 22.20 
1976 33.44 5.74 39.18 
1977 34.99 7.26 42.25 
1978 39.70 3.24 42.94 
1979 63.31 2.99 66.30 
1980 79.15 - 79.15 
1981 58.99 2.72 61.71 
1982 60.37 1.96 62.33 
1983 81.00 N/A 81.00 
1984 57.00 N/A 57.00 
1985 39.00 N/A 39.00 
1986 25.00 N/A 25.00 
1987 17.00 N/A 17.00 
1988 27.00 N/A 27.00 
1989 35.00 N/A 35.00 
Not a significant amount 
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Table 4: Value of China's trade with the PDRY 1967-1989 (US$ million) 
Year Exports Imports Total 
1967 1.54 N/A 1.54 
1968 1.80 N/A 1.80 
1969 3.69 N/A 3.69 
1970 3.80 0.04 3.84 
1971 4.56 0.88 5.44 
1972 7.38 3.81 11.19 
1973 15.29 3.81 19.10 
1974 12.59 N/A 12.59 
1975 18.55 0.01 18.56 
1976 11.50 1.38 12.88 
1977 13.86 0.02 13.88 
1978 19.73 2.14 21.87 
1979 20.37 N/A 20.37 
1980 23.25 0.74 23.99 
1981 30.81 3.69 34.50 
1982 36.57 N/A 36.57 
1983 53.00 N/A 53.00 
1984 36.00 N/A 36.00 
1985 28.00 2.00 30.00 
1986 21.00 N/A 21.00 
1987 25.00 1.00 26.00 
1988 37.00 N/A 37.00 
1989 22.00 1.00 23.00 
Table 5: Value of China's trade with the Republic of Yemen 1990-1996 (US$ million) 
Year Exports Imports Total 
1990 74.00 2.00 76.00 
1991 71.00 N/A 71.00 
1992 74.00 74.00 148.00 
1993 112.00 255.00 367.00 
1994 85.00 149.00 234.00 
1995 108.00 344.00 452.00 
1996 106.00 570.00 676.00 
Sources: Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1984), p.850; 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 Yearbook, p. 135; and Direction of Trade Statistics 1990 
Yearbook, p. 158. 
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Table 6: Value of China's trade with Kuwait 1955-1996 (US$ milhon) 
Year Export Import Total 
1955 0.11 N/A 0.11 
1956 0.43 N/A 0.43 
1957 0.28 N/A 0.28 
1958 1.10 N/A 1.10 
1959 1.03 N/A 1.03 
1960 0.67 N/A 0.67 
1961 1.06 N/A 1.06 
1962 1.83 N/A 1.83 
1963 2.79 N/A 2.79 
1964 5.35 N/A 5.35 
1965 8.39 N/A 8.39 
1966 10.55 N/A 10.55 
1967 15.69 N/A 15.69 
1968 18.05 N/A 18.05 
1969 18.84 0.38 19.22 
1970 16.76 3.68 20.44 
1971 18.39 3.69 22.08 
1972 24.10 9.78 33.88 
1973 41.55 19.05 60.60 
1974 54.33 24.15 78.48 
1975 69.75 2.46 72.21 
1976 99.91 10.39 110.30 
1977 94.45 20.86 115.31 
1978 92.98 33.11 126.09 
1979 136.24 38.73 174.97 
1980 156.98 42.13 199.11 
1981 146.16 8.57 154.73 
1982 124.50 26.69 151.19 
1983 99.00 50.00 149.00 
1984 85.00 26.00 111.00 
1985 73.00 19.00 92.00 
1986 73.00 26.00 99.00 
1987 94.00 41.00 135.00 
1988 131.00 75.00 206.00 
1989 131.00 56.00 187.00 
1990 65.00 43.00 108.00 
1991 19.00 N/A 19.00 
1992 60.00 3.00 63.00 
1993 88.00 12.00 100.00 
1994 191.00 36.00 227.00 
1995 105.00 125.00 230.00 
1996 102.00 111.00 213.00 
Sources: Editorial Board 
IMF, Direction of Trade 
Yearbook, p. 158 
, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (1984), p. 841; 
Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p. 135; and IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 
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Table 7: Value of China's trade with Oman, 1955-1996 (US$ million) 
Year Export Import Total 
1955 0.01 N/A 0.01 
1956 0.19 N/A 0.19 
1957 0.18 N/A 0.18 
1958 0.37 N/A 0.37 
1959 0.11 N/A 0.11 
1960 0.16 N/A 0.16 
1961 0.12 N/A 0.12 
1962 0.12 N/A 0.12 
1963 0.18 N/A 0.18 
1964 0.29 N/A 0.29 
1965 0.38 N/A 0.38 
1966 0.73 N/A 0.73 
1967 1.28 N/A 1.28 
1968 2.79 N/A 2.79 
1969 2.20 N/A 2.20 
1970 2.61 N/A 2.61 
1971 1.61 N/A 1.61 
1972 2.58 N/A 2.58 
1973 3.68 N/A 3.68 
1974 5.07 N/A 5.07 
1975 6.35 N/A 6.35 
1976 5.85 N/A 5.85 
1977 5.39 N/A 5.39 
1978 7.38 N/A 7.38 
1979 10.45 N/A 10.45 
1980 12.76 - 12.76 
1981 11.29 - 11.29 
1982 10.48 - 10.48 
1983 10.00 - 10.00 
1984 11.00 2.00 13.00 
1985 9.00 - 9.00 
1986 10.00 - 10.00 
1987 8.00 - 8.00 
1988 7.00 67.00 74.00 
1989 7.00 132.00 139.00 
1990 8.00 125.00 133.00 
1991 10.00 400.00 410.00 
1992 8.00 447.00 455.00 
1993 11.00 561.00 572.00 
1994 18.00 413.00 431.00 
1995 15.00 482.00 497.00 
1996 14.00 828.00 842.00 
- Not a significant amount 
Sources: Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade 
IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p. 135; and IMF, Direction of Trade 
Yearbook, p. 158. 
(1994), p.844; 
Statistics 1997 
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Table 8: Value of China's trade with Saudi Arabia, 1954-1996, (US$ million) 
Year Export Import Total 
1955 0.12 N/A 0.12 
1956 0.04 N/A 0.04 
1957 0.17 N/A 0.17 
1958 0.19 N/A 0.19 
1959 0.21 N/A 0.21 
1960 1.26 N/A 1.26 
1961 0.73 N/A 0.73 
1962 0.77 N/A 0.77 
1963 1.45 N/A 1.45 
1964 2.63 N/A 2.63 
1965 4.20 N/A 4.20 
1966 7.66 N/A 7.66 
1967 8.84 N/A 8.84 
1968 4.38 N/A 4.38 
1969 0.75 N/A 0.75 
1970 1.06 N/A 1.06 
1971 2.10 N/A 2.10 
1972 1.42 N/A 1.42 
1973 1.64 N/A 1.64 
1974 3.06 N/A 3.06 
1975 3.89 N/A 3.89 
1976 6.75 N/A 6.75 
1977 14.79 N/A 14.79 
1978 36.99 N/A 36.99 
1979 68.01 8.38 76.39 
1980 136.15 15.54 151.69 
1981 168.29 12.30 180.59 
1982 143.74 10.42 154.16 
1983 149.00 19.00 178.00 
1984 133.00 28.00 161.00 
1985 133.00 22.00 155.00 
1986 134.00 52.00 186.00 
1987 247.00 107.00 354.00 
1988 230.00 195.00 425.00 
1989 235.00 66.00 301.00 
1990 337.00 80.00 417.00 
1991 387.00 138.00 525.00 
1992 444.00 127.00 571.00 
1993 579.00 119.00 698.00 
1994 674.00 353.00 1027.00 
1995 734.00 553.00 1287.00 
1996 748.00 840.00 1588.00 
Sources: Editorial Board, Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and 
CRTC, 1984), p. 846; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p. 135: 
Trade Statistics 1997 Yearbook, p. 158. 
Trade, (Hong Kong: 
and IMF, Direction of 
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Table 9: Value of China's trade with the U A E , 1964-1996, (US$ million) 
Y e a r Exports Imports Total 
1964 0.70 N / A 0.70 
1965 0.85 N / A 0.85 
1966 1.23 N / A 1.23 
1967 2.33 N / A 2.33 
1968 3.34 N / A 3.34 
1969 3.81 N / A 3.81 
1970 3.92 N / A 3.92 
1971 5.44 N / A 5.44 
1972 9.03 N / A 9.03 
1973 20.28 N / A 20.28 
1974 34.86 N / A 34.86 
1975 42.60 N / A 42.60 
1976 49.15 N / A 49.15 
1977 47.22 N / A 47.22 
1978 58.51 N / A 58.51 
1979 80.71 N / A 80.71 
1980 91.66 N / A 91.66 
1981 100.67 N / A 100.67 
1982 85.31 N / A 85.31 
1983 68.00 N / A 68.00 
1984 63.00 13.00 76.00 
1985 64.00 21.00 85.00 
1986 90.00 10.00 100.00 
1987 123.00 28.00 151.00 
1988 185.00 71.00 256.00 
1989 239.00 52.00 291.00 
1990 246.00 41.00 287.00 
1991 408.00 69.00 477.00 
1992 543.00 66.00 609.00 
1993 711.00 106.00 817.00 
1994 862.00 37.00 899.00 
1995 1,101.00 120.00 1,221.00 
1996 1,078.00 68.00 1,146.00 
Sources: Almanac of China 
Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p. 
s Foreign Economic Relations and rra<ie_(1994), p. 849; 
135; and Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 Yearbook, p. 
Direction of Trade 
158. 
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Table 10; Value of China's trade with Qatar, 1958-1996, ($ million) 
Y e a r Exports Imports Total 
1958 - N / A -
1959 0.02 N / A 0.02 
1960 0.02 N / A 0.02 
1961 - N / A -
1962 0.02 N / A 0.02 
1963 0.04 N / A 0.04 
1964 0.11 N / A 0.11 
1965 0.34 N / A 0.34 
1966 0.52 N / A 0.52 
1967 0.66 N / A 0.66 
1968 0.69 N / A 0.69 
1969 1.12 N / A 1.12 
1970 1.15 N / A 1.15 
1971 1.45 N / A 1.45 
1972 2.41 N / A 2.41 
1973 3.81 N / A 3.81 
1974 4.79 N / A 4.79 
1975 6.28 N / A 6.28 
1976 6.82 12.95 19.77 
1977 7.58 1.36 8.94 
1978 5.65 - 5.65 
1979 7.42 11.66 19.08 
1980 11.13 41.47 52.60 
1981 8.30 22.15 30.45 
1982 8.26 36.65 44.91 
1983 6.00 43.00 49.00 
1984 6.00 63.00 69.00 
1985 4.00 36.00 40.00 
1986 5.00 27.00 32.00 
1987 9.00 21.00 30.00 
1988 7.00 48.00 55.00 
1989 5.00 44.00 49.00 
1990 6.00 25.00 31.00 
1991 6.00 80.00 86.00 
1992 8.00 69.00 77.00 
1993 11.00 42.00 53.00 
1994 10.00 48.00 58.00 
1995 10.00 90.00 100.00 
1996 21.00 49.00 70.00 
- Not a significant amount 
Sources: Editorial Board, Almanac of China 
Direction of Trade Statistics 1990 Yearbook, 
158. 
s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade_{\99A), p. 845; 
p. 135; and Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 Yearbook, p. 
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Table 11: Value of China's trade with Bahrain, 1956-1996 (US$ million) 
Y e a r Exports Imports Total 
1956 - N / A -
1957 0.08 N / A 0.08 
1958 0.11 N / A 0.11 
1959 0.07 N / A 0.07 
1960 0.06 N / A 0.06 
1961 0.07 N / A 0.07 
1962 0.14 N / A 0.14 
1963 0.18 N / A 0.18 
1964 0.38 N / A 0.38 
1965 0.76 N / A 0.76 
1966 1.78 N / A 1.78 
1967 2.46 N / A 2.46 
1968 3.18 N / A 3.18 
1969 6.53 N / A 6.53 
1970 7.53 N / A 7.53 
1971 9.36 N / A 9.36 
1972 11.76 N / A 12.76 
1973 19.43 N / A 19.43 
1974 26.57 1.96 28.53 
1975 32.63 9.20 41.83 
1976 48.21 17.59 65.80 
1977 40.89 13.15 54.04 
1978 32.45 N / A 32.45 
1979 25.89 N / A 25.89 
1980 23.60 N / A 23.60 
1981 21.15 N / A 21.15 
1982 19.40 N / A 19.40 
1983 11.00 23.00 34.00 
1984 8.00 18.00 26.00 
1985 7.00 19.00 26.00 
1986 8.00 3.00 11.00 
1987 10.00 4.00 14.00 
1988 9.00 3.00 12.00 
1989 9.00 3.00 12.00 
1990 9.00 N / A 9.00 
1991 11.00 1.00 12.00 
1992 10.00 2.00 12.00 
1993 39.00 6.00 45.00 
1994 17.00 4.00 21.00 
1995 14.00 19.00 23.00 
1996 14.00 29.00 43.00 
- Not a significant amount 
Sources: Almanac of China 
Statistics 1990 Yearbook, p. 
's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade, (1994), p. 835 
135; and Direction of Trade Statistics 1997 Yearbook, p. 
; Direction of Trade 
158. 
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Table 1: China ' s aid to the Y A R 1958-1987 
*Agreement on scientific, 
technical and cultural co-
operation 
12-1-1958 China granted an interest-free 
loan of $16 mil l ion 
*Protocol on the construction of 
the Sanaa-Hodeida road and the 
building of a textile m i l l 
23-1-1959 China granted an interest-free 
loan of $0.14 mil l ion 
*Protocol on the Sanaa-Hodeida 
road 
13-3-1962 
Protocol on economic and 
technical co-operation 
24-11-1962 China granted a loan of $4.8 
mil l ion 
Agreement on economic and 
technical co-operation 
9-6-1964 China granted an interest-free 
loan of $28.2 milHon 
Protocol on the construction of a 
textile m i l l in Sanaa 
23-3-1965 Construction was started in 
September 1964 and was 
completed in March 1967. 
Wel l -d r i l l ing 1967 From 1967 until 1969 Chinese 
technicians drilled several wells 
in the Sanaa-Hoth section of the 
Sanaa-Sada road 
Sanaa-Sada Road -9-1967 The construction started in 
September 1967 and was 
opened to traffic in July 1977 
Education aid -3-1968 The Chinese Ministry of 
education donated 283 crates of 
teaching materials to Yemen 
Protocol on the construction of a 
technical school 
14-7-1969 The school was a present from 
the Chinese. I t had four classes 
specialising in auto, electrical 
machinery maintenance, house 
construction, and road and 
bridge consfruction. Chinese 
teachers worked until 1976 
Agricultural station -12-1971 The consfruction o f an 
agricultural technique 
experiment and popularisation 
station at Batina was established 
in the fa l l 1976 with Chinese 
assistance. The station cultivates 
sorghum, maize, wheat, cotton, 
sweet potatoes and vegetables 
Minutes o f talks on building a 
hospital in Taiz 
16-3-1972 It was opened in September 
1973 and has 220 beds and the 
capacity to attend more than 500 
patient per day 
Agreement on economic and 
technical co-operation 
21-7-1972 China granted a loan of $22.1 
mi l l ion 
Oi l pressing m i l l -1973 A Chinese team concerned with 
the building of a cotton ginnery 
and an oi l press in Sanaa. It 
constructed o f an oil-pressing 
mi l l connected to the Sanaa 
textile m i l l . This oil-pressing 
m i l l processes the cotton seeds 
supplied by the ginning 
workshop of the textile m i l l . 
Amran-Haj ja Road -9-1974 The consfruction started in 
September 1982. I t is 76 km 
long and reduces the distance of 
the fransportation between 
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western Saudi Arabia and Sanaa 
by over 200 km 
Protocol on the despatch of a 
new Chinese medical team 
7-6-1977 The group consisted of 30 
person 
Protocol on the construction of a 
conference hall 
19-12-1978 It was to be built with Chinese 
assistance. Nothing was heard 
of this project 
Cotton Ginning and oi l pressing 
plant 
-1978 A Chinese team worked on a 
study for the construction o f this 
project, located in an eastern 
suburb of Hodeida 
Protocol on the despatch of a 
new Chinese medical team 
16-4-1979 
Helicopter parking apron -8-1979 The Road and Bridge 
Construction Company of China 
signed a contract to construct 
the apron in the Republican 
Palace and completed in 1980 
Extension o f a roundabout -8-1979 The project was in the northern 
suburb o f Sanaa and was 
completed in 1980 
Contract on the construction of 
two roads 
-8-1979 These roads were in Sanaa and 
the project was completed in 
1980 
Protocol on the transformation 
and expansion of the Sanna 
textile m i l l 
-12-1979 
Protocol on the despatch of a 
new Chinese medical team 
29-1-1980 Init ially the group was consisted 
of 51 person. I t was planned to 
raise its number to 116 
Off ice building -7-1980 The office building of the 
Yemeni Radio and Television 
General Administration 
Corporation was put to use in 
July 1980 with Chinese aid 
Contract for the establishment 
of China-Yemen Joint Furniture 
Enterprise Co., L td . 
-10-1980 The company is to manufacture 
furniture suites in steel and 
wood. This factory was 
expected to be completed by 
March 1981 with production 
equipment provided by China 
Mokha-Mufrak road -11-1980 Construction of the road started 
in September 1980 and was 
completed in November 1981. 
The road was o f economic 
significance because i t links the 
southern port of Mokha to the 
Hodeida highway. 
Contract on the construction 
housing project 
-5-1981 The housing project located in 
the southern suburbs o f Sanaa 
and started with Chinese 
assistance 
Contract on the construction of 
a hospital for gynaecology, 
obstetrics and children in Sanaa 
19-7-1982 The work started in September 
1983 and was opened in 
November 1988. China 
provided this project with 
building materials, medical 
apparatus and instruments worth 
about $9.43 mil l ion. 
Contract on improving the 
Sanaa-Sada road 
7-9-1986 The contract was signed 
between Y A R and two foreign 
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companies, one Chinese and the 
other Federal German. The fund 
was to be provided by the 
Federal German as a g i f t 
Contract for building water and 
sewerage project in the cities of 
Ibb and Zhamar 
15-9-1986 
Loan and road agreement 26-12-1987 China granted $40.32 mil l ion to 
construct Heghana-Mareb road. 
The work started in December 
1988. 
A i d to the royalist regime 
Table 2: China ' s aid to P D R Y 1968-1987 
Agreement on economic and 
technical co-operation 
24-9-1968 China granted a loan of $9.6 
mi l l ion 
Protocol on the dispatch of a 
Chinese medical team 
4-12-1969 China's medical aid started in 
1970 
Protocol on economic and 
technical co-operation 
30-7-1970 
Agreement on economic and 
technical co-operation 
7-8-1970 China granted an interest-free 
loan of $43.2 mil l ion in 
repayable in 20 years. 
Minutes o f talks on the 
construction o f cotton textile 
printing and dyeing enterprise 
and the reconstruction of the 
Khormaksar salt works 
7-7-1971 The work on Aden textile, 
printing and dyeing mi l l was 
started in December 1972 and 
completed in December 1975. 
The expansion of the Aden salt 
works started in October 1973, 
and i t was completed in June 
1976. 
Minutes talks on the 
construction o f a road, the 
Zingibar bridge and on dr i l l ing 
wells 
16-8-1971 The A m Ain-Mukal la road was 
constructed with Chinese 
assistance and completed in 
October 1977. The Zingibar 
bridge was built with a free-
interest loan from China and 
was opened in June 1984. 
Agreement on economic and 
technical co-operation 
12-7-1972 
Minutes o f talks on the 
construction o f the Mahf id -
Mukakka road 
24-3-1973 The consfruction started in early 
1974 and was completed in 
October 1977 
Agreement on economic and 
technical co-operation 
13-11-1974 
Notes exchange on the 
consfruction of the Shihr-Sayhut 
road 
8-5-1975 
Protocol for the construction of 
a state-owned fishery company 
-6-1976 The work was started in March 
1977 and completed in 
December 1979. I t included a 
fast freezer, refrigeration 
facilities, repafr shop, netting 
shed, offices and store houses 
Minutes o f talks on building the 
Aden Friendship Hospital 
12-7-1976 A 200-bed hospital was to be 
built gratis with Chinese 
assistance in Aden 
Protocol on continuing to sent 
Chinese medical teams 
15-4-1978 
Agreement on extending -4-1979 
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US$12.5 mi l l ion loan to South 
Yemen 
Protocol on economic and 
technical co-operation 
24-5-1982 
Contract on continuing to send 
Chinese medical teams 
2-7-1984 The number of medical 
personnel was to increase f rom 
41 to 50 fi-om 1984 to 1986 
Contract on a project of 
irrigation and levelling of soil 
20-11-1985 
Agreement economic and 
technical co-operation. A n 
agreement on establishing a 
jo in t committee for economic 
technical co-operation and trade 
15-3-1987 
Source: Wolfgang Bartke, The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries, 
(London: K .G . Saur, 1989), pp. 139-145. 
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